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PARTY ORGANISATION AND PARTY ADAPTATION: WESTERN 
EUROPEAN COMMUNIST AND SUCCESSOR PARTIES 
 
SUMMARY 
 
This study examines the development of Western European Communist parties 
(WECPs) and their post-Communist successor parties.  These parties had always 
adapted in surprising ways as they struggled in political systems that they sought to 
overthrow.  Following the collapse of Communism in 1989 in central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) they continued to amaze.  Some reformed themselves dramatically, 
sacrificing or transforming their policies in search of office and votes.  A number of 
them moved into mainstream politics and became more influential as other parties 
brought them into governing coalitions or they expanded at elections.  Several 
WECPs disappeared but others resisted compromising their orthodox Marxism-
Leninism.  These hard-line Stalinist parties managed to remain significant players in 
their party systems.  This in-depth study analyses the reasons behind the divergent 
trajectories of five WECPs and their post-Communist successor parties in the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland and Portugal.  It does this by importing and refining an 
analytical framework developed to explain the diverse adaptation of Communist 
parties in CEE.  Extensive primary research based on elite interviews and the analysis 
of party programmes is used to evaluate the framework’s usefulness and its 
implications for studying the trajectories of Communist parties in Western Europe 
(and beyond). 
 
There are two main empirical findings from this research.  First, it was elites with 
experience in working with groups and institutions outside their parties that led efforts 
to reform WECPs, just as in CEE successor parties.  Second, mid-level elites in 
 vi 
WECPs were not necessarily hardliners bent on resisting reform.  Their leaders could 
be extremely effective in advocating reforms and convincing members into supporting 
them, meaning that organisational democratisation could be compatible with reform.  
This meant that organisational centralisation was not as necessary as it was in the 
successor parties in CEE.  Moreover, reformist party leaders had not, like their 
counterparts in CEE, learnt to be centralisers through past struggles over reform.  
When party leaders did pursue elitist strategies to promote programmatic 
transformation this usually took place through shifting power to the party in public 
office rather than central office.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
‘Good Communists can also change their minds.’ (Elli Izeboud former Chair, 
Communist Party of the Netherlands, Interview 14.05.09) 
 
1.1 Setting the scene 
This is a comparative study of how parties respond to external political changes that 
trigger internal crises.  The central question it asks is why when all Western European 
Communist Parties (WECPs) faced a plethora of crises; some transformed themselves 
while others did not.  To do this it asks whether organisational changes and strategies 
pursued by party leaders affected their parties’ ability to respond to their desperate 
situations.  Communism appeared to be finished as popular uprisings brought down 
regimes in CEE in 1989, students protested in Tiananmen Square, the Berlin Wall fell 
and the Soviet Union collapsed.  The problems in Communist regimes were laid bare 
for all to see including economic misery from strategic planning, corruption, self-
enrichment by party officials and oppression (Grzymała-Busse 2002, p. 1).  This was 
a torrid time for their brethren in Western Europe who had historically claimed that 
such systems were a model for the West and that they were on the side of democracy.  
Some WECPs scrambled to adjust their views while others disclaimed the relevance 
of events in CEE.   
 
However, WECPs had long struggled to cope with shocks that resulted in internal 
crises, ideological divisions and splits.  They faced immense pressures to change from 
Cold War controversies including de-Stalinisation in the 1950s, the Sino-Soviet split, 
the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968, the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the 
suppression of workers in Poland in the early 1980s and the need to respond to 
Perestroika (Bull 1994, p. 204).  WECPs’ relationships with Communist regimes, 
their revolutionary aims and anti-systemic appeals had made them ‘the enemy within’.  
Other parties regularly tried to exclude them from office and to weaken their 
influence within society.  WECPs also faced regular internal disagreements over the 
dilemmas involved in moderating to win influence on their social democratic rivals 
(Hudson 2000, pp. 87–88).  
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Worse still, WECPs had often found that changes in Western European societies 
eroded their support base in heavy industry, contributing to electoral and membership 
decline (see Ramiro 2003, Gapper 2002, pp. 98–100).  By the late-1970s it became 
clear that many WECPs were facing a multifaceted crisis.  Several of them suffered 
huge electoral losses in this period and some practically disappeared, being reduced to 
just a few thousand members (Botella and Ramiro 2003, p. 240).  In short, WECPs 
had been almost relentlessly bombarded with ‘external’ or ‘exogenous shocks’.  These 
tested their allegiance to orthodox Communism and sparked numerous attempts at 
reform.  Consequently, many WECPs had made inroads to reforming their orthodox 
Communism before 1989 including the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the 
Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) and the Finnish Left Alliance (VAS).   
 
The events in the late 1980s and the rejection of Communism presented by the 
revolutions in CEE significantly added to WECPs’ woes and they increasingly 
struggled to survive (Bull, 1994, p. 210).  For many parties it was the final straw.  The 
already fragmented ‘WECP party family’ became increasingly divided as some 
parties (including the PCI, CPN, the Swedish Left Party – Communists (VKP), and 
Communist Party of Great Britain) took steps to abandon Communism.  They became 
parties of the centre-left, green parties and non-Communist radical ‘left-socialist’ 
parties (Bull 1994, p. 214).  Others including the French Communist Party (PCF) 
sought to reform Communism while some Communists established new parties like 
Communist Refoundation Party in Italy (PRC), Party of the Italian Communists and 
the Refounded Communist Party of San Marino in an effort to refound or continue 
Communism.  In contrast, some parties including the Portuguese Communist Party 
(PCP) and Greek Communist Party (KKE) remained orthodox and revolutionary 
(Gapper 2002, pp. 105–107). 
 
This research analyses five parties which adopted very different responses to the 
multitude of exogenous shocks they encountered and the collapse of Communism in 
1989.  The outcomes they reached range from attempts to avoid even the slightest 
deviation from orthodox Marxism-Leninism to an acceptance of social democratic 
policies, green politics, feminism, a need for austere government spending measures 
and acknowledging NATO.  Four of these parties proved capable of radically 
transforming themselves.  This might seem surprising when they had frequently been 
  
3 
portrayed by outsiders, rivals and the media as being out of touch, dogmatic or 
uncompromising.  At first glance the politicians in these parties seemed unlikely to be 
capable of advocating alternative ideologies and new ideas so readily.  This research 
sheds light on how this was possible and the puzzle of why these parties adopted such 
a diverse range of identities.    
 
Several of the successor parties in CEE fully ‘social democratised’ through adopting 
social democratic symbols, policies and joining the Party of European Socialists and 
Socialist International.  Like the PCI/DS in Italy, these parties repudiated Marxism 
and non-parliamentary socialism.  While these parties wholeheartedly accepted social 
democracy, social democratisation is used in a broader sense in this research.  It is 
used to include those parties who did not join the Party of European Socialists and 
Socialist International but did take huge strides in breaking with Marxism-Leninism, 
abandoning revolutionary and radical politics, accepting the market and campaigning 
on traditional social democratic policies based on protecting the public sector and the 
welfare state.  Several WECPs like V in Sweden and the SP in the Netherlands 
accepted key parts of social democratic thinking but still in some respects occupy the 
grey area between social democracy and radical socialism.  
 
1.2 The Literature on WECPs  
Despite a long tradition of scholarship on WECPs (see, for instance, Duverger, 1954) 
relatively little research exists on them in comparative perspective.  The comparative 
literature that does exist resembles three main strands.  First, since the late 1960s 
scholars sought to describe the Eurocommunist directions taken by some WECPs.  
These studies usually sought to explain how WECPs were responding to their troubles 
by differentiating themselves from the Soviet Union and accepting parliamentary 
democracy.  They also analysed the theoretical basis behind WECPs’ newfound 
polycentrism and their chances of success (for example: Machin, 1983; Lange and 
Vannichelli, 1981; Childs, 1980; Devlin, 1979, 1977b, 1968; Mortimer et al., 1979; 
Timmermann, 1979; Urban, 1978; Di Palma, 1977, McInnes, 1975; Einaudi et al., 
1971; and Greene, 1968).  Second, focus shifted to explaining the reasons for their 
decline.  This body of literature questioned how factors including policy failure, de-
industrialisation, their unattractive internal discipline and democratic centralism, 
partisan de-alignment, and the rise of post-material value-orientations might have 
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eroded their support (for example: Ramiro, 2003; Bell and Criddle, 1989; Waller, 
1989; Waller and Fennema, 1988; and Lazar, 1988).  Studies also considered the 
affects of Perestroika on WECPs (Daniels, 1989).  
 
Third, the dramatic events of 1989 prompted authors to analyse the impact of the 
revolutions in CEE on WECPs.  The literature grappled with classifying their fast 
changing identities and to make sense of the continued break-up of the WECP party 
family (key studies included: Bull, 1995; Bull and Heywood, 1994; Bell, 1993; and 
Wilson 1992).  Scholars tried to show which parties had transformed their appeals 
becoming ‘non-communist parties of the left’ and which parties were pretending that 
nothing was happening (Bull 1994, pp. 210–218).     
 
In later years, Hudson (2000) focused on the electoral fortunes of several WECPs and 
their relationships with social democratic parties whilst Bosco (1998, 2000 and 2001) 
analysed the roles played by Communist parties in the integration and consolidation 
of southern European democratic party systems.  More recently, Dunphy (2004) made 
significant advances in assessing the responses of Left parties towards European 
integration and their attempt to develop policies that contest free market capitalism.  
This is part of a growing literature on their approaches to European integration 
(Benedetto and Quaglia, 2007; also see Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008; Bell, 1998, 
1996 (and on globalisation Kopeček, 2005).  Further, March and Mudde, (2005) have 
contributed a pan-European account of the heightened diversity and mutation of what 
they term the Radical Left and (post-) Communist parties (also see March, 2008; 
Lazar, 2002; Gapper, 2002; Ramiro, 2004, 2003, 2002; Mair and Mudde, 1998; and 
Moreau, 1998).  These studies describe and map out the different identities that the 
parties assumed.  Scholars have also analysed these parties’ roles in forming 
governing coalitions and the considerations they make in seeking office (Olsen, Koβ, 
and Hough, 2010, – forthcoming; Verge, 2007; Bale and Dunphy, 2006; Olsen and 
Hough, 2006; and Maor, 1998).   
 
These studies apart, there has been little comparative research on WECPs and their 
post-Communist successor parties.  Political scientists still have many gaps to fill in 
terms of our knowledge about their organisations, programmes and electoral 
strategies.  Perhaps it is not surprising that there is such a lack of literature on 
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WECPs.  With Communism in CEE seemingly consigned to the ‘dust-bin of history’ 
(Grzymała-Busse 2002, p. 2), it seemed that WECPs faced an equally dismal future.  
Scholars were not that optimistic about their chances of survival.  It seemed they 
would gradually wither away and that those that tried to adapt would struggle in 
established party systems (Bull 1994, p. 218).  
 
However, WECPs and their post-Communist successors demand study for several 
reasons. First, ideally, political scientists should maintain an understanding of the 
development of all the party families in Europe including what remains of the WECP 
party family.  Second, we need to understand what happened to WECPs because they 
did matter.  They had been significant in international terms, providing legitimacy to 
the idea that Communism was an international movement and they played a major 
role in Cold War controversies (Bell 1993, pp. 3–4).  The funds they received from 
the Soviet Union enabled them to make major campaigns and protests (McInnes 1975, 
p. 128).   
 
At times, WECPs were highly influential in their respective party systems.  This was 
most notable in terms of the historically larger WECPs in France, Italy, Portugal, 
Greece, Spain and Finland.  In France and Italy WECPs had gained over a million 
members while others including the PCP had over 200,000 in the early 1980s (von 
Beyme 1985, pp. 181–185).  In Italy fear of the PCI’s strength led to unholy 
governing alliances between centre-left and centre-right parties (Newell 2000, p. 18).  
Moreover, the PCF had been France’s largest party following World War Two and 
had huge political significance (see Bell, 2001, 2004, and Leclercq and Platone, 
2003).  It also attempted to win policy concessions from the Socialists by allying with 
them in a ‘union of the left’ (Bell 2003, p. 34, Bell 2006, p. 8).  In several countries 
including Spain, Greece and Portugal WECPs were instrumental in the overthrow of 
military dictatorships (Mujal-Leon 1977, p. 28).  Even smaller WECPs seemed to 
gain support in the post-war years from emphasising their roles in resistance against 
Nazism during World War Two (Bell 1993, pp. 2–3).  WECPs’ mass party 
organisations were also highly demanding of their members who were tightly 
controlled (Duverger, 1954).  Furthermore, their ‘cells’ often infiltrated the state and 
other organisations in civil society (see for instance Groppo, 1990; Santamaria, 1990).  
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Third, after 1989, political scientists might have thought that they have bigger fish to 
fry.  However, rather than just being relics from a bygone age, several WECPs and 
post-Communist successor parties retained significant levels of support despite having 
generally declined.  For example the PCF, PCP and PRC each had over 100,000 
members at the turn of the millennium and many WECPs remained influential in trade 
union organisations (Botella and Ramiro 2003, p. 240). WECPs often remain 
equipped to promote large-scale campaigns.  Even smaller parties including the 
Communist Party of Austria (with only 5000 members in 1996) retained their 
educative ambitions and all-encompassing roles in the lives of their party members 
(Ehmer 1998, p. 216).  Several WECPs and their radical left successor parties also 
went on to win over ten per cent share of the vote in parliamentary elections (in 
Cyprus, Germany, Finland, Sweden and as much as seventeen per cent in Italy) (Bale 
and Dunphy, 2007).  
 
Fourth, since 1994, several of these parties forged supra-national alliances with 
counterparts from CEE by joining the Party of the European Left and the Confederal 
Group of the European United Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) which has a 
significant presence in the European Parliament.  This allows them to maintain formal 
relations and to share policies (Bell 1998, p. 142).  Fifth, other parties also recognised 
that as WECPs became less revolutionary or orthodox there were new opportunities to 
bring them and their successors ‘in from the cold’, as coalition partners (for example 
in France, Finland, Italy and Sweden (Dunphy 2006, Bale and Dunphy 2006, p. 1; 
Olsen, Hough and Koβ, 2010 – forthcoming).  Furthermore, WECPs including the 
PRC have continued to use their ‘blackmail potential’ when participating within 
governing coalitions (Albertazzi et al. 2007, p. 3).  WECPs also regularly participate 
in local or regional government including the PCF which in 2001 held over seventy 
towns and cities in France (Bell 2004, p. 24).  When these parties have shown that 
they can become parties of government and several reformed themselves to try and 
gain a foothold a centre- left coalitions (or even with the centre-right) it is astonishing 
how little is known about them.   
 
The heightened differences between WECPs that kept the Communist label and also 
between their post-Communist successor parties might make it seem that they are less 
comparable.  In several respects it is now more appropriate to compare some non-
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Communist successor parties with other members of their new party families (as done 
by Voerman, 1992 and 1995).  As Gapper notes (2002, p.92), one of the challenges 
for scholars is in finding meaningful rationales and valid reasons for comparing 
WECPs and their successor parties.  Following the revolutions in CEE some scholars 
were not sure if this would be possible. As Bull put it, ‘In the future it will no longer 
be possible to generalise about these parties as a ‘family’, nor fruitful to study them 
within the same analytical framework’  (Bull 1994, p.211). 
 
However, a final reason for studying WECPs is that there are still possibilities to 
research WECPs and many of their post-Communist successors’ under such common 
frameworks of analysis.  Maintaining an understanding of WECPs and their 
successors is essential if we are to develop knowledge about the parties that are 
termed the ‘Left-Party Family’ or the non-social-democratic radical-left as shown by 
March and Mudde (2005), and Bale and Dunphy (2006).  The apparent breakup of the 
traditional WECP party family does not preclude studying these parties comparatively 
under ‘big tent’ frameworks (Botella and Ramiro, 2003).  Most of these parties 
occupy the materialist space to the left of social democracy (Olsen, Hough and Koβ, 
2010 – forthcoming).  As parties of the radical left they face several common 
dilemmas and frequently promote similar ideas regarding socialism: including a 
rejection of capitalism, the promotion of alternative economic and power structures, a 
fairer and classless society, a major redistribution of resources and solidarity with 
marginalised groups (March and Mudde 2005, p. 25; Bale and Dunphy 2006, p. 6; 
Gapper 2002, p. 89).  
 
Scholars are beginning to see opportunities to analyse WECPs and most of their 
successors alongside post-Communist successor parties, Green parties, democratic 
socialist, social-populist and radical parties that have broken away from social 
democracy in a pan-European perspective  (March and Mudde, 2005; Gapper, 2002).  
Some studies have begun to draw comparisons with left parties outside of Europe 
(Bale and Dunphy 2006, p. 6).  Studying WECPs and left parties by adapting 
comparative frameworks used to study the other types of party including the Greens 
has also been fruitful (Olsen and Hough, 2006; Hough, Koβ and Olsen, 2007).  Some 
scholars have also found chances to build WECPs into comparative large-N 
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quantitative studies to explain how Communist parties adapt (including Ishiyama, 
2000).   
 
The literature has remained vibrant on some WECPs including the PCF (Bell, 2001, 
2003, 2006).  However, general problems run through much of the existing literature.  
Scholars have often been excessively partisan or biased.  However, the type of 
analysis that studies have used has been more problematic.  Studies are typically 
based around ‘thick description’ in which focus on the intricacies of individual cases 
leaves little room for comparison, generalisable theory or use of the tools from 
political science to develop analysis.  Studies have rarely asked whether independent 
variables found to be important elsewhere impacted upon the programmatic 
development of their cases.  They neglected to show which factors seemed to be case 
specific and failed to generate theoretical propositions that may have wider 
significance (Keith, 2009).  Some including Bosco (2001) seem well placed to 
provide comparative explanations of parties’ divergent adaptation only to eschew this 
altogether, because the political circumstances in different countries and histories of 
individual parties seem to preclude a common basis for comparison or generalisation 
(see Bale and Dunphy 2006, p. 28; Bosco 2001, p. 387).  Comparative analysis has 
also been made difficult because studies have rarely been published beyond their 
respective national languages. 
 
In particular, a systematic and theoretically informed comparative analysis to explain 
WECPs’ diverse adaptation following the collapse of Communism does not exist.  
Revisiting the literature written in the aftermath of 1989 reveals a failure to explain 
this puzzle.  To experts at the time this did not seem so surprising:  
 
‘Asking why the parties reacted so differently is, to a large extent misguided.  
Had the parties all reacted in the same way then it would have been pertinent 
to have asked why.  As argued earlier, the differentiation between Communist 
parties before the revolutions of 1989 was considerable and the movement 
was undergoing further fragmentation.’ (Bull 1994, pp. 211–12). 
 
Scholars had accepted that important differences existed between WECPs by 1989.  
However, they seemed to take this for granted and failed to question which 
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differences were most significant in shaping their diverse responses to prior external 
shocks and the collapse of Communism.  This left it unclear whether differences in 
variables that were common to all WECPs could account for their different 
programmatic directions.  It became hard to discern the reasons why some WECPs 
had become better positioned to transform themselves.   
 
Few efforts have been made to analyse the causes of diversity between WECPs.  
Those that tried suffered from a lack of systematic analysis, empiricism or became 
overwhelmed by a myriad of different variables.  The best attempts to do this 
(Tannahill, 1976, 1978) concluded that differences between WECPs’ leaders meant 
that some parties were better placed to respond changes in their party systems and the 
international environment.  It also seemed that factors including generational changes 
in the leadership and rank and file, leaders’ backgrounds in terms of: social class, 
trade union involvement, as well as the promotion of loyal apparatchiks and 
hardliners from party youth organisations might be significant in shaping WECPs’ 
diversity.  Furthermore, some scholars thought that organisational factors could have 
affected their adaptation (Arter, 2002; Wilson, 1980).  However, the theoretical 
reasoning behind their studies was undeveloped.  It was unclear how or why such 
factors might have mattered and empirical analysis was patchy.  This leaves a major 
gap that this study seeks to fill.  
 
The lack of focus in the literature on WECPs’ organisations is surprising considering 
that they had traditionally operated under the highly controversial structures of 
democratic centralism.  This was the rigid form of organisation set out by Lenin and 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (McInnes 1975, p. 96).  What Waller (1981) 
termed as the ‘orthodox version of democratic centralism’ generally had several 
common characteristics: 
 
 The application of the elective principle to all leading organs of the party 
from the highest to the lowest; 
 Periodic accountability of party organs to their respective party 
organisations; 
 Strict party discipline and the subordination of the minority to the 
majority; 
  
10 
 The absolutely binding character of the decisions of the higher organs 
upon the lower organs and upon party members.  
 
Scholars found that the first two ‘democratic’ principles were frequently lost as 
elections were rarely held (or fixed) and the latter two centralist principles took over 
(Waller 1981, p. 12).  In practice this meant that policy and decision making power 
was concentrated in the hands of the party’s top officials and that lower level bodies 
in the party hierarchy were policed by those above them.  The high degree of power 
vested in the leadership enabled domineering leaders to regularly engage in one-man 
management and large, bloated leadership bodies, often with over a hundred members 
became little more than rubber stamps.   
 
What is more, it was common for officials to interfere in the running of local affairs 
and congresses were rarely forums for debate but simply functioned to praise 
decisions already taken by the leadership on the basis of ‘scientific socialism’ and its 
ability to perceive the common good.  Furthermore, members of regional assemblies, 
leadership bodies including Central Committees and daily Politburos were usually 
nominated by the level above them in the party organisation and remained fully 
subservient to them.  Moreover, congress delegates tended to be obedient ideologues 
selected by party officials.  Under democratic centralism internal opposition or 
factions were banned, iron discipline was maintained with limited room for debate 
and reformers were ruthlessly expelled.  There were few mechanisms by which to 
hold the leadership to account.  Members were also taught to take pride in upholding 
unity to make the party effective and were given little access to positions of influence 
or freedom of expression in party publications (see Waller 1988, p. 14; Waller 1981, 
pp. 22/117; McInnes 1975, pp. 98–99, Von Beyme 1975, pp. 260–270). 
 
WECPs often faced pressures to reform their organisations and to provide members 
with increased power in decision-making.  However, scholars paid relatively little 
attention to changes in the way that democratic centralism operated and whether 
organisational developments might have affected their ability to adapt.  In addition to 
this, political scientists have failed to provide a systematic comparative analysis of 
how party leaders’ organisational strategies contributed to their divergent 
programmatic adaptation which is a gap that this study seeks to address.   
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1.3 Searching for a theoretical framework to analyse WECPs  
A cursory glance at the literature on most party families (for example the Greens – see 
Burchell, 2001, Kitschelt, 1990) shows that debate rages surrounding the factors that 
affect their members’ behaviour and the role of organisational factors in shaping their 
parties’ development. These debates draw upon generalisable theories and examine 
their usefulness.  The literature on WECPs lacks this and is in need of new ideas.  
 
This research looks elsewhere for inspiration to shed light on WECPs’ diverse 
adaptation.  There are plenty of explanatory frameworks on offer from the wider 
literature on party organisation and party change in Western Europe that might help to 
develop our understanding of WECPs.   In particular, Harmel and Janda’s (1994) 
‘Integrated Theory’ of party change presents avenues for future research (developed 
in Harmel et al., 1995; Harmel and Tan, 2003). These studies propose that external 
shocks and changes in parties’ environments such as election defeats can send 
‘ripples’ throughout their organisations (Harmel et al. 1995, p. 257).  They argue that 
a plethora of organisational variables for example changes in the dominant group 
within the leadership can influence parties’ ability to respond to such shocks by 
questioning their primary goals including vote-, office-, policy-seeking and internal 
democratic decision making.  Such frameworks for analysis should be applied to 
WECPs and their ideas have been found to improve our understanding of 
organisational changes within Green parties (Burchill, 2001) and in the study of anti-
establishment parties’ (Abedi and Schneider, 2004).  However, in a field that has 
already lost sight of the wood for the trees, parsimony is needed to begin developing a 
clear starting point from which to analyse WECPs.   
 
There are now a number of significant analyses of how the former Communist parties 
of CEE have successfully adapted to democratic competition since 1989 (Haughton, 
2004; Ishiyama and Bozóki, 2001; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Ishiyama 2005, 2000, 1999, 
1997, 1995).  These studies have been more proactive in using the concepts of political 
science and comparison to study Communist parties.  In particular, Anna Grzymała-
Busse’s study ‘Redeeming the Communist Past’ (2002), provides a detailed study of 
how organisational factors affected the ability of Communist parties to take advantage 
of the new democratic systems.  She developed an analytical framework that enabled 
her to explain why Communist successor parties in Slovakia (Strana demokratickej 
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ľavici, SDĽ), Hungary (Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSzP) and Poland 
(Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, SdRP) were able to adapt their policies 
towards social democracy, regenerate support and return to office while in the Czech 
Republic the Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (KSČM) remained orthodox and 
was restricted to protest politics (also see Mareš, 2005; Hough and Handl, 2004).  
 
1.4 Explaining the adaptation of CEE successor parties  
Studies of Communist successor parties in CEE have made significant advances in 
identifying which independent variables shaped differences between their internal 
organisations, programmes and electoral success (Ishiyama 2000, 1997, 1995; Bozóki 
and Ishiyama, 2002; Kitschelt, 2002).  Many scholars have concluded that legacies 
inherited from previous regimes shaped party adaptation.  However, a debate has 
emerged as to whether differences between Communist successor parties occurred 
because of ‘external’ or ‘internal’ factors (see Ishiyama, 2001).  The ‘externalist’ 
perspective emphasises that it was primarily environmental differences that shaped 
the parties’ diverse adaptation (See Orenstien, 1998; Waller, 1995; Kitschelt, 1995; 
for an overview see Ishiyama, 1999).  The independent variables it emphasises 
include: 
 
• The degree of competition the successor parties faced from other parties of the 
left and the structure of competition between parties. 
• Factors affecting the ‘political space’ including: the degree of state funding; 
the institutional features of the electoral system. 
• Opportunities provided by the salience of particular issues or the declining 
standards of living or Gross Domestic Product in the transition period; 
collective value orientations in wider society and nostalgia for the Communist 
past.  The importance of ethnicity as a political issue could also provide 
incentives for some successor parties to embrace national chauvinism. 
• The existence of particular political constituencies; the age of the electorate; 
the degree of urbanisation or unionisation of the workforce; the proportion of 
the workforce employed in manufacturing.  
• Successor parties’ electoral fortunes in the first elections after 1989, with a 
sudden loss prompting them to adapt.  
  
13 
Kitschelt (1995) also emphasises the importance of environmental factors inherited 
from the previous Communist regime.  He identifies three types of regime and 
explains how they shaped the adaptation of Communist successor parties.  First, 
‘patrimonial systems’ like in Russia, Romania and Bulgaria had relied heavily on 
patronage and chains of dependence of the leaders and followers; had low levels inter-
elite competition, interest articulation or professional bureaucracy and had been 
highly repressive with heavy emphasis on democratic centralism.  Kitschelt found that 
such regimes had Communist successor parties that could entrench themselves and 
block challenges from poorly organised groups of intellectuals, middle class 
professionals rival left-wing parties and therefore faced little competition or pressure 
to adapt.  Instead they were able to gain electoral success through hard-line 
Communist and nationalistic appeals.  Second, ‘national consensus’ regimes in 
Hungary, Poland, Estonia and Lithuania had been less repressive and provided room 
for the representation of a range of groups in society in government.  This gave rise to 
strong competitors for Communist successor parties and greater pressure for them to 
adapt (often towards social democracy).  Third, ‘authoritarian bureaucratic’ systems 
that were based on bureaucracy rather than clientelism fostered successor parties that 
were ill-equipped to adapt from orthodox Communism (like in the Czech Republic).  
High degrees of professionalisation and organised social opposition groups helped 
strong competitors to emerge but histories of internal repression presented significant 
obstacles to these successor parties breaking with Communism.  
 
Attempts to discern which independent variables were most important in shaping 
Communist successor parties’ adaptation point to the greater significance of ‘internal’ 
or organisational rather than ‘external’ factors (Ishiyama, 2001).  Indeed, Ishiyama 
concludes that ‘The environment does not cause the party to adapt; whether or not the 
party is able to adapt depends on the willingness of the leadership to adapt’ (Ishiyama 
1995, p.158).  Thus, the key factor shaping party transformation was the leadership’s 
ability to respond to external developments or the opportunity structures that their 
parties faced and successor parties’ survival strategies were largely a function of 
internal factors.  Quantitative analysis has found little link between environmental 
factors and the adaptation of successor parties (see for example Ishiyama, 2001).  The 
internalist school of thought (Ishiyama, 2001, 1997; Agh, 1995; Welsh, 1994) is based 
on the idea that successor parties were not reactive institutions that simply responded 
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to their environments but were essentially ‘creative’, with their own internal features 
affecting the way they changed (Bozóki and Ishiyama 2002, p. 7).  This approach 
explains diversity between Communist successor parties as a result of differences 
between their internal party organisational characteristics which were inherited from 
the previous regime.  Organisational variables used to explain differences between 
successor parties include: 
 
• ‘Organisational density’ – the relative size of a party’s membership to its 
electorate and ‘organisational complexity’ – the size of a party’s smallest 
organisational unit were found to have significant correlations with party 
adaptation and success (Ishiyama 2001, p. 844).   
• The degree of elite level pluralism and elite contestation/competition in the 
previous regime.  In national consensus regimes the range of interests 
articulated at elite level and bureaucratic professionalisation equipped parties 
with ‘skilled’, reformist, pragmatic, entrepreneurial and technocratic leaders 
who were equipped to adapt to and win competitive elections by embracing 
social democracy (see Kitschelt, 2002; Bozóki and Ishiyama, 2002 and 
Chotiner, 2002). 
• The outcome of fights between reformists and hard-line leaders (Bozóki and 
Ishiyama 2002; Bozóki, 2002; Orenstien 1998, p. 487; Ishiyama, 1995).   
• The initial overlap between parliamentarians and the party in central office 
(Ishiyama, 2001). 
• Levels of resistance to reform from middle or low ranking apparatchiks who 
had little to gain from reform (Kitschelt 2002, p. 28).  
• Organisational changes made during the transition period (Grzymała-Busse, 
2002).  
• Parties’ financial resources during the transition period, with those party 
leaderships that had more funds at their disposal or that received greater state 
funding being less dependent on hard-line party members for material support 
(Ziblatt and Biziouras, 2002).  
 
Kitschelt also recognises that organisational legacies and resources inherited from the 
former regime affected the development of successor parties.  In bureaucratic 
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authoritarian systems the history of a lack of pluralism at elite level provided few 
opportunities for reformers to challenge the system and few technocrats were 
promoted to the leadership with experience of public administration.  In contrast 
national consensus systems had promoted such leaders and members of the 
intelligentsia meaning that parties in Hungary, Lithuania and Poland, had leaders 
better suited to adapt to competitive elections. Indeed, scholars found that national 
consensus systems provided room for politicians with reformist agendas (See 
Ishiyama, 1997; Ágh, 1995).  Some studies have also noted an interaction between 
environmental and internal variables.  To account for such factors Bozóki and 
Ishiyama present a comprehensive framework for analysis that combines factors 
inherited from the Communist past, the nature of the transition process, environmental 
factors as well as organisational variables which they argue are of primary importance 
in explaining the development of successor parties.  Within this framework the most 
significant organisational factors were: pluralism under the previous regime which 
could provide a pool of talented reformers to help reform parties into modern 
European left parties and parties’ organisational resources (in terms of membership 
and money) (Bozóki 2002, p. 428).  
 
The comparative literature on CEE successor parties, then, points to the importance of 
party organisational factors in shaping the parties’ ability to adapt.  However, it 
presents several problems.  First, the aim of developing generalisable theory has 
prompted scholars to analyse as many cases as possible and in doing so they have 
largely produced quantitative research.  Scholars have analysed the significance of 
different variables but have taken insufficient effort to speak to the actors involved 
about the causal process at work inside their parties or the reasons behind their 
actions.  Second, the indicators used in leading studies to measure parties’ internal 
organisational characteristics have been problematic.  In particular, measures of party 
organisation such as ‘organisational density’ (party membership divided by the size of 
its electorate) and ‘organisational complexity’ (the size of its most basic 
organisational unit) tell us little about parties’ organisational characteristics, the 
power relations within them or the decision making processes at hand.  Furthermore, 
measuring party programmes by coding the use of individual words or the number of 
party name changes sheds little light on the underlying significance of changes in 
programmes.   
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Third, questions remain about how organisational factors affected parties’ 
programmatic adaptation and electoral success.  The literature on CEE successor 
parties has been confused on this issue.  Ishiyama (2000) draws on ideas from the 
canon of literature on West European Parties including arguments that mass parties 
are less able to adapt their programmes than cadre parties.  This is based on the 
reasoning that cadre parties are built for the primary goal of winning elections and 
have few internal structures providing influence for ideologues to constrain efforts by 
the leadership to react to electoral defeats/pressures to change.  It seems that more 
elitist organisational models with high levels of overlap between parliamentary 
officials and more centralised organisational structures – that make leaders more 
independent from party members are beneficial to party transformation, with more 
membership intensive mass parties being unable to adapt or less successful at 
elections and more decentralised parties retaining orthodox party programmes 
(Kitschelt 2002, p. 30; Ishiyama and Bozóki 2001, p. 47; Ishiyama, 2001).  However, 
some of Ishiyama’s research points to the idea that mass parties were actually suited 
to programmatic adaptation and electoral success (Ishiyama 2000, pp. 14/19).   
 
Importing Grzymała-Busse’s theoretical framework offers a good starting point for 
investigating the role of organisational variables in shaping WECPs’ diverse 
adaptation for at least four reasons.  First, her study brings together several prominent 
ideas found in the wider literature on successor parties including the ideas that the 
experiences and skills of party leaders shaped the development of their parties 
(Kitschelt 2002, p. 14; Bozóki and Ishiyama, 2002) and that there is a relationship 
between the internal distribution of power (i.e. centralisation) and programmatic 
adaptation (also found in Ishiyama, 2002 and Kitschelt, 2002).  Second, Grzymała-
Busse’s work goes to greater lengths to explain the reasons why such why such 
organisational variables influenced the adaptation of successor parties in CEE.   She 
provides the most detailed account to date of the relationship between leaders’ prior 
experiences and their ability to envisage programmatic and organisational reforms.  In 
particular she explains why some leaders had become pragmatic and better equipped 
to centralise their parties’ organisations.  Moreover, Grzymała-Busse offers clear 
theoretical propositions to test about the relationship between internal party 
democracy and programmatic change; the need to force through painful changes to 
overcome resistance from hardline mid-level elites and party members. 
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A third reason for importing Grzymała-Busse’s framework is that it provides a 
parsimonious account of which organisational variables were the most important in 
shaping the adaption of successor parties in CEE.  Focusing on what can be expected 
to have been the most important organisational explanatory variables is highly 
valuable when research on WECPs has failed to provide generalisable theory and has 
lost sight of the wood for the trees.  Fourth, there are methodological reasons for 
importing Grzymała-Busse’s framework for analysis.  It provides a way to research 
WECPs by directly engaging with those involved in the causal processes behind their 
diverse adaptation and to develop our understanding of the reasons for their actions, 
the informal workings of organisational procedures and the significance of 
programmatic changes.  This will help to show whether theoretical propositions 
developed in quantitative studies on successor parties resonate with the experiences of 
party leaders.   
 
1.5 Redeeming the Communist past 
Other studies had found that the ideological views of party leaders affected the ability 
of Communist parties to break with Communism with the key factor being the struggle 
between liberal reformers and orthodox ‘stand-patters’ (Ishiyama 1995, p. 149).  
Grzymała-Busse took this a stage further by showing that the ‘Ideological stance per 
se mattered less than the practical skills and experiences of party elites’ in affecting 
parties’ chances of successful transformation (Grzymała-Busse 2002, p. 13).  She 
argued that the reasons for the parties’ divergent adaptation were in many respects to 
be found in developments before 1989 and in particular in differences in their prior 
elite advancement policies.  She found that some parties had systematically promoted 
elites with greater levels of ‘portable’ or ‘transferable’ skills (including expertise in 
policy innovation and administrative experiences) and usable pasts (their records of 
previous accomplishments) that were beneficial to adapting their parties to democratic 
competition in 1989.   
 
The parties’ top leaders had been removed in 1989, but the ability and willingness of 
those remaining in their leadership bodies to break with the Communism past and to 
transform their parties into non-Communist mainstream office-seekers was shaped by 
their repertoires of prior experiences.  These variables affected elites’ ability to 
envisage a political metamorphosis along social democratic lines and to implement 
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this through reorganising and centralising their parties’ internal structures.  Grzymała-
Busse found prior elite advancement practices meant that some parties’ elites were 
better prepared to adapt than others and that parties with flexible elite advancement 
practices before 1989 were better positioned for transformation.  These parties gave 
more room for debate within their leadership bodies and had greater levels of elite 
turnover.  Moreover, they had advanced elites ‘horizontally’ from across the state 
apparatus and organisations outside the party (see below) as well as promoting leaders 
with experience of negotiating with outsiders and other social institutions.  These 
factors fostered elites with experiences that had made them pragmatic and who had 
ideas that were useful in carrying out reforms.  
 
The leaders of parties including the KSČM were generally ill-equipped to adapt.  
They had been recruited ‘narrowly’ as their parties took decisions in the Cold War to 
install tried and tested, ideologically orthodox and loyal apparatchiks.  They had 
slowly worked their way ‘vertically’ up the multileveled party hierarchy through 
years of proving their orthodoxy by working as functionaries.  Further, elite 
advancement was essentially ‘closed’ – it was usually only those deemed to be ‘safe’ 
and loyal who were promoted, leaving little room for functionaries or officials who 
had tried to innovate and make policy changes.  Elites were also recruited in an 
insular fashion from orthodox party youth organisations while critics were rejected on 
ideological grounds.   
 
These ‘party hacks’ were ill-equipped to transform their parties, having spent most of 
their professional lives operating inside highly orthodox and disciplined party 
apparatuses.  Having worked in roles focused almost exclusively on coordinating the 
party apparatus rather than working with outside groups and institutions, they had 
been given little opportunity to experience pressures for moderation and lacked ideas 
useful for carrying out reforms.  These elites were also almost exclusively recruited 
from poorly educated blue-collar backgrounds rather than a broad range of social 
groups including the intelligentsia or groups of officials with experience in state 
sector administration: this ensured that they were not too analytically-minded.  
Additionally, these parties did little to negotiate with opposition groups in the 1980s 
or during the popular uprisings in 1989.   
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In these parties, ideological pluralism in leading bodies had been kept to a minimum 
before 1989.  The parties’ top leaders had refused to change in response to earlier 
crises and failed to debate or respond to Perestroika.  Although some of them were 
removed in 1989, turnover had been kept low within the party leadership bodies for 
decades. This restricted room for the emergence of younger generations of reformers.  
Grzymała-Busse showed that such parties struggled to break with Communism or to 
envisage alternatives and reforms because their leaders had few ideas for 
transformation.  They initiated policy-seeking strategies by appealing to their 
Communist members with nostalgic appeals regarding the Communist past rather than 
the wider electorate.  
 
In contrast, in parties in Poland, Hungary and Slovakia it had been less common for 
orthodox functionaries to be promoted to elite positions before 1989.  These parties 
had more open and flexible elite advancement processes.  They promoted more elites 
‘horizontally’ across the party organisation and from other organisations within 
society rather than the immediate party hierarchy.  This meant it was more common 
for elites to have backgrounds in media institutions, trade unions other social 
organisations like student unions that were open to believers and non-believers.  
Highly qualified technical experts, professionals and bureaucrats from outside the 
party with hands-on experience of public administration and members of the 
intelligentsia were also advanced to the leadership.   
 
These elites were often selected because they had records in successful administration 
rather than because they had proved their ideological orthodoxy.  Many of them were 
not orthodox ideologues and if they ever were, they had moderated through 
encountering a need for practical decision making and through facing the constraints 
of administration.  They had also enjoyed a relative degree of autonomy from the party 
in their professions or roles in public administration.  They had found pressures and 
room to innovate or experiment with policy during the 1970s and 1980s in response to 
administrative problems and had become highly pragmatic.  Opportunities for local 
party organisations to hold elections by secret ballot also gave elites experience in 
competing for the public’s favour.  There they encountered pressures to make effective 
and broader public appeals to build coalitions of support.  
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These elites had greater experience in negotiating with groups and institutions outside 
of the party before entering the party leadership.  Their roles as leaders also exposed 
them to negotiations with opposition groups in the 1980s and during the 1989 
revolutions.  Grzymała-Busse found that they saw the need to accommodate the 
concerns of groups in wider society.  The practice they had gained in formulating 
viable broader appeals stood them in good stead for democratic competition after 
1989.  The parties’ leadership bodies had also exhibited greater ideological pluralism 
and tolerance of dissent which allowed elites room to develop reformist ideas before 
1989 and they had taken greater steps to moderate policies in light of prior crises.   
Elites with these experiences were better equipped to transform their parties and to 
return to power under social democracy. 
   
Table 1.1: Prior elite experience and programmatic transformation in CEE 
 Programmatic direction  
Leadership experience in 
negotiating with outside 
groups and institutions 
Social Democratisation Communism 
High MSzP                                   
SdRP (electoral success) 
 
Moderate  SDĽ  (electoral failure)  
Low  KSČM  
 
 
Grzymała-Busse argued that these elites were better predisposed to reform.  They had 
greater desire for reform but more importantly, their experiences had shown them the 
need to innovate and respond to the preferences of groups outside the party (see Table 
1.1).  They had also gained practice in doing this.  With skills including pragmatism 
and being able to read the electorate’s desires they were better equipped to formulate 
successful appeals that resonated beyond the confines of their parties’ Communist 
rank and file.  Their pragmatism meant that they were not sentimental about members’ 
views but prioritised winning votes.  These party leaders were willing to make painful 
policy sacrifices and to rapidly break with Communism to ensure that their parties 
became competitive.  These elites also possessed demonstrable records of success 
from carrying out prior reforms.  They could point to these for credibility making them 
better positioned than reformers in other parties to win support for their proposals.  
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Grzymała-Busse argues that elites with experience in negotiating with outside groups 
and institutions and professional backgrounds were also better placed to see the need 
for centralising their parties’ organisations (see Table 1.2).   
 
Table 1.2: Prior elite experience and organisational transformation in CEE 
 Organisational 
strategy 
 
Elite experience in 
negotiating with outside 
groups and institutions 
and professional 
backgrounds 
Centralisation Democratisation 
High SDĽ                                         
MSzP                                   
SdRP 
Low  KSČM  
 
Grzymała-Busse’s research found that in Poland and Hungary, where elites had these 
experiences and skills in abundance they made appeals that resonated with voters.  In 
contrast, in Slovakia reformist elites had autonomy to make innovative policies in 
party research institutes, but lacked experience in negotiating with outsiders or 
practice in campaigning to win support.  They had not seen the need to make 
consistent campaign appeals; their messages lacked distinctiveness and sometimes 
undermined their social democratic credentials.  As a result they were less able to 
develop appeals that were popular with voters and performed poorly at elections 
compared to their counterparts in Poland and Hungary.  In contrast, the Czech 
KSČM’s elite advancement practices had meant that electoralist goals figured little in 
elites’ thinking.  They lacked the ability or vision to orchestrate party transformation. 
 
Grzymała-Busse’s second main argument was that parties whose elites rapidly 
replaced democratic centralism with a new highly centralistic organisational model in 
1989 were best positioned for programmatic transformation.  She found that reformist 
elites needed to seize policy making powers and ensure that they controlled candidate 
lists for the leadership and parliamentary groups.  Control over elite advancement 
meant that they could push aside elderly statesmen or orthodox elites and ensure that 
reformers gained key positions.  Grzymała-Busse found it was also essential that 
reformers ‘streamlined’ their parties’ organisations to limit the number of decision 
making points that could derail their plans or from too many cooks from spoiling the 
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broth.  This process involved cutting out intermediate organisational layers, multiple 
sources of decisions and overlapping authorities within the party including regional 
organisations.  These were replaced with a new vertical hierarchy of control that was 
dominated by the leadership.  
 
These centralised parties only paid lip service to inner-party democracy as they 
replaced democratic centralism.  They gave little room to orthodox members and mid-
level elites like regional leaders to interfere with party transformation.  There was 
little role for these groups in decision-making as opportunities for internal debate 
were limited (or even reduced) and local party organisations given less autonomy.  
The leadership encouraged orthodox members to leave, kicked them out, or made 
them reapply for membership on the condition that they had left Communism behind.  
Elites were able to force through vote-seeking policy changes and new centralistic 
statutes with minimal room for discussion.  The reformist elites’ power over policy 
making allowed them to quickly break with Communism and old ditch old symbols, 
appeal to educated and white-collar groups and to social democratise.  
 
A high degree of overlap between members of the leadership bodies and the 
parliamentary group meant that policy sacrifices were possible while maintaining 
discipline and unity in parliament.  Grzymała-Busse found that this was needed to 
ensure that the parties could reposition themselves as reliable coalition partners.  They 
could also make effective and consistent campaigns while being able to prevent 
meddling by orthodox elites or from competing views from distorting their messages.  
Grzymała-Busse accepted that no single organisation model guaranteed successful 
programmatic reform and stops short of making the deterministic claim that failure to 
centralise made reform impossible but does portray it as being vital and argued that 
centralised parties had considerably higher chances of transformation.  To Grzymała-
Busse the irony of adapting to democracy was that if parties were to take advantage of 
the window of opportunity presented by the collapse of Communism then they 
required an undemocratic internal ethos.  Reformers needed leeway from the rank and 
file to carve out a new direction.  
 
In comparison, parties whose leaders democratised and decentralised in 1989 failed to 
break with Communism.  This occurred as orthodox mid-level elites slowed and 
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sabotaged reformers’ proposals.  Leaders who did not believe in programmatic 
transformation also pursued policy seeking strategies.  They prioritised retaining as 
many members as possible rather making changes needed to win votes.  Accordingly, 
members and regional leaders were empowered to choose candidates and policy 
decisions were made through internal referendums, congresses or party meetings.  
This allowed an army of Communist stalwarts in the rank and file and mid-level elite 
to crowd out any reformist elites and to defeat their proposals.  Highly orthodox 
regional leaders were strengthened by decentralisation and used their influence to 
promote hard-line appeals.  These officials had risen through the ranks, had little 
experience of negotiating with outside groups and depended on the party for their 
livelihoods.  They dominated local discussions, and ruined attempts to moderate or to 
give Communism a more ‘human face’.  When reformists made belated attempts to 
centralise democratisation meant that these were easily blocked.  
 
Table 1.3: Elite experience of carrying out reforms and organisational transformation in 
CEE 
 Organisational 
strategy 
 
 Centralisation Democratisation 
Elite experience of 
programmatic reform 
  
High SDĽ                                         
MSzP                                   
SdRP 
 
Low  KSČM  
 
Grzymała-Busse found that the degree of centralisation within parties immediately 
after the revolutions of 1989 shaped the nature and viability of programmatic 
adaptation.  However, elites’ ability to centralise was based on their involvement in 
carrying out reform before 1989.  Elite advancement practices equipped elites with 
‘skills’ beneficial to centralising their organisations.  While Grzymała-Busse found 
that professional backgrounds affected this, more important was prior experience in 
carrying out reforms and attempts to broaden appeal which had turned elites into 
centralisers.  Grzymała-Busse remains sketchy on the precise reasoning behind this 
process.  However, she appears to be arguing that elites whose earlier reforms had 
encountered resistance from hardliners will have seen the need for organisational 
centralisation to make quick and painful changes in 1989:   
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‘The more a party promoted policy innovation prior to 1989, the more it 
fostered pragmatism and flexibility in policy making.  The more it had 
subsequently implemented innovation, the more experience that party elites 
received in overcoming administrative reluctance, organisational 
entrenchment, and other institutional and political barriers to party 
regeneration.’ (Grzymała-Busse 2002, p. 28). 
 
In contrast, those elites that were inexperienced in carrying out prior reforms did not 
see the need to centralise (see Table 1.3).  Consequently, some reformists promoted 
democratisation in 1989 which was self-defeating and reform became an uphill task as 
reformers lost control over strategy to hardliners (see Table 1.4).  The reformers’ lack 
of experience in implementing earlier reforms seemed to mean that they 
underestimated the strength of the orthodox-wing in their parties and the need to shift 
power away from them.  Thus, elites’ prior experiences and skills were highly 
important if transformation was going to be successfully implemented.  Desire for 
programmatic reform alone was insufficient.  To Grzymała-Busse, being a skilled 
reformer was almost synonymous with having learnt to become a centraliser.    
 
The lack of such elites and centralisation in the Czech KSČM meant that orthodox 
members seized control of policy making and by 1993 packed leadership bodies with 
orthodox figures.  Soon enough reformers were ostracised, congress agendas were 
manipulated, splits occurred in the parliamentary group and orthodox Communism, 
Marxism-Leninism and democratic centralism were reasserted.  As internal democracy 
became increasingly constrained, little room was given to debate attempts at reform.  
Furthermore, old discredited leaders returned, initial reforms were undone, Communist 
symbolism was retained and the Communist past was praised.  The party also 
maintained solidarity with regimes in North Korea and Cuba.  Parties like the KSČM 
failed to take advantage of their competitors’ weakness in 1989 by rapidly breaking 
with the past or seeking a wider audience.  It restricted appeals to the losers of 
transition and the discontent.   
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Table 1.4: Organisational strategies and programmatic transformation in CEE 
 Programmatic 
transformation 
 
 High Low 
Organisational 
strategy 
  
Centralisation SDĽ                                         
MSzP                                   
SdRP 
 
Demcoratisation  KSČM  
 
The relationship between elite advancement policies organisational strategies and 
party transformation in parties in CEE is illustrated in Figure 1.1.  This is based on a 
simplified interpretation of Grzymała-Busse’s findings that elites’ professional 
backgrounds and prior experience in negotiating with outside groups affected their 
ability to i) centralise and ii) to meet the preferences of the electorate by envisaging 
changes to programmes and electoral strategy to regenerate their support.  Elites’ prior 
experience in reform also determined their ability to centralise.  In turn, centralisation 
affected their power to transform their parties by implementing changes like breaking 
with Communism and adapting policies in aim of achieving electoral success.  
 
Figure 1.1: Party transformation in CEE 
 
Elite advancement practices  Organisational strategies 
Prior experience in carrying out reforms  (centralisation?) 
 
 
 
 
                                  Programmatic transformation 
 
 
1.6 Importing and adapting Grzymała-Busse’s framework for use in the West 
There are significant advantages to be gained from importing Grzymała-Busse’s 
framework for analysing WECPs.  First, it is parsimonious in showing how two 
(organisational) independent variables in particular influenced the adaptation of 
Communist parties and this gives us a clear starting point for analysing WECPs.  It 
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reaches the places that other frameworks can not by telling us why elite advancement 
processes and organisational changes might have affected WECPs’ adaptation.  It 
fleshes out theoretical reasoning to explain many of the ideas that earlier theorists 
including Tannahill (1978) stumbled upon.  In doing so, it addresses the gap scholars 
have left by overlooking the role elite advancement processes or elites organisational 
strategies upon WECPs’ development.  Attempts to analyse developments at elite 
level in WECPs have generally been restricted to biographical research on their top 
leaders rather than providing systematic analysis of cohorts of elites  (for example 
Westlake, 2000; Narkiewicz, 1990).   
 
Second, it presents an opportunity to look in-depth at the process of change to see 
how organisational variables within WECPs affected their development rather than 
simply just looking to the outcomes of their adaptation.  The framework enables in-
depth tracing of the causal chains and mechanisms through which organisational 
variables affected programmatic change.  Third, the framework provides an 
opportunity to boil down some of the ‘thick description’ of WECPs’ organisations in 
the literature and to incorporate it in a more structured analysis.   
 
However, this explanatory framework was not designed or intended to be used to 
study parties in Western European party systems – although Grzymała-Busse does 
draw fleeting comparisons with some WECPs to support her findings.  WECPs were 
obviously very different to their counterparts in CEE.  Even though WECPs 
sometimes became effective at infiltrating the state, they did not have monopolies over 
it.  This meant that WECPs generally had smaller party apparatuses.  Arguably this 
presented them with less of a need to centralise or ‘streamline’ and meant that they 
had smaller ancillary organisations through which they could ‘horizontally’ advance 
elites.  Nonetheless, WECPs still had plenty of opportunities to do this, being able to 
place elected politicians and officials from party publications, think tanks, Communist 
student and trade unions and direct action organisations into their leadership bodies.  
Elites could also have been parachuted in from outside organisations.  On the other 
hand, WECPs could have promoted functionaries from central office, or elites who 
had worked largely on matters of internal coordination and who had little opportunity 
to work with outsiders. 
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Grzymała-Busse also applied a particularly narrow view of what counted as successful 
adaptation for parties in CEE.  She restricted this to becoming a social democratic, 
mainstream party that returned to government and performed well at the polls.  
However, for WECPs success often involved actually managing to survive or 
achieving more modest electoral expansion.  Ideas about what counted as successful 
adaptation must be adapted to their situation.  This study focuses largely on their 
ability to transform their programmes rather than their ability to conjure increased 
electoral support.  Moreover, it is worth noting that in a long term perspective the 
Czech KSČM did fare better at elections than one might first think and seemed to use 
its protest strategy as an effective means by which to win votes.  
 
WECPs also had to contend with established party systems in 1989.  This made it 
harder for them to assume new identities than for CPs in CEE where these were more 
‘up for grabs’.  For WECPs social democratic space was usually occupied by long-
established competitors (Wilson 1992, p. 99).  In addition, the presence of Green 
parties or other left parties often curtailed the availability of non-Communist radical 
identities.  Similarly, Grzymała-Busse recognised that in the Czech Republic the 
historical legacy of having a strong social democratic party made it easier for social 
democratic competitors to establish themselves.  However, she argues that it was 
ultimately the KSČM’s failure to reform that allowed the Czech Social Democratic 
Party to re-establish itself rather than the pre-existing strength of historical social 
democracy actually preventing the KSČM from social democratising.  Accordingly 
the framework is adapted to see if WECPs’ leaders were still able to envisage 
alternative identities, despite the greater barriers they faced in this and the research 
questions whether elites were able to take advantage of the numerous opportunities 
that still occurred in their respective party systems to move into other parties’ terrain.  
This approach rejects the idea that WECPs’ adaptation was an inevitable consequence 
of changes in other parties.  Instead, it looks to how elites’ perceptions of their party 
systems and prior experiences influenced their strategies.   
 
One of the main lessons found in the literature on WECPs is that they adapted much 
more than parties in CEE before the collapse of Communism.   Almost relentless 
pressures to change triggered numerous internal crises in these ‘non ruling 
Communist parties’ and many reforms before 1989 (Greene 1973, p. 345).  They had 
  
28 
long struggled to cope in competitive parliamentary systems in which they needed to 
win votes.  Some took huge steps towards reforming themselves as early as the 1960s 
and earlier exogenous shocks including election defeats sometimes seemed to play an 
even more significant role in shaping WECPs’ adaptation than the collapse of 
Communism.  This does not preclude analysing WECPs’ responses to the collapse of 
Communism under a common analytical framework.  However, failing to analyse 
these earlier crises would leave our understanding of the key turning points in 
WECPs’ histories and the reasons for their divergent adaptation incomplete.  
 
Therefore, the core ideas in Grzymała-Busse’s framework are applied in a longer-term 
perspective by analysing several different stages in WECPs’ development.  This 
shows how elite advancement practices, dismantling democratic centralism and 
organisational reforms affected their ability to respond to a range of exogenous 
shocks.  This seeks to build a comparative analysis that helps to show why differences 
emerged between WECPs both before and in response to the collapse of Communism.  
The research also extends the framework to analyse WECPs and their post-
Communist successor parties’ reactions to exogenous shocks following 1989.   
 
1.7 Research questions and hypotheses 
The research uses Grzymała-Busse’s explanation of party adaptation in CEE to 
investigate two main research questions.  The first examines the affects of elite 
advancement practices.  It seeks to determine if party leaders’ portable skills and 
useable pasts influenced their ability to transform their parties following the collapse 
of Communism in 1989 (or exogenous shocks).  It asks whether WECPs’ leaders had 
prior expertise that helped them put organisational or programmatic changes into 
effect.  The following hypotheses focus on the independent variables of elites’ prior 
experience in negotiation with groups and institutions outside the party, ‘horizontal’ 
elite advancement practices, the degree of prior pluralism in leadership bodies and 
levels of elite turnover.  The hypotheses below are designed to test for a relationship 
between these factors and elites’ ability to envisage and their parties’ ability to enact: 
vote-seeking reforms aimed at broadening appeal, office-seeking, social 
democratisation, breaking with Communism/democratic centralism, and 
organisational centralisation (all of which are treated as dependent variables).   
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H1a.  Those parties that advanced leaderships with greater prior 
experience in working with groups and institutions outside of the party 
and with greater levels of horizontal elite advancement were more 
engaged in carrying out electorally-driven reforms after the revolutions 
of 1989 (or exogenous shocks).  
 
 
Negotiation with outsiders            Electorally-driven reforms 
Horizontal elite advancement 
 
H1b.  Those parties with leadership bodies that gave more room for 
ideological pluralism and debate before 1989 (or exogenous shocks), 
were more engaged in carrying out electorally-driven reforms after the 
revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous shocks). 
 
Prior elite pluralism            Electorally-driven reforms 
 
H1c.  Elites equipped with greater experience in negotiating with outside 
groups and institutions will have been more engaged in carrying out 
electorally-driven reforms after the revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous 
shocks). 
 
Negotiation with outsiders                              Electorally-driven reforms                  
 
H1d.  Those parties exhibiting greater levels of elite turnover will be 
more engaged in carrying out electorally-driven reforms or breaking with 
Communism after the revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous shocks). 
 
Elite turnover             Electorally- driven reforms 
               Breaking with Communism 
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H2a.  Those parties that advanced leaderships with more prior 
experience in working with groups and institutions outside the party and 
with greater levels of elite horizontal advancement were more engaged 
in implementing office-driven reforms after the revolutions of 1989 (or 
exogenous shocks). 
 
Negotiation with outsiders          Office-driven reforms 
Horizontal elite advancement 
 
H2b. Those parties that had leadership bodies that gave more room for 
ideological pluralism and debate before 1989 (or exogenous shocks), 
were more engaged in implementing office-driven reforms after the 
revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous shocks). 
 
Prior elite pluralism           Office-driven reforms 
 
H2c.  Elites equipped with greater experience in negotiating with outside 
groups and institutions will have be more engaged in implementing 
office-driven reforms after the revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous 
shocks). 
 
         Negotiation with outsiders          Office-driven reforms 
 
H3a.  Those parties that advanced leaderships with more prior 
experience in working with groups and institutions outside the party and 
with greater levels of horizontal elite advancement were more engaged 
in social democratising after the revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous 
shocks).  
 
Negotiation with outsiders       Social Democratisation 
Horizontal elite advancement 
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H3b.  Those parties with leadership bodies that gave more room for 
ideological pluralism and debate before 1989 (or exogenous shocks), 
were more engaged in social democratising after the revolutions of 1989 
(or exogenous shocks). 
 
Prior elite pluralism       Social Democratisation   
 
H3c.  Elites equipped with greater experience in negotiating with outside 
groups and institutions will have been more engaged in social 
democratising after the revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous shocks). 
 
         Negotiation with outsiders        Social Democratisation  
 
H4a.  Those parties that advanced leaderships with more prior 
experience in working with groups and institutions outside the party and 
with greater levels of horizontal elite advancement, were more engaged 
in breaking with Communism (and democratic centralism) after the 
revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous shocks). 
 
Negotiation with outsiders           Breaking with Communism 
Horizontal elite advancement 
 
H4b.  Those parties with leadership bodies that gave more room for 
ideological pluralism and debate before 1989 (or exogenous shocks), 
were more engaged in breaking with Communism (and democratic 
centralism) after the revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous shocks). 
 
Prior elite pluralism          Breaking with Communism 
 
  
32 
H4c.  Elites equipped with greater experience in negotiating with outside 
groups and institutions will have been more engaged in breaking with 
Communism  (and democratic centralism) after the revolutions of 1989 
(or exogenous shocks). 
 
 Negotiation with outsiders            Breaking with Communism 
 
H5a.  Those parties that advanced leaderships with more prior 
experience in working with groups and institutions outside the party and 
with greater levels of horizontal elite advancement were more engaged 
in organisational centralisation after the revolutions of 1989 (or 
exogenous shocks). 
 
Negotiation with outsiders           Centralisation 
Horizontal elite advancement 
 
H5b.  Elites equipped with greater experience in negotiating with groups 
and institutions outside the party or with professional backgrounds will 
have been more engaged in organisational centralisation after the 
revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous shocks). 
 
Negotiation with outsiders           Centralisation 
Professional backgrounds 
 
The second major research question examines the relationship between the internal 
distribution of power (independent variable) and policy change (dependent variable) 
following exogenous shocks and the collapse of Communism in 1989.  In particular, 
the research focuses on the effect processes of organisational change had on policy 
change.  It asks questions including whether WECPs’ leaders carried out reforms that 
democratised their parties as they abolished democratic centralism, or if they found 
new ways to reinforce top-down control over their parties? Have WECP leaders been 
able to initiate organisational reforms that consolidate their strategic and political 
control, whilst seeming to democratise their parties? If so, have they made the kind of 
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transitions to party models which are typical of modern vote- and office-seeking 
parties (Panebianco, 1988)? Have the adaptation strategies of WECPs given 
precedence to ‘policy, office or votes’ (Müller and Strøm, 1999)? Have parties been 
able to replace democratic centralism with new highly centralised structures that 
enabled their leaders to force through policy reforms and social democratisation?   
 
The hypotheses below apply Grzymała-Busse’s idea that democratisation was 
counterproductive to transformation because it resulted in reformist elites losing 
control of strategic matters.  In addressing this issue, the research questions the 
implications of Bull’s early observation that party leaders including the PCI’s Achille 
Occhetto could lose control after dismantling the organising principle of democratic 
centralism (Bull 1995, p. 89).  It also asks if retaining democratic centralism allowed 
orthodox leaders to resist pressure to reform.  Finally, it seeks to determine if elites 
equipped with experience in carrying out prior reforms aimed at broadening appeal 
are more likely to recognise a need for organisational centralisation.   
 
Specifically, the research tests these hypotheses: 
 
H6a.  Following events in 1989 (or exogenous shocks) parties that 
replaced democratic centralism with new highly centralised party 
organisations were more able to adopt radical reforming policies 
(electorally-driven reforms, social democratisation, breaking with 
Communism and office-seeking) than less centralised parties. 
 
Centralisation           Transformation 
 
H6b.  Following events in 1989 (or exogenous shocks), parties that 
abolished democratic centralism by democratising themselves were more 
likely to fail to adopt radical reforming policies (electorally-driven 
reforms, social democratisation, breaking with Communism and office-
seeking) than less democratic parties.                                                                       
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         Democratisation         Failed transformation  
 
H6c.  Parties that kept democratic centralism will not have significantly 
sought to transform themselves (with electorally-driven reforms, social 
democratisation, breaking with Communism and office-seeking). 
 
Democratic centralism      Failed transformation  
 
H7.  Elites equipped with greater prior experience in carrying out 
reforms aimed at broadening appeal, will have been more engaged in 
pursuing organisational centralisation in aim of reform following the 
collapse of Communism (or exogenous shocks).  
 
            Prior reform         Centralisation 
 
 
1.8 Methodology and operationalisation 
The research primarily involved semi-structured elite interviews and analysis of party 
documents from five case studies.  Interviews were conducted with politicians and 
bureaucrats from a wide range of positions including: party officials, functionaries, 
Members of the European Parliament, (MEPs) civil servants, party leaders, members 
of executive committees, local councillors, and parliamentarians.  Interviews were 
also conducted with mid-level elites including members of party councils, congress 
delegates, activists and dissidents from the parties.  Interviews with party experts and 
journalists helped to triangulate the findings.  Snowball sampling was used, beginning 
with the parties’ (or their successor parties’) international secretaries and MEPs.  
Their help was enlisted to identify politicians who were instrumental within the 
parties’ organisational and programmatic development.   
 
The research is based on the idea that talking to elites about party adaptation is one of 
the best resources we have to find out about the internal processes at work within their 
parties and the motives behind their actions.  It prioritised gathering in-depth data 
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about the decisions and actions of those involved at first hand in the causal processes 
of party change (Tansey 2006, p. 7).  Only rarely was their evidence from subsequent 
interviews found to question or undermine the information that elites supplied.  Some 
of the case studies – the Communist Party of the Netherlands and Democratic Left – 
ceased to exist in the 1990s.  Nonetheless, it was the orthodox Portuguese Communist 
Party that proved the hardest party to research.  Its politicians often struggled to speak 
freely about internal affairs or to discern basic changes in policy seemingly out of fear 
of misrepresenting the party line and being punished.  Unlike other parties studied 
here, the PCP provided little access to its politicians.   However, high ranking 
dissidents from the PCP provided valuable insight into the party’s affairs.  While 
some of these politicians may have had axes to grind, they provided useful insight 
into the party’s secretive workings that were largely corroborated by expert surveys.  
 
The interviews gathered data concerning: 
 
 the experiences of party leaders before 1989 in terms of their role in prior 
organisational and policy reform; 
 the parties’ elite advancement processes; 
 the internal conditions in the parties both before and after 1989, whether they 
acted to promote or restrain the development of a leadership experienced in 
carrying out reforms and that was equipped with the portable skills that might 
help to pursue reform; 
 leadership strategies regarding major party rule changes after 1989 and the 
lasting impact of these upon their ability to influence policy and decision 
making within the parties;  
 details of the internal distribution of decision-making power within the parties 
in relation to the formulation of policy positions, electoral strategies and 
candidate selection processes; 
 the nature of decision-making bodies; conference procedures, formal statutes 
and the informal rules that the parties operate under;  
 whether party leaders have pursued changes that distance party members from 
policy making or empower them;  
 the reasons that elites had for centralising or democratising;  
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 whether organisational changes succeeded in steering the parties’ programmes 
and electoral strategies in the directions that were originally desired or whether 
they resulted in unintended consequences.  
 
The use of elite interviews was consistent with the methods used by Grzymała-Busse.   
However, the project was largely interested in uncovering the factors shaping 
WECPs’ ability to reform their programmes and to make broader appeals rather than 
their ability to shadow the desires of the electorate.  It did not use opinion polls to 
examine this as she did.  With few WECPs having (entirely) moved to contest the 
political centre-ground, there is less of a need to studying them in this way.  Due to 
the lack of existing literature on the case studies a large part of the analysis in this 
research is based on interview material.1   
 
The second part of the research’s methodology consisted of the analysis of party 
documents. These were located through the parties’ websites, contacts with 
interviewees, party officials or with experts and archives including the Documentation 
Centre for Dutch Political Parties in Groningen and the International Institute of 
Social History in Amsterdam. 
 
Documents were analysed that:  
 
 related to the internal balance of power within the parties, organisational 
reforms, including party statutes and documents which justify or explain new 
procedures (or those that ruled out reform);  
 focused on policy change, its direction and the justifications for it; including 
party papers, journals and programmes and speeches. 
 
The documents were assessed in order to develop a qualitative understanding of the 
organisational and programmatic development of the parties.  This was done by 
comparing the language they invoked and by analysing differences and shifts in their 
discourses.  It is recognised that party documents represent an ‘Official Story’ rather 
                                                           
1
 The list of interviewees is presented at the end of the thesis, however, direct references to the 
interviews have generally been omitted to preserve readability. 
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than the ‘Real Story’ of party organisational development (Katz and Mair 1992, p. 7) 
and that both the implications of rule changes in party organisations and the strategies 
behind them can be ambiguously recorded (Lawson 1990, p. 107).  Therefore, the 
elite interviews were used to shed light on the significance of changes, the underlying 
strategies behind them as well as the informal codes of behaviour and procedures 
within the parties to see how these shaped their adaptation.   
 
Sometimes the research drew on data from the comparative manifestos project to 
assess programmatic change (Budge et al. 2001, 2006) however, generally this was 
found to be out of line with assessments of the parties’ programmatic development 
from interviews and the existing literature on the case studies (see page 61 for 
analysis of this in the PCP).  One of the major barriers to comparative research on 
WECPs has been the practical constraint of language barriers.  It was possible to 
conduct most of the interviews in English.  However, some used translators, who also 
helped to translate party documents.  
 
The research works on the ontological position that parties encounter similar 
dilemmas and that the presence or absence of certain independent variables can 
contribute to shaping patterned variations in the outcomes of their adaptation.  The 
ontological underpinnings of the research are in some respects ‘foundationalist’ 
(Marsh and Furlong 2002, p. 18).  However, the research rejects the foundationalist 
idea that the presence of particular independent variables or similar dilemmas will 
necessarily shape party adaptation in a predictable way at all times and in all contexts.  
Accordingly, parties’ responses to common independent variables and dilemmas are 
seen to be in part shaped by actors’ (and elites’) own subjective interpretations, ideas 
and agency.  This research shows that such factors could mean that party adaptation 
sometimes took surprising tangents.  The epistemological foundations of the research 
are essentially ‘post-positivist’ (Grix 2004, p. 84).  It seeks to develop generalisable 
theory about these processes by subjecting them to systematic empirical tests (Marsh 
and Furlong 2002, p. 25).  However, this appreciates that theoretical relationships will 
only work on a probabilistic basis rather than parties crudely conforming to 
deterministic laws.  It is appreciated that too many studies using similar systems 
comparative designs are guilty of assuming deterministic casual relationships (see 
Takayasu 2004, p. 1373). 
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1.9 Indicators and measures  
A range of indicators were used to investigate the key concepts employed in the 
research.  To assess the extent to which democratic centralism operated in the case 
studies, indicators similar to those outlined by Waller and McInnes (see above) were 
used.  In addition, the formal use of the term democratic centralism within party 
documents was taken into account.  Finding indicators to tap into the level of 
centralisation within political parties is more complicated.  Scholars have approached 
this in a range of ways.  For example Janda (1980, p. 108) provides a range of 
indicators including the: 
 
 Nationalisation of party structure 
 Selection processes for parliamentary candidates 
 Selection processes for party leaders 
 Allocation of party funds 
 Policy formulation 
 Intra-party communication 
 Degree of administrative discipline 
 Concentration (authority) of party leaders   
 
Janda proposed measuring these factors with a set of descriptors which classified 
parties on a scale of one to ten depending on whether power rested with the rank and 
file or party leaders.  In comparison, Grzymała-Busse used a wider range of 
indicators.  Indeed, this research found that to appreciate the distribution of power 
within the case studies and the extent of centralisation a far more comprehensive set 
of indicators was necessary. These included: candidate selection processes, the 
selection of party leaders, the development of shortlists of candidates, responsibility 
for policy making and organisational reforms, the extent to which party leaders can 
force changes like policy sacrifices through and the ability of opposition groups to 
contest the leadership’s authority.  Others included: opportunities for local party 
organisations to veto decisions, the role of central office and administration in running 
campaigns, the formulation of manifestos and programmes, room for debate within 
party meetings, the accessibility of party publications, the ability of local party 
organisations to make coalition agreements and decisions, the relationship between 
the parliamentary group/elected officials and the national leadership, the ability to set 
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the agenda for party congresses and meetings, the procedures at congresses and the 
ability to vote on competing programmes or candidates lists or to override the 
leadership’s proposals.  
 
Moreover the study also looked to the use of outside professional public relations 
specialists or opinion pollsters in devising party strategy, the distribution of party 
finance; changes made by the leadership to local party organisations, the outcome of 
controversial decisions and the level of debate that was allowed on them.  Similar 
indicators were used to assess the level of inner party democracy and processes of 
democratisation to discern if parties became more participatory or decentralised.  
 
Indicators used to assess elites’ prior experiences included: the extent to which parties 
advanced members of national leadership bodies from student organisations, trade 
unions, party papers, or functionaries who had solely worked within the party 
organisation and from orthodox youth organisations.  The research looked to elite’s 
prior experiences in making autonomous political decisions, the turnover within the 
elite and the extent of prior competition between elites or for debate or pluralism (and 
tolerance) in leadership bodies.  Expulsions or attempts to sideline reformers were 
also taken into account.  The research considered the extent to which elites had 
backgrounds in working or making compromises with outside groups and institutions 
or in state sector administration and outside professions.  It also identified the extent 
to which elites’ roles in their parties provided opportunities for working with other 
parties, outside organisations and in public office as well as the degree to which they 
had experience in carrying out prior reforms.  Furthermore, the research analysed the 
prior experiences of mid-level elites at party congresses or in regional party positions 
to discern whether they had experiences that might have benefited party 
transformation.   
 
Above all else the research examined whether elites with these experiences developed 
‘skills’ that were beneficial to party transformation as Grzymała-Busse found in CEE.  
In doing this it analysed whether elites had found new ideas, a willingness to 
centralise and to sacrifice old commitments, pragmatism or whether they remained 
rigidly orthodox in ideological terms.  These outcomes were measured by the 
assessments provided from the interviewees.  Indicators that were used to ascertain 
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the degree of programmatic transformation included the evidence of changes in party 
documents, the sacrifice of key programmatic commitments and emergence of new 
ideas.  
 
The study did not use a set of generic benchmarks to rank the parties for each of the 
above indicators.  It was found that classificatory schemes like Janda’s were too crude 
to capture the complexities of the parties’ organisational structures.  It was often 
unclear as to which classification (e.g. on a 1–10 scale) that the parties should be 
awarded.  Instead, the evidence found through the interviews and analysis of party 
programmes was used to make an overall qualitative judgement that ranked the parties 
into ordinal categories based on whether they exhibited a high, moderate or low 
degree of these variables (for example in terms of how centralised they were or how 
experienced their elites were in carrying out prior reforms).  These interpretations 
were based on how compelling the available evidence was across the range of 
indicators that were used.  The substantive part of the evidence informing this is 
presented in the following chapters.  
 
1.10 Case Selection 
The research works on the basis of a most similar systems comparative design.  This 
looks to see if the presence or absence of particular elite advancement policies and 
organisational strategies affected the cases development.  Five cases were selected 
that were broadly similar in the sense that they were WECPs that operated under 
democratic centralism and upheld orthodox Marxism-Leninism, revolutionary politics 
and the vision of a Communist society.  They were similar in most of the important 
factors and faced similar dilemmas and crises.  However, to a certain degree WECPs’ 
have always been a broad church.  Some were larger than others terms of 
parliamentary representation and membership in 1989, some had experience in 
clandestine action, some had backgrounds in the Comintern, others emerged as 
Maoists or orthodox groups broke way from existing parties or other social 
movements. There is good reason to expect that such factors might have shaped their 
elite advancement policies and internal balance of power in different ways. 
 
Grzymała-Busse found that similar historical contextual factors had influenced the 
ability of parties in CEE to adapt in 1989.  They had mattered because they 
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contributed to differences in elite advancement policies and the ability of elites to 
make prior reforms in CEE.  Therefore this research deliberately looked to WECPs in 
which we might have expected elite advancement processes and elites’ levels of 
experience in carrying out prior reform to have differed.  This allows it to analyse 
whether or not these factors had impacted on their divergent programmatic adaptation 
and ability to respond to prior exogenous shocks and the collapse of Communism.  
The research also asks whether factors that were case specific account for the cases 
divergent adaptation.  The five case studies were also selected to both incorporate into 
analysis parties that have resisted change and those that have embraced different 
strategies of adaptation.  In this way, variation on the dependent variable(s) was 
assured in order to test the hypotheses. Scholars have tended to limit comparisons 
between WECPs to sub-regions within Europe (Arter, 2002; Bosco, 1998, Gildberg 
1980) or to focus excessively on larger WECPs from France and Italy.  The research 
seeks to break with this trend by building less studied parties into analysis.  
 
The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) is analysed in chapter two.  This party 
resisted changing its orthodox programmes.  Its leadership maintained insular elite 
advancement processes, prevented pluralism in leadership bodies and restricted elite 
turnover.  This fostered an elite ill-equipped to break with Communism in 1989 and 
other exogenous shocks.  Its elites lacked skills and prior experiences that could have 
been beneficial to transformation, having little opportunity for negotiation with other 
parties and a low level of administrative experience.  Despite being 75 years old in 
1989, the party’s orthodox leader Álvaro Cunhal who had led it since the 1940s, 
remained in charge until 1993, when he was eventually replaced by other orthodox 
leaders (Cunha 2003, p. 121).  The chapter details how the maintenance of democratic 
centralism enabled orthodox elites to continually expel critics and to crush four major 
attempts at reform.  The PCP declined dramatically in electoral terms during the 
1980s and this continued after 1989.  Its exclusion from governing coalitions also 
continued and its leaders even lacked the pragmatism to participate regularly in local 
governing coalitions.  The chapter shows that in recent years the PCP has become 
increasingly hostile to the compromises this requires and has preferred to focus almost 
exclusively on protest politics.   
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The Dutch Socialist Party (SP) is analysed in chapter three.  The SP broke with 
Marxism-Leninism to embrace socialism in an effort to broaden its appeal after 1989.  
As its vote-seeking strategy paid off, it continued to abandon radical ideological 
commitments: it accepted social democratic policies, increased responsibility in local 
office and attempted to gain inclusion in a national government coalition.  The SP’s 
genesis saw it grow from below one per cent of the vote in 1989 to almost seventeen 
percent in 2006.  Analysis of the SP shows that organisational centralisation could 
prove highly beneficial to breaking with the Communist past.  It also supports the idea 
that elites with a high degree of negotiation with outside groups and institutions are 
more predisposed to seeking reform and breaking with Communism.  
 
Grzymała-Busse found that centralisation was vital for party transformation in CEE.  
This study analyses three WECPs that found other routes to transformation through 
democratisation.  Chapter four assesses the development of Swedish Left-Party 
Communists (VPK) and its successor the Left Party (V).  Despite changing its name 
in 1990, V initially struggled to adapt to events in CEE.  Its ideology and electoral 
strategy appeared largely unaltered until 1993 when Marxism-Leninism was removed 
from its programmes.  Thereafter, V transformed itself by pursuing more social 
democratic and left-liberal policies as its leaders sought to gain electoral expansion 
and inclusion in a governing coalition.  This did not happen, but they gained greater 
influence through institutionalising relations with their governing social democratic 
rivals in return for V’s parliamentary support.    
 
Electoral losses and the compromises made by V’s leadership in support of the 
government led to a backlash from its rank and file after 2000 and attempts to re-
radicalise programmatic commitments and to reassert Communist symbolism. 
However, this did not last long and V continued to make policy sacrifices and won 
acceptance from the social democrats who seek to include it in a governing coalition 
should this be possible after Sweden’s 2010 parliamentary election.  Analysis of V 
shows that while democratisation was an unsteady path to party transformation, in 
many respects it helped party leaders to make changes aimed at moderating policy or 
achieving broader appeal.  It also shows how reformist elites could shift power to the 
party in public office rather than centralising in order to promote reform.   
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Chapter five assesses the Irish Workers’ Party (WP) and its breakaway successor 
party Democratic Left.  The WP managed to expand its electoral support during the 
1980s.  However, Perestroika and events in CEE triggered internal turmoil as 
reformers attempted to protect these gains and to break with Communism to further 
broaden appeal.  Divisions mounted as reformers called for the abolition of the party’s 
paramilitary-wing the Official IRA and for the party to commit to parliamentary 
politics.  Again democratisation and a shift of power to the parliamentary group 
fuelled reform and the WP took major steps towards breaking with Communism.  
However, the reformers were frustrated by the pace of change and most of them split 
to form their own party non-Communist radical left party Democratic Left (DL).  This 
left the WP as a tiny orthodox Communist party.  DL subsequently entered a 
government coalition. This sapped its resources and it adapted towards a centre-left 
platform.  Electoral defeat soon meant that DL’s leaders saw little option but to merge 
into the social democratic Labour Party.   
 
The Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) is analysed in Chapter six.  The CPN 
struggled to maintain its electoral appeal in the 1980s and lost its three remaining 
parliamentary seats in 1986.  It responded by forming an electoral alliance named 
GroenLinks with other Dutch small left parties.  This received just over four per cent 
of the vote in parliamentary elections in 1989 giving it six parliamentary seats and 
returning the CPN’s leader Ina Brouwer to parliament.  Following the collapse of 
Communism in CEE, the CPN dissolved itself to fully merge into GroenLinks in 1991 
– thereby abandoning Communism.  GroenLinks pursued both ‘red’ (socialist) and 
‘green’ (environmentalist) policies but soon became increasingly left liberal and 
dispensed with radical appeals to double its number of parliamentary seats and to seek 
office (see Keith, 2010).  Analysis shows how huge changes in the CPN’s recruitment 
strategies and elite advancement practices helped to promote its transformation in 
response to election defeats.  Democratisation and decentralisation enabled its leaders 
to break with key parts of its Communist ideology and to seek broader appeal.  
 
Chapter seven provides detailed comparative analysis of the case studies and tests the 
hypotheses set out above.  This establishes a basis for Chapter eight which sets out the 
general findings about the development of WECPs.  These include the finding that 
prior experience in negotiating with outsiders proved highly instrumental in shaping 
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attempts for reform in the case studies just as Grzymała-Busse found in CEE.  
However, in contrast to parties in CEE, WECPs are shown to have managed to make 
massive steps towards transforming themselves through democratisation (as shown in 
analysis of the CPN, V and WP/DL).   The cases also show that shifting power to 
parliamentary groups was also another strategy that elites used to promote reform.  
While this was in many respects detrimental to internal party democracy, it was more 
nuanced and subtle than centralisation.  However, the research found this to be a less 
stable route to adaptation than that enjoyed by the SP’s leaders.  Its highly centralised 
organisation allowed them to adapt their party in response to exogenous shocks with 
almost complete control.  
 
The case studies also show that reformist elites in WECPs seemed more hesitant to 
seeking office and social democratising in 1989 than reformists in parties in CEE.  
This questions key ideas in the hypotheses set out above.  In particular, the research 
concludes that elites with professional backgrounds and prior experience in carrying 
out reforms in WECPs were not significantly more likely to try to centralise their 
organisations.  This was partly because the changes they sought were often not as 
controversial or as rapid as the social democratisation pursued in CEE in 1989.  
However, it was also because they were strongly opposed to centralisation and they 
found that they had other options.  In V and the WP/DL reformers with moderate (and 
later a high) level of experience in carrying out prior reforms did not centralise.  
 
Furthermore, in the CPN a high degree of such experience did not turn elites into 
centralisers.  Actually, the prior experiences and portable skills available to these elites 
because of elite advancement processes and their prior experience in implementing 
reforms promoted democratisation.  The three parties analysed here that democratised 
present a large amount of evidence to demonstrate this finding.  When reformist elites 
did engage in limited processes of centralisation this was because of factors contingent 
on a party merger or other factors that are not accounted for in the explanatory 
framework set out above.  Chapter eight concludes that Grzymała-Busse’s framework 
is generally useful in analysing WECPs although some of the dynamics within it need 
adjusting to account for their adaptation.  Accordingly, the framework is refined in 
Chapter eight to provide a better account of why some WECPs were able to adapt 
while others maintained Communist programmes.  
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1.11 Contributions of the research 
This study makes several main contributions.  First, it uses a theoretical framework to 
analyse WECPs.  This is rare and doing so helps to re-orientate the field in a 
comparative direction.  This study helps to fill large gaps in our knowledge about 
WECPs and the reasons behind their divergent adaptation.  Very little is known about 
them and there are only a handful of scholarly works on the case studies analysed 
here.  In particular, this study provides advances in analysing the centralistic 
organisations and their secretive internal workings of some of the case studies which 
scholars have found difficult to study.  Over twenty years after the collapse of 
Communism in CEE, this study provides an opportunity to explain WECPs’ 
development and that of their successor parties with the advantage of greater certainty 
about their long-term trajectory than studies had in the early 1990s.  It is an 
opportunity to go back and talk to those who were involved at the time and presents 
data that was often not available to researchers in the immediate aftermath of the 
collapse of Communism.  This research presents a challenge to experts on WECPs to 
use their expertise to test the propositions in the framework provided in Chapter eight 
to see if it has wider relevance and to develop other comparative frameworks to 
analyse WECPs.   
 
Second, by drawing upon Grzymała-Busse’s work, this research provides an 
opportunity to apply concepts developed in the study of CEE Communist successor 
parties to WECPs.  This ensures that the research places itself at the forefront of 
introducing ideas formulated from outside of the comparative study of Western 
European parties into the field.  Importing such a framework is justified in light of the 
increasingly pan-European focus of the literature on parties (see Lewis and Webb, 
2003) and presents added value because few (if any) studies have sought to test or 
refine frameworks developed in studying CEE parties by applying them elsewhere.   
 
As an endeavour in importing ideas from CEE this research allows us to test how well 
theoretical frameworks developed in the study of CEE are able to travel to other 
contexts.  Therefore it has important implications for the wider literature on political 
parties and the role of party organisational factors in party change.  Moreover, this 
study provides an opportunity to identify similarities and differences in the factors that 
shaped the development of Communist parties and their successors in CEE and 
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Western Europe which can contribute to the development of a pan-European 
understanding of the left.  It also develops explanations regarding the development of 
Communist parties that may have relevance beyond a European context.  Scholars 
have explained the social democratisation of CPs in CEE in comparative perspective. 
This research provides an opportunity to develop such an analysis of WECPs that 
social democratised (also see Arter, 2002, Waller, 1995).  
 
Third, this analysis contributes to our general understanding of party organisational 
and strategic adaptation.  It adds to the wider literature on institutional change and 
critical junctures in the development of institutions (Mahoney, 2000) and the effects 
of reforming organisational practises such as candidate selection methods (Barnea and 
Rhat, 2007).  It also contributes to our understanding of the role of organisational 
variables in affecting parties’ ability to adapt in response to changes in the electoral 
marketplace or to learn from external shocks like election defeats (Mair et al., 2004, 
Norris and Lovenduski, 2004).  Further, it adds to the study of elites’ organisational 
strategies.  This helps to develop our knowledge of how party leaders make 
organisational changes by democratising, centralising, changing the role of party 
members or pursuing electorally-driven professionalisation in aim of changing their 
parties’ programmes.  These debates have so far largely focused upon larger vote- and 
office-seeking, mainstream parties (Ramiro, 2005; Lundell, 2004; Pettitt, 2004, 
Faucher-King and Treille, 2003; Webb and Fisher, 2001; Farrell and Webb, 2000; 
Müller and Strøm, 1999; Panebianco, 1988; Katz and Mair, 1992, 1995; Scarrow, 
1994).  This research shows that these ideas have relevance to WECPs and their 
successors.  It helps to establish that political scientists can study WECPs using 
similar tools of analysis to those that they draw on to understand mainstream parties.   
 
1.12 Main findings of the Research  
There are two main findings of this research.  First, that, just as in the successor 
parties in CEE, efforts to reform WECPs came from party leaders who had greater 
experience in working with groups and institutions outside of the immediate party 
hierarchy.  It was leaders with experiences in the student movement, trade unions, 
new social movements and elected office, or who had risen rapidly to leadership 
positions, who were at the forefront of reforming WECPs.  Furthermore, those leaders 
who rose gradually up the party hierarchy by proving their loyalty through working 
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on internal party affairs were far more hesitant about breaking with Communism.  
These leaders lacked ideas and pragmatism that would have helped to transform their 
parties.  While outsiders sponsored party change, it was elected officials who were 
most prone to breaking with radical left-wing politics altogether in pursuit of social 
democracy.   
 
Second, in contrast to what happened in the successor parties of CEE, organisational 
centralisation was not needed in WECPs to achieve programmatic transformation or 
in order to force through office and vote seeking strategies.  Internal democratisation 
could be effective in promoting these goals.  This was because in several WECPs the 
mid-level elite was not dominated by hardliners who would stubbornly resist reform 
but by activists who drew on the moderating experience of working with groups and 
institutions outside of their parties.  Moreover, in several cases reformist party leaders 
were highly successful in convincing party members of the need for programmatic 
changes following the revolutions in CEE in 1989 and electoral defeats.  Shifting 
power to the party in public office also provided WECPs’ leaders with alternatives to 
organisational centralisation.  While reformers in successor parties in CEE had 
encountered a need for organisational centralisation from previous struggles to 
broaden their party’s appeal, their counterparts in WECPs are shown to have become 
more committed to democratisation through such experiences.  
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Chapter 2 
 The Portuguese Communist Party – Lessons in Resisting Change 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter extends Grzymała-Busse’s framework to analyse the Portuguese 
Communist Party (PCP) which kept democratic centralism – a scenario Grzymała-
Busse tells us little about because it broke down in the cases that she analysed.  The 
PCP played a leading role in clandestine resistance against the Salazar and Caetano 
dictatorships (1932–74).  It grew rapidly during the 1974 Carnation Revolution in 
which it played a central role.  Its cells infiltrated the armed forces, the media, 
emerging public assemblies, trade unions and state institutions (Hottinger, 1975).  
Flush with financial backing from the Soviet Union and infiltration of the state it 
became one of the most influential WECPs (De Sousa 2001, p. 157, Narciso 2007, p. 
17).  The PCP participated in provisional national governments in 1975–1976 and 
made significant inroads in ‘socialising’ Portuguese society (Patricio 1990, p. 45).  Its 
links to the armed forces allowed it to gain significant influence and a legal monopoly 
over trade unions during the revolutionary period (Middlemass, 1980, p. 191; Cabral, 
1983, p. 194).  In 1975 its revolutionary tone and armed protesters caused headaches 
for governments throughout Western Europe as a failed left-wing coup brought 
Portugal to the brink of civil war (FCO, 1975, Mujal-Leon 1977, p. 32, Varela 2008, 
p. 6).   
 
Thereafter, the PCP pursued a threefold strategy.  First, it participated in elections 
while waiting for another chance to overthrow capitalism (Cunha 2008, p. 3, Fryatt 
1997, p. 6).  Second, it sought to protect gains from the revolutionary period including 
nationalisations and collectivisation in agriculture (Cunhal 1988, p. 121).  This 
involved staunch opposition to European integration for promoting American 
capitalism (Dunphy 2004, p. 115).  Third, the PCP pursued a hegemonic electoral 
strategy.  It sought credibility by contesting elections in coalition with its own front 
parties, the Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP) and later the Greens.  Despite 
demanding coalitions with the social democratic Socialist Party (PS), this aim was 
rendered unrealistic by ferocious attacks on it, meddling in its internal affairs and a 
refusal to moderate or compromise (Cunha 1992, p. 300).  The PCP’s pariah status 
divided the Portuguese left and prompted the PS to form weak minority governments 
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or to look to the centre-right for coalition partners (Gallagher 1988, p. 293, Lisi 2007, 
p. 51 also see Bosco, 1998).  
 
The PCP’s policy seeking strategy was largely unsuccessful.  In 1979 it won almost 
nineteen per cent of the vote in parliamentary elections.   However, it has encountered 
a sustained crisis and numerous pressures to change since the 1980s including steady 
electoral and organisational decline (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2).  Its support bases in 
industry and collective agriculture shrank and mainstream parties revised Portugal’s 
Constitution to dismantle its influence through privatisations (Gaspar 1991, p. 3, 
Patricio 1989, p. 45).  The PCP’s leaders also made disastrous tactical mistakes 
including the refusal to support their ‘Number one enemy’, PS leader Mario Soares’s 
Presidential bid in 1986, only to make a spectacular volte-face because in comparison 
to the centre-right alternative, he was the lesser of two evils (Gallagher 1986, p. 294).   
The PCP lost control over its front party MDP which added to its woes and it 
struggled to reconcile its orthodoxy with Perestroika.  
 
Most southern European parties have undergone wide-ranging changes in the last 
twenty years (Bosco and Morlino 2007, p. 351).  Puzzlingly, the PCP’s leaders 
refused to change, even though scholars have long expected it to moderate following 
electoral defeats (Mujal-Leon, 1977; Patricio and Stoleroff, 1994; Cunha, 2008).  
Instead of adapting, the PCP’s leaders preferred ideological purity and gradual decline 
(Raby 1989, p. 222).  Even after the death of its orthodox, and domineering former 
Secretary-General Álvaro Cunhal in 2005 (who led the party from 1941–1992), PCP 
programmes show remarkable continuity with those following the Carnation 
Revolution (PCP, 2008a, 2008b).  While reduced in stature, it remains one of the 
strongest WECPs, one of the last bastions of Stalinism and its orthodoxy continues to 
divide the Portuguese left.  
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Table 2.1: Electoral results of the PCP in parliamentary elections* 
Year 1975 1976 1979 1980 1983 1985 1987 
Votes (per cent) 12.5 14.6 19 16.9 18.07 15.49 12.18 
        
Year  1991 1995 1999 2002 2005 2009  
Votes (per cent) 8.8 8.6 8.93 6.97 7.7 7.88  
*Includes vote for the PCP’s front parties. 
(Magone, 2006; Botella and Ramiro, 2003; Cunha 2003; Staar 1989, 1985).  
 
This chapter has three sections.  The first shows that the PCP developed a rigid form 
of democratic centralism that positioned its leaders in good stead to retain control 
following exogenous shocks.  Second, it shows that restrictive elite advancement 
practices fostered an unresponsive leadership that was ill-equipped to break with 
Communism following events in CEE in 1989.  A third section analyses how the 
leadership used its power under democratic centralism to crush four major episodes of 
dissidence rather than to initiate reform.     
 
Table 2.2:  Membership figures of the PCP 
Year 1946 1973 1974 1975 1976 1978 1981 
Members 4,800 3,000 14,593 30,000 100,000 142,000 164,713 
        
Year 1983 1986 1989 1990 1996 1999 2005 
Members 200,753 200,000 199,275 120,000 140,000 131,504 80,000 
(Lisi, 2009; Cunha, 2003; Botella and Ramiro, 2003; Pereira, 1988; Staar, 1989, 1986).  
 
 
2.2 The PCP’s rigid democratic centralism 
The PCP has formally committed to democratic centralism since the 1920s.  After 
being banned in 1926, it faced brutal repression and a clandestine existence.  This 
provided little opportunity for debates or congresses and required military discipline 
that insulated the PCP from Cold War controversies like the Prague Spring that 
divided some other WECPs (Cabral 1983, p. 181).  Cunhal Stalinised the PCP in the 
1940s by introducing the cult of personality and tightening discipline.  With Cunhal 
imprisoned in 1949–61, the party became more pluralistic.  However, following his 
dramatic escape deviant anarcho-syndicalists, Maoists and ultra-leftists were banished 
and democratic centralism was reasserted to curtail heterogeneity (Mullen, 2005; 
Patricio and Stoleroff 1993, p. 82).   
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The PCP portrays itself as the most democratic Portuguese party.  Supposedly, a deep 
debate occurs at every level of its pyramid shaped organisational structures.  This 
begins in local meetings that elect delegates to powerful national congresses (usually 
with over 1000 delegates).  These subsequently elect a Central Committee (CC) to 
govern the party and to nominate executive institutions (a Secretariat, Political 
Commission and a Secretary-General) (Cunha 1992, p. 328).  Centralism is intended 
to preserve effectiveness in face of a hostile environment (PCP 1974, p. 94).  
Therefore officials speak with ‘one voice’; avoid washing dirty linen in public and 
congress decisions are binding.  Those publicly deviating from the party line are 
disciplined and lower party organs are accountable to the level above them.  
Horizontal discussion between local organisations is prohibited to prevent the 
formation of factions that might contest the leadership’s authority which leaves little 
room for expression by minority groups (PCP, 2008a, Raby 1989, p. 222).   
 
The PCP’s highly centralistic organisation has changed little since the Carnation 
Revolution.  In practice it has been more centralistic than its statutes admit and this 
allowed the leadership or more specifically, Cunhal to control policy making and elite 
advancement.  Even now agendas for pre-Congress meetings are determined by the 
leadership and debates are policed by party officials.  Critics are routinely blocked 
from speaking and when genuine debate is allowed this is used to track dissidents 
rather to provide input (Cunha 1992, p. 337).  Files monitoring members’ views and 
self-criticisms enable the leadership to root out bad apples while regional officials 
tightly control the selection of congress delegates by pressuring local party leaders not 
to select troublemakers.   
 
The leadership’s control is reinforced through the appointment of functionaries on the 
party payroll as congress delegates.  This group have made up over half of delegates at 
most congresses since 1974 and those undermining the leadership risk the sack.  
Institutional procedures have also kept congresses weak.  Conducting congress votes by 
a show of hands long enabled the leadership to identify any rebels.  Furthermore, 
congresses have only been allowed to vote on a single programme and a single list for 
the CC and these are proposed by the leadership.  The latter can not be amended by 
congress.  With dissidents always being overwhelmingly outvoted, amendments to the 
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leadership’s programmes have only ever been superficial at congresses and they have 
never rejected the leadership’s proposed list for the CC.  
 
As Secretary-General, Cunhal sat on all the leadership institutions.  His personality cult 
and role in Portuguese history gave him great authority (Narciso 2007, p. 21).  He 
dominated CC meetings and overruled them at a whim (Publico, 05.10.2004, Cunha 
1991, p. 6).  Under Cunhal, the Secretariat (between five to seven members) handled the 
party’s finances, ran communications and directed its organisation; the Political 
Commission (around 20 members) made policy documents while tightly controlling 
ancillary organisations and elected officials (Cunha 1992, p. 328).  Parliamentarians 
were generally weak vis-à-vis the party leadership and paid most of their salary to the 
party which contributes a high proportion of its income (van Biezen 2000a, p. 400; 
2000b, p. 333).  Researchers found that parliamentarians signed blank resignation 
letters to keep them subservient (Cunha Interview, 15.07.08).   
 
The PCP expanded rapidly following the Carnation Revolution as young radicals 
flocked to its revolutionary appeals (see Table 2.2).  The introduction of undisciplined 
newcomers presented new pressures to reform.  The PCP’s leaders, however, were wary 
of the ‘New Member Factor’ that hollowed out other WECPs that expanded on the 
back of new protest movements (Waller 1989, p. 45).  In response, they established 
mid-level regional committees to discipline and integrate the rank and file (Cunha 1992, 
p. 221).  In 1979 they also crushed ideological pluralism amongst its student members 
by merging the pluralistic Union of Communist Students (UEC) with the orthodox 
Union of Communist Youth to form Portuguese Communist Youth (JCP).  
 
The flow of internal information has also been strictly controlled.  Before 1989 the 
party paper Avante lacked any critically minded discussion or room for rival analyses 
including Eurocommunism or environmentalism.  Cunhal also overruled elites calling 
for theoretical debate in the intellectual journal O Militante (Narciso 2007, p. 21).  
Scholars found that party archives were closed, even to historians within the party and 
that it held files on those researching it.  Moreover, the PCP’s leaders falsified, 
destroyed or hid documents and pressured witnesses to keep silent to obstruct analysis 
of party history (Cunha 1992, p. 93).   
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2.3 Elite Advancement in the PCP 
The PCP’s leaders had the power to force through programmatic reforms.  However, 
Cunhal’s restrictive and insular elite advancement practices constrained reform.  They 
fostered an elite generally lacking in experiences that could have helped them to 
envisage transformation or to question the party’s orthodox ideology in the late 1980s.  
Moreover, the leadership deliberately constrained elite advancement to resist 
moderation. This was no easy feat considering the PCP’s growth but was possible 
because of several factors.   
 
First, CC members were handpicked to be ideologically orthodox.  In 1974, the CC 
was expanded but packed with experienced, orthodox clandestine elites with proven 
loyalty.  Between them, the CC’s 36 members shared 755 years of clandestine struggle 
and 308 years in prison (see Cunha, 1992).  In 1976, the CC expanded to 90 members, 
incorporating more veteran militants (Gaspar 1990, p. 48).  When younger newcomers 
were promoted as the CC grew to 165 members by 1983, ideological orthodoxy 
remained a prerequisite for advancement.   
 
Second, it became the norm for as many as ninety per cent of CC members to work as 
functionaries in the PCP’s apparatus (Gaspar 1990, p. 52, Raby 1989, p. 221).  Funding 
from the Soviet Union enabled the PCP to employ an army of full-time apparatchiks.  
CC members had proven obedience from slowly rising up the hierarchy and spent their 
lives working exclusively in the party machine at central office, running campaigns or 
coordinating local organisations.  These elites had usually been given party jobs before 
they could attend university to prevent them from developing analytical skills or entering 
professional occupations.  Most had little experience in carrying out prior reform.  
Dissenting CC members risked losing their jobs and excommunication from their social 
networks.  The leadership also ensured a ‘Working Majority’ under which around 70 per 
cent of the CC had working class backgrounds to marginalise the influence of 
intellectuals who Cunhal argued were more susceptible to bourgeois influences (Cunha 
1992, p. 356).  Infiltration of the state apparatus, the wages of elected officials and 
corruption in local politics enabled the PCP to employ a large army of functionaries (De 
Sousa 2001, p. 163).  
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Third, officials working on the edge of the PCP’s apparatus were rarely ‘horizontally 
advanced’ to the CC in case their thinking was contaminated by experiences in 
negotiating with outsiders.  Only a handful of CC members had experience of elected 
office and few had been ‘Unitarian’ workers who infiltrated social and political 
organisations including trade unions or the health and education sectors.  Even leaders of 
the Communist dominated trade union the General Confederation of Portuguese 
Workers (CTGP) were underrepresented in the elite (Gaspar 1990, p. 48).  Cunhal 
wanted to control them rather than succumb to their influence.  By the late 1980s, it 
became common for around 20–30 CC members to have trade union backgrounds but 
even then they remained greatly outnumbered by functionaries and prominent unionists 
were still excluded.  A fourth reason for the lack of reformers in the CC was that in a 
handful of cases those who managed to find a limited degree of autonomy, including 
parliamentarian Vital Moreira, rejected invitations to join it, for fear that Cunhal might 
monitor their activities more closely.  
  
Fifth, the more powerful leadership bodies the Political Commission and Secretariat, 
were dominated by veteran orthodox clandestine militants (see Bosco, 2000).  Cunhal 
handpicked their members and none were removed from 1963–83.  In practice the 
Secretariat ran the party.  When this expanded in 1976, it included more of the old 
guard including Cunhal’s aid Domingos Abrantes (Gaspar 1990, p. 48).  Generational 
turnover in the Political Commission was delayed until the late 1980s.  Even then, as 
younger elites who joined the party after 1960 including Carlos Carvalhas, gradually 
began to replace those who joined in the 1940s, the PCP’s funnel shaped advancement 
policies meant only the orthodox and obedient advanced (Bosco 2001, p. 357).  A new 
Executive Political Commission was also introduced to preserve the old guard’s 
dominance (Cunha 1991, p. 160).  Before 1989 few members of the Secretariat and 
Political Commission had experience of working in other organisations or in carrying 
out prior reforms.  
 
In 1988, the pack was also shuffled to ensure that only Cunhal and Abrantes sat on all 
the main leadership bodies, dealing a blow to aspiring successors.  The ruthless 
removal of Cunhal’s rivals left a ‘desert’ in the leadership (Cunha 1991, p. 161).  
Most decisions had gone through Cunhal, constraining opportunities for reform and 
preventing elites from gaining the stature needed to contest his authority.  Cunhal 
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delayed a change of leadership for as long as possible.  When he retired as Secretary-
General aged 79 in 1992, he chose his successor Carlos Carvalhas.  Following this 
Cunhal still managed the PCP as President of a new ‘National Council’ until 1996 and 
remained a CC member until his death in 2005 (aged 91) (Cunha 2008, p. 4). 
 
Cunhal had several of the characteristics that Grzymała-Busse argues are beneficial to 
reform.  He was recruited from outside the PCP’s traditional support base, being 
middle class, a lawyer and an academic and had worked as Minister without Portfolio 
following the Carnation Revolution.  He sought to broaden the party’s revolutionary 
appeal to a wide spectrum of the electorate by toning down Marxist-Leninist rhetoric 
in election campaigns that emphasised ‘national and democratic revolution’ (Pereira 
1988, p. 91). Cunhal managed to take a cautious approach during most of the 
revolutionary period and opportunistically accepted an electoral coalition with the PS 
in the Lisbon Mayoral election in 1989 to hide the PCP’s losses.  However, Cunhal 
consciously tried to keep his ideas pure because he believed any deviation from 
Leninism would leave its historical mission unfulfilled (Mujal-Leon 1977, p. 22).  
This shows that there is a risk in overstating the extent to which orthodox elites will 
draw on prior experiences that seem beneficial to reform.  A majority of such elites in 
the PCP still ignored their experiences due to a high degree of ideological conviction 
and fear of being punished.  
 
2.4.1 Cushing the reformers 
Reformers were in short supply in the PCP and it failed to break with the past as 
Grzymała-Busse found of parties with restrictive elite advancement practices.  
However, there have been four major episodes of dissidence aimed at instigating 
reform.  Each reformist faction had strong links with groups and institutions outside 
the PCP.  These engendered pressures for change and support Grzymała-Busse’s idea 
that elites negotiating with outsiders are those best positioned to embrace 
programmatic transformation. 
 
2.4.2.1 The Group of Six  
The PCP’s monolithic image was first dented when the ‘Group of Six’ (Veiga de 
Oliveira, Vital Moreira, Silva Graça, Vitor Louro, Sousa Marques and Dulce Martins) 
broke ranks in the late 1980s (Cunha 1991, p. 6).  The ‘Six’ had been 
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parliamentarians, with the exception of Martinez (a secretary in parliament), or 
worked in the 1974–75 provisional governments.  The experience of working in 
parliament was the decisive factor shaping their gradual moderation and dissidence. 
There they found pressures to negotiate, compromise with other parties and to respond 
to media criticisms of party ideology.  Furthermore, they moderated from working 
with outsiders in parliamentary committees including those that drafted and revised 
Portugal’s Constitution.  This convinced them of the need for less radical policies on 
state ownership; removing Marxist rhetoric from the constitution and ending the 
political role of the armed forces to the chagrin of the leadership.   
 
Most members of ‘the Six’ (and their supporters) also drew on experiences from 
professional backgrounds, involvement in other social organisations and engagement 
with theoretical debates from university education.  Most of them had little 
clandestine experience. While elite advancement was generally restrictive, Cunhal 
occasionally promoted outsiders to the parliamentary group if they could help the 
party gain influence.  This allowed Vital Moreira to advance unusually rapidly from 
outside the party hierarchy.  He had not been an orthodox Communist but a prestigious 
Marxist academic and lawyer with much needed expertise.   
 
The PCP’s parliamentarians were generally tightly controlled; however, the head of 
the parliamentary group, Carlos Brito took a tolerant approach to handling ‘the Six’.  
He accepted their refusal to entertain Soviet officials and let them abstain from 
parliamentary votes.  Nonetheless, some of ‘the Six’ resigned in 1982, while others 
were soon dropped from the PCP’s electoral list.  Most of them were excluded from 
the leadership by the time of their dissidence.  However, they remained highly 
regarded figures (Narciso 2007, p. 49).  Further, Cunhal reluctantly allowed Moreira 
to represent the PCP as a judge in Portugal’s Constitutional Court after the PS 
threatened to include him as one of their judges.  Moreira continued to moderate from 
working there.   
 
2.4.2.2 The Group of Six and democratic centralism  
In March 1987, ‘the Six’ handed Cunhal a document detailing their criticisms of party 
ideology.  They anticipated that reforms would be blocked without Cunhal’s support 
and asked to discuss the party’s decline with Cunhal in an effort to persuade him to 
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allow reforms.  Simultaneously, Moreira began publishing critical articles under a 
pseudonym to stimulate debate.  The ‘Six’ promoted Eurocommunism, a market-
based economy and commitment to parliamentary democracy.  They also demanded 
cooperation with the PS; dropping Euroscepticism and criticised the Soviet model 
(Gaspar 1990, p. 59).  However, they stopped short of advocating dropping the goal of 
a ‘Communist society’ or embracing social democracy believing this would be easy 
for Cunhal to dismiss.   
 
Despite their professional backgrounds and experience in making broader appeals in 
parliament and the Constitutional Court, ‘the Six’ did not envisage new centralised 
organisational structures or streamlining.  They argued that under Perestroika rapid 
democratisation should be used to evoke ideological renewal (Cunha 1991, p. 6).  The 
‘Six’ demanded reforms that would allow congress (not the CC) to choose the 
Secretary-General; an organisational committee to manage the party to reduce the power 
of the Secretariat, secret-balloting in elections for congress delegates and the CC; 
competitive elections for the CC and generational turnover in the elite (Gaspar, 1991).  
The ‘Six’ saw themselves as ‘brain-stormers’ starting a debate. They wanted Cunhal 
to sponsor democratisation to help it succeed.  However, they did not want him to use 
democratic centralism to force through programmatic reforms.   
 
The ‘Six’ stood little chance of success when Cunhal refused to budge.  He agreed to 
only meet them individually in a failed effort to divide them.  Cunhal kept the 
discussions and their proposals secret from the CC thereby ignoring their requests and 
the principle of collective leadership (Cunha 1991, p. 6).  In response, ‘the Six’ went 
public in newspaper articles criticising democratic centralism from 1987–1989 (Raby 
1989, p. 220).  Cunhal subsequently delayed the upcoming Twelfth Congress to gain 
time to shore up support (Cunha 1991, p. 160).  He threatened to expel ‘the Six’, 
portrayed them as enemies of the party and warned of the dangers of factionalism in 
O Militante as well as his speech at the party festival Avante (Raby 1989, p. 220).  
Cunhal also used ‘the Six’s’ backgrounds against them by portraying them as 
troublesome intellectuals who were out of touch with the PCP’s proletarian rank and 
file.  The ‘Six’ were sidelined but not expelled (Gaspar, 1991).  When the CC finally 
discussed their dissidence in 1988, it condemned them as counter-revolutionaries 
(Patricio and Stoleroff 1994, p. 100).   
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The ‘Six’ had prior experiences that Grzymała-Busse argues will be beneficial to 
party transformation and also received support from activists with broader experiences 
from trade unions, municipal politics and as intellectuals.  Even still, ‘the Six’ could not 
overcome the power relations inside the PCP and only a small minority of the elite 
supported them.  All ‘the Six’ could do was to publish their criticisms.  This was 
unsuccessful because few party members were avid readers and fellow reformers 
disliked the damage it caused to the party (Cunha 1991, p. 159).  The ‘Six’ won only 
small concessions. Cells were temporarily allowed to hold secret votes for electing 
congress delegates if they first agreed to do this by a show of hands, which few did 
and a letters page was established in the party paper Avante (Cunha 1991, p. 160).  
The ‘Six’ boycotted the Twelfth Congress when it was finally held in December 1988 
to prevent the leadership from gaining authority by crushing them.  Several of them 
left the party after the Congress when democratic centralism was used to reassert an 
orthodox line.   
 
2.4.3.1 The case of Zita Seabra  
Few of the PCP’s high ranking elites embraced reform during the late 1980s.  Zita 
Seabra, its rising star, leading female politician and potential leader bucks the trend 
(Raby 1989, p. 220).  Her dissidence in 1987–1988 supports Grzymała-Busse’s idea 
that those working with groups outside the party will face pressures to reform.  
Seabra’s role in leading the student organisation UEC following the Carnation 
Revolution involved working with radical feminist groups.  This helped her to 
question the party line in the Political Commission as she worked to reform the PCP’s 
conservative approach on women’s rights, leading the campaign for the legalisation of 
abortion in Portugal (Guardiola, 1984).   
 
However, Seabra’s uncompromising approach meant that she generally resisted 
pressures to moderate from contact with outsiders.  She rarely built bridges with them 
and did not gradually accept the need for reforms like most reformers.  UEC remained 
a disciplined, orthodox and militaristic organisation under Seabra’s leadership during 
the Carnation Revolution; she saw herself as a Bolshevik and complained that the 
Communists held back from civil war (Cancio and Almeida, 2007; Avante, 26.07.07).  
Seabra’s rapid promotion was possible precisely because she was an uncompromising 
Stalinist who devoted her time to internal party administrative tasks.  Seabra’s 
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eventual dissidence was shaped more strongly by two factors that are not accounted 
for by Grzymała-Busse’s framework.  First, she was disillusioned by visits to CEE 
and second, her obedience to the Soviet Union prompted her to question Cunhal’s 
failure to follow Perestroika.   
 
Few of the PCP’s highly orthodox elites changed their ideas in response to the crises 
of the late 1980s.  Those that did generally struggled to offer another left identity or a 
realistic process of ideological renewal.  Their dissidence shocked colleagues who 
questioned their legitimacy as reformers.  Moreover, having hidden their heads in the 
sand and failed to negotiate with outsiders or to gradually adapt their beliefs, orthodox 
elites including Seabra, found that their ideas collapsed altogether.  Most were 
devastated that Communism was finished and dropped out from politics altogether.  
However, Seabra moved from one extreme to another and embraced right-wing 
politics. 
 
2.4.3.2 Zita Seabra and democratic centralism 
In 1988 Seabra criticised the leadership in CC meetings.  Cunhal responded more 
forcefully than with the ‘Six’ by putting her on ‘trial’.  She was expelled from the 
Political Commission and subsequently the CC (Cancio and Almeida, 2007).  In 
January 1990 she was expelled from the party for publishing newspaper articles that 
attacked its approach to Perestroika, democratic centralism and Marxism-Leninism 
(Patricio and Stoleroff 1994, p. 99).  Cunhal ruthlessly made Seabra’s ex-husband Carlos 
Brito announce her expulsion and she was threatened, intimidated and spied on (see 
Narciso, 2007). 
 
2.4.4.1 The Third Way 
Inspired by ‘the Six’ and Seabra, another group of reformers the ‘Third Way’ 
developed around a handful of party officials and CC members in 1988 (Naricso 2007, 
p. 60).  It was not as organised as ‘the Six’, or as esteemed, but proved more troubling 
for Cunhal and drew support from around 3000 activists.  The Third Way organised 
loosely and did not have a leader to avoid being punished as a faction.  Its members 
mostly came from a younger generation to the leadership that had joined the party 
during the Carnation Revolution. Around ninety per cent of prominent Third Wayers 
moderated through working outside the party in other professions or political 
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organisations (Moreira Interview 13.09.09).  Many drew on backgrounds in local 
government, professional bodies and most were involved in the PCP’s intellectual 
sector including artists, journalists, academics, civil servants and teachers (Gaspar 1991, 
p. 18).2  Outside the party they had learnt to compromise to get results, seen the need 
for practical decision making and encountered criticisms of Marxism-Leninism.  The 
Third Way also included officials and CC members involved in liaising and 
negotiating with party cells inside the state, the armed forces, judges and the police 
who had also gradually moderated. 
 
Prominent Communist trade unionists including Jóse Judas from the CGTP and António 
Teodoro head of the Federation of Teachers Unions joined the Third Way.  Criticism of 
the party had mounted in the trade unions in the 1980s (Gaspar 1991, p. 18).  Unlike the 
party leadership, Communist trade unionists could not ignore changes in industry, 
working patterns and Portuguese society (Patricio and Stoleroff 1993, p. 78).  The 
leaders of the CGTP clashed with the leadership as they accepted the need to work with 
rivals including the social democratic unions that challenged its hegemony over the 
labour movement and to enter corporatist negotiations in 1987 on wage agreements and 
labour laws (Patricio and Stoleroff 1994, p. 95).  The PCP’s leaders initially blocked 
these decisions but the CGTP’s leaders had a limited degree of autonomy and forced 
their hand.  Thereafter, they craved greater independence.  Negotiating with workers 
and trade union members also showed CGTP leaders the need for practical policies to 
train workers to meet the demands of more highly skilled production; that European 
integration was a force for modernising Portugal and that the PCP’s dogmatic appeals 
were losing resonance (Cunha 1991, p. 12, Dunphy 2004, p. 118).  Although trade 
unionists were underrepresented at elite level, there were enough of them in the CC 
for this to cause problems.   
 
Almost all Third Wayers had multifaceted links to other social organisations. Many 
had been prominent student activists at Coimbra University during the late 1960s 
where actions involved dialogue and compromise with a wide spectrum of political 
groups.  Others were members of UEC under the leadership of Joaquim Pina Moura 
                                                           
2
 Prominent Third Way members included: José Saramago (Nobel prize winning novelist), Baptista 
Bastos (writer), Mario de Carvalho (writer), Gomes Canotilho (constitutional expert), António Manuel 
Hespanha (historian) and Mário Vieira de Carvalho (Musician). 
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(later a leading Third Wayer) in the late 1970s.  In this period, rapid membership growth 
transformed UEC from being a small sectarian organisation into an inclusive venue for 
debate that was powerful in national student organisations and its leaders became more 
responsive to student’s aspirations.  Elites with backgrounds in UEC had experience in 
making compromises from forging broad alliances with other political groups to run 
university student unions.  In contrast, they found the PCP’s democratic centralism too 
constraining.  Politicians from UEC also exchanged grandiose ideological goals for 
pragmatism as they encountered practical problems like buying cheap books for students 
or providing basic services.  Some prominent Third Wayers became dissidents after the 
party leadership seized control of UEC in 1979.  Other Third Wayers living in exile 
under fascism also became critically minded as they encountered Eurocommunism in 
Italy or disappointing realities in the Eastern bloc.   
 
2.4.4.2 The Third Way and democratic centralism 
The Third Way wanted a gradual process of reform and criticised the public outbursts 
of the Six.  They initially sought reform by mobilising activists and distributing 
documents at party meetings but claimed they were not a faction and were only 
contributing to debate for the Twelfth Congress.  It was hoped that a less 
confrontational approach would make them acceptable to the leadership and harder 
for it to discipline them (Gaspar 1991, p. 5).  Analysts were dismayed that they clang 
to a culture that avoided public criticism and that this divided reformers (Gaspar 1990, 
p. 5).  In 1988, the Third Way presented their manifesto, with 300 signatures to the CC 
(Cunha 2003, p. 8).  This proposed an end to officials being nominated from above; 
fair elections; secret votes; reduced leadership control over lists for the CC; 
meaningful participation for members in decision-making; less militaristic discipline; 
rights to horizontal discussion between branches and to form factions; abandoning the 
cult of personality; a body to protect members’ rights and more powerful congresses.  
 
The Third Way demanded reforms to break with Stalinism and to update Marxism-
Leninism in light of Perestroika, developments in other WECPs and social change in 
Portugal.  The Third Way did not advocate abandoning Communism but focused on 
freeing up debate in aim of renewal.  Central to their concerns were ideological 
pluralism, a more favourable approach to European integration and less sectarian 
relations with other left-wing parties (see Narciso, 2007).   Cunhal appeared to be 
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receptive to the Third Way.  He overruled calls to punish them and included two of 
them in a fifteen member committee to revise party statutes and programmes.  This 
toned down the policy of Portugal leaving the European Community which even 
orthodox elites recognised was becoming unrealistic.  However, the committee 
ignored the Third Wayers’ proposed reforms.  Their attempts to promote recognition 
of the benefits from European integration failed and the party’s Euroscepticism 
deepened.   
  
Cunhal easily out-manoeuvred the Third Way.  Being reluctant to promote an open 
schism they had few options when the leadership enforced the ban on horizontal lines 
of discussion to stop them from forming a movement, speaking at meetings or 
campaigning within the party.  This meant that reformers rarely knew of any like-
minded activists and they fragmented into different groups (Cunha 1991, p. 4).  
Before the Twelfth Congress Cunhal and leading orthodox elites called Third Way 
members to meetings to demand an end to their dissidence and tried to buy them off 
with promotions (Narciso 2007, p. 52).  Simultaneously, their calls for democratic 
debate in the CC were crushed and leading reformers were spied on (Narciso 2007, 
pp. 85–109).  
 
The leadership’s control over the selection of congress delegates meant that the Third 
Way only gained around 50 of 2090 congress delegates at the Twelfth Congress in 1988.  
In some regions activists were not invited to vote, as the leadership packed the congress 
with loyal functionaries (Raby 1989, p. 221).  Leading Third Wayers made it to the 
congress, however, their speeches and accusations of rigged delegate elections were 
ignored.  When trade unionist José Judas demanded secret votes for selecting the CC, 
Cunhal grabbed the microphone and claimed the congress was being sabotaged.  The 
PCP’s official congress report overlooked this incident and the congress was closed to 
the media while the dissidents were routinely blocked from speaking at subsequent 
congresses (see Narciso, 2007).   
 
Cunhal took measures to reinforce his power in response to the dissidence.  A new 
‘Control Commission’ elected by the CC and run by old orthodox elites was 
established to police the party.  Its formal role is to ‘fiscalise the party’s accounts’ 
(PCP, 2006) but it assumed powers to monitor dissidents, to recommend punishments 
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and operated to prevent reformers from gaining elite positions.  At the Twelfth 
Congress leading Third Wayers and those thought to be close to them were almost 
completely purged from the CC as 46 of its members were replaced by orthodox 
functionaries (Gaspar 1990, p. 60).   
 
The Third Way broke the tradition of unanimous congress votes but could not challenge 
the leadership’s power (Patricio and Stoleroff 1994, p. 102).  Cunhal claimed that the 
1988 Programme made significant changes in recognising that there was no universal 
model for socialism, a need for freedom of the press and the right to form political 
parties (Raby 1989, p. 222).  Some scholars viewed this as an acceptance of pluralist 
democracy (see Bosco, 2001).  However, the changes were merely cosmetic as Cunhal 
shrouded the party’s most vulnerable positions in ambiguous rhetoric (Gaspar, 1991).  
Revolutionary aims were seen as ‘unfinished’, leaving it unclear if they had been 
abandoned (Gaper, 1991).  Cunhal’s new theory of ‘advanced democracy’ did not 
mention whether governments alternate following elections, rule out armed uprising, or 
abandon Marxism-Leninism (Gaspar, 1991).  The 1988 congress reaffirmed traditional 
positions (Raby 1989, p. 221).   
 
The Third Way and reformers lost influence before the collapse of Communism in CEE.  
Thereafter, they increasingly made public statements and in 1989 cooperated with ‘the 
Six’ and Seabra to form a think-tank the National Institute of Social Studies to lobby 
for change.  The leadership continued to ignore them at the Thirteenth-Extraordinary 
Congress in 1990 which analysed events in CEE.  It reasserted an orthodox line; 
revolutionary politics; demanded internal discipline and called for critics to resign 
(Patricio and Stoleroff 1994, p. 109).  Third Wayers including José Judas were 
deselected as congress delegates and fewer intellectuals became delegates than at 
previous congresses (Gaspar, 1991).  Judas proceeded to present an alternative 
programme, criticising the Soviet model and democratic centralism in a press 
conference outside the congress (Patricio and Stoleroff 1994, p. 103). 
 
The leadership explained events in CEE as the result of mistakes and deviations from 
Leninism that the PCP would have avoided through a more democratic model based on 
collective leadership rather than the cult of personality (Cunha 1991, p. 160).  It praised 
the social and cultural achievements of state socialism and maintained alliances with 
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regimes in Libya, Cuba, China and North Korea (Gaspar 1991, p. 19).  The Political 
Commission’s support for the failed coup d'état in the Soviet Union in August 1991 
brought things to a head (Patricio and Stoleroff 1993, p. 78).  Prominent Third Way 
members held a public meeting supporting Perestroika and called for the CC to 
renounce the decision (Calder 1992, p. 168).  The leadership responded by expelling 
several of them after consultation with the Control Commission.  Support for the coup 
contributed to another electoral defeat in the 1991 election as the party fell from over 
twelve per cent in 1987 to below nine per cent (Cabral 1983, p. 170).  
 
The collapse of Communism did little to dent the party’s Stalinist organisational 
workings, Euroscepticism, hostile approach to the PS or its Leninist view of revolution 
(Cunha 1992, p. 314).3  There was an exodus as the Third Way left.  In 1992 many of 
them formed an organisation called the Left-Platform.  This soon split and some elites 
(mostly high ranking former elected officials) joined the PS while others formed a 
new left party the Left Bloc (BE) in 1999 (Cunha 2008, p. 4).  This highlights the 
ideological divisions within the Third Way.  Its members had not united around social 
democratisation as Grzymała-Busse found reformers experienced in negotiating with 
outside groups in CEE had done.  Its programmatic aims remained vague.  Most Third 
Wayers advocated broader socialist appeals, or more flexible forms of Communism.  
They also called for democratisation although leading figures had professional 
backgrounds and prior experiences in broadening appeals that Grzymała-Busse found 
bred centralisation in CEE.  
 
2.4.5.1 The Renovadores  
When Cunhal retired as Secretary-General in 1992 it looked like the struggle to 
reform the PCP was over.  However, a fourth group of hesitant reformers the 
‘Renovadores’ waited in the background (Gaspar, 1991).  They included several high-
ranking Political Commission members and (temporarily) Cunhal’s successor Carlos 
Carvalhas.  Most Renovadores quietly sympathised with the Third Way’s strategy of 
gradual reform by working through party institutions. However, some had even built 
                                                           
3
 The consistency of the PCP’s ideology in its programmes politicians’ speeches and findings from elite 
interviews contradicts Manifesto Research Group data which shows that Marxist-analysis in party 
programmes declined from 8.2 in 1975 to 0.11 in 1991 (Budge et al., 2001, 2006).  
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their own careers from persecuting them.  The Renovadores gained influence as they 
silently won a slim majority in the Political Commission.  Influence at the top gave 
them a better chance of success than previous dissidents and they used their positions 
to forge support amongst elites and to develop a movement within the party from 
1992–2000.  They aimed to reform the party in response to its continued decline.  
 
Grzymała-Busse’s framework helps to explain the conundrum of how reformist 
Political Commission members emerged when Cunhal picked them to be orthodox 
and obedient.  It shows that he had been unable to fully exclude elites with prior 
experiences that were beneficial to envisaging reform.  Generational turnover in the 
Political Commission had been delayed for as long as possible.  At the Twelfth 
Congress in 1988, Cunhal retired nine of its fourteen members.  Most of them were 
replaced with younger elites who were relative newcomers including Luis Sá, Luís 
Figueira and Carlos Carvalhas who had joined the CC after 1974 (Bosco 2000, p. 
241).  This process continued in the 1990s.  Many new Political Commission 
members were highly orthodox.  Nonetheless, the changing of the guard provided 
some opportunities for reformers.  
 
As Gaspar (1991) noted, despite their apparent orthodoxy, these new faces were the 
PCP’s best hope for reform.  Unlike their predecessors, they had little experience of 
clandestine struggle; were highly educated and had become pragmatic through 
working in professional occupations outside the party.  Sá for example encountered 
pressures for moderation and compromise as a student activist, a lawyer and an 
elected official in municipal politics.  He was comfortable with theoretical debate and 
socialised with third wayers, with whom he discussed Eurocommunism and 
Perestroika (Narciso 2007, p. 30).  It is surprising that such elites advanced so high.  
However, they had toed the orthodox-line despite having long harboured criticisms 
and these ‘newcomers’ had been tested by around twenty years of experience at elite 
level.  With the orthodox-wing firmly in control, Cunhal had little to fear and they had 
skills that made them useful; Sá for example had proven ability on TV and expertise 
in local politics. Cunhal had overestimated their obedience and by the early 1990s the 
Renovadores questioned the failure to broaden appeal to attract middle class 
supporters (Bosco 2001, p. 365).  
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Institutional factors also provided pressures for moderation.  A group of veteran 
orthodox elites including parliamentary leader Carlos Brito, and the high ranking 
clandestine militant Edgar Correia became leading Renovadores.  Most of this group 
had slowly risen up the hierarchy, worked as functionaries from a young age, had 
experienced imprisonment under dictatorship and lacked professional experience 
outside the party.  However, being in the leadership exposed these orthodox elites to 
critical ideas at international Communist seminars and they had disappointing 
experiences of visiting the Soviet Union.  Their responsibilities in the Political 
Commission also involved coordinating the PCP’s ancillary organisations, negotiating 
with outside groups and elected officials in municipal politics who expressed 
criticisms of the party’s decline, dogmatism and loss of influence.   
 
This process of moderation continued after the collapse of Communism.  Political 
Commission members including Brito were tasked with forging a rare municipal 
alliance with the PS to control the Lisbon executive from 1989–2001.  This showed 
them the benefits of cooperation and breaking with Marxism-Leninism.  Similarly, 
Correia (who had opposed previous reformers) and elites responsible for health and 
social policy in the Political Commission moderated through working with trade 
unionists, professional organisations, civil servants and PS health ministers who 
sought the PCP’s support in the mid-1990s.  This convinced them that opportunities 
existed to gain influence in public sector reform through compromising with the PS 
and triggered conflict with orthodox colleagues.  Working in roles as parliamentarians 
and municipal officials also placed pressures on some Political Commission members 
to moderate and to work with outsiders.  Parliamentarian Carlos Carvalhas succeeded 
Cunhal.  He was selected as a compromise.  Carvalhas was orthodox but had 
friendships with less hard-line elites.  His appointment as leader was seen as an 
opportunity to unite them around an orthodox direction (Gaspar, 1991).  This did not 
go to plan.  Being from the younger generation and feeling pressures to compromise 
with the PS in parliament, Carvalhas aligned with the Renovadores in the Political 
Commission.   
 
Renovadores also emerged in the CC. Most of this group of Rennovadores had 
moderated through working with outsiders in Unitarian work, municipal office or in 
professional occupations.  The highest ranking Renovadores also used their influence 
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to increase generational turnover and to promote moderate functionaries with outside 
political experiences to the CC.  The PCP’s hard-line Control Commission failed to 
block all of them and overestimated the orthodoxy of several functionaries promoted 
to the Political Commission and CC which strengthened the Renovadores.  By the 
mid-1990s they had solid support from around 30 (of 170) CC members and at times 
could muster a majority there.   
 
During the late 1990s, the Renovadores built a factional movement by connecting 
mid-level elites and members to debate and campaign for reforms.  Those involved 
were often in their fifties and generally younger than the leadership.  Most of them 
worked outside the party bubble as professionals, trade unionists, ‘Unitarian’ workers 
(working for organisations/professions outside the party) and around half of them 
were doctors.  These groups had become pragmatic through encountering the 
practical constraints of administration and favoured exchanging dogmatic ideology 
for practical policy goals.  Many were also from the party’s intellectual sector 
organisations which provided some room for ideological debate in the 1990s and 
officials in municipal government confronting local electoral realities were also strongly 
represented.  However, the most common characteristic between the Renovadores was 
the pluralistic environment they encountered in UEC during the 1970s.  
 
2.4.5.2 The Renovadores and democratic centralism  
Leading Renovadores tried to gradually introduce democratisation and ideological 
moderation.  They did not seek social democracy and initially, shied away from 
advocating the abandonment of Marxism-Leninism or democratic centralism to avoid 
overplaying their hand.  Unlike previous reformers they made small inroads to reform.  
They revised party statutes in 1992 to emphasise the ‘creative development’ of 
democratic centralism which gave more room for their factional activities.  The 
Renovadores’s flagship policy ‘The New Impulse’ was approved by the CC in 1998.  
This asserted that officials should be elected not appointed (Cunha 2003, p. 119); it 
promoted cooperation with other political forces, freedom for the party’s intellectual 
sector and debates with previous dissidents.   
 
In the mid-1990s Carvalhas’s congress speeches emphasised renovating Communism, 
distance from Stalinism, cooperation with the PS and creative input from members 
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(Cunha 2003, pp. 115–117).  In 1996 the leadership withdrew its presidential 
candidate to promote left-unity with the PS.  Meanwhile, Renovadores advocated 
alternative ideological inspirations in CC meetings and used their influence to tone 
down references to Marxism-Leninism in policy documents and campaigns.  As editor 
of Avante, Brito published articles that debated reform in other WECPs.  However, 
there were only modest changes to statutes and programmes.  The Renovadores were 
unable to curtail the party’s ritualistic PS-bashing or Euroscepticism and Marxism-
Leninism was not abandoned as some scholars reported (Dunphy 2004, p. 119). 
 
The Renovadores struggled to work through existing party structures to instigate 
reform.  Most of the elite still lacked the outside experiences that Grzymała-Busse 
argues will promote reform and stood in their way.  A majority of those with such 
experiences failed to support them.  Carvalhas was unable to dominate the PCP’s 
daily executive the Secretariat as Cunhal had done and was forced to share power 
with it under collective decision making (Publico, 26.11.04a/b).  This informal 
empowerment of the Secretariat was the PCP’s major organisational change in the 
1990s.  Turnover there remained low and its members had little political experience 
beyond internal administrative tasks.  Only two Renovadores were in the Secretariat 
which was dominated by former clandestine, orthodox elites loyal to Cunhal.  They 
included Cunhal’s henchman Abrantes who was the only Secretariat member other 
than Carvalhas who sat also in the Political Commission.  In practice Abrantes was 
the real Secretary-General while Carvalhas was only a public figurehead (Publico, 
26.11.04).  
  
The PCP’s pyramid shaped institutional structure meant that the reformers had 
numerous obstacles in their way and could not transform the party unless they had 
control at the very top.  Even with majorities in the Political Commission and 
occasionally in the CC the Renovadores failed to secure reform, being outflanked by 
their superiors in the Secretariat.  They prevented cooperation with the minority PS 
government in 1995, instructed their parliamentarians to vote against PS budget 
proposals and fiercely criticised it for shifting rightwards.  This left Carvalhas’s 
strategy in tatters and prompted the Renovadores to redouble their efforts.  However, 
in 1998, Brito was replaced as editor of Avante which fell back in line.  The 
Secretariat also empowered the orthodox Control Commission with executive powers 
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to punish dissidents and gave it more influence in compiling candidate lists for the 
CC. 
   
Before the PCP’s Sixteenth Congress in 2000 Cunhal led a rearguard action by 
orthodox elites.  He publicly criticised Carvalhas’s deviation from Marxism-
Leninism, the possibility of allying with the PS and social democratisation under the 
New Impulse (see Dunphy 2004, p. 119).  Cunhal returned to personally instruct the 
Secretariat and seized control of key organisations in Lisbon and Setúbal.  He used his 
influence to break the Renovadores’ majority in the Political Commission where votes 
became deadlocked and they were weakened by Sá’s untimely death in 1999 which 
deprived the PCP of its leading face of change (Cunha 2003, p. 117).  Carvalhas and 
his supporters failed to resist the takeover and could not compete with Cunhal’s 
authority.  They suddenly abandoned the Renovadores and destroyed their majority in 
the CC.  The Renovadores had helped Carvalhas to rise to power and saw him as one 
of their own but were taken by surprise as he tried to save his own position (Publico, 
05.10.2004).    
 
The Renovadores forged a larger movement than previous dissidents and posed a 
bigger challenge to Cunhal.  However, following a year of internecine struggle, 
Carvalhas worked with the orthodox Secretariat to crush them at the Sixteenth 
Congress in 2000 (Cunha 2003, p. 119).  He shifted the Political Commission’s policy 
making powers to the Secretariat which deleted the reforms from the New Impulse in 
draft congress programmes and Abrantes designed orthodox alternatives (Publico, 
26.11.04a).  The Political Commission’s input into the list for the CC was assumed by 
the Control Commission.   
 
The Renovadores openly criticised party strategy and were condemned in Avante for 
factionalism.  They found that congress delegate elections were controlled by the 
Secretariat and they were given little space to express themselves making the congress 
a fait accompli.  Carvalhas’s congress speech called for a less abstract form of 
Marxism-Leninism than in CEE (Carvalhas, 2000).  However, this was not a sign of 
moderation as some interpreted it (Dunphy 2004, p. 119) but rhetoric borrowed from 
Cunhal’s earlier attempts to disclaim the relevance of events in the Soviet bloc 
(Cunhal, 1995).  Cunhal was too ill to attend the congress but wrote a letter 
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instructing it remain ideologically pure (Cunha, 2003).  The party line became more 
orthodox as Carvalhas reasserted Marxism-Leninism, castigated the Renovadores’s 
public criticisms and denounced their attempts to ‘de-characterise’ the party 
(Carvalhas, 2000; PCP, 2000a).  
 
Most Renovadores including Political Commission members were dropped en masse 
from the CC.  They were replaced with 44 new CC members, most being young 
highly orthodox functionaries from the Stalinist youth organisation the JCP (PCP, 
2000a).  High ranking Renovadores that survived the purge often left in frustration, 
including Henrique de Silva who resigned from the Secretariat.  The CC was approved 
with the highest ever number of opposing votes but still only 121 of 1700 delegates 
voted against or abstained (Cunha 2003, p. 119).  Decline at the 2001 local election 
fuelled further dissidence from Renovadores.  Those in Lisbon’s intellectual sector 
called for an extraordinary-congress, but the leadership ignored them, sacked their 
leaders and installed orthodox replacements (Cunha 2003, p. 120).   
 
The PCP fell from nine per cent of the vote in 1999 to seven per cent at the 2002 
parliamentary elections prompting further dissidence (Cunha 2003, p. 120).  The 
leadership responded by expelling several former Political Commission members 
(PCP, 2002).  Reformist Parliamentarian João Amaral was also deselected (Mullan, 
2002). Expulsions continued during 2002 prompting resignations from high ranking 
Unitarian workers and CC members (Radio Noticias, 14.04.02).  Most Renovadores 
wanted to stay in the PCP but found themselves excluded from positions of 
responsibility and left from 2000–02.  When a small Committee for the Promotion of 
Renewal with around 200 members started in 2003 further expulsions took place 
(Magone 2004, p. 1119).  
 
The Renovadores had prior experience at broadening appeals from working in trade 
unions, in elected office, as professionals outside the party and in the Lisbon 
municipal alliance with the PS.  However, they did not envisage shifting power to 
themselves or new centralistic organisational structures and streamlining.  They used 
their positions to encourage moderation from above but few believed a major ideological 
transformation should be forced through or envisaged a centralistic process of change.  
Instead they aimed to initiate democratisation and debate to spur ideological renewal.  
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The Renovadores also had other attributes beneficial to this strategy.  Experience of 
running clandestine operations, intricate knowledge of party procedures and contacts 
throughout the party helped them build a strong movement.  
 
The Renovadores believed that the Secretariat would block any effort to centralise, 
distort elite advancement processes or to redirect power to the Political Commission 
and that the rank and file needed to be empowered to break its grip on the party.  
Without control over the Secretariat, they were unable to use discipline under 
democratic centralism to their advantage or centralise party structures.  Ultimately, 
the Renovadores ‘portable skills’ mattered little to the final outcome because they 
lacked influence at the very top, making their attempt at reform an uphill struggle.  
 
In the 1990s, scholars saw signs that the PCP was breaking with Marxism-Leninism 
or gaining ‘inclusion’ in the party system through its municipal coalition with the PS 
in Lisbon (Bosco 2001, p. 351).  However, the Renovadores failed to consolidate 
these changes.  Their attempt at reform was too little too late.  When they broke ranks 
they found it hard to justify their complicity in crushing previous dissidents and why 
they had stayed quiet for so long.  The Renovadores had experiences that Grzymała-
Busse found to be beneficial to reform in parties in CEE but did not unite around an 
alternative ideology.  While most Renovadores accepted the need for compromises with 
the PS and European integration only a few of them sought to re-cast the party along 
social democratic lines.  Most of them refused to break with Communism, preferring 
to renovate it in a more a pluralistic form.  The Renovadores fragmented as several 
hundred of them formed the Associaçao da Renovaçao Communista to campaign for 
the renovation of the PCP from outside its structures (Renovação Comunista, 2007, 
2003).  Others joined radical left rivals the BE or the PS.  
 
The PCP became increasingly orthodox following the Renovadores’s defeat.  
Carvalhas was no longer needed to unite the party.  He was weakened without the 
Renovadores’s support, enabling hard-line elites to replace him.  Although the party 
claimed that decided to Carvalhas step down in 2004, Abrantes forced his hand 
(Publico, 05.10.04, 20.08.05).  Abrantes played kingmaker and his extremely 
orthodox protégé Jerónimo De Sousa was accepted by the CC as Secretary-General 
after being the only candidate (Publico, 26.11.04, 17.11.04).  Both Carvalhas and De 
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Sousa reasserted an orthodox line at congresses in 2004 and 2008 (PCP, 2008a; De 
Sousa 2008, 2004; Publico, 26.11.04b; Carvalhas, 2004).  Cunhal died having ensured 
that party programmes changed little since 1965 (PCP, 2009; Cunha 1992, p. 162).  
Revolutionary rhetoric, praise of Stalin and solidarity with North Korea continue to 
dominate appeals devoid of budgeted proposals (PCP, 2008a, 2005, 2004a; Avante, 
16.10.08). The leadership continues to prevent municipal alliances other than concealed 
agreements with right-wing parties to block the PS from controlling local executives.   
 
De Sousa has made the party even more orthodox.  It increasingly campaigns on his 
working-class roots and identifies mounting dangers from trans-national capitalism 
and of capitalist imperialism by NATO (PCP, 2008a; De Sousa, 2006).  
Unencumbered by the Renovadores, the leadership employs technical Marxist-
Leninist terminology in campaigns and in 2008 approved the policy of leaving the 
Euro.  The PCP has rejected joining the Party of the European Left – not over 
ideological differences – but because it now rejects ‘supra-national’ institutions per se 
(PCP, 2008a, 2008b; Avante, 27.10.05; Magone 2004, p. 1119).  It has also broken its 
alliance with the PS and BE in Lisbon (Cunha 2008, p. 18).   De Sousa argues that the 
PS have become too right-wing and the BE are bourgeois and favours street-protests 
above compromising to attain political power (Marao, 01.12.08; De Sousa, 2008; 
Freire and Costa Lobo 2008, p. 584).  In contrast, Cunhal sometimes accepted unholy 
alliances or electoral campaigns with broader appeal if they could help the party to gain 
influence. 
 
Democratic centralism remained intact in the PCP even after parliament passed laws 
in 2003 banning it from holding congress votes for appointing officials by show of 
hands and CC members from being in the Control Commission (Publico, 20.10.04; 
PCP, 2004b).  Secret balloting did little to increase the number of dissenting congress 
votes (Cunha 2008, p. 9).  Only eight of 1402 delegates voted against the list for the 
CC at the 2008 congress.  Little seems likely to change until the leadership’s control 
over the selection of congress delegates is broken or congresses vote on a plurality of 
candidates.  Like Carvalhas, De Sousa lacks full control over the Secretariat as 
collective responsibility now minimises the risk of future Secretary-Generals 
implementing reforms (Cunha 2008, p. 16).  Democratic centralism is more rigid than 
ever.  Critics find less toleration than under Cunhal and there is less room for 
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ideological pluralism in the elite.  Senior politicians continue to struggle to speak 
about party history for fear of misrepresenting the party line and believe that the party 
is under attack in a hostile environment.   
 
When De Sousa became Secretary-General critical CC and Political Commission 
members were removed; leading ‘Carvalhistas’ fell on their swords and older elites 
retired (Diario de Noticias, 24.11.04).  In response, the leadership increased the 
insular promotion of young highly orthodox functionaries from the JCP that began in 
2000 (Carvalhas, 2000).  The number of CC members under forty years old increased 
from thirty–nine in 2000, forty–eight in 2004 and fifty–six in 2008; nearly all of them 
came from the JCP (PCP, 2008b, 2004b, 2000b, 1996).  Concomitantly, Unitarian 
workers and intellectuals become more underrepresented in the elite as orthodox elites 
curtailed the advancement of middle class intellectuals which they blamed for 
triggering Perestroika in the Soviet Union.  Most CC members (113 of 176 in 2004) 
also remained party functionaries (Cunha 2008, p. 8).   
 
The JCP became increasingly orthodox and sectarian during the 1980s and lost 
influence in student union politics.  It now attracts few students.  The apparatchiks 
promoted from it seem unlikely to be a source for reform from the perspective of 
Grzymała-Busse’s framework.  They lack political or professional experience outside 
the party.  These elites are being promoted because they are ‘yes men’ rather than 
because they have impressive political reputations and have little stature in the 
leadership.  Their language of struggle lacks resonance with their peers who 
increasingly join the more pluralistic BE and the PCP struggles to recruit young 
members (Cunha 2003, p. 20). 
 
Sporadic calls for democratisation, reforms and inquiries into the party’s troubles still 
occur but are ignored or shouted down by congress officials (Publico, 26.11.04, 
27.11.04, Diario de Noticias, 24.11.04).  The PCP staved off further electoral decline 
in recent parliamentary elections and marginally increased its share of the vote (see 
Table 2.1).  De Sousa’s leadership seemed to slightly boost the PCP’s support 
(Magone 2005, p. 1164; Freire and Costa Lobo 2008, p. 584).  It might be a while 
before the next shock.  However, scholars predict it is only a matter of time before 
PCP is forced to change (Cunha 2008, p. 18).  In 2009 it fell from being the third to 
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fifth largest party in Portugal and was overtaken by left-wing rivals the BE.  It is 
unclear where the next episode of dissidence will come from with only a handful of 
moderates remaining in prominent positions.  Intellectuals and Unitarian workers 
including the leader of the CGTP trade union Carvalho da Silva still harbour 
criticisms of the leadership but are declining in influence (Publico, 19.11.04).   
 
2.5 Conclusion  
The PCP’s leaders resisted pressures to change from electoral defeats and the collapse 
of Communism in CEE.  Its programmes and electoral strategy show remarkable 
continuity since 1974 and have even become more orthodox.  Analysis using 
Grzymała-Busse’s framework reveals eight main lessons about WECPs.  First, it shows 
that they could maintain rigid forms of democratic centralism.  This allowed the 
PCP’s orthodox Secretary-General Cunhal and later the Secretariat to dominate the 
levers of power.  A second lesson is that while the cases Grzymała-Busse analysed 
had their old heads lopped off, this was not always the case for WECPs in which 
some leaders resisted calls for their resignation.  Having retired in 1992, Cunhal 
controlled the party even a decade later and blocked reforms.  The PCP’s mid-level 
elites posed a barrier to reform.  However, this was not because their mid-level roles 
promoted orthodoxy per se but because they were tightly controlled by the old guard 
in the leadership which posed a larger obstacle to ideological transformation.  
  
Third, the PCP supports Grzymała-Busse’s idea that prior experiences in negotiating 
with outsiders can shape elites’ ability to adapt following exogenous shocks.  Her 
framework helps to explain why so few reformers emerged in the PCP.  Gradual and 
insular elite advancement practices insulated the PCP’s orthodoxy from expansion 
following the Carnation Revolution and multiple crises since the late 1980s.  When 
elites hardened by clandestine struggle were replaced this was with obedient fulltime 
functionaries and zealots from the party’s youth organisation.  Phony electoral 
alliances with front parties rather than meaningful negotiations with the PS also 
limited opportunities for negotiation with outsiders.  The lack of reformist elites made 
it much harder to push Cunhal and old orthodox elites aside.  
 
Fourth, analysis shows that Grzymała-Busse’s framework can be used to study why 
some elites change, even when their parties do not.  It supports her argument that 
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elites with experiences of negotiating with outsiders (prior to and following their 
advancement to the elite) are better equipped to respond to pressures to reform than 
those without.  The PCP’s leaders recognised this and pursued advancement policies 
that not only rooted out heretics but underrepresented groups that might be 
predisposed to seeking reform or had greater potential for dissidence.  Most leading 
reformers responded to pressures for reform including the collapse of Communism 
and electoral defeats because they had moderated gradually through connections with 
outside groups and institutions.  Scholars have noted that horizontal discussion 
between branches would help the PCP to reform itself (Cunha 2008, p. 17).  Analysis 
informed by Grzymała-Busse’s framework shows that reformers would be advised to 
begin by relaxing elite advancement practices.   
 
Cunhal’s strategy of infiltrating all aspects of Portuguese society made those with 
influence in outside political organisations, professions or Unitarian valuable.  It was 
impractical to filter them out from the elite altogether.  What is more, the party could 
not avoid having elites whose party roles directly involved negotiation with outside 
groups and institutions. Even visiting the eastern bloc gave opportunities for 
mediating with outsiders.  Rigid elite advancement practices meant that the latter 
factors proved more influential on dissidents at the top of the party causing even 
highly orthodox functionaries to gradually moderate.  In contrast, the former played a 
greater influence on the minority of CC members, mid-level elites and members who 
joined their factions.  Grzymała-Busse’s framework helps us to understand the 
dissidence of reformers outside the elite as well.   
 
Fifth, analysis supports Grzymała-Busse’s argument that the relationship between 
outside experience and reform only works on a ‘probabilistic level’.  That Cunhal 
consciously tried to maintain his ideological purity in light of the moderating effects 
of outside experiences had a profound impact on the PCP.  Further, only a minority of 
those negotiating with outside groups became dissidents – in no small part – because 
of countervailing pressures from party culture and fear of being punished.  Experience 
in negotiating with outsiders could be sufficient for elites to embrace reform but was 
not a necessary factor.  Surprisingly, some orthodox elites with little prior background 
in negotiating with outside political forces or who ignored such experiences 
responded suddenly to the pressures to change.  However, in accordance with 
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Grzymała-Busse’s argument that elites’ ‘portable skills’ mattered more than the desire 
for reform per se; they struggled to envisage a new ideological direction or took 
peculiar directions like Zita Seabra.  Further research is needed to investigate whether 
it was a general trend for such elites to simply give up on left-wing politics or politics 
altogether.  
 
A sixth lesson is that WECPs could fail to adapt even when some of their elites were 
highly equipped with experience in negotiating with outsiders and in carrying out 
prior reforms.  Grzymała-Busse’s framework is useful in telling us that parties with 
restrictive elite advancement policies will struggle to break with Communism.  
However, it does not tell us whether the presence of highly-equipped elites alone is 
enough to bring about reform; how many ‘skilled’ reformists are necessary for reform 
(e.g. whether they have to be a majority in the elite) or the factors that may block 
these ‘organisational Supermen’.   
 
The PCP shows that a powerful old guard could use democratic centralism highly 
effectively against them.  The ‘Six’, Zita Seabra, the Third Way and the Renovadores 
employed a range of strategies.  All their attempts to use organisational change to 
stimulate programmatic transformation were crushed as Cunhal resisted change.  He 
blocked their internal attempts to reform and disciplined them for factionalism when 
they resorted to public criticisms.  During the late 1990s, the Renovadores’s positions 
at the top of the party enabled them make greater inroads to implementing reforms but 
they still encountered this no win situation.   
 
An eighth lesson from the PCP is that there have been significant opportunities for 
reformers to gain experience in carrying out reforms prior to (and following) the 
collapse of Communism in 1989 in even the most hard-line WECPs.  In contrast, 
Grzymała-Busse found that the most hard-line parties in CEE had elites with minimal 
prior experience in implementing reforms.  If this is a general trend then according to 
her arguments about the link between prior reform and centralisation then we have 
reason to expect that elites equipped to centralise should be more prevalent in 
WECPs.  However, this relationship between carrying out prior reforms and 
organisational centralisation is not borne out by the reformers in the PCP.  They had 
encountered resistance to prior reforms but rejected centralising in favour of 
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democratisation and a participative process to bring about ideological renewal.  They 
shared this belief with those who lacked prior experience in implementing reforms 
and these experiences actually made them even more committed to democratisation.  
Moreover, negotiation with outsiders prompted them to seek reforms but they did not 
unite around social democratisation and most of them rejected this option.  
 
  
78 
Chapter Three  
The Dutch Socialist Party – the Centralisers 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Anna Grzymała-Busse identifies how several Communist Parties in CEE thoroughly 
reformed themselves and became both social democratic and coalitionable.  This was 
possible not only because their leaders abandoned democratic centralism but also 
because rather just ‘democratise’, they established new highly centralised 
organisations.  The power these leaders enjoyed enabled them to overcome internal 
resistance from radical mid-level elites and to force through painful changes.  Similar 
cases are harder to find amongst WECPs.  The existing literature on WECPs shows 
little evidence of similar developments (see for example Bull, 1994).  It seems that 
most WECPs that transformed themselves dismantled democratic centralism and 
democratised their organisations. 
 
This chapter shows that the Dutch Socialistische Partij (SP), formed in 1972 out of a 
Maoist splinter group of the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN), bucks the 
trend.  Although the SP did not adhere to the instructions of the Soviet Union it still 
faced many of the same dilemmas as its Communist counterparts in other countries in 
1989 and it needed both to renew itself and to find a new purpose.  The SP’s vote-
seeking leaders successfully abandoned Marxism-Leninism for a moderate brand of 
socialism in 1991 before ‘social democratising’ in the late 1990s, and pursing an 
office seeking strategy after 2002.  As they embraced mainstream politics the SP 
achieved remarkable electoral expansion.  It went from a being tiny sect of around 
500 members with a handful of local councillors to becoming the third largest party in 
the Netherlands by 2006 with over 50,000 members and 25 MPs (see Tables 3.1 and 
3.2).   
 
Scholars have pointed to the SP’s highly adaptive, chameleon-like characteristics 
(Voerman 2004, p. 48; 2007, p. 1).  This chapter shows that the SP had a highly 
centralised organisation as Grzymała-Busse’s framework leads us to expect of parties 
that managed to break with Communism.  This allowed its leaders to radically change 
its programmes and electoral strategy.  The SP appears to be Western Europe’s best 
example of a Communist party that reformed into a social democratic party through 
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centralised processes.  Although it did not join the socialist International or the Party 
of European Socialists its leaders accepted a large number of social democratic 
policies and abandoned revolutionary politics.  While successors of the Italian PCI 
faced a turbulent path, the Swedish Left Party’s leaders encountered an internal 
backlash and in Ireland Democratic Left’s parliamentarians were absorbed by the 
Labour party, the SP’s leaders have, thus far, maintained firm control over strategy.  
This analysis of the SP’s development supports Grzymała-Busse’s idea that flexible 
elite advancement processes that promote elites experienced in negotiating with 
outside groups are beneficial to reform.  It also seems to support her argument that 
such elites pursue organisational centralisation and that this is beneficial to 
transformation.   
 
Table 3.1: Electoral results of the SP in parliamentary elections 
(Voerman, 2008). 
 
The chapter is structured in four sections.  The first analyses the SP’s development in 
the 1970s and identifies the emergence of a new pragmatic elite that prioritised 
electoral expansion.  The second section shows how the leadership used democratic 
centralism to build up the SP’s central office in order to repackage the party and that 
this helped it to break with Marxism-Leninism in 1991.  The third section shows that, 
while the SP appeared to democratise in 1991, it actually established a new highly 
centralised organisational model that helped its leaders to make (and consolidate) 
further transformations in party strategy and to crush resistance from mid-level elites.  
This process meant that in several respects the SP became more centralised than it had 
been under democratic centralism in the 1980s.  It analyses how a small clique or 
‘inner circle’ of elites dominated the SP’s leadership bodies.  The final section 
analyses the SP’s social democratisation and office-seeking.  It shows that the 
expansion this delivered presented new challenges but its centralised organisation has, 
thus far, helped its leaders to retain control, even at times of remarkable growth. 
 
 
 
Year  1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2006 
Votes (per cent) 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 1.3 3.5 5.9 6.3 16.6 
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Table 3.2: Membership figures of the SP 
Year  1975 1992 1995 1998 2002 2006 2007 2010 
Members 500 15,000 17,000 22,000 27,291 44,853 50,238 46,507 
(Voerman, 2008; DNPP, 2010).  
 
3.2 Breaking with Mao 
The Communist Party of the Netherlands/Marxist-Leninist (KPN/ML) renamed itself 
as the Socialist Party in 1972.4  To the Socialist Party, the CPN had strayed from 
orthodox Communism (Voerman 2008, p. 28).  It emphasised revolution and 
defended Stalin, Mao and Marxism-Leninism while rejecting Khrushchev’s 
justifications of parliamentary socialism.  The SP was the vanguard for a violent 
revolution.  It saw parliament as a façade for the rule of the capitalist elite and 
doubted that parliamentary reforms could break the power of the ruling class 
(Voerman 1994a, p. 7).   
 
The SP forged links with the Communist Party of China and revelled in extra-
parliamentary activism.  It embraced Mao’s method of the ‘mass line’.  SP activists 
maintained daily contact with the masses, speaking with people in local 
neighbourhoods and factories.  They became known as the ‘Red Jehovahs’ for their 
energetic canvassing and attempts to rally the poor around local concerns, housing 
shortages and low wages in an effort to form class consciousness (Voerman 1986, p. 
124).  The SP began providing its own doctors and legal services for workers, tenants 
and consumers in those cities where it was strongest including Oss.  SP activists were 
visible in marketplaces each week to speak with people about local problems.  They 
sought to differentiate themselves from other politicians who tended to only do this at 
election time.  The SP claimed to be the ‘voice of the people’, interpreting the desires 
of the ‘ordinary people’ and made populist criticisms of the political elite for being 
self serving and out of touch (Voerman 1994b, p. 4).  Participation in parliament (or 
governing) was simply a propaganda tool used to publicise grass roots activism and a 
revolution by the masses (SP 1987, 1974).  The SP was hostile to feminism and made 
                                                           
4
  KPN/ML emerged as a split in the Dutch Maoist movement.  It broke from Kommunistiese 
Eenheidsbeweging Nederland (expelled from the CPN in 1964), believing it to be too intellectual and 
not proletarian enough (see Voerman and van Schuur, 1995). 
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nationalistic appeals about the dangers of migrants failing to integrate and dividing 
the poor in their struggle against capitalism (Voerman 1986, p. 16).   
 
The SP operated under democratic centralism.  Branches expelled those who did not 
uphold strict discipline, including several activists who pursued a social democratic 
line during the early 1980s.  Members had to study Communist theory, practice self-
criticism and face probationary periods before being granted membership status.  
They had to work up to seven days a week handing out leaflets, selling the party 
paper, knocking on doors and/or operating in factories to recruit workers.  The SP’s 
statutes established that the rank and file were subordinate to the decisions made by 
congresses and the leadership (SP, 1976).  Divisions were kept inside the SP to ensure 
it spoke with one voice.  Daan Monjé, its founding leader, a blue-collar worker from 
Rotterdam harbour who was expelled from the CPN in 1956 during the Sino-Soviet 
split, dominated its executive Board.   
 
The SP developed in the largely Catholic South of the Netherlands, in rural areas but 
soon grew in small towns (most notably in the Brabant Province) where the Labour 
Party (PvdA) was weak.  It broke with Mao and China in the late 1970s.  The 
leadership developed doubts about Maoism’s relevance to Dutch society.  Their 
experience of local activism showed them that it was unpopular, not practical enough, 
and they observed the problems that emerged in China.  Maoism was dropped silently 
in a top-down fashion by the executive Committee and the Maoist phrase ‘Dare to 
struggle, Dare to Win’ was removed from the party paper Tribune.  Rigid application 
of democratic centralism ensured there was little discussion or room for resistance.  
The party retained ideas associated with Mao’s ‘mass line’.  Being in touch with 
‘ordinary people’ meant the SP’s leaders could justify enormous changes in policy as 
being what the people wanted (Voerman 2007b, p. 3).  This would help the leadership 
to mastermind the party’s transformation.  Even the SP’s own theoretical inspirations 
could not get in the way.  The SP’s populism and contacts with outside groups and 
institutions increasingly began to trump its theory.  
 
As the SP struggled to gain support, its leaders sought to tailor its theory to Dutch 
conditions.  The idea of violent revolution was dropped and opposition to 
parliamentary democracy was moderated.  This was accepted as the best form of 
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government possible under capitalism, and supporting membership was introduced for 
less committed activists (Voerman 1994a, p. 7).  Grass roots activism held the SP 
together as it abandoned Mao.  The SP fell back on Marxism-Leninism, local activism 
and the idea of the mass line.  The SP’s proposals remained committed to withdrawal 
from NATO, disarmament, nationalisation of the means of production, abolishing the 
free-market and massive reductions in unemployment (SP 1974, 1987).   
 
During the early 1970s the SP gained five councillors and by the early 1980s it 
expanded to around twenty, many being in the province of Brabant (van der Steen 
1994, p. 173).  Working in local councils had a moderating influence on the SP’s elite 
who encountered the constraints of elected office.  They became more practically 
minded, less attached to abstract theoretical ideas and more concerned with making 
concrete practical proposals on issues including housing problems and streetlamps.  
Moreover, they became committed to gaining political power to make changes.  
Expansion in local councils meant that Monjé lost influence in some local branches.  
Leading activists came to be increasingly focused on making practical changes and 
less concerned with radical theory through dealing with everyday local problems.   
 
The SP’s elite advancement policies were strict.  Only loyal activists could rise up the 
chain of command.  This runs contrary to what Grzymała-Busse found in those parties 
that dramatically transformed themselves in CEE.  Most of the SP’s founders were 
students and more joined it during the 1970s.  The newcomers were increasingly less 
hard-line than Monjé and the parties’ founders and had not been in the CPN 
(including future party chair Tiny Kox).  Monjé was sceptical of promoting 
intellectuals, believing that workers should be at the forefront of the vanguard party.  
However, loyalty remained the major criteria for promotion and the students worked 
in factories to proletarianise themselves and to recruit workers.  There was generally 
little turnover in the SP’s leadership; however, Monjé let some of the new students 
and the councillors gain important positions.  As the SP expanded in local politics, 
more of the elite, including Kox, became councillors.  Monjé was warned that 
pragmatists would gain influence by his orthodox allies in Rotterdam, who lacked 
experience in councils.  However, he was generally enthusiastic toward the increased 
influence the councillors provided the party and allowed them into the leadership.   
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What happened next supports Grzymała-Busse’s argument that elites with experience 
of negotiating with groups outside their parties are predisposed to seeking reform.  In 
the mid-1980s, the councillors and younger generation of activists came into conflict 
with Monjé and his supporters in the Party Board.  They were frustrated that the SP 
was unable to gain parliamentary representation, despite the low threshold for this in 
the Netherlands.  In particular, they questioned Monjé’s strategy of sending weekly 
lorry loads of aid to the British miners even after their strike had collapsed.  Monjé 
believed that local activism would eventually bring success in parliamentary elections 
while older cadres were not interested in ideological renewal or electoral politics.  The 
councillors rejected this, and found that SP voters in local elections were not voting 
SP in parliamentary elections because it lacked national visibility.  They argued for a 
redirection of resources to raise the SP’s national profile and to prioritise electoral 
success and winning seats in parliament.   
 
The councillors’ calls for a strategic reassessment resonated in the SP’s Board.  Monjé 
had grown ill and was unable to maintain a full-time presence at Board meetings.  
This allowed Kox to arrange for the charismatic Jan Marijnissen, a former sausage 
factory worker and an influential local councillor from Oss, who was hitherto 
excluded from the leadership, to enter the Board.  Monjé occasionally attended Board 
meetings to assert his control but his influence waned and he was ousted from power.  
Marijnissen, became the new face of the SP.  He was once a hardliner who would 
quote Mao in council meetings, but had become pragmatic.  The new leadership 
consolidated their power after Monjé died in 1986. 
 
3.3 The Great leap forward 
The SP’s new leaders set about remaking the SP into a force in national elections.  
Marijnissen and Kox, (or ‘The Rat’ as he became known within the party elite) 
obtained extensive control over the SP’s internal structures.  Democratic centralism 
enabled the leadership to retain firm control over elite advancement and policy-
making.  Symbolically, the only speakers from the SP at Monjé’s funeral were from 
the minority opposition to the new leadership.  They were expelled soon after, as were 
those Monjé chose to succeed him.  Some branches loyal to Monjé left.  Jan Carter, a 
Monjé supporter, tried to take over central office but was unable to muster support.  
The Board chose Marijnissen as chair in 1988.  He replaced Hans van Hooft, who was 
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seen as too Stalinist by the reformers and who left the Board in 1991.  The SP 
increased its number of councillors to over 40 in 1986.  The councillors continued to 
replace the old guard and were promoted to influential posts including on the Board. 
 
The SP’s leaders had previously carried out reforms to broaden the party’s appeal.  
They had done this in local councils and had supported the break with Mao.  Just like 
Grzymała-Busse’s cases of successful transformation in CEE, they also centralised 
during the late-1980s.  The leaders recognised a lack of coordination between 
branches and that local party leaders/activists were running campaigns that were 
radical and failed to engage with national political debates.  The SP’s central office in 
Rotterdam was staffed by only a handful of activists and was less well equipped than 
local offices.  It did not even know how many members the SP had.  Marijnissen 
redirected power and resources to refurbish central office, increasing its staff from 
three to sixteen functionaries and it took control of administrative tasks.  Central 
office increasingly intervened in the affairs of local branches and gained power to 
coordinate campaigns.  It distributed centrally made material to replace that made by 
radical activists in local branches.  The SP’s small size meant that there was little need 
for them to streamline the party apparatus as in Grzymała-Busse’s cases in CEE. 
 
The leadership retained tight control over the party paper Tribune and Marijnissen 
centralised its production.  Previously its writers lived across the Netherlands.  They 
were moved to Rotterdam.  Central office focused on promoting the profile of 
candidates for parliamentary elections and running nation-wide campaigns.  The aim 
was to criticise government policies and to set out the SP’s national level goals to 
provide reasons to vote SP in parliamentary elections.  The SP’s leaders made 
themselves increasingly available to journalists.  Loyal activists were also forced to 
move across the Netherlands to establish new branches and to take control of 
unreliable districts.  This process of centralisation before the collapse of Communism 
ensured that the SP was well positioned to react after 1989 and to be effective in 
promoting vote-seeking policy reforms.   
 
The SP’s leaders initially focused on building up a campaign machine more than 
ideological change.  They managed to convince the Board to hold a congress in 1987 
(the first in ten years).  However, they reaffirmed their commitment to Marxism-
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Leninism, historical materialism, and democratic centralism while committing to the 
formulation of a new party programme and statutes in the future.  Although the SP 
continued to expand in local elections, centralisation was not enough to secure entry 
into parliament in the 1989 election.  The leadership’s attempts to induce change 
doubled following this failure and the collapse of Communism in CEE (Voerman 
1994a, p. 3).  The latter provided an opportunity to break with Marxism-Leninism and 
Communist symbolism which the leadership believed were impractical and lacking in 
electoral appeal. 
 
The dynamics of the party system also shaped the leadership’s priorities.  The PvdA 
broke tradition by pursuing allegedly neo-liberal policies, including privatisations and 
welfare cuts, under Lubbers’ (1989–1994) and Wim Kok’s ‘Purple-Governments’ 
(1994–2002) (see Hillebrand and Irwin 1999, p. 123).  This provided the SP with an 
opportune moment to moderate (Voerman 2008, p. 38).  Its pragmatic leaders seized 
the initiative, re-positioning themselves as a credible alternative for disaffected PvdA 
supporters (Voerman 2008, p. 35).  GroenLinks, a merger between the CPN and the 
other main Dutch left parties, took a Left-Libertarian direction making the SP the 
clearest ‘left’ alternative to the PvdA and the main beneficiary of the PvdA’s electoral 
difficulties.   
 
The new programme, Charter 2000, was formulated during 1989–1991 (SP, 1991a).  
It recognised the need for freedom of expression while jettisoning Marxism-Leninism 
and the nationalisation of the means of production.  Marijnissen argued that taking 
Marxism-Leninism out of the programme was like removing a ‘millstone around our 
necks’ (Voerman 2007b, p. 3).  Instead, a vague notion of ‘socialism’ (not 
Communism) became the SP’s ideology: ‘Socialism’ was a ‘guiding set of morals’ 
rather than an objective blueprint for society.  It involved preventing privatisations, 
implementing economic planning, full-employment, establishing workers’ councils 
and ‘socialising’ the economy under democratic control (SP, 1991a).  The SP 
remained a ‘weapon of the working class’ that would contest capitalist profit motives 
(SP, 1991a).  Its vision remained Marxist in several respects but this was toned down.  
The moderation continued in 1993 with a subtle name change from Socialistiese 
Partij, to the apparently less reactionary, Socialistische Partij. 
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The leadership appeared to democratise in 1991 in an attempt to broaden appeal and 
to make the SP an acceptable mainstream party (Voerman 2008, p. 31).  Restrictions 
on membership were relaxed to provide additional funding, and the 12,000 
subscribers of Tribune were invited to join its 500 activists as full members; members 
now needed just a three month probationary period to prove their reliability.  The size 
of the leadership was expanded as the executive Board grew from between three–five 
members to seven and a general Board of 40 members was introduced; nineteen being 
elected by congress and 21 being regional leaders selected by regional conferences.  
Regular party congresses were scheduled, providing opportunities to update 
programmes.  A monthly party Council was also introduced in which chairs of local 
branches had 96 per cent of the votes, allowing them to monitor the leadership (see 
Voerman, 2007).  Transparent budget statements were also introduced in 1992 to 
show where the SP spent its money (van der Steen 1994, p. 178). 
 
The party leadership argued that the formulation of ‘Charter 2000’ democratised 
policy-making and was highly participative (see Kox, 2009).  Kox and Marijnissen 
drafted the basis for the programme, a document called ‘A Society for People’.  This 
was distributed by activists in a mass campaign, that talking with ‘the people’ to find 
out what a modern socialist party should be like after the collapse of Communism.  
The SP argued that the new programme was made from ‘half a million pieces’ as its 
activists presented feedback to central office.  However, democratic centralism gave 
the leadership immense scope to interpret what ‘the people’ thought.  The leadership 
went in the direction it wanted, as it had always done under the method of the mass 
line (Voerman Interview, 09.07.09).  Those involved report that there was little 
critically minded discussion about the leadership’s proposals and that the process was 
more of a campaign to publicise the SP’s moderation than an open instrument of 
policy formulation.  The campaign successfully gained media coverage for the SP, 
which for the first time bought advertising space in national newspapers.  The policy 
changes were driven by the leadership which wrote the programme.   
 
The SP had been a party devoid of debate in the 1980s.  Political education and debate 
was further scaled back after the break with Maoism.  The leadership did little to 
encourage members to critique its proposals or to begin thinking critically about the 
SP’s direction as in other parties like the CPN.  Most activists simply deferred to the 
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wisdom of the leadership and were unskilled or inexperienced in debate.  Grzymała-
Busse’s finding that radical mid-level elites tried to sabotage reform in CEE, misses 
how in some WECPs they could be so used to following their leaders that they 
accepted changes and were too unprepared to assert themselves.   
 
The leadership got all of its changes passed by congress.  The SP’s leaders argue that 
there was little dissidence in response to their reforms because members shared a 
moderate perspective from their experience of activism.  However, it was also highly 
significant that the leadership used democratic centralism to provide little room for 
internal criticism.  Feminists tried to organise as a faction to promote an alternative 
ideological direction before the 1991 congress and called for equal representation in 
the Board.  The leadership opposed this, portrayed them as trying to organise a coup 
and ensured that the congress overwhelmingly rejected their proposals.   
 
Because the structures of democratic centralism were not relinquished minority 
groups of hardliners had to uphold internal discipline and follow the leadership’s line.  
When the Communist leadership in Zwolle opposed the professionalisation and 
opening up of membership for fear that the newcomers would downgrade the SP’s 
revolutionary status, the whole branch was shut down and its members were expelled 
other than a handful of loyalists.  Branches in Enschede and Hengelo were also 
expelled.  Small groups that opposed the changes in Rotterdam and Amsterdam were 
constrained and unable to organise because of the block on factions. They also left 
frustrated or were expelled during 1986–1992.  There was little discussion permitted 
on the new direction and orthodox members of the old guard were unable to organise 
and could gain only a few votes at congresses. 
 
3.4 A new centralised organisation 1991– 
The leadership created an organisational structure that, at first glance, was not worlds 
apart from that of the other Dutch parties (SP 2003, 1991b).  However, the 
democratisation of the SP remained limited.  The ‘inner-circle’, a close network of 
around 25 elites that had dominated the SP since the mid-1980s, continued to control 
the levers of power and implemented policy changes in a top-down fashion.  As 
former MEP Eric Meijer argues they ‘organised the SP in a way in which they can 
focus on the leadership of the party’ (Meijer Interview, 10.09.08).  Democratic 
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centralism undermined the image of modernisation that the SP wanted to portray and 
had to be removed; however, the SP’s leaders did not have an intrinsic concern with 
democratic debate like their New Left counterparts in the CPN.   
 
The organisation established after 1991 retained traits of democratic 
centralism/Maoism and it further reinforced the centralisation of power.  The SP’s 
leaders sought to avoid the image that they dictate party affairs.  They claimed that the 
SP was thoroughly democratic and that there were open debates at branch, regional 
and national levels, providing plenty of opportunities for the membership to exert 
influence.  However, elites in the SP, experts on Dutch parties, elites in other parties 
and dissidents nonetheless believed that the leadership’s centralisation of power was 
highly instrumental in its transformation.  It provided the leadership with almost 
complete control over elite advancement and policy formulation, making it easy for 
them to consolidate enormous changes and to break with past commitments.  This was 
possible because of several factors.  
 
First, the SP’s leaders continued to work under the method of the mass line and 
interpreted ‘the people’s’ desires with little discussion.  This gave them considerable 
space to control policy-making through the 1990s and to sacrifice radical or 
theoretical policies because they were not in line with the aims of ‘the common man’ 
(Voerman 2007b, 2002, p. 3).  Second, increased resources at central office were used 
to forge a personality cult around Marijnissen.  During the 1990s books were 
reportedly ghost-written for Marijnissen that glorified his leadership and the SP’s 
activism in Oss (Interview former Board member).   
 
In 1993, the leadership formed a group of ten outside media professionals and 
advertising experts called the ‘V-Team’.   This answered directly to Kox and 
Marijnissen and they ensured it understood the direction the leadership wanted.  There 
was little democratic accountability over their work for the rank and file and they had 
immense influence over policy-making as they were trusted to mastermind the SP’s 
transformation.  They subsequently built up a powerful centralised campaign 
machine.  The introduction of professional marketing experts such as Nico Koffeman 
played a key role in revamping the SP’s image and in practice they designed its 
policies.  They overhauled campaigns to remove long speeches and ideological 
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slogans.  The ‘V-Team’ also used the SP’s activists to distribute over three million 
leaflets to target voters and they invested large amounts of money in campaign 
material (van der Steen 1994, p. 182).  The SP’s leaders increasingly briefed 
journalists to signal their moderation.  Campaign material was also standardised and 
the PR professionals abbreviated the name Socialist Party to SP, again with the aim of 
moderating its image. 
 
The V-Team decided that voters did not believe that the SP’s radical policies would 
be possible with just a handful of MPs.  In response, Koffeman’s campaigns 
emphasised that even with only a small number of MPs the party could offer effective 
opposition to neo-liberal policies and defend the welfare state.  Koffeman introduced 
a ‘Vote Against!’ slogan and the image of a tomato to symbolise the SP’s oppositional 
role (a tomato being something that could be thrown at dishonest politicians, 
replacing its ‘Honest and Active’ theme and its grandiose proposals (van der Steen 
1994, p. 182).  Koffeman realised that the PvdA’s rightwards shift created new 
opportunities.  The SP’s policies were moderated to offer a credible alternative to 
disaffected left-wing, middle class social democrats.  Simultaneously, it offered them 
a clear-cut protest vote by providing a more overtly oppositional line to the PvdA.  
Campaign banners stressed that ‘Voting against is better than staying at home’.   
 
Third, the SP’s internal culture was not liberalised.  An informal ban on internal 
factions prevented the formation of opposition groups.  Unlike the CPN it did not 
institutionalise separate groups for women or ethnic minorities, providing little room 
for opposition.  Most opposition has been given by individuals who were easily 
crushed.  A highly disciplined culture persisted in which engagement with activism 
left little room for internal discussion at party meetings and commitment to working 
for a common purpose provided a substitute for critically minded debate.  As 
Voerman argues, the SP’s internal culture is not beneficial to democratic decision-
making when it is left to veteran leaders behind closed doors (Voerman, 2007c). 
 
The party elite are still notoriously reluctant to speak about internal affairs or to 
provide a critical assessment of party history.  They remain attached to notions of 
democratic centralism, strong leadership, quick decision-making and take pride in the 
way that SP officials speak with one voice.  Loyalty is highly valued in the SP.  
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Members are taught that this and self-discipline are paramount.  Dissent is frowned 
upon as it undermines effectiveness.  Decisions made by the leadership and congress 
are binding, providing little room for dissidence when the SP’s leaders decide to 
jettison old ideas.  As one elite argued, the principle of unanimity ensures that unlike 
their rivals ‘our enemies are outside, not inside the party’.  Furthermore, in the early 
1990s few SP congresses or conferences were open to the public (Van der Steen 1994, 
p. 177).  SP communications are tightly controlled and the party’s official history 
makes no mention of its founding leader Monjé (SP, 2009a).   
 
Fourth, new formal structures that might have been democratic – had they been 
implemented differently – were used to protect the leadership’s dominance over the 
levers of power.  Troublemakers continued to be sidelined or expelled, usually at the 
local level, and the leadership continued to cut out obstinate local-branches – a power 
given to it by party statutes (SP, 1991b).  Infrequent attempts to revert to a radical 
identity did not get far.  The new organisation has been policed by the SP’s twelve 
regional leaders.  Typically they are on the party payroll (eight were in 2009) or have 
other influential roles such as being MPs.  Nearly all of them are long-trusted 
apparatchiks who have spent most of their working lives in the party or were close 
friends with members of the inner circle.  Younger regional leaders tend to come 
through ‘master class’ training sessions where they are instructed by the leadership.  
Regional leaders work closely with members of the inner circle, recruit activists, run 
campaigns and make sure local departments follow the party line.  They link the 
leadership to the local level and do its bidding by identifying and rooting out 
troublemakers through organising support against them.  This new structure gave the 
leadership additional control over the mid-level elite.   
 
Elite advancement and policy-making are firmly controlled by the leadership.  Critics 
note that many elections in the SP are ‘pre-cooked’ by the leadership and that it is 
difficult to become a regional leader without the blessing of the inner circle at 
regional conferences.  Formally, programme and candidates’ committees (to propose 
candidates for the national Board and parliamentary list) are chosen by the party 
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Council and make proposals for congress to vote on.5  However, these committees 
have routinely been dominated by leading members of the inner circle or have 
deferred to it behind the scenes.  The candidates committees are far from independent.  
Those opposing the leadership are rarely included on candidate lists.   
 
The SP’s leadership bodies have been devoid of critics.  In 1991 the expanded Board 
was packed with established, trusted elites as was the party’s daily executive Board.  
It included Kox as party Secretary (SP leader in Tilberg, campaign manager, 
candidate for the second chamber, candidate for elections to the European Parliament 
and editor of the party paper (1974-95)); Marijnissen as Chair (leader in Oss, top of 
the list for parliamentary elections), and long established elites such as Ger Wouters 
(leader in Schijndl and candidate for second chamber) and Theo Cornelissen 
(Treasurer, candidate as councillor in Rotterdam and for parliament) (van der Steen 
1994, p. 177).  There has been little turnover within the daily Board (Voerman, 
2007c).  In 2009, four of its six members were long established members of the inner 
circle. 
 
Formally the leadership has little control over the composition of the 40 member 
Board established in 1991.  However, the inclusion of the regional leaders 
consolidated the inner circle’s dominance. Moreover, Board members elected by 
congress have been loyalists elected from lists chosen by candidates’ committees (that 
are themselves dominated by the inner circle).  Board members have rarely been a 
source of criticism or independent thinking.  Voerman estimates that at least half of 
the Board are usually on the payroll, blunting their autonomy and blurring their 
personal and political interests.  Many Board members (and elites) also have family 
members working within the party apparatus who are dependent on the leadership 
(Voerman, 2007c).  As the leadership bodies expanded, trusted allies from Brabant 
were advanced while hard-line critics were left behind.  Few of Monjé’s allies from 
Rotterdam remained in top positions.  Turnover on the Board has been constrained.  
Usually around five new members enter at each congress, and they are normally 
young loyal apparatchiks.  Outsiders were rarely suddenly parachuted into the elite.  
                                                           
5
 Initially, leading members of the Board were chosen to write programmes before the Party Council 
was tasked with forming committees.   
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The SP’s leaders are masters at getting loyal followers to the top.  Members of the 
elite regularly attend internal training courses to shape their loyalty. 
 
There have been no ideological divisions or factions in the Board or leadership bodies 
and there is an almost complete lack of debate in any of these fora.  As Party Chair 
(1988–) Marijnissen has dominated the Board’s proceedings and is notorious for his 
aggressive management style and fierce criticism of Board members when they 
question the leadership.  Former Board members note how their colleagues were too 
scared to speak out against the leadership for fear of losing their jobs.  Board 
members who are critical usually leave after becoming isolated.  There has also been 
little room for discussion on ideological matters in Board meetings that focus on 
maintaining levels of activism and expanding membership.   
 
Furthermore, local branch meetings have little time for resistance or soul-searching, 
being thoroughly focused on activism.  Troublesome questions are usually ignored as 
chairs base discussion around local issues such as traffic regulations, expanding into 
nearby areas, council work and membership drives rather than engaging in ideological 
debate.  Local branches spend little time preparing for regional meetings to challenge 
the party leadership and often do not even decide on what their branches’ views are 
on important issues: representatives of local branches usually speak as individuals.  
Moreover, regional meetings are organised by Board members.  They provide little 
room for debate and it is rare for discussion to go beyond a simple answer from the 
party elites.  The agenda is set from above, as the Board feeds down its instructions, 
and communication is rarely two-way.   
 
Congresses are formally the SP’s main source of democratic decision-making.  
Branches receive one congress delegate for every 50 members.  The leadership 
believes that this is more democratic than allowing all members to attend congresses 
because it prevents congresses being distorted by more delegates being from the 
region where the congress is held.  However, most Dutch parties now empower all 
their members at congresses (Voerman, 2007d).  The internal lines of power and 
monitoring in the SP mean that the way the local delegate congress model functions in 
the SP provides little room for critically minded congress delegates.  The SP’s locally 
elected congress delegate system is dominated by local party chairs who are kept 
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loyal by the work of regional leaders or their dependence on the leadership.  They 
often nominate loyal activists as delegates and rarely choose dissidents.  Minority 
groups in local branches are afforded little representation.  The chairs of large local 
branches are often loyalists or on the payroll and can deliver many congress votes for 
the leadership.   
 
The leadership’s block on cross-branch communication also means that critics 
struggle to coordinate and do not even know who has been nominated as delegates in 
other branches.  Local branches also struggle to prepare for congress debates, having 
only a few days to prepare positions on the 800 or so congress motions leaving little 
time too organise opposition and many defer to the leadership’s recommended 
positions.  Many branches do not debate the motions at all, being focused on activism.  
These factors mean that congress votes are in effect pre-determined and simply follow 
the leadership’s proposals.  Spontaneous attempts to change things at congresses are 
strongly opposed.  As Rudie Kagie’s research (2004) found, in practice the policy 
changes at congress have often been made in advance in the leadership’s campaigns 
anyway. 
 
Procedures at congresses also give the leadership the upper hand.  Those presenting 
motions get only one minute to explain themselves.  Members of the leadership then 
respond to several motions at a time and speak at length.  On controversial motions as 
many as ten to twelve members of the leadership speak to shore up support.  Those 
proposing motions then have another minute to respond.  Congress delegates can not 
ask questions about motions or develop discussion.  Outsiders have no opportunity to 
ask questions about congress motions.  While most Dutch parties take several days for 
congresses the SP wraps them up in one.  It has a highly efficient form of decision-
making but is not, some argue, democratic. 
 
The leadership has not been defeated on a major policy issue at congress.  Its lists for 
parliamentary candidates are always accepted and there has only been one change to 
its lists for the Board.  Alternative candidates struggle to compete as the leadership 
sends out information and photos of its preferred candidates to delegates who receive 
no information on independent candidates other than a list of names.  Most 
independent candidates struggle to make their case and resort to standing outside the 
  
94 
congress hall to hand out their information.  There is no time for delegates to ask them 
questions and they lack the publicity afforded to the leadership’s preferred candidates 
who are profiled in the party magazine.  Herman Beekers, one of the few remaining 
elites to have openly disagreed with Marijnissen, has been the only independent 
candidate to successfully stand but he was a well known, long-established activist.  
Furthermore, while votes on candidates are conducted by secret ballot, votes on policy 
are held by a show of hands, enabling the leadership to identify rebels.  Every major 
reform in the SP has seemed democratic, having been passed by congress, but there 
was little chance of resistance.   
 
Local branches are tightly controlled.  They send the Party Secretary monthly 
progress reports on their daily activities, the number of new members recruited and 
local problems and are visited regularly by regional leaders.  This provides the 
leadership with awareness of any troublemakers within the organisation.  The Party 
Council is supposed to scrutinise the leadership; however it is reduced to a forum in 
which the leadership simply provides feedback on the decisions it has taken.  A high 
proportion of local chairs in the Council also have paid jobs to defend or are allies of 
the leadership.  The leadership sits at the front of Council meetings and with voting by 
hand can identify recalcitrant officials.  It has been rare for the Council to contest the 
leadership’s ideas even after it grew from 40 people to 200 members as the SP 
expanded.  Council meeting notes show little attempt to scrutinise the leadership (SP, 
2009b). 
 
Policy-making has been a collective project for a few members of the inner circle.  
Kox in particular has enjoyed great power in writing documents and in programme 
committees.  There is no important SP document that is not edited or critiqued by him 
and he usually writes the final draft of programmes presented to congress.  Most elites 
accept this is the way things are done.  Marijnissen’s hands-on management style as 
Chairman and willingness to personally intervene to solve local problems led Kagie to 
conclude that he has been ‘like a spider in the middle of a web’.  Verhey goes further, 
arguing that ‘Nothing takes place in the SP without Marijnissen’s approval’ (Verhey 
Interview). 
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3.5 Social democratisation  
The SP’s protest vote strategy was successful in attracting those disaffected with the 
PvdA’s austere policies and enthusiasm for European integration (Voerman 2008, p. 
33).  This delivered parliamentary representation, with two seats in 1994 (as well as 
126 councillors, up from 70 in 1990).  The SP’s attempt to give a ‘red answer to the 
purple government’ worked again in 1998 which commentators called ‘the year of the 
tomato’ as the SP’s parliamentary party grew to five MPs (alongside their 188 
councillors) (De Boer et al. 1998, p. 65).  The SP’s membership rapidly expanded 
from 15,000 in 1994 to 26,000 by 2000.  Contrary to Grzymała-Busse’s finding in 
CEE that a protest strategy limited parties to the margins of politics, this brought 
expansion.  It also contributed to further shifts in strategy as the SP grew to a position 
where office-seeking was realistic.  Moreover, the SP’s leaders continued to moderate 
through parliamentary politics and as its presence in councils grew the number of 
pragmatic councillors in the Board increased, bringing greater pressures for 
moderation. 
 
After 1994 the SP exchanged socialism for vaguer concepts of human dignity, 
equality and solidarity (Voerman and Lucardie, 2007).  Its new programme ‘Heel de 
Mens’ (roughly meaning ‘All of Mankind’) abandoned ideas of socialising and the 
planned economy and replaced criticisms of Dutch capitalism with attacks on neo-
liberalism imported from Britain and the United States (SP, 1999).  As the SP’s 
leaders tried to broaden its appeal they accepted social democratic principles; 
coupling social democracy with activism, radical left credentials and opposition to 
European integration to provide ‘social democracy plus’ (Voerman 2008, p. 34).  
Programmes remained critical of the political establishment but opposition to the 
capitalist system made in ‘Charter 2000’ disappeared.  The leadership saw these as 
too theoretical and idealistic.  Now the focus was criticising the ‘unrestrained 
capitalism’ of the Kok and Balkenende governments.  The SP focused on criticising 
the free market, welfare cuts and privatisations (SP, 1999).  There was little organised 
opposition to the change and only around ten per cent of congress delegates opposed 
dropping the socialisation of the means of production in 1999.   
 
The SP’s programmatic ideals came to resemble den Uyl’s social democratic policies 
of the 1970s and elites praised his investment in education and social security.  SP 
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policies came to focus on limiting working-hours, maintaining full-employment, 
capping salaries for company executives and politicians, limiting cheap migrant-
labour to defend the position of Dutch workers while increasing social provision for 
migrants; and bringing about a ‘fairer distribution of wealth’.  It also aimed to end 
segregation in education, tackle child poverty, strengthen social services and to 
reverse the marketisation of public transport (SP 2006, 2002).  Those who sought a 
far-reaching, theoretical analysis of capitalism or a vision of an alternative socialist 
economic system would have been disappointed.   
 
The SP’s leadership switched to an office-seeking strategy in 2002, changing its 
slogan to ‘Vote For, Vote SP’.  This change came about when PR experts found that 
focus groups and poll data suggested potential SP supporters were not voting for it as 
doing so would be a wasted vote when it could not govern nationally.  In response the 
leadership sought to show that it could govern and fulfil more moderate goals.  New 
pressures also came from expansion.  More local councillors with experience of the 
constraints of elected office and the need to make administrative compromises entered 
the SP’s elite, providing additional pressures to downplay policy-goals.  The SP also 
attracted more PvdA voters and members (Voerman 2008, p. 33, Voerman and 
Lucardie 2007, p. 140).  The SP’s leaders also gained confidence in governing with 
the party entering the executives of three municipalities including Oss in 1998.  
Growth in the polls made future participation in coalitions seem possible presenting 
new dilemmas.  These factors convinced the leadership that governing at a national 
level was feasible and it argued that people were demanding the SP take more 
responsibility.   
 
Expansion had strengthened the leadership.  Marijnissen countered his few critics on 
the Board by pointing out his record of success.  Having MPs and new members also 
brought additional funds for campaigns and helped to place more elites on the party 
payroll.  It was the members of the inner circle who became the SP’s MPs and 
Marijnissen became his own boss, gaining a dual role as parliamentary leader and 
Chair of the Board, a practice that is uncommon in Dutch parties.  This led to some 
dissent from MP Harry van Bommel who publicly criticised Marijnissen’s dual role 
for giving too much power to one man (Ed.nl, 03.07.07).  However, criticism of this 
remained limited. 
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Had the parliamentarians been independent of the Board they could have been 
scrutinised, however the inner circle dominated both institutions.  Marxist-Leninists 
argued the SP had become susceptible to the moderating effects of parliament.  The 
parliamentarians gained employees who were included on lists for the Board, 
increasing the leadership’s control.  The MPs were, for the most part, tightly 
controlled.  Most were members of the inner circle, being trusted allies or were 
completely dependent on the leadership for their positions.  A few established MPs 
were replaced but more loyal apparatchiks were advanced as the SP expanded.  There 
have been very few divisions within the parliamentary group and the MPs do not 
break the party line in parliament.  The leaders of the SP’s parliamentary groups were 
also automatically made Board members.  Unlike most Dutch parties which have 
independent Boards, it is common for MPs to sit in the Board.   
 
The SP’s parliamentarians are responsible for particular policy issues and hold weekly 
meetings with their advisors and assistants.  These meetings are monitored through 
party functionaries who sit in on the meetings, making notes.  These go to 
Marijnissen, as Chair, who subsequently reads them, intervening when he does not 
agree.  MPs have been prevented from making their own initiatives.  Some tried to 
organise a meeting with NGOs to investigate possibilities for co-operation in an open 
discussion meeting.  The leadership did not agree with this and hijacked the meeting, 
with Party Secretary Paulus Johnson speaking at length about the SP’s expansion 
leaving little possibility for discussion.  Having spoken to each member of the 
parliamentary group, Kagie concluded that Marijnissen does indeed control 
everything in the SP (Kagie Interview).   
 
The SP’s office-seeking strategy worked and it expanded to win nine parliamentary 
seats in 2002.  After the election the SP’s leaders sought to find out why many PvdA 
voters had still not joined it.  Pollster Maurice de Hond’s research showed that most 
PvdA supporters disagreed with the SP’s commitments to withdrawal from NATO 
and to abolish the monarchy.  The leadership concluded such policies were barriers to 
inclusion in a governing coalition and they were dropped from the SP’s 2006 election 
manifesto and at its 2006 congress.  The SP still criticises NATO and the monarchy, 
but argues that defending the welfare state is its immediate priority.   
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The leadership moderated its proposals on tax-rates for high earners and for 
egalitarian tax-relief reforms to attract middle class voters (SP 2006, 1998).  It also 
watered down the commitment to maximum salaries being no more than three times 
the minimum wage.  It increased this to five times the minimum wage before the 
policy disappeared from programmes completely.  Even criticism of neo-liberalism 
now appears only intermittently (SP, 2006).  PR experts played a key role in this 
process.  They pursued a ‘vampire strategy’ that criticised the PvdA but adopted its 
policies to suck it dry of left/centrist supporters.  Furthermore, from 2002–06, the 
leadership increasingly called for a left-wing coalition with PvdA and GroenLinks.   
 
Marxist-Leninists could not prevent the leadership’s strategies of social 
democratisation and office-seeking.  There was little room for debate about the 
changes in the Board or on a local level.  The moderate 1999 programme was easily 
passed by congress.  Founding member Willem de Vroomen criticised the changes in 
the Board.  He rejected the drift to parliamentary priorities, the downgrading of class 
struggle and criticised the lack of internal debate, seminars or discussion in party 
publications.  De Vroomen found little support in the Board and left it in 2002.  
Regional leader Rick Denkers supported de Vroomen but found colleagues were 
scared that if they opposed the leadership this would lead to them losing their own 
positions, even if they privately expressed their opposition.  Tight discipline 
prevented opposition from gaining a foothold in leading institutions and the Party 
Council offered little opposition.  When de Vroomen wrote secret letters to local 
branches from 2003–05 to organise resistance, he received no response.  However, 
after he did this, regional leaders had to put down dissidence at regional gatherings to 
prevent a backlash.  The leadership continued to win congress decisions and 
staggeringly, only around ten per cent of congress delegates opposed the change of 
policy on NATO in 2006.  This is staggering for a left party and only seems possible 
because of the party’s highly centralised organisational structures.  
 
Having led the successful ‘no’ campaign in the 2005 referendum on the European 
Constitution the SP’s electoral rise continued at the 2006 national election (Vollaard 
and Boer 2006, p. 11; Harmsen 2005, p. 5).  The SP won almost seventeen per cent of 
the vote, up from six per cent in 2003, making it one of Europe’s largest left parties.  
It won over a large number of PvdA supporters and with 25 seats in the parliament it 
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became the third largest party in the Netherlands (Lucardie et al. 2006, pp. 79–84).  
Experts estimate that around a quarter of those voting SP had voted PvdA in 2003 
(van Holsteyn 2007, p. 1146).  Scholars anticipated that the SP’s leaders might lose 
control, like the CPN’s leaders had after recruiting a generation of white-collar, public 
sector workers, social democrats and radicals who were unused to strict discipline 
(Voerman, 1998).  Expansion and increased social heterogeneity presented new 
dilemmas for the SP’s leaders; however, thus far, its centralised organisation has 
helped them maintain control over newcomers who have been integrated into 
activism.   
 
The SP’s greatest challenge has been to retain its direct action and ‘social-populist’ 
contacts with ‘the common man’ that legitimise its criticisms of the elite or outsider 
status (March 2008, p. 126; March and Mudde 2005, p. 35).  For as long as this 
continues, it will occupy a space that other parties cannot fill (Voerman, 2008, p. 34).  
The SP’s leaders have had considerable success at combining parliamentary activity 
with extra-parliamentary activism.  They recognised the risk of becoming part of the 
establishment and used MPs’ allowances to establish a free phone-line in parliament 
in 1994 to keep in touch with people’s concerns under the motto ‘Join in Den Haag’ 
(Voerman and van Schuur 1995, p. 8).   
 
Stringent rules compel the SP’s elected representatives to give most of their salary to 
the party to show that they are not self-serving and to maintain levels of activism.  
Local sections are closely monitored and must re-apply each election to run under the 
SP’s name.  They must prove that they have an acceptable list of candidates who have 
been successful activists.  Those losing touch with the ‘common man’ are abandoned.  
Potential councillors must also attend weekend courses so the leadership can gauge 
their obedience and train them.  Moreover, local branches are closely supervised by 
the Party Secretary in making local coalitions to make sure their alliances respect the 
leadership’s goals. 
 
As the SP expanded, other small leftist organisations orientated themselves to it 
including Offensief, the Trotskyist International Socialism and Socialist Workers’ 
Party (see Voerman, 2008).  However, attempts to form opposition factions within the 
SP continue to fail.  Offensief’s Marxists joined SP in 1998 and began to work as an 
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internal pressure group.  They were tolerated on a local level but became more 
assertive and tried to use SP events and the youth organisation to sell their paper.  
Offensief began to criticise the SP’s moderation, the lack of internal debate and its 
municipal coalition alliances with the centre-right Christian Democratic Appeal 
(CDA) and the PvdA on their website.  In 2009 Offensief’s members were given an 
ultimatum to choose between Offensief or the SP and some were expelled.  
International Socialism began co-operating with SP campaigns and Marijnissen 
invited them to join SP.  When it became apparent that they believed in workers’ 
councils and they criticised the SP’s programmatic moderation they were, however, 
then blocked from joining.  The Socialist Workers’ Party’s activists have criticised the 
SP’s centralised organisation and advocate closer links with radical social movements 
but have thus far avoided strong criticism.  Most Marxist-Leninist activists withdrew 
from the SP being unable to gain influence.   
 
Expansion posed risks that newcomers would rock the boat, being unused to tight 
discipline and seeking careers (Voerman 1998, p. 2).  The SP’s leaders recognised this 
and the 1999 congress decided to pay more attention to training and integration into 
activism.  As the SP expanded, its leaders maintained strict control over its youth-
wing Rood.  Formed in 2003, Rood has its own paper but does not criticise the 
leadership or the party line and it is not allowed to use symbols or forms of branding 
other than those imposed on it by the party.  Rood’s members hand out flyers and 
learn about the SP’s ideology but there is little time for them to debate.  Rood is 
becoming an important source for elite advancement.  It took a long time for the SP to 
construct a youth organisation that it could control.  Rood is like a local branch and its 
founding chairman was appointed by the party leadership, before rising to become an 
MP.  Dutch parties’ youth groups are usually much more independent.   
 
As the SP expanded in the polls, the leadership realised that it lacked the intellectual 
power needed to be in government.  There was increased space for outsiders as the 
leadership scouted and rapidly promoted young talent to broaden its appeal and to 
bring in much needed expertise on the SP’s list of parliamentary candidates.  This is 
now a source of regret for elites.  Most of the MPs remained loyal to the leadership; 
however some newcomers, including Piet de Ruiter and Ali Lazrak soon became 
critical.  Lazrak opposed the leadership’s policies on immigration and paying his 
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salary to the party (Hippe et al.  2003, p. 108).  He had previously been a journalist 
and was unused to the discipline of the SP and left, taking his seat with him, in 2006.  
Likewise, MEP Eric Meijer, who was the former Vice-Chair of the left-libertarian 
party GroenLinks, was rapidly advanced to give the SP much needed expertise in the 
European Parliament.  Meijer was used to open debate and began to criticise 
Marijnissen’s dominance in the Board.   
 
Problems also emerged with new untested councillors and provincial representatives.  
Councillor Johan Luijendijk rebelled over paying his wages to the party when his 
state-welfare payments were cut and his income fell, claiming that working for the 
party was akin to slavery.  Following the 2006 election over 55 of the SP’s 350 
councillors left or were expelled, many finding the demands of activism and paying 
their wages to the party too onerous.  Usually they were newcomers who had outside 
professional experiences or were wage earners.  This supports an understanding of the 
development of WECPs’ post-Communist successors based on Grzymała-Busse’s 
idea that elites and officials advanced rapidly, from outside, who have not been long 
established functionaries but have broader experiences, are likely to seek change.   
 
Expansion brought increased competition for places in elected office that 
demonstrated the leadership’s control over elite advancement.  When critically 
minded Board member and provincial representative Düzgün Yildirim was not 
included on the candidate committee’s parliamentary list, he stood at congress as an 
alternative candidate.  His supporters tried to rally support but central office would 
not give them email addresses for all of the SP’s branches.  Yildirim was criticised by 
the leadership at the congress and failed to gain inclusion on the list.  Instead he was 
placed in an un-winnable position for the list for the Senate.  The system whereby 
provisional councillors select the members of the Senate made it possible for a 
handful of SP provincial representatives to elect Yildirim to the Senate against the 
leadership’s wishes.  It also allowed Yildirim to vote for himself.  The SP’s provincial 
representatives believed that they were free to vote for any of the SP’s candidates 
because the leadership had apparently forgotten to tell them to follow the order of its 
list of candidates.  They chose Yildirim above those placed higher on the leadership’s 
list.  The leadership was horrified and when Yildirim refused to give up his seat, he 
was expelled.   
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The leadership maintained control over elite advancement but at a cost.  Around thirty 
members of Yildirim’s supporters formed ‘Committee to Democratise the SP’.  They 
campaigned at the 2007 congress for cross branch discussion, an internet forum to 
facilitate this and for more powerful congresses.  This was ineffective but served to 
show the lack of debate within the SP.  The Yildirim affair had further ramifications 
(Lucardie and Voerman 2007, p. 55).  In 2005 Marijnissen recruited social democrat 
Elma Verhey, editor of the weekly Fri Netherlands, to edit Tribune.  The leadership 
aimed to make Tribune into a more general left-wing paper to broaden the SP’s appeal 
and Verhey was granted editorial independence.  Verhey tried to transform Tribune 
into a source of critical debate.  Verhey managed to cover International Socialism 
conferences, to the leadership’s dissatisfaction, but she was sacked after attempting to 
publish an article by Yildirim’s supporters.  This fuelled media coverage on the SP’s 
lack of democracy (NRC, 26.06.07) and a spoof of the SP’s website ‘SP Transparant’.  
Rick Denkers, a former social democrat, promoted rapidly as regional leader because 
of his close relations with members of the inner circle, also disagreed with the 
leadership over expelling Yildirim and having been isolated he left the SP.   
 
Before the 2006 election an unprecedented left-majority coalition with the PvdA and 
GroenLinks seemed possible and the SP participated in talks with its potential allies.  
However, the larger PvdA would not commit to an alliance.  Ultimately, the PvdA 
and GroenLinks lost seats at the 2006 election, preventing a left-majority in 
parliament.  However, the SP’s success led to calls to include it in an oversized 
coalition with the other two largest parties, who had both lost seats, the PvdA and the 
CDA.  The SP entered coalition talks but the centre-right CDA enjoyed a position of 
strength in negotiations being the largest party.  It blocked the SP’s inclusion to avoid 
being outnumbered (in terms of seats) by left-wing coalition partners (Lucardie 2007, 
p.  1046).   
 
3.6 New challenges 
The SP did not encounter a major internal backlash over failing to enter government 
in 2006.  Its incompatibility with the CDA appeared to be largely accepted by the rank 
and file who were not enthused by inclusion in a centre-right coalition.  However, the 
tight grip of the inner circle prevented critical discussion of coalition negotiations.  
Failure to enter government did not trigger the organisational time-bomb that exists 
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inside the SP from its lack of democracy and influx of new members unfamiliar with 
rigid discipline (Voerman, 1998).  The main problem that the SP encountered from 
failing to enter government came from the electorate.  In the 2009 election to the 
European Parliament it received only just over seven per cent of the vote.  This was a 
marginal increase on its 2004 performance but a massive reverse after the 2006 
national election result.   
 
However, the SP’s problems go beyond European elections.  It is no longer the fastest 
growing party in the Netherlands.  Its approval ratings even fell below those of a 
resurgent GroenLinks in the polls, suggesting that the SP may be heading for a 
massive electoral shock and might lose as many as half of its MPs (Politieke 
Barometer, 2010; Peil, 2009).  When a sudden election was called for summer 2010 
the party’s support in the polls failed to improve.  Part of this decline is due to the 
replacement of parliamentary leader Marijnissen, who stepped-down for health 
reasons.  Marijnissen’s successor Agnes Kant lacked his appeal and received more 
negative media coverage.  SP politicians lay the blame for the party’s dwindling 
support on the disillusionment on those who voted SP in 2006 believing it could reach 
power and initiate social change, only to be let down when it failed to deliver the 
goods.  The SP’s leaders have failed to counter claims that they had a chance of 
entering government and turned it down.  The SP also seems to be losing support to 
Geert Wilders’ anti-immigration Partij voor de Vrijheid.  Wilders’ demand for 
withdrawal from the EU outflanks the SP’s Euroscepticism (see Van Kessel and Crum 
2009, p. 10).  The SP’s leaders recognise this and are contemplating a more positive 
alternative model of European integration in response to this dilemma. 
 
The SP also faces a challenge of maintaining its high level of activism.  Membership 
now appears to be falling and die-hard veteran activists have left following recent 
policy sacrifices.  The PvdA supporters it recruited are less active.  Even when 
membership was increasing in 2006 the Board found that new social democratic 
members were not integrating and were leaving.  Chief spin doctor Koffeman and 
leading environmental activist Harry Vos also joined the Party for the Animals.  Vos 
reportedly fell out with the leadership after they disciplined him for being late to a 
meeting and downgraded his job.  He won a costly settlement for his eventual 
dismissal, as have other leading activists.   
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The inner circle continues to run the SP.  In 2008 Kant, a trusted functionary who 
slowly worked her way up the party hierarchy (working for Marijnissen in parliament 
and having little experience of political work outside the SP) was the only candidate 
to succeed him (de Witt, 1998).  Marijnissen remained in the parliamentary group and 
party Chair.  This preserved a managerial sandwich, in which Marijnissen was Kant’s 
boss out of parliament and she was his inside it.  Kant was seen as subservient to 
Marijnissen, who remained in control of the SP twenty years after becoming its 
leader.  Kant resigned as parliamentary leader and MP during the 2010 parliamentary 
election campaign following large losses in municipal elections. The party’s decline 
in the polls has not yet fed into strong calls for democratisation.  However, the SP is 
used to electoral success.  Former Member of the European Parliament Eric Meijer 
argues that defeat is all that could bring about democratisation and break the inner 
circle’s control (Meijer Interview, 10.09.08).   
 
The SP did not re-radicalise in response to its failure to enter government.  Having 
abandoned its most radical policies, there is little in the SP’s programme that could 
not be put up for discussion in coalition negotiations.  However, a left-wing coalition 
following the next parliamentary election looks unlikely because of the parties’ 
standing in the polls.  Nonetheless, the SP’s astonishing adaptability persists.  It has 
begun to soften hostility to the CDA and Marijnissen has signalled a willingness to 
talk with it about coalition formation.  In recent years leading SP politicians have 
rediscovered Christianity – even though the SP was historically secular – providing 
room to attract CDA supporters and to converge with it (Voerman 2007a, p. 3).  The 
SP’s moderation also continued in 2009 its leaders agreed to sit in the parliamentary 
committee controlling the Dutch secret service which the SP had long opposed.   
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Following the collapse of Communism the SP went from being a tiny vanguard party 
to a genuine force in Dutch Politics.  It did this by dropping ideological commitments.  
It became a social democratic party with radical credentials.  Thus far, it has made 
remarkable achievements in coupling activism with electoral expansion and 
integrating new groups.  Its expansion surpassed all expectations (Voerman, 1998, 
2002, p. 5).  It is not surprising that the SP changed as many of the students advanced 
into the elite by the late 1980s who had not been in the CPN (as founding leader 
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Monjé had been) and were less experienced in labourist tradition.  Restrictive elite 
advancement practices meant only the loyal advanced.  However, the ‘horizontal’ 
advancement of councillors and activists to elite positions was highly significant.  
Their experiences in working outside of the SP gave them pragmatism and they called 
for reforms.  The SP shows that reformers can advance even if there is tight control 
over elite advancement and a lack of debate. 
 
The new leadership used Mao’s concept of the mass line and democratic centralism to 
make inroads into breaking with Marxism-Leninism and to make a new organisational 
model.  In relation to the Grzymała-Busse framework it shows that rapid 
centralisation was not necessary if WECPs were to transform themselves in response 
to the events in 1989.  The process was more gradual as the SP had already begun to 
build up its central organisation before 1989. Furthermore, delaying organisational 
reorganisation by maintaining discipline and democratic centralism, until 1991, gave 
the leadership strategic space to control adaptation.  The case of the SP supports the 
idea that centralisation was possible in WECPs.  The new organisation it constructed 
did not significantly democratise but was highly centralistic.  That the SP had such a 
small organisation gave new opportunities for the leadership to craft new centralistic 
structures and to handpick officials as it expanded; there was little need to streamline 
the party apparatus.   
 
The SP’s leaders implemented practically minded reforms in local politics and 
supported the break with Mao.  As Grzymała-Busse says we should expect of elites 
with experience in carrying out prior reforms, the SP’s elite centralised.  One 
complicating factor that the SP presents for applying Grzymała-Busse’s framework is 
in terms of whether experience of prior reform was really the reason why the elite 
centralised.  The SP’s top leaders acknowledge that they increased the power of 
central office to prevent radicals in local branches running campaigns, to provide 
greater coordination between local branches and to respond to election losses.  Their 
experiences in local councils fuelled this process. 
 
Problematically though, members of the inner circle maintain that they democratised.  
This makes it harder to discern why they created such a restrictive organisation.  
However, they do not accept that they had a systematic strategy of centralisation 
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forged out of experiences of resistance to their earlier reforms or from their 
professional backgrounds.  They point to experience in carrying out reforms 
promoting a need for greater internal democracy.  Moreover, elite interviews and 
expert surveys point to other explanations for centralisation in the SP.  They show that 
its elite were used to a highly centralised organisation which became ingrained in 
their way of working, even after they abolished democratic centralism.   
 
This chapter has shown that in several respects the SP retained aspects of democratic 
centralism.  As Voerman (2006, p. 5) argues, the party’s internal culture was a major 
factor behind this.  However, analysis also showed that new institutional mechanisms 
and informal procedures also consolidated the power of the leadership and with it a 
strict hierarchy.  These mechanisms and procedures helped the leadership to 
repeatedly reposition the SP.  The case of the SP strongly supports Grzymała-Busse’s 
argument that centralisation can enable pragmatic elites to carry out programmatic 
reforms, to social democratise and pursue office.  The SP dropped ideological 
baggage easily in comparison to their left-libertarian and more democratic rivals, 
GroenLinks (see Keith, 2010).  The SP rapidly broke with Marxism-Leninism.  Its 
former hostility to the Soviet bloc also made it easy for it to critique the regimes in 
CEE, but the leadership’s power also meant it was easy for it to ditch old ideas.  The 
SP’s centralised organisation enabled the leadership to constrain attempts to re-
radicalise the party, to consolidate moderate positions and to maintain its control even 
as the SP expanded. 
  
Nonetheless, exchanging socialism for social democracy and policy-seeking for 
office-seeking took place in several stages.  The SP shows that such a process did not 
have to be rapid as Grzymała-Busse found in CEE.  When the SP’s leaders wanted 
changes they could make them quickly, but despite their negotiation with outside 
groups and institutions, they did not seek these changes in 1989.  However, the SP 
shows how post-Communist parties could win votes from a protest strategy in the 
aftermath of 1989.  Success in this yielded subsequent opportunities for social 
democratisation and office-seeking.  Tight internal discipline helped the leadership to 
maintain control.  This was coupled with emphasis on direct action which allowed the 
party to retain activists and members despite controversial policy changes.  The SP 
did this well enough to question the PvdA’s status as the major left-wing force in 
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Dutch politics.  European left parties and socialists have looked to the SP for 
inspiration (McGiffen, 2007).  However, it is questionable whether they could (or 
would want to) copy its centralised model of activism and campaigning.  Even so, the 
SP’s elite have so far not yet made significant inroads to democratising.  Indeed, as 
one of them said of internal democracy ‘if we are successful, does it really matter?’. 
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Chapter Four 
The Swedish Left Party – the Democratisers 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The Swedish Left Party – Communists (VPK) re-branded themselves Vänsterpartiet 
(Left Party (V)) in 1990 and became both socialist and feminist in 1996.  Despite 
these changes, radical mid-level elites, empowered by a high-level of internal 
democracy, prevented V from fully breaking with Communism.  This analysis of 
Vänsterpartiet supports Grzymała-Busse’s ideas that flexible patterns of elite 
advancement stimulate reform/ideological ‘social democratisation’ and that 
democracy is an uncertain route to adaptation.  These two factors combined led to a 
high level of internal turmoil.  This chapter, however, throws doubt on the idea that 
elites with prior experience of reform or professional backgrounds are predisposed to 
centralising.  It also shows that while internal democratisation made attempts at 
reform difficult, on the whole it was compatible with party transformation. 
 
Vänsterpartiet’s leaders have traditionally been held captive, supporting Social 
Democratic Party (SAP) minority governments for fear of a centre-right alternative.  
Following the collapse of Communism in CEE, reformists sought greater influence on 
SAP by generating realistic policies.  Changes in the Swedish political system also 
presented new opportunities for Vänsterpartiet’s leaders to redefine its role.  New 
budget procedures made it harder for minority governments to remain in power after 
being defeated in parliament in votes on the budget, prompting SAP to formalise 
relations and to negotiate ‘contracts’ for Vänsterpartiet’s support between 1998–2006 
(see Koß, 2010).  After a right-wing coalition came to power in 2006, SAP became 
more enthusiastic about bringing V into government and made a pre-electoral 
coalition agreement with them in 2009.   
 
This chapter shows how resistance and internal democratic structures often stifled 
reformers’ responses to such exogenous shocks.  However, it also shows that they still 
managed to make considerable changes and that their reforms were rarely undone 
altogether.  It has four sections.  The first analyses C.H. Hermansson’s pursuit of 
Eurocommunism in response to electoral defeat during the 1960s.  Hermansson made 
considerable achievements in breaking with orthodox Communism.  Nevertheless it is 
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shown that the effects of democratisation and dismantling democratic centralism 
significantly hampered his strategy and constrained his options.   
 
Table 4.1: Electoral results of SKP, VPK and V in parliamentary elections 
Year 1944 1948 1952 1956 1958 1960 1964 1968 1970 1973 1976 
Vote (per cent) 10.3 6.3 4.3 5 3.4 4.5 5.2 3 4.8 5.3 4.8 
            
Year  1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 1999 2002 2006  
Vote (per cent) 5.6 5.6 5.4 5.8 4.5 6.2 12 10.9 8.3 5.9  
(Möller, 2007; Arter, 2003; Botella and Ramiro, 2003; Errson, 1998; Staar, 1990; Staar, 1989; 
von Beyme, 1985; Tannahill, 1978). 
 
The second section shows that Lars Werner’s leadership balanced competing 
traditionalist and reformist groups through Vänsterpartiet’s democratic structures 
leading to ideological stagnation in the late 1980s.  A third section analyses Gudrun 
Schyman’s reforms (1993–2003) when pragmatic elites equipped with experience in 
negotiating with outside groups and institutions moved to ‘social democratise’ and 
feminise in order to win votes and to make Vänsterpartiet coalitionable.  This made V 
Sweden’s first feminist party and feminism played a central role in party programmes.  
Analysis shows that Schyman’s organisational strategy consisted largely of 
‘parliamentarisation’ rather than centralisation.  This achieved considerable expansion 
(see Tables 4.1 and 4.2) but proved unsustainable as mid-level elites used internal 
democratic structures to re-radicalise programmes.  The final section analyses V since 
2004 when the party was led by a more narrowly recruited traditionalist leadership, 
headed by Lars Ohly.  It outlines an initial period of radicalisation but shows that 
leading traditionalists moderated in ideological terms because of their newfound 
responsibilities, including those in parliament.  Ohly’s leadership now pursues a 
‘Janus-faced’ strategy combining pragmatic office-seeking with radical internal 
appeals that appease traditionalists.   
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Table 4.2: Membership figures for SKP, VPK and V 
Year  1944 1951 1957 1963 1970 1979 1980 1986 1989 1990 
Members 58,000 34,256 28,000 22,900 14,000 16,000 18,157 17,500 17,800 13,000 
                      
Year  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1998 1999 2001 2005 2010 
Members 11,821 11,104 10,649 10,700 11,313 13,097 13,589 13,868 11,000 12,000 
(Möller, 2007; Ersson, 2004; Botella and Ramiro 2003, Mair and van Biezen, 2001; Errson, 
1998; Staar, 1990; Tannahill, 1978).  
 
4.2 Battling the old guard 
In the 1960s the Communist Party of Sweden (SKP), became Eurocommunist and 
broke with the Soviet Union when Hermansson led reformists to change its name to 
VPK.  This was when the effects of dismantling democratic centralism and 
democratisation were felt most strongly.  The SKP’s leaders were originally a diverse 
group of leftists (see Sparring 1973).  This ended when Leninists took control in 1929.  
Elite advancement became narrow and insular, based on the promotion of working-
class, low-educated, orthodox apparatchiks and the gradual turnover resulted in an 
aging leadership (Sparring 1964, p. 168).  The elite were thoroughly Stalinised as 
intellectual MPs left or were expelled (Sparring 1964, p. 293).  The SKP was an 
orthodox Marxist-Leninist party that strictly applied democratic centralism.  In the 
early 1960s it was dominated by these orthodox ‘men of 1929’ and Chair, Hilding 
Hagberg.  The old guard blindly followed the Kremlin and in an effort to reconcile 
international allegiances with domestic realities supported or ‘hid’ behind SAP 
minority governments while waiting for the Russians to invade. 
 
Members with experience of negotiation with outside groups and institutions led 
criticisms of this strategy and calls for renewal, supporting a cornerstone of 
Grzymała-Busse’s framework.  However, these younger activists were excluded from 
the elite.  SKP’s MPs, whose work involved a high degree of communication with 
groups outside the party, were also more responsive to exogenous shocks including 
the Cuban missile crisis and electoral losses in 1962.  Narrow patterns of elite 
advancement and leadership bodies lacking in debate made the leadership seem an 
improbable place to find reformists.  However, this did not make regeneration 
impossible, as a crude interpretation of Grzymała-Busse’s framework would predict.  
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Hermansson, who was recruited from outside the party’s industrial working class 
base, slipped through the net.  Against the odds he presented a new vision, dethroned 
the old guard and transformed the SKP into one of the most progressive WECPs.  
This came largely in response to electoral decline.  The quality, not just the quantity, 
of reformers and their agency mattered.   
 
This period supports Grzymała-Busse’s arguments that elites recruited with 
experience in negotiating with outside groups and institutions have prior experiences, 
ideas and skills beneficial to reform and are more prone to seeking moderation than 
narrowly recruited elites.  Hermansson was middle-class, a postgraduate student, a 
trained economist who was active in other leftist organisations including the Social 
Democratic Youth League and the socialist student organisation Clarté.  He drew on 
wider debates and analytical skills to envisage reform.  In particular, Hermansson’s 
experience of democratic debate gave a basis for democratisation.  Experience of 
theoretical debates on Marxism and economics helped him recognise the problems in 
the Soviet model early on and working as assistant to liberal political scientist Herbert 
Tingsten Hagberg shaped his views.  Hermansson was also close to intellectuals and 
mid-level elites seeking a ‘modernist’ (Eurocommunist) direction.   
 
In accordance with Grzymała-Busse’s framework, Hermansson was ‘horizontally’ 
advanced – being recruited to work for SKP’s paper Ny Dag in 1941 then rapidly 
rising to the Politburo.  Working at Ny Dag shaped Hermansson’s reformism and he 
encountered criticisms of the lack of debate on sensitive issues from reformers, 
including trade unionist Sven Landin MP and maverick intellectual Anton Strand 
(Sparring 1964, p. 303).  On becoming editor Hermansson created a forum of debate 
and democratic centralism broke down as Ny Dag criticised SKP’s losses in the 1962 
local election, developments in the Soviet-bloc and advocated generational turnover 
in leadership bodies (Sparring 1964, pp. 303–7).  The leadership responded by 
removing dissidents and advancing young orthodox functionaries to the CC.  When 
Hagberg stepped down from ill-health, Hermansson was chosen as a compromise 
candidate at the 1964 congress, his record of criticising Stalinism and the Soviet-bloc 
gave him legitimacy with reformists.  The old guard (mistakenly) saw him as a trusted 
member of the leadership because he had stayed clear of dissidence preceding the 
congress and made his criticisms internally, following party rules (Jorgenson 2002, p. 
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64).  Democratic centralism ensured that loyal delegates were elected to the congress, 
enabling Hermansson’s uncontested election (Tarschys 1974, p. 38).   
 
Hermansson’s first speech as Chair revealed his election as a victory for the 
modernists.  He rejected Hagberg’s calls to reassert democratic centralism, pleaded 
for ongoing debate, and abandoned the Bolshevik model.  Hermansson also asserted 
independence from Moscow and SAP to gain credibility and force more concessions 
from the Social Democrats.  SKP boycotted international Communist conferences and 
criticised the regimes in CEE.  Hermansson did not social democratise but found 
inspiration from Scandinavian left-socialist parties and Italian Eurocommunism 
(Devlin, 1969).  There was a noticeable moderation in campaign rhetoric (Jorgenson 
2002, pp. 66–9).  Hermansson opened elite advancement to ‘modernist’ reformers, 
New Left feminist and environmentalist activists and left-wing social democrats.  He 
tried to make the party more attractive to them with books emphasising broader leftist 
appeals.  Turnover in leading organs was gradual, but New Leftists advanced to 
important positions and the social composition of SKP’s rank and file and electorate 
changed as academics and white-collar workers began to displace trade unionists and 
the working-class (Arter 2002, p. 50, 1993, p. 34).   
 
Hermansson dismantled democratic centralism between 1964–5.  Communications 
between central and district bodies became increasingly two-way, providing room for 
debate and local-level decision-making (Devlin, 1982a).  Congresses were held more 
regularly and secret ballots were introduced for delegate elections.  Moreover, the 
Central Committee/Politburo were renamed as the Party Board/Executive Committee 
and restrictions on members were relaxed allowing ‘supporting members’ who were 
not activists to enter debates at meetings (Devlin, 1982a).  The size of the Board was 
reduced to make it stronger vis-à-vis the Executive Committee, deliberately 
weakening the leadership’s power.  Debate was encouraged at Board meetings which 
were also opened to guests.  Alongside this more independent programme 
commissions were established (see Jorgenson, 2002).  Hermansson’s successor at Ny 
Dag was chosen from its own staff rather than a Board member as usual (Sparring 
1964, p. 318). 
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As the rank and file were empowered they pursued Eurocommunist and New Left 
policies.  The changes were consolidated in new programmes and statutes in 1967.  
These portrayed socialism as an ethical principle rather than a scientific prescription, 
removed the phrase democratic centralism and embraced an ultra-democratic 
organisation (Hermansson 1988, p. 137).  Hermansson did not substantially centralise 
as Grzymała-Busse found that experienced reformers had done in CEE.  Only some 
processes of centralisation took place including Hermansson’s publications like 
Vansterns Vag (1965) which repositioned the SKP while circumventing internal 
decision-making channels and the appointment of a fourteen member committee 
dominated by reformists that drafted proposals for the 1967 congress (Sparring 1964, 
p. 319).  Democratic debate was used to make most of the changes.  
 
Electoral expansion helped Hermansson to achieve his key programmatic goals at the 
1967 congress and references to Lenin were dropped (Taryschys 1974, p. 39).  
Hermansson encouraged respect for liberal rights, acceptance of the parliamentary 
system and exchanged dogmatism for practical policies such as tax reform.  However, 
democratisation opened a can of worms.  Resistance tarnished the credibility and 
distance from Communism that Hermansson sought.  The old guard retained a 
majority in the Board and key positions throughout the party apparatus (Sparring 
1964, p. 292).  A new generation of elites selected by open procedures did not emerge 
until 1967.  As the old guard’s obedience waned they sabotaged reform, blocking 
several changes to the 1967 programme including the removal of radical phrases and 
criticism of regimes in CEE (Tarschys 1974, p. 41). 
 
Hermansson failed to fully consolidate his broadly pitched brand of socialism, being 
forced to compromise on symbolic changes including dropping the word Communism 
from SKP’s name.  Instead it became Left Party – Communists (VPK) at the 1967 
congress (Devlin, 1969).  The leadership’s inability to control competing factions 
became visible as Maoists publicly criticised the leadership before splitting in 1967.  
Modernists and renewers dissatisfied at the lack of decisive reform followed suit.  
Hagberg and the pro-Soviet wing based around working-class cadres from the North 
distrusted the new intellectual elite.  They began using internal democracy to organise 
against Hermansson’s reforms and clashed with pragmatic, middle-class, locally 
elected officials.  The hardliners formed a faction called the ‘Flamman-Group’ around 
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local Communist paper Norrskensflamman, using it to criticise the leadership and 
preserve VPK’s Communist heritage, undermining Hermansson’s attempts at 
broadening the party’s appeal.  Hermansson aimed for a common electoral platform 
with SAP in 1966 but the VPK’s continued association with orthodox Communism 
meant that it remained beyond the pale (Koß 2010, – forthcoming).   
 
Hermansson’s appeals for a restoration of discipline were ignored (Devlin 1969).  The 
leadership’s commitment to democratisation made it hard to expel, silence or 
discipline the Flamman Group as traditionally happened to dissidents.  Although 
Hermansson had the support of a majority of the rank and file, the hard-line activists 
were effective organisers and fought a long battle for control of the party.  The 
Flamman Group understood the party’s institutions better than the young reformers, 
continued to win concessions and tried to take control of district organisations 
(Tarschys 1974, p. 40).  The leadership was also confronted by a new fiery leadership 
in the Youth Communists that criticised Hermansson’s strategy.  Its leaders restored 
democratic centralism in 1969 and asserted their independence from the party, 
undermining Hermansson’s reforms and contributing to disunity at congresses.   
 
Hermansson was soon on the defensive.  He appeased the hardliners by ending aid to 
New Left publication Tidssignal which they saw as bourgeois (Jorgenson 2002, p. 
68).  Reformist Kjell Johansson complained of a retreat to pre-1964 positions (Devlin, 
1969).  A further pressure was the pending constitutional change that established a 
four per cent threshold for representation in the Riksdag which forced Hermansson to 
avoid a split (Tarschys 1974, p. 43).  As a result the 1969 programme made 
concessions that replaced commitments to gradual reform with criticisms of ‘Swedish 
class society’ and a readiness to contemplate use of force if imperialists blocked 
social change.  In May 1969, Ny Dag conceded that parliamentary activity should 
remain subordinate to extra-parliamentary action (Devlin, 1969).   
 
The hardliners also won a large number of places in the Board and Executive 
Committee in 1969 (Devlin, 1969).  Throughout the 1970s they blocked the 
leadership’s reforms.  By 1972 programmes made no criticisms of developments in 
CEE and there was a noticeable shift back to the left (Olsen 1986, p. 368).  
Hermansson stepped down in 1975, partly because he grew tired of fighting the 
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hardliners.  When the Flamman-Group eventually split, forming the Workers’ Party – 
The Communists (APK) in 1977, it took 3,000 members and seized 
buildings/resources leading to chaotic legal disputes and fighting.  After the split 
VPK’s leaders felt compelled to stress radicalism to compete with the APK.  
Hermansson’s attempts to break with the regimes of CEE also proved ineffective as 
leading officials continued to travel there (Josefsson, 2004a).   
 
Hermansson’s open elite advancement policies also caused problems.  Elites from the 
New Left ‘1968 generation’ included protesters from the anti-Vietnam war 
movement, Maoists, Socialists, Marxists, feminists and left-wing social democrats 
(Gilberg 1980, p. 249).  The newcomers were often female, highly-educated, middle-
class professionals working in social work, health and education.  Their advancement 
to elite positions helped to break with pro-Soviet hardliners, changed a male 
dominated party and many of them sought reforms.  However, some of them brought 
militancy and newfound radicalism incompatible with Hermansson’s pragmatic 
Eurocommunism.  A ‘neo-Leninist’ tendency formed that, although critical of the 
Soviet Union, was committed to Marxism-Leninism and opposed co-operation with 
SAP. 
 
Neo-Leninist elites soon dominated and several leading Eurocommunists left while 
others converted (Tarschys 1974, p. 41).  Flexible elite advancement did not 
necessarily foster moderation.  The neo-Leninists radicalised programmes at 
congresses.  These emphasised ideas avoided during by the ‘modernists’ including 
proletarian internationalism, violent revolution by the working-classes to overthrow 
capitalism, extra-parliamentary activism above parliamentary reform, the scientific 
nature of Marxism-Leninism and democratic centralism (Olsen 1986, p. 368; VPK, 
1987, 1972).  Unsurprisingly, SAP maintained little contact with the VPK (or 
Hermansson) and it remained captive, failing to gain sufficient reward for its support. 
 
4.3 Democratic stagnation 
Lars Werner succeeded Hermansson in 1975.  He had been one of 29 modernists who 
wrote to the CC demanding an independent and moderate course in the early 1960s.  
He supported Hermansson, fought against the hardliners/neo-Leninists and 
encountered the pragmatising experiences of working in trade unions and elected 
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office.  However, in Grzymała-Busse’s terms, Werner lacked the complete ‘set’ of 
experiences beneficial to centralising or social democratising.  Unlike most reformers 
he was narrowly recruited, spending most of his political life in VPK, slowly rising up 
the ranks.  Werner was strongly connected to VPK’s past – his father was a leading 
Communist.  He was also a construction worker, with little formal education giving 
him support from traditionalists.  His attachment to them made breaking with 
Communism agonising.   
 
Werner took a more traditionalist approach than Hermansson.  He appeased the 
Flamman Group by improving relations with the Soviet Union and removing 
restrictions on VPK politicians holidaying there.  Declassified documents show 
Werner maintained secret contacts with the Soviet-bloc seeking resources and even 
‘booze and fags’; he regularly met officials from the German Democratic Republic 
and praised North Korea’s socialism as late as 1987 (SVT, 2004b).  Werner sought 
few reforms in the 1980s, supporting the idea in Grzymała-Busse’s framework that 
narrowly recruited elites struggle to adapt.  Needing the traditionalists’ support, 
Werner avoided rocking the boat or seeking inclusion in a governing coalition 
(Devlin, 1982a).  Instead, Werner balanced VPK’s competing groups to hold it 
together and protect his position.  He ensured that Board and parliamentary group 
meetings made vague decisions and provided little room for critical discussion on 
conditions in CEE.  If Board decisions deviated from Eurocommunism or support for 
SAP he would ignore them, which dismayed reformers.   
 
VPK’s organisation in many respects resembled that of other Swedish parties by 
1989.  This left little demand for organisational change, room for a backlash from 
democratisation, or a restructuring in which to centralise following the collapse of 
Communism.  However, the small changes that were made continued to push the 
party towards democratisation.  Members no longer required nomination from 
existing members and organisational committees of old elites regulating internal 
affairs were abolished.  Internal democracy continued to hamper reform.  
Traditionalists, favouring Marxism-Leninism, Communist symbolism and who were 
sceptical of co-operation with SAP held a majority in the Board and were strongly 
represented in the mid-level elite.  Werner supported the advancement of some 
reformists to counter the neo-Leninists in the Board, but reformers lacked influence 
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and were unable to seize the initiative with Werner as leader.  Werner would not 
support the advancement of extreme reformers aiming to break with Communism and 
rarely led or supported reforms; instead stalemate and ideological stagnation occurred 
as reformists fought a losing battle within VPK’s internal structures.  Several leading 
reformist Executive Committee members left frustrated.   
 
Werner did not substantially centralise to sidetrack traditionalists, as the framework 
expects of experienced reformers.  The leadership reduced the size of the Board from 
35 to 25 members strengthening its managerial role vis-à-vis the Executive 
Committee and internal accountability (V, 2001).  VPK’s organisation remained 
extremely open and pluralistic with few expulsions (Hermansson 1988, p. 152).  
When Werner did grab power, by creating policies in interviews without prior 
discussion, it was to the detriment of reform.  When the leadership tried to make 
policy more realistic by enabling parliamentarians to be elected to the Party Board in 
1990, this had little impact on the Board’s composition until the late-1990s.  
Reformist elites’ New Left backgrounds meant they were strongly attached to 
democratisation, contrary to Grzymała-Busse’s findings in CEE that elites with 
professional backgrounds or prior experience in seeking broader appeals and reforms 
centralise.  They also lacked power to make organisational changes and centralisation 
would have faced serious resistance.   
 
Elite turnover was slow but by the late 1980s a significant part of the leadership came 
from the ‘1968 generation’ and were experienced in negotiating with outside groups 
and institutions.  Most were traditionalist and not pragmatic enough to support reform.  
However, (like under Hermansson) the reformists generally had the characteristics 
identified by Grzymała-Busse.  Most had encountered problems with VPK’s appeals 
through engaging with other political organisations or wider debates and were 
professionals working as teachers, academics and health workers.  Flexible 
recruitment practices continued to be the strongest influence on V’s reformers.  These 
new leftists were attracted by Hermansson’s pluralistic brand of socialism but 
believed VPK’s Communism left his project incomplete.  Open recruitment and 
advancement practices supplied new ideas but the reformists were not ideologically 
cohesive.  They advocated a range of approaches to socialism rather than social 
democracy.  Conversely, elites emerging ‘narrowly’ from the Youth League were 
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usually traditionalist.  Most narrowly recruited hardliners who became reformist 
changed gradually, having gained more responsible roles in elected office, or through 
witnessing life in CEE at first hand.  Few changed suddenly in 1989.   
 
Some reformers were moderate when they joined VPK and relatively open elite 
advancement practices provided opportunities to careerists and opportunists.  These 
reformers were usually driven to elected positions, while traditionalists tended to seek 
positions as functionaries, regional apparatchiks and at central office.  However, 
working in parliament (or for parliamentarians) also exposed radical New Leftists to 
the constraints of office and they moderated, becoming so called ‘softies’ on 
programmatic issues and compromises with SAP.  This included Lars Bäckström who 
became a realist through designing budget proposals in parliament.  SAP was 
generally reluctant to include VPK in municipal government, but its support role 
involved direct negotiations, meaning that VPK’s locally elected officials also 
encountered the realities of budgetary decisions, the benefits of moderation and 
became hungry for government.  These locally elected officials promoted reform in 
Board and regional meetings and were able to point to their increased influence on 
SAP.  Where VPK was strongest it was also usually more hard-line, resulting in 
regular clashes between pragmatic politicians and the traditionalist rank and file/mid-
level elite at meetings and congresses.  Similarly, (ongoing) tensions developed 
between VPK’s practically-minded parliamentarians and the Party Board in the 1980s 
because of their different roles. 
 
Democratic procedures allowed traditionalist functionaries in the mid-level elite to 
block reform. This group had little experience in negotiating with groups and 
institutions outside the party.  The former social democratic, local councillor Johan 
Lönnroth, led reformists presenting motions to the 1985 congress expressing the 
merits of Swedish capitalism over Soviet Communism.  Werner did not support them 
and they were roundly defeated.  Reformers tried again in 1987, when reformers 
including feminists Tora Freeba and academic Göran Therborn were elected to the 
Programme Commission.  The reformers clashed with neo-Leninist Jörn Svensson in 
the Commission and drafted a programme that broke with Communism and 
demanded free elections in CEE.  This encountered stiff resistance at the 1987 
congress and neo-Leninist Vice-Chair Kenneth Kvist controversially revised the 
  
119 
programme overnight reintroducing traditional concepts including democratic 
centralism while emphasising some new themes to avoid a split (VPK, 1987).  This 
was possible because of Svensson’s influence with the Board’s traditionalist majority 
and procedures whereby the Programme Commission submitted draft programmes to 
the Board for amendments.   
 
Freeba’s feminist reforms were also rejected by the majority of working-class, 
congress delegates who remained more traditionalist than most members.  For them 
green policies and feminism played second fiddle to Marxism-Leninism.  
Traditionalists took control of reformers’ districts and organised against them in 
elections for the Board.  Reformers were also less engaged with local meetings than 
traditionalist functionaries who enjoyed the upper-hand in nominating congress 
delegates and choosing the Board.  After failing in 1987, leading reformists left VPK.  
Electoral success in 1988, however, seemed to vindicate Werner’s strategy (Arter 
1988, p. 97).  Nonetheless, the collapse of Communism in CEE plunged VPK into 
crisis and intensified fighting.  Criticising the Soviet-bloc was no longer a taboo and 
reformers achieved several victories through VPK’s democratic structures.  However, 
these occurred more through accident than design and their efforts remained 
constrained.  The traditionalist programme in 1987 had seemingly settled debate in 
the Programme Commission.  The new Commission was expected to make few 
changes, freeing up the nomination process to more outsiders, trade unionists, 
feminists and academics.  Events in CEE meant it was suddenly tasked with updating 
the programme.   
 
The Commission replaced the programme’s traditionalist terminology with a 
minimalist set of eleven points that were accepted at the 1990 congress (V, 1990).  
The Commission wanted a practical document that avoided theory but Werner 
intervened, inserting direct references to socialism and traditionalist rhetoric 
undermining the intended break with the past.  The programme continued to aspire to 
a Communist society.  The reformists in the Commission, however, suggested 
dropping the word Communism from VPK’s name.  This was accepted with a 
majority of three votes after a hard-fought debate and VPK was renamed 
Vänsterpartiet (Arter 1991, p. 66).  The decision was strongly opposed by 
traditionalist mid-level elites and district organisations.  Werner originally opposed 
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the change but switched sides during the congress like many leading Communists 
who sought to disassociate Swedish Communism from the Soviet Union and to 
protect its electoral appeal.  However, it was not the comprehensive break with 
Communism the reformers sought, doing little to repudiate V’s Communist history.  
In 1991 V declined from 5.8 per cent to 4.5 per cent of the vote (see Table 4.1). 
 
Modernisation was protracted and divisive (Arter 2002, p. 10).  Events in CEE were 
not enough to dethrone Werner.  A spontaneous challenge from Vice-Chair Gudrun 
Schyman, considered a traditionalist, won only a third of votes at the 1990 congress.  
Even reformers including Johan Lönnroth voted for Werner and they lacked a credible 
candidate.  Traditionalists retained a majority in the Board and undermined reformers’ 
efforts by closing Ny Dag.  They also removed some of Werner’s reformist advisors 
who favoured closer ties with SAP including Bo Hammar and placed social 
democratic parliamentarians in unelectable positions on V’s parliamentary-list (Arter 
2002, p. 10).  Congresses continued to elect traditionalist Party Secretaries 
(responsible for the party’s organisational functioning) to put ‘overcoats’ on Werner 
in case he sided with the reformists.  Before the 1993 congress leading reformists, 
including several MPs, demanded renewal based on commitments to individual 
freedom, moderate Socialism with regulated markets instead of state-ownership and 
economic planning.  The modernisers were rebuked by Vice-Chair Kvist for 
attempting a split (ibid., p. 10).  The lack of programmatic change meant that more 
frustrated reformers left V including parliamentarians who were possible successors 
to Werner which weakened the remaining reformist elites.   
 
Werner failed to direct V and did not denounce Communism.  Alcoholism meant that 
he increasingly paid less attention to reform and Board meetings (Interview former 
Party Board member).  With Werner incapacitated in 1993 and the Board divided, the 
Programme Commission set the precedent of sending proposals directly to congress 
and worked more independently.  Its 1993 programme accepted several of Lönnroth’s 
proposals and left behind references to Communism and descriptions of the capitalist 
nature of Swedish society.   This avoided theories or philosophies in favour of 
concrete policy proposals and was based on three principles: feminism, 
environmentalism and socialism.  Marxism was now just one of V’s inspirations and 
the concept of democratic centralism had been left behind (V, 1993).  This time 
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congress accepted some programmatic reforms with resistance alleviated by the 
Commission’s consultation with district organisations.  However, tensions remained 
and debate ran out of control, so that the whole congress agenda was not discussed.  
This left it unclear how Marxist, Communist or radical V would be and traditionalists 
retained their majority in the Board.   
 
4.4 Parliamentarisation 
When Werner finally resigned, the 1993 Congress chose Schyman as Party Chair, 
above leading reformist Annika Ohlabe whose enthusiasm for European integration 
angered traditionalists.  Schyman pledged adaptation on leftist lines – championing 
extra-parliamentary activism.  She had been a peripheral, traditionalist figure.  To her 
colleagues’ surprise, Schyman became a leading member of V’s reformist right-wing.  
Schyman broke with Werner’s strategy, aggressively pursuing electoral and 
governmentally driven strategies, endeavouring to win acceptance from SAP and 
promoting a socialist-market economy above public ownership (Arter 2002, p. 11).  
As Vice-Chair Schyman promoted the agendas of new social movements, supported 
the name change and she stood against Werner to inject competition into leadership 
selection.  However, she lacked great experience in carrying out prior reforms that 
Grzymała-Busse’s framework expects of leaders that overhaul their parties.  Based on 
these criteria, Werner was a more likely reformer but a high level of experience in 
carrying out prior-reforms was not a pre-requisite for elites’ to seek or implement 
adaptation. 
 
Like many reformists, Schyman’s background gave her ideas, pragmatism and 
experience in negotiating with outsiders that proved beneficial to reform.  She had an 
outsiders’ perspective.  Working as a social worker formed Schyman’s concern with 
equality.  She had not become Communist through family tradition or ideological 
conviction but the influence of friends and VPK’s connections to anti-nuclear and 
peace movements.  Schyman was not extremely ideological or theoretical until she 
embraced feminism in the 1990s and was promoted as VPK sought female candidates 
rather than through loyalty, making it easy for her to adapt.  As a parliamentarian she 
encountered the need for moderate appeals that resonated with voters.  She drew on 
her broad experiences to reach out to people she encountered in her career and people 
like herself –  women, single mothers, the low-paid and public sector workers.  She 
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was able to talk ‘in their language’; about every day, non-political situations, unlike 
Werner.  She also drew on experiences in new social movements and debates on the 
EU to change the topics covered by board meetings and to broaden V’s profile.   
 
Second, Schyman was active in the Maoist Marxist-Leninist Struggle League.  
Although Schyman downplays the importance of her past, leading elites see Maoist 
traits in her hands on style of working closely with voters.  Politicians with Maoist 
backgrounds have been amongst V’s most pragmatic reformers having exchanged 
theoretical dogma and broadened appeals through speaking to ‘ordinary people’ about 
local, everyday concerns.  Third, Schyman’s experience as a journalist benefited her 
media-led strategy for repackaging V.  She, unlike Werner, was very successful at 
communicating with outsiders in television appearances.  Schyman astonished 
colleagues with her ability to make sound-bites from complex briefing papers.   
 
Under Schyman elite turnover increased as reform-minded new leftists gained 
important positions in the Executive Committee and parliamentary group.  Schyman 
chose Lönnroth as Vice-Chair, a non-Communist, left-libertarian, who criticised state 
intervention in welfare and labour markets and looked to the voluntary sector to 
promote socialism. This legitimised the leadership with reformers.  Leading 
reformists were not ideologically homogenous but shared many of the attributes that 
Grzymała-Busse found reformists exhibited in CEE.  Most joined because of 
Hermansson’s reforms and shared broader experience from professional backgrounds, 
outside organisations and elected roles that prompted them to moderate their ideas.  
These characteristics systematically gave them a fresh outlook and desire to show that 
V could be pragmatic, could compromise and could govern.  Critics complained that 
the executive committee was dominated by middle-class professionals and outsiders 
unfamiliar with V’s traditions (Bottwyk, 1998).   
 
Contrary to the ideas in Grzymała-Busse’s framework, the reformist elites did not 
centralise.  They retained an ideological aversion to centralism and did not envisage it 
as a viable instrument for reform.  Leading reformers were generally satisfied with 
V’s local delegate congress system for voting on programmes/candidates presented by 
independent committees.  The absence of centralisers could be explained by the lack 
of experience in carrying out prior programmatic reforms.  Only a minority of the new 
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elite had hands-on experience in proposing these.  However, many had sought to 
make broader appeals on a local level or promoted them at party meetings and within 
the Party Board.   
 
Nevertheless, even experienced reformers, including Lönnroth, opposed centralising.  
Leading reformists were well aware of resistance from mid-level elites.  A minority 
encountered it at first hand and the others had observed reformers’ proposals being 
sabotaged throughout the 1980s but still did not see centralisation as the solution.  
Many reformers had little truck with centralisation because they were committed to 
liberal conceptions of democracy, minority rights and local decision making.  The 
lack of centralisation shows that Grzymała-Busse’s reasoning of why reformers with 
professional occupations or prior experience of reform should be predisposed 
reformers to centralisation does not travel well to V.  
 
The framework captures how traditionalist elites often advanced narrowly as 
functionaries.  Working largely inside the party apparatus they lived in a parallel 
universe to V’s elected officials, avoiding pressures to justify Communism to 
outsiders and rarely needing to moderate.  This process meant that centralisation was 
not the silver bullet Grzymała-Busse imagines.  Central office was a stronghold for 
traditionalists.  A major shake-up of personnel was needed before centralisation 
would have benefited reform.  The leadership introduced some new faces at central 
office.  However, turnover there remained low and new employees were often 
traditionalists seeking somewhere to hibernate through the winter of reform, 
prompting reformers to call central office ‘the mausoleum’.  The traditionalist 
functionaries used their roles to control internal affairs and block reform.  They 
enjoyed substantial influence over internal communications and campaign material, 
regularly drafting radical policy documents that reformist parliamentarians were too 
busy or not strong enough to alter.  The leadership had little motivation or power to 
remove traditionalist functionaries.  V has rarely expelled officials, and expulsions 
have not been connected to left-radicalism but rather to illegal acts or allying with 
right-wing parties.   
 
The reformers were largely disinterested in organisational issues or institutional 
changes and did not prioritise comprehensive organisational re-structuring.  However, 
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they envisaged some alternative strategies to centralisation and drew on their New 
Left backgrounds to promote further, informal, democratisation to overcome 
resistance and broaden appeal.  The reformers brought in greater representation for 
women and established working groups to shed-light on VPK’s secretive contacts 
with the Soviet-bloc.  Congresses were also scheduled every two rather than four 
years, to renew traditionalist policies.  Most importantly, Schyman opened meetings 
to non-members and activists from peace and environmental NGOs to dethrone 
traditionalists.  Schyman also instructed members to attend trade union and NGO 
meetings to broaden appeal.  Party meetings were instructed to be like ‘kitchen table’ 
conversations and held in cafes rather than party offices to engage with everyday 
issues rather than insular theoretical debates.  The traditionalists thought Schyman’s 
changes were crass and many local meetings continued as normal.  Although new 
members joined, democratisation failed to completely overrun traditionalists and their 
ways of doing things.   
 
The leadership made some use of streamlining, selling V’s own newspaper because it 
was detached from voters and the mainstream press.  The reformers did not see a need 
to centralise power.  Instead they informally made more of their institutional 
resources available and rhetorical skills by making more speeches, public appearances 
and media briefings to promote a broader image and to cultivate co-operation with 
SAP.  Schyman in particular made greater use of her role as Chair than her 
predecessors.  She spent most of her time travelling around Sweden, attending events, 
talking to voters and would not attend party meetings closed to the public.  She 
redefined and softened V’s image in numerous interviews and appearances, going to 
film-premiers, Nobel-prize dinners and befriending the leader of the employers’ 
federation. 
 
The reformer’s other main organisational change involved shifting power to the 
parliamentary group.  V’s reformist MPs worked more closely with the small 
Executive Committee.  It placed the parliamentarians at the forefront of campaigns, 
giving them increased freedom to make policy statements and re-define the party line, 
thereby marginalising the Party Board.  Schyman and the parliamentarians 
downgraded formal policy making structures in interviews by inventing/changing 
policies and distancing V from Communism.  The parliamentary group also gained 
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powers to employ staff, a role previously controlled by the Board.  In 1987, V’s 
statutes committed the parliamentarians to following programmes and congress 
decisions (V, 2001).  This was watered down to treating congress decisions and 
programmes as ‘guidelines’.  The MPs increasingly made policy documents that 
conflicted with those of the Board and Programme Commission and controversially 
joined the defence committee in parliament, even after the Board opposed doing so 
because it worked with NATO, threatening Swedish neutrality.   
 
Little formal centralisation took place.  However, some informal top-down processes 
were brought in.  Most significantly, Schyman led the professionalisation of V’s 
campaign machine.  The leadership was mindful that introverted activists were 
formulating dogmatic appeals lacking resonance with the electorate.  In 1994 external 
PR professionals were introduced to make messages more attractive.  V began 
distributing centrally made campaign material to district organisations and tried to co-
ordinate them through email.   The leadership attempted only limited centralisation as 
the executive committee played a leading role in election campaign committees in 
1998/2002.  The changes encountered stiff resistance from traditionalists who 
believed using marketing experts was too capitalist and many districts refused to use 
centrally made material.  The leadership was unable to force them to standardise 
campaigns and in response ran its own adverts in local newspapers.  The leadership 
also worked increasingly hard behind the scenes to ensure reformers advanced as 
spokespeople and parliamentary candidates while blocking traditionalists.   
 
The leadership achieved significant changes.  Publications including ‘Skeletons in the 
Wardrobe’ in 1993 made inroads towards ditching old ideas and a revised edition by 
historians in 1996 investigated VPK’s relations with the Soviet-bloc.  In 1993, it 
looked as though V might disappear from parliament but in 1994 less class conscious, 
less theoretical campaigns successfully targeted female, young, green, intellectual, 
public sector voters and delivered seven per cent of the vote (Arter 2002, p. 11).  V 
reprised its support role with SAP and managed to persuade the Social Democrats to 
enter ground-breaking formal negotiations.  The parliamentary leadership sought 
more influence by abandoning excessive demands that SAP could easily dismiss and 
adopted Bäckström’s (hitherto blocked) realist economic policies.  Schyman wanted 
an arrangement with SAP covering the whole of the parliamentary term.  She did not 
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get this, but secured a series of tax rises (Koß 2010, forthcoming).  However, overall 
V won few concessions and had to accept low-inflation targets, a budget surplus, and 
the Central bank’s independence for EMU negotiations (Socialism Today, 
01.11.1998).  Schyman saw this as a basis for future negotiations but support for 
SAP’s austere budget triggered huge pressures from traditionalists to break co-
operation.  SAP also cut child benefit to reduce the budget deficit worsening the 
situation.  Reformers including Lönnroth were prepared to support this but SAP 
abandoned V in 1995 for the Centre Party. 
 
SAP’s dominance made it harder for V to adopt a social democratic platform than was 
the case for Communist parties in CEE.  However, as Arter (2002, p. 3) argues, SAP’s 
neo-liberalisation and enthusiasm for European integration presented opportunities for 
‘social democratisation’.  SAP’s cuts in public services caused disaffection at a time 
of economic crisis, long-term unemployment and when out-migration was devastating 
some regions.  V’s pragmatic leaders shifted appeals to the right to fill the space made 
available, promoting traditional ‘social democratic polices’ from the 1970s.  
Opposition to the EU was no longer based on it being a ‘capitalist plot’ but as a threat 
to the welfare state.  V sought to protect this protecting against neo-liberalism (see 
Dunphy, 2004).  It became the only party explicitly to defend the Swedish welfare 
model (Koß, 2010 – forthcoming).  The parliamentary leadership ran the 1998 
election campaign on increased corporate taxes, redistribution of wealth, protection of 
workers’ rights, full-employment, expansions in public services and welfare 
provision.   
 
Being in opposition freed V from SAP’s unpopular policies and boosted its appeal 
(Arter 2002, p. 12).  It allowed Schyman to be more critical of SAP than her 
predecessors.  As intended, V attracted swathes of disgruntled SAP supporters, trade 
unionists and white-collar workers, who saw it as the ‘old social democrats’ (see 
Moller, 1998).  A third of V’s new voters came from SAP and most of them opposed 
EU membership (Koß, 2010 – forthcoming; Arter, 2002).  This strategy combined 
with Schyman’s broad appeal and excellent communication skills enabled V to win 
twelve per cent of the vote in 1998, almost doubling its number of MPs to 43, making 
it Sweden’s third largest party.  It also expanded rapidly across local councils.  The 
growth of the parliamentary group increased the resources at the reformers’ disposal 
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and introduced new allies into the elite.  Moderation and growth delivered 
unprecedented acceptance from SAP which broke tradition by bringing V into more 
municipal executives.  Schyman secured pioneering institutionalised relations and 
binding agreements with SAP (and the Greens) in exchange for V’s parliamentary 
support in 1998 and 2002 – which scholars have termed ‘Contract Parliamentarism’ 
(Bale and Bergman, 2006a, 2006b).   
 
Most of the reformers’ policy changes took place in dealing with SAP rather than in 
party programmes.  Institutionalised negotiations expanded the reformists’ autonomy 
from the board.  Reformist parliamentarians and Executive Committee members, 
Lönnroth, Bäckström and Hans Andersson gained key positions in dealing with SAP.  
The negotiators were given freedom to make decisions quickly and flexibly.  The 
parliamentarians’ increased number of employees conducting research resulted in a 
growing knowledge gap with the Board’s part-time members, who deferred to their 
expertise and inside knowledge of negotiations.  As the parliamentary group 
negotiated with SAP they drifted further rightwards.  Gaining acceptance from SAP 
increasingly took precedence over V’s programmatic goals or activism.   
 
Parliamentarisation could not sustain all the reforms made by the parliamentary 
leadership.  The lack of centralisation returned to haunt the Schyman leadership, 
highlighting the relevance of the ideas in Grzymała-Busse’s framework to WECPs.  
The reformers lacked influence in key positions.  In 1993 congress elected a 
traditionalist majority to the Board.  The reformists grew stronger there in 1996 as 
they gained influence in candidate committees.  Reformers were also strengthened by 
increasing overlap between members of the Board and the parliamentary group.  
However, even though parliamentarians made up almost half the Board, the reformist 
leadership always lacked a solid majority there.  While hard-line employees from 
central office were rarely Board members it was also uncommon for those whose jobs 
depended on the parliamentary leadership to enter the Board.  Instead, Board 
members usually worked outside the party making them relatively independent.  
Others were often in locally elected office, or were important local party officials.   
 
V won some concessions from SAP in 1998 and more in 2002, including an advisory 
role in important ministries and regular meetings with SAP’s leaders (Christiansen 
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and Damgaard 2008, p. 57).  However, accepting SAP’s spending limits, 
privatisations and moves towards European integration proved traumatic (Dunphy 
2004, p. 153).  The leadership’s strategy placed immense strains on V.  It struggled to 
reconcile different electorates; socialism with social democracy; working-class 
labourism with New Left ecology; and a policy seeking mid-level elite with office-
seeking (Koß 2010 – forthcoming).  Opposition within the Board grew and 
parliamentary discipline was strained as traditionalist MPs criticised the privatisation 
of telecoms and abstained from votes.  Expansion in local councils added to tensions 
as pragmatic councillors were increasingly brought into red-green municipal 
coalitions and they made painful compromises on closing hospitals and public sector 
job cuts (Socialism Today, 01.11.98).  The councillors regularly clashed with 
traditionalist activists unconvinced of the benefits from governing and dissent became 
paralysing.   
 
The reformers’ parliamentary priorities distracted them from engaging with the 
growing internal opposition.  The leadership was soon constrained as the Board 
increasingly blocked their plans.  It rejected Lönnroth’s proposal to demand posts in 
government in 1998 and voted down Schyman’s attempts to control V’s 
communications.  While the media traditionally chose who they would speak with, 
she proposed the parliamentary leadership handpicked reformist parliamentarians, 
Board members and parliamentary secretaries for a brochure presenting a young 
leadership with responsibilities for specific policy areas.  This aimed to place 
reformists including future Member of the European Parliament Jonas Sjöstedt in the 
media while side-tracking traditionalists.  Schyman initially listened to the Board 
more than Werner had done.  However, she tired of resistance and instead of leading 
discussion grew disinterested in Board meetings.  Likewise, she had split her time 
between V’s central and parliamentary offices but frustrated with traditionalists at 
central office she stopped consulting it.  Eventually, Schyman spent little time on 
internal issues or even parliamentary negotiations, focusing on making public 
appearances. 
 
Schyman’s speeches did little to resolve the growing divisions within Vänsterpartiet.  
Calls for refraining from excessive demands and briefing against traditionalists were 
ignored.  Failure to streamline or reign in V’s independent Youth League (Ung 
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Vänsterr) meant that reformists lost control of elite advancement and policy making.  
In the early 1990s, reformists led the Youth League, but after a period of infighting, it 
radicalised and elected Jenny Lindahl as Chair and Kalle Larsson as Organisational 
Secretary who introduced a traditionalist programme in 1996.  In contrast to 
Vänsterpartiet’s direction, it reasserted radical concepts, extra-parliamentary activism 
and differences from SAP.  It argued that government should not ride roughshod over 
Vänsterpartiet’s anti-systemic, anti-establishment commitments.  The Youth League’s 
leaders claimed not to interfere in V’s affairs but this became a hollow commitment 
and serious tensions emerged between the organisations. 
 
In Grzymała-Busse’s terms of ‘transferrable skills’ the Youth Leaguers were highly 
equipped to radicalise Vänsterpartiet when its support began to shrink.  Its leaders 
became experienced activists, having built up the Youth League, written documents, 
built a central organisation and run campaigns.  These activists were better trained 
than most of V’s mid-level elite.  The Youth Leaguers shared a common traditionalist 
perspective, having worked in programme and statute committees.  They had run 
education courses and published books on campaigning, coalition-building, making 
congress motions and institutional changes; internal democratic procedures; and 
communication skills.  The Youth Leaguers followed a conception of democratic 
centralism in which a strong organisation strictly follows democratically made 
decisions.  They practiced a delegate/congress model similar to V’s and every 
member received publications on internal democracy.  The Youth League’s leaders 
had also defended their organisation against anarchist groups looking to downgrade 
its formal structures.  These factors made them sensitive to the growing gap between 
V’s activists/formal policy commitments and the leadership.  They believed 
Schyman’s use of the media contravened democratic decision making and that her 
celebrity status was detached from the disadvantaged groups that V represents.   
 
Procedures ensured that V’s candidates’ committees work at arm’s length from the 
leadership.  In the mid-1990s they were controlled by reformers and systematically 
blocked the advancement of accomplished Youth Leaguers, promoting non-members 
from NGOs instead.  The parliamentary leadership also gave few opportunities to the 
Youth Leaguers.  Frustrated, the Youth League’s leaders encouraged members to stay 
and built up their organisation while protesting against the situation.  The lack of 
  
130 
centralised control allowed them to change the composition and priorities of the 
candidates’ committees.  From 2000–09 they gave little room to reformist, right-wing 
candidates.  Excluding the Youth Leaguers meant that Vänsterpartiet failed to 
internalise their ideas or blunt their radicalism by burdening them with responsibility.  
Instead, V shut them out until they had an informal network strong enough to take 
control. 
 
The Youth Leaguers were strategically minded about gaining influence in powerful 
positions in the Board, Programme Commission, local selection committees for 
parliamentary candidates and as congress delegates.  In the late-1990s a cohort of 
Youth Leaguers advanced with over 25 leading Youth Leaguers winning national 
positions in V including Kalle Larsson and Jenny Lindahl, and many more taking 
mid-level roles.  The Youth Leaguers drew on their training to engineer a leftwards 
shift by connecting with V’s dissatisfied traditionalist activists at party meetings.  
While the Youth Leaguers helped one another (and traditionalists) gain important 
positions, the reformists’ alliances were looser.  The traditionalists began removing 
reformers from the Board including Bäckström (leader of V’s parliamentary group).  
He and Lönnroth were also almost de-selected from the parliamentary group at district 
meetings.  Several reformers withdrew from prominent roles and congresses being 
frustrated by increasing glamorisation of the Soviet Union.   
 
Prominent Youth Leaguers including Jenny Lindahl and Ali Esbati advanced to the 
Programme Commission deepening the gap between it and the parliamentary group.  
Esbati played a leading role in radicalising V’s economic policies setting out a 
Socialist vision very different from modern Swedish capitalism.  Programmes became 
more detailed to hold the leadership to account and attached more conditions on co-
operation with SAP through rejecting privatisations, welfare cuts and reductions in 
union rights.  Convention meant that parliamentarians rarely sat on the Programme 
Commission, limiting the reformer’s influence there.  
 
Congresses were always unreliable for the leadership.  In 1994 hundreds of 
alternative/critical motions and debates altered the leadership’s proposals.  Schyman 
was successful in promoting the feminisation of V’s programme making it Sweden’s 
first feminist party at the 1996 congress (V 1997, 1996).  However, several of her 
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motions were rejected by traditionalists, as were ten motions made by Lönnroth 
aiming to broaden appeal by rejecting scientific-socialism/Marxism, promoting 
syndicalism and strengthening liberal freedoms.  The leadership was more successful 
at the 1998 Congress, boosted by rising opinion polls and Schyman’s triumphant 
return from alcoholism but delegates still caused mayhem by criticising the 
centralisation of election campaigning.  Despite Schyman’s attempts to moderate the 
mid-level elite, they remained considerably more radical than the parliamentary 
leadership.   
 
The 2000 Congress was a major turning point when Youth Leaguers led a majority of 
traditionalist delegates to reject the leadership’s general strategy.  It dismissed a 
proposed pre-electoral programme with SAP, poured scorn on the leadership’s 
aspirations for government, committed to abolishing spending ceilings and passed 
motions criticising agreements with SAP on privatisations in telecoms and healthcare.  
Some members of the leadership criticised the final 2000 programme for being too 
detailed, strategically naïve, a slide back to Communism and an electoral liability.  
But they could not postpone it.  Meanwhile, Schyman talked down the programme’s 
significance in interviews, portraying it as a discussion document rather than V’s 
blueprint for office.  Most embarrassing for the leadership was Congress’s reaction to 
Schyman’s speech which denounced Communism and argued that Communists had 
no place within V.  The speech drew silence from shocked delegates and Schyman 
was usurped by Jenny Lindahl, whose fiery traditionalist speech received a jubilant 
standing ovation.  Schyman was V’s first leader to denounce Communism but the 
radical mid-level elite roundly rejected her vision.   
 
Schyman’s attempt to break with Communism was easily countered.  Communist 
members rebelled, presenting a petition in Flamman for the right to call themselves 
Communist.  Subsequently, the leadership pursued a tolerant line, fearing a split.  At 
the 2002 congress Youth Leaguers campaigned to reassert Communism as part of V’s 
identity, unravelling Schyman’s efforts.  Indeed, Youth Leaguers continue to adhere 
to Communism (Fraurud, 2004).  The reformers contemplated introducing a regional 
system for electing congress delegates to displace traditionalists, but did not support 
the idea of empowering all members at congresses.  They were left to lament that a 
small number activists had radicalised Vänsterpartiet at its congresses.   
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Since, 2000 reformists have overwhelmingly lost every congress.  The Programme 
Commission strengthened commitments to public ownership and congress approved 
its motions to limit market forces in energy and healthcare.  This led commentators in 
the media to conclude that Vänsterpartiet wanted to renationalise industries, 
sabotaging the leadership’s quest for moderation and its broad appeal.  The 2002 
Congress also committed to an expensive pensions system and major expansions in 
public services and V’s 2002 manifesto emphasised class conflict.  The leadership 
criticised – to little effect – the radicalisation as being irresponsible.  Schyman wrote 
joint newspaper articles on raising social security payments with SAP Prime Minister 
Göran Persson (Arter 2002, p. 13).  However, SAP refused to give V a cabinet 
position because it remained too radical, too unreliable and its foreign policy 
(Euroscepticism and anti-NATO stances, which reformers were willing to 
compromise on) made it unacceptable (Koß, 2010 – forthcoming). 
 
The Youth Leaguers had another weapon.  The paper Flamman re-affiliated with V in 
1990 when several Communists returned from the APK.  Flamman needed assistance 
being in debt and understaffed and Youth Leaguers including Larsson and Aron Etzler 
entered its editorial board.  The Youth Leaguers had been trained to build institutions, 
lacked a publishing house and aimed to forge a left-wing alternative having criticised 
the corporate ownership of the media.  The reformist leadership did not believe V 
needed to own paper(s) and prioritised coverage in mainstream outlets so as to reach a 
broader audience.  It did little to prevent Flamman falling into disarray, being hesitant 
to support a paper historically connected to Stalinism and having experienced 
financial crises with Ny Dag.  The leadership failed to streamline by closing Flamman 
or to block the Youth League’s actions.  Flamman again became a powerful 
mouthpiece to criticise reform. 
 
Traditionalist Board members were shocked that Schyman broke convention by not 
sending her 2000 Congress speech to the Board and Executive Committee for 
scrutiny.  Whilst the Board accepted the 2002 ‘contract’ with SAP, traditionalists won 
a large majority in the Board at the 2002 congress.  When opinion polls fell the 
leadership became vulnerable in Board meetings which increasingly blocked left-
libertarian proposals and compromises with SAP, including policies on reforming the 
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welfare state through private insurance.  The parliamentary group remained a 
stronghold for reformers but their work became heavily scrutinised.  The 
parliamentary leadership’s media-led strategy of talking down or ignoring unwanted 
policies was unsustainable given V’s democratic culture and Board meetings became 
an attempt to bind Schyman to radical policy commitments. As Jonas Sjöstedt 
(Interview, 18.06.08) puts it: ‘Compare it to two sides of the brain one being rational, 
one more irrational, when those two sides work together it is brilliant but when they 
do not co-ordinate it becomes chaos.’.  
 
Schyman continued her own initiatives regardless but lost the support of the Board as 
centrists backed the traditionalists.  Ultimately a tax-scandal forced Schyman’s 
resignation before things came to a head (Widfelt 2004, p. 1148).  By this point V had 
fallen to six and a half per cent in the polls (The Local, 08.12.2004).  The reformists 
could not direct Schyman’s succession.  As Vice-Chair, Lönnroth should have taken 
charge but he was ill.  Instead, two temporary ‘Presidents’, the leftist Ulla Hoffman, 
who was a critic of Schyman and in favour of breaking co-operation with SAP in 
1995, and centrist Ingrid Burman were chosen by the candidates’ committee.  
Hoffman, like many parliamentarians, had become pragmatic in elected office.  She 
continued co-operation with SAP but took a harder line, threatening to break co-
operation if SAP did not reverse cuts in sick-leave pay, which Hoffman promised to 
restore in 1998 after fierce criticism from V’s local chairmen.  She got her concession.  
Having changed party programmes and elite advancement processes, the 
traditionalists tried to elect one of their own, Lars Ohly, as Chair.  Reformists lacked a 
credible candidate given that Sjöstedt left the Board when centrists and traditionalists 
in central office campaigned against him, in a bitter period of infighting for the 
temporary leadership.   
 
The reformers finally saw a need for organisational centralisation to safeguard reform.  
Before the 2004 Congress, prominent reformers including Karin Svensson-Smith and 
Dan Gahnström formed a left-libertarian think-tank Vägval Vänster (VV) with 
Lönnroth becoming its Chair.  VV was a belated effort to counter a lack of 
representation in the Board by the reformist elite including twelve MPs.  This time 
they were writing petitions but VV could not compete with the traditionalists and 
gained few members.  The reformers were also ideologically fragmented.  Schyman 
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did not join VV and instead started a new party ‘Feminist Initiative’.  V’s convention 
of not having formalised factions meant leading reformers saw operating a separate 
organisation within V as undemocratic and subsequently did not join VV. 
 
Leading members of VV wrote a secret strategy document for the 2004 Congress 
called ‘Plan B’.  This identified power centres to influence, suggested merging the 
central and parliamentary offices and planned media briefings to attack the 
traditionalist leadership’s radicalism (Flamman, 03.04.04).  Plan B was leaked and 
published in Flamman.  The Board, Congress and traditionalists criticised VV for 
dangerous factionalism and Werner compared them to the APK (Flamman, 11.03.04, 
03.06.04, 04.11.04).  V’s culture of democratic debate meant the traditionalist 
leadership could do little to curtail the reformers’ devastating media criticisms.  
Although Hoffman favoured expelling those involved and leading traditionalists 
hinted at this they did were not worried about appearing authoritarian.  Hoffman 
temporarily left the Board in protest.  However, the game was up and many reformers 
left before the Congress began.  Svensson-Smith and Gahnström subsequently joined 
the Greens.  The reformers could do little as Ohly was elected, garnering 195 of the 
225 delegate votes (Ersson 2008, p. 7).  Schyman struggled to rid V of Communist 
baggage but was therefore ultimately succeeded by a Communist. 
 
4.5 Lars Ohly’s leadership: democratisation and parliamentarisation 
Ohly was narrowly recruited from the Youth League.  He was a leading traditionalist.  
Whereas Schyman deflected her past as a youthful adventure and Hoffman avoided 
calling herself Communist, Ohly accepted his Communism (Josefsson, 2004a).  It was 
not long before the media seized on his background and Communism in TV 
programmes including Uppdrag Granskning (September 2004).  Ohly was attacked 
for portraying himself as a defender of human rights while previously defending 
regimes in CEE and for not apologising to relatives of Swedish Communists executed 
in the Soviet Union (Josefsson 2004a, 2004b, The Local, 08.12.2004).  This presented 
the image that V had failed to break with Communism, competitors argued that 
Communists had seized back power and the radical tone of the 2004 Congress was 
interpreted as evidence that the party opposed co-operation with SAP (Josefsson, 
2004a).  So, having been forced on to the defensive, Ohly changed track and stated 
that he was no longer Communist (Widfelt 2005, p. 1199).   
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Ohly’s victory was part of a leftwards shift.  His support came from a coalition of 
traditionalists, Youth Leaguers, central office and centrist elites.  The traditionalists 
(temporarily) reaped the spoils of victory.  On becoming leader, Ohly heavily 
criticised the libertarian-reformists and Communists were no longer denounced.  Ohly 
initially asserted that he did not strive for ministerial office (Koß, 2010 – 
forthcoming).  Youth Leaguers and traditionalist functionaries with little experience 
of negotiating with outside groups and institutions continued to advance.  Leading 
reformers left parliament and V’s MPs moved closer to the traditionalist-led majority 
in the board.  The right-wing grew weak, becoming largely absent from congresses 
while fewer academics or outsiders joined the Programme Commission.  Lönnroth 
stayed but his alternative left-liberal draft programmes were roundly rejected by the 
Commission and Congresses.   
 
V’s campaigns radicalised, becoming increasingly Marxist and much more 
theoretical.  Commitments to withdraw from the EU and to socialise the banks were 
strengthened at the 2004 Congress (Eriksson, 2004).  Party programmes became more 
anti-capitalist, emphasising revolutionary, scientific-socialism (V, 2008, 2004).  
Reformers including Bäckström, were horrified when new economic policies 
committed to large expansions of the public sector, undoing the previous decade’s 
moderation in parliament (Jonsson, 2005).  This included Ohly’s 2006 pledge to 
expand the public sector by 200,000 jobs, which became a major campaign theme.  
The radicalisation made inclusion in government unthinkable before the 2006 election 
(Koß, 2010 – forthcoming).  In 2008 V asked for tax increases of €5.4B (Koß, 2010 – 
forthcoming) and the congress formed a working group on reversing privatisations.  
Traditionalists have also marginalised feminism and environmentalism with their 
socialist policies.  Hoffman led feminists in a rearguard action at the 2006 Congress to 
stop traditionalists placing class above gender.  However, the Board scrapped V’s 
women’s committee made from district representatives, making itself responsible for 
feminism, partially weakening feminism’s role within V.   
 
The Youth Leaguers made inroads to changing V’s tactics by strengthening extra-
parliamentary activism, drawing inspiration from the Dutch Socialist Party (SP).  
Larsson headed an organisational committee emphasising the need for increased 
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contact with voters on the streets, knocking on doors, working on a local level and 
reconnecting the leadership with district organisations.  Flamman also reported on the 
SP’s stunning electoral success and activism.  V trialled door-knocking in eleven local 
branches to speak with people about local concerns and worked with the homeless in 
Stockholm.  The leadership views this as a success and V’s new ‘Information Plan’ is 
heavily influenced by the SP.  While campaign funding tripled in the 1990s, state 
funding declined following electoral losses (2002 and 2006) providing less 
wherewithal for employing outside PR experts.  Instead campaigns are now designed 
in house by traditionalists and Youth Leaguers, becoming more ideological, 
theoretical and decentralised with greater local input to campaign material.   
 
V’s support role proved electorally damaging in 2006, despite its programmatic 
radicalisation (Koß, 2010 – forthcoming).  Traditionalists were dumfounded by losses 
at the 2006 election, with SAP also losing support as disaffected SAP voters broke 
tradition and went to the right.  V returned to opposition and lost positions in local 
government.  Decline continued in opposition, as V fell below the four per cent 
parliamentary threshold in polls (The Local, 11.06.07) and it lost support at the 2009 
election to the European Parliament.  Ohly is an effective debater but Schyman’s 
proficiency with the media was hard to replace.  The losses prompted reformers to 
criticise the lack of policy innovation and the narrowing of appeals to protests against 
neo-liberalism and global capitalism.  The lack of change is not surprising given that 
many elites were recruited in an insular fashion and have little experience in 
negotiating with outside groups and institutions.  Ohly’s role as Party Secretary was 
focused on organisational rather than programmatic issues and the Youth Leaguers’ 
backgrounds drew them to traditionalist ideology.  The elite had few new ideas from 
which to broaden appeal.   
 
The conventional wisdom portrays Ohly as extremist, but, as Koß (2010 – 
forthcoming) notes, Ohly’s oscillating appeals have caused confusion.  Grzymała-
Busse’s framework helps explain this by drawing attention to how Ohly is more 
pragmatic than first meets the eye.  This was recognised by the Schyman leadership 
which included him in a working-group that published ‘New Times, New Left’, an 
attempt to break with Communism and broaden the party’s appeal in 1993 and then 
made him Party Secretary.  The leadership saw that Ohly recognised the need for 
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painful changes and that his traditionalist identity helped sell reform to the rank and 
file.  His pragmatism enabled him to combine loyalty to Schyman, working with SAP 
and radical internal appeals popular with traditionalists.  Ohly remains proud of the 
funding for the welfare state that V’s support role delivered and recognises budget 
deficits and SAP’s larger size made compromises unavoidable.  He only sees two of 
V’s compromises as mistakes – the weakening of taxes on inheritance and privatising 
telecoms (Ohly Interview).  The reformists did not fear that Ohly would break co-
operation with SAP but believed his policies would be electorally unsuccessful and 
that realistic proposals would deliver more concessions. 
 
Like many traditionalists, Ohly opposed co-operation with SAP in the early 1990s, 
but moderated during his time in parliament.  He encountered the realities of elected 
office, became open to compromise and saw the advantages of having ministers.  
Likewise, leading traditionalists and Youth Leaguers, elected to the parliamentary 
group and Executive Committee out of opposition to Schyman, changed through their 
responsible roles in parliamentary committees/institutionalised negotiations with SAP.  
By 2006 many favoured entering government.  V’s locally elected politicians also 
maintained pressure for participation in government, having become confident with 
municipal coalitions under Schyman and they remain more flexible than the mid-level 
elite.  The traditionalists encountered similar pressures to earlier reformers once they 
controlled Vänsterpartiet.  They now aim to break Vänsterpartiet’s captive role.  
Internal factors meant that V’s leaders became more pragmatic and better positioned 
to respond to exogenous shocks.  
 
In response to V’s electoral decline, Ohly made the pioneering commitment to 
entering government (Widflet 2006, p. 1271; Bale and Blomgren, 2008, p. 101).  V’s 
pragmatic, centrist MPs (who remained stronger than traditionalists in the 
parliamentary group), and traditionalists who had grown pragmatic in parliament led 
the shift in strategy which gained momentum after the 2006 election loss.  The 2008 
Congress supported this, something Schyman could not deliver.  While the rank and 
file now accept participation in municipal government they remain sceptical about the 
concessions needed at the national level.  Ohly is better placed than Schyman to sell 
co-operation with SAP to them but this remains his biggest challenge.  The 
leadership’s engagement with V’s democratic structures helped position it for 
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government.  The traditionalists were appeased by Congress’s decision to refuse a 
pre-election agreement with SAP to retain ideological distinctiveness.  In their view 
this would provide fewer reasons to vote for V, weakening its influence on SAP.  
Leading traditionalists thought a pre-electoral agreement would never be possible.   
 
Ohly’s plans for negotiating after the 2010 election were fractured when SAP leader 
Mona Sahlin called for talks in autumn 2008 on a pre-election agreement.  The right-
wing parties’ successful pre-election coalition agreement in 2006 prompted SAP to 
reassess its hesitancy to bringing V (and the Greens) into government.  V’s leaders 
frustrated their allies by refusing to commit to a budget surplus, spending-ceilings or 
entering pre-electoral agreements and talks collapsed (The Local, 08.10.08).  
Reformers were dismayed, having craved such acceptance during the 1990s.  SAP 
threatened to exclude V from government if it did not return to talks and make the 
necessary concessions by Christmas 2008.  Vänsterpartiet’s centrist and increasingly 
pragmatic (former traditionalist) parliamentarians supported the pre-electoral 
agreement but this was blocked by the Board’s traditionalist led majority.   
 
Ohly and the increasingly pragmatic leadership had experience of carrying out prior-
reforms and faced exogenous shocks but did not centralise as Grzymała-Busse found 
elites with such experiences had done in CEE.  Instead, they looked inwards, to 
ensure that radical socialist policies produced by V’s internal structures were 
respected.  Attempts to quantitatively measure internal democracy in Swedish parties 
still show V as the most internally democratic (Bäck 2008, p. 81).  However, greater 
overlap had unintentionally developed between the Board and parliamentary group 
(nine of the twenty Board members being MPs), further weakening the Board’s 
authority.  The pragmatic parliamentarians eventually won support from centrist 
Board members.  After stalling as long as possible, V’s leaders broke their 
commitments and made the necessary compromises (The Local, 07.12.08).  Despite 
increased commitment to internal democracy and radical socialism, in practice 
Vänsterpartiet’s gradual parliamentarisation and social democratisation continue – 
under narrowly recruited elites seeking to capitalise on Vänsterpartiet’s first realistic 
chance of governing.  Ohly’s trade unionist background has also helped to strengthen 
co-operation with the social democratic unions. 
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The pragmatists in the leadership attempted to water down some radical policies at the 
2008 Congress with office- and vote-seeking in mind.  The leadership aimed to signal 
that it was open to compromise and attempted to replace V’s widely-criticised 
commitment to a six–hour working day with one of ‘lowering working-hours’.  
However, mid-level traditionalists resisted this and the commitment remained a long-
term goal, alongside the immediate goal of shorter working-hours.  The leadership 
also criticised the Cuban government over issues of democracy and opposed 
traditionalist congress motions praising Cuban politics.  Ohly works through V’s 
internal democratic structures more than Schyman had done but the majority of 
radical mid-level elites continue to constrain the leadership and dominate congresses.  
The leadership made deliberately vague motions at the 2008 Congress to avoid 
divisions and debate continues about V’s Communist affiliations.  Failure at the 2009 
election to the European Parliament prompted Ohly to speak of reconsidering V’s 
Eurosceptecism.  Withdrawal from the EU may be the next sacred cow to be 
sacrificed.  It is unlikely V would accept a federal Europe but more moderate 
opposition, providing an alternative vision of EU integration is being formulated to 
remove an excuse for excluding V from government.  This is likely to encounter stern 
resistance.   
 
Traditionalists were weakened further by the orthodox figurehead Camilla Sköld 
Jansson’s resignation as Vice-Chair, after she became marginalised in the Executive 
Committee.  The traditionalists’ majority in the Board was not stable and they lost 
influence in candidates committees.  This signals that V is choosing a centrist, 
pragmatic, socialist direction between the extreme left-libertarians and traditionalists.  
In 2009, the leadership and candidates committees promoted centrists and initiated a 
rapprochement with reformers, including Jonas Sjöstedt, placing them on lists for the 
2010 parliamentary election.  Several former traditionalists welcomed this realising 
that once they gained power, they struggled to use it and needed practical politics to 
gain credibility and broader appeal.  This shift in elite advancement will bring greater 
realism and experience if V enters government.   
 
Some traditionalists feel secure now V has more detailed socialist policies and the 
leadership are more trusted to promote V’s programmes.  Their radical credentials 
help activists accept major compromises, making it possible to combine radical 
  
140 
policies with office-seeking.  As reformers argue, Ohly’s leadership is ‘an alibi for 
going to the right’ (Tännsjö Interview, 15.08.07).  Ohly attempts to drive a harder 
bargain than Schyman and hopes SAP’s agenda will be more socialist than liberal.  
Some things stand in Ohly’s favour; he is more involved in negotiations and has better 
personal relations with SAP’s leaders than Schyman.  However, V is smaller than in 
1998 and major differences from previous negotiations are unlikely.  V is now 
formally left-socialist rather than left-libertarian but in parliament it finds little 
alternative to social democracy.  
 
Traditionalists did not strengthen controls over V’s parliamentarians, believing that 
congress decisions would gain more respect under the new leadership.  However, the 
momentous changes in 2008 suggest this is wishful thinking.  Ohly is more prepared 
to admit that agreements with SAP are not V’s ‘preferred policies’ but necessary 
compromises.  Whether this can sustain support for painful compromises remains to 
be seen.  V’s internal democratic procedures provide plenty of opportunities for 
traditionalist mid-level elites to unravel the contradictions in Ohly’s leadership.  
Support from traditionalist mid-level elites may make Ohly a hostage to fortune.   
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Scholars have noted V’s parliamentarians sought self-preservation through social 
democratising in a similar fashion to some Communist parties in CEE.  They thought 
that organisational issues were involved, but struggled to explain how or why (Arter, 
2002).  Applying Grzymała-Busse’s framework fills this gap, shedding light on the 
ways in which elite advancement and changes in distribution of power affected V’s 
social democratisation but left it unable to fully break with Communism.   
 
This chapter analysed four stages in V’s development.  It showed that applying 
Grzymała-Busse’s framework captures how reformist elites drew on wider 
experiences for inspiration in attempting to break with Communism (or key aspects of 
it) in response to exogenous shocks.  Hermansson did this to pursue a form of left 
socialism with broader appeal and Eurocommunism.  Schyman attempted to finish the 
job.  Under Werner reformist elites with experience in negotiating with outside groups 
and institutions tried their best to promote reforms in response to Cold War 
controversies and turmoil in CEE in the 1980s.  Flexible recruitment and elite 
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advancement practices played the central role in shaping reform and provided 
important ideas for new policies.  Elected officials were exposed to exogenous shocks 
more than functionaries.  
 
Conversely, those elites lacking experience in negotiation with outside groups and 
institutions and those who had not been ‘horizontally advanced’ usually resisted 
reform.  However, Ohly’s leadership shows how even narrowly recruited Communists 
from the Youth League have ended up pursuing policies that converge with social 
democracy because of the affects of elected office.  Without rigid democratic 
centralism, Communist Parliamentarians struggled to avoid moderation.  This analysis 
of V supports Grzymała-Busse’s idea that roles involving negotiation with outside 
organisations blunt radicalism.  As Grzymała-Busse suggests, even capable reformers 
can be stumped by traditionalist mid-level elites empowered by the removal of 
democratic centralism (or within existing democratic structures).  Analysis supports 
the idea that radical mid-level elites will try to sabotage reform in the absence of 
organisational centralisation.   
 
Democratisation was used in response to exogenous shocks by Hermansson and 
Schyman to fuel reform.  Following electoral defeat in the 1960s Hermansson used 
his role to initiate democratisation to empower reformers within the party with 
experience at negotiating with outsiders.  Increasingly flexible elite advancement 
practices allowed them and newcomers attracted by Hermansson’s less dogmatic 
appeals, to rise to the leadership.  These processes brought about additional reforms to 
party programmes.  However, this attempt at reform empowered mid-level elites who 
eventually expressed fierce opposition to reform and constrained it. Hermansson 
found it increasingly hard to carry out reforms and was confronted by neo-Leninists 
and orthodox Communists. Under Lars Werner internal democratic structures meant 
that hardliners and Leninists (including elites and mid-level elites) were able to block 
most reforms.   
 
Schyman’s attempts to further democratise the party in the 1990s aimed to dethrone 
traditionalists and radical mid-level elites entrenched within the party apparatus.  This 
had some success but eventually radical mid-level elites were able to mobilise within 
V’s democratic internal structures to oppose her reforms and gain control of the party.  
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Young Communists began to contest the model of democracy that Schyman had in 
mind preferring strict lines of accountability rather than loose networks, open party 
meetings and the increasing power of the parliamentary group.  The Youth League set 
out to resurrect the party’s formal organisational structures and emphasised the 
supremacy of party congresses as well as the primary role of party activists and 
congress delegates in decision-making.   
 
Democratisation, parliamentarisation and media-led strategies helped the leadership to 
make major inroads to reform but were insufficient to fully break with Communism.  
Schyman’s attempts to do this remain incomplete.  However, reforms were not 
entirely undone by the ‘democratic backlashes’ they encountered.  Hermansson 
established democratic credibility and Schyman swapped V’s ‘blackmail potential’ 
for real ‘coalition potential’ (Arter 2002, p. 13).   V has not fully broken with 
Communism, but Communist rhetoric has little role in party programmes these days 
and the party has largely consolidated broadly based socialist and feminist 
perspectives in its appeals. Moreover, Schyman’s efforts put the issue of government 
firmly on the agenda.  For Ohly, V’s democratic structures provide an unstable path to 
seeking office.  Thus far, his radical background and appeals have meant that many 
traditionalists have trusted him to push as far as possible in winning concessions from 
SAP.  It remains unclear how far V can compromise to enter government for the first 
time.  However it looks increasingly possible that Ohly can pull it off.   
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Chapter 5 
The Irish Workers’ Party and Democratic Left – the Democratisers  
 
5.1 Introduction 
Following the collapse of state-socialism, the leaders of the Irish Workers’ Party (WP) 
struggled to reform their party.  By democratising the WP they managed to carry out 
significant programmatic reforms, had almost entirely rejected Communism and 
positioned the party as a democratic socialist party.  However, they grew frustrated with 
the pace of change and left the party before they had managed to fully rid it of Marxism-
Leninism and connections with paramilitarism.  The history of the WP supports Anna 
Grzymała-Busse’s argument that democratisation is an unsteady path to reform but 
shows that it was still a viable strategy to breaking with Communism.  This almost 
worked as the reformists won on most issues, were firmly in charge of the party and 
almost managed to transform it.  They eventually left the WP to preserve their own 
credibility rather than because they were forced out.  The reasons for their ultimate 
failure to transform the WP were very different from the Czech KSČM where orthodox 
mid-level elites seized control.  
 
This chapter shows that Grzymała-Busse’s findings in CEE help to explain the 
attempts for reform in the WP.  Most reformists saw the need for reform through their 
experiences in negotiating with groups and institutions outside of the WP, professional 
backgrounds or because they were advanced ‘horizontally’ to elite positions.  These 
factors played a key role in shaping calls for ideological transformation.  Reformist elites 
in the WP had a moderate level of experience in carrying out prior reforms and 
broadening appeal, having played significant roles in the WP’s genesis following a split 
in the republican movement in during the 1960s.  This chapter, however, casts doubt 
on an understanding of WECPs based on Grzymała-Busse’s argument that elites with 
professional backgrounds and experience in implementing reforms will be 
predisposed to organisational centralisation.  Furthermore, it questions the idea that 
elites experienced in negotiation with groups outside the party would seek to 
reposition themselves as social democrats in 1989.  
 
The WP was born as the leadership of the republican paramilitary organisation the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) and its political party Sinn Féin embraced Marxism.  
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With the IRA’s ‘Border Campaign’ failing to muster public support in the mid-1960s, 
a new generation of republican leaders, promoted by Chief of Staff Cathal Goulding, 
turned to Marxism as a way to promote republican objectives (Dunphy 1997, p. 118).  
This triggered a violent split between their ‘Official’ IRA (OIRA) and Official Sinn 
Féin (OSF) and rival ‘Provisional’ organisations in 1969–70 (Hanley and Millar 2009, 
p. 149).  The Officials emphasised forging unity between workers in both 
nationalist/Catholic and unionist/Protestant communities to overthrow capitalism.  
They initially saw a need for an armed Marxist liberation movement but increasingly 
argued that paramilitarism against British rule in Northern Ireland divided the 
working classes and questioned the merits of abstaining from parliaments in Dublin, 
Belfast and London.  Irish unity became a long term goal that would be achieved 
through a revolution by the working classes.  In contrast, the provisionals prioritised 
achieving a united Ireland through armed struggle against the British state.  The 
leadership subsequently changed OSF’s name to Sinn Féin the Workers’ Party 
(SFWP) in 1977 and the Workers’ Party in 1982.  
 
The WP’s republican origins make it different from other WECPs.  Unlike the smaller 
and older Communist Party of Ireland it did not overtly call itself Communist or have 
historical links to the Comintern, but its leaders did indeed accept the Soviet model and 
Marxism-Leninism (Bell 1998, p. 135).  The WP allied with the Soviet Union, 
accepted its funds and sought to become Moscow’s favourite party in Ireland, despite 
reservations about Soviet support for the Provisional IRA (Dunphy 1992, p. 26).  
Unlike most WECPs the WP also enjoyed modest electoral growth in the 1980s (see 
Table 5.1).  It peaked by winning seven seats in the Dáil Éireann, with five per cent of 
the vote and one seat in the European Parliament in 1989 (Hanley 2009, p. 1).  
Nevertheless, it faced pressure to reform itself from Cold War controversies, the demise 
of Communism in CEE as well as its failure to expand beyond 2,000 members (see 
Table 5.2) and from losing support in the 1991 local election amidst renewed allegations 
of connections to the Official IRA. 
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Table 5.1:  Electoral results of OSF, SFWP and WP 1973–1989 in parliamentary 
elections (in the Republic of Ireland) 
 
Year 1973 1977 1981 1982 Feb 1982 Nov 1987 1989 
Vote (per cent) 1.1 1.7 1.7 2.2 3.3 3.7 5 
Seats 0 0 1 3 2 4 7 
(Dunphy, 1998, 1992; Gillan 1997; Holmes, 1994; Mackie and Rose, 1974).  
 
This chapter has three main sections.  The first traces the development of the WP from 
the time it split from the republican movement.  It shows that a highly centralised 
organisation and latter the discipline of democratic centralism enabled the leadership to 
force through painful policy changes.  The second section outlines how expansion in the 
1980s meant that new members and parliamentarisation shaped the formation of a 
reformist-wing.  It also shows that democratisation, coupled with a shift of power to its 
parliamentarians (Teachta Dála) (TDs) in the Dáil, proved insufficient to entirely 
overcome resistance to reform and to break with paramilitarism.  As a result, party 
President Proinsias De Rossa led frustrated reformists to split from the WP to form a 
new radical left party, the Democratic Left (DL).   
 
A final section demonstrates that despite possessing prior experience in reform, DL’s 
elite avoided centralising.  Grzymała-Busse argued that Communist successor parties in 
CEE could best regenerate themselves by rapidly pursuing mainstream politics and 
office-seeking after 1989.  Analysis of DL shows that WECPs’ post-Communist 
successor parties managed to do this by gradually accepting social democracy.  This 
occurred as DL participated in government in 1994–97.  This chapter also provides 
evidence with which we might doubt whether prioritising office-seeking and social 
democratisation were necessarily beneficial for post-Communist successor parties.  DL 
shows that these could be a poisoned chalice.  Having become de-radicalised it was soon 
assimilated into the social democratic Labour Party.  
 
Table 5.2 Membership figures for SFWP and WP 
Year  1980 1991 
Members 2000 1000 
  (Hanley, 2009; Dunphy, 1997).  
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5.2 Building a vanguard party through centralism 
Historically the IRA’s army council had tightly controlled Sinn Féin.  The dominance 
of paramilitary structures over political ones continued in SFWP and the WP.  OIRA 
leaders, including Cathal Goulding, were highly influential behind the scenes in the 
parties even if they rarely attended formal meetings (Dunphy Interview, 25.08.08).  
However, during the 1980s the role of the Official IRA was reduced and its existence 
was publicly denied as the WP pursued parliamentary politics.  It used this as a 
platform through which it could promote revolutionary class consciousness (Dunphy 
and Hopkins 1992, p. 93).  The OIRA continued to run drinking clubs and funded the 
WP through protection rackets and bank robberies (Dunphy 1997, p. 129).  It kept 
weapons for protection from unionists and their provisional rivals, even after 
declaring a ceasefire in 1972 (Swan 2008, p. 356).  Irish businesses wanting licences 
to trade with the Soviet Union also had to go through a company managed by elites 
called Repsol and commission from this provided the party with large sums of money 
(Dunphy Interview, 25.08.08).   
 
OSF’s strict command and control structures made it easy for its leaders to impose 
reforms.  In 1974 the OSF Vice-President Seamus Costello was expelled after 
questioning the abandonment of militarism and rejecting orthodox Communism.  The 
leadership were not confident in producing ideology or policy documents but 
commissioned Stalinist intellectuals from OSF’s Research Section including journalist 
Eoghan Harris and industrial activist Eamon Smullen to perform this role (Patterson 
1989, p. 152).  Elites advanced from the Research Section played an unaccountable 
role in shaping ideology, working as a ‘vanguard within a vanguard’, spearheading 
reforms and rooting out opposition (Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, p. 95).  In the 1970s 
the Research Section purged the WP of ‘bourgeois’ nationalism, Eurocommunism and 
Trotskyism because they risked diminishing the revolutionary role of the industrial 
working class (Hanley and Miller 2009, p. 305).  
 
A Research Section document called the ‘Irish Industrial Revolution’ (IIR) (1976), 
promoted transition from a military structure to a class conscious, revolutionary party.  
It established allegiance with the international Communist movement as well as a 
highly statist economic vision, abandoned republicanism and tempered the role of the 
OIRA (Dunphy 1997, p. 130).  The IIR blamed the underdevelopment of the Irish 
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economy on the Irish bourgeoisie rather than British imperialism.  It broke support for 
the agricultural sector and farmers by calling for rapid industrialisation and 
multinational investment to build an urban working class and class consciousness.  
Poland and Stalinism were now the example for the industrialisation of Ireland.  
OSF’s opposition to European integration for building a ‘rich man’s club’ was 
replaced with the deterministic view that this was a necessary part of capitalist 
development (Dunphy 1992, p. 24).   
 
The IIR’s attempts to almost entirely break with republicanism shocked elites who 
remained attached to nationalism.  The leadership would most likely have lost a 
debate on the document but forced it through as party policy almost overnight, giving 
no space for debate.  Tight discipline from OSF’s roots helped this process (Dunphy 
and Hopkins 1992, p. 97).  The leadership continued to re-brand the party, renaming 
its newspaper the United Irishman, as Workers’ Life in 1980.  Dissent was suppressed 
and those speaking out about the crushing of Solidarity in Poland in 1982 were sacked 
from positions of responsibility or denounced for ‘electoral opportunism’ (Dunphy 
and Hopkins 1992 p. 103).  Young moderate elites were easily outmanoeuvred.  The 
leadership ensured that decisions were made before party meetings and controlled 
their agendas.  It forced congress motions condemning the Guildford Four and 
Birmingham Six off the agenda for jeopardising cross community appeal as well as 
those made by Eurocommunists (Gillan 1997, p. 143, Woodworth 1991, p. 10).  
Adopting the Soviet model was never even debated internally but was imposed from 
above (Dooney 1991, p. 5).  A high degree of centralisation helped the leadership to 
force through painful reforms.   
  
Democratic centralism’s authoritarian, disciplined command structures mirrored those 
of the IRA (Gillan 1997, p. 152).  Adopting this in 1983 helped the leadership to 
consolidate reforms and to fend off attempts to question its decisions (Woodworth 
1991, p. 10).  Democratic centralism enabled the leadership to make strictly binding 
decisions.  Members played a subservient role and factions were banned within the 
rank and file (Dunphy 1997, p. 140).  There was space for some debate at elite level in 
the 1980s but questioning the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism remained off 
limits.  The leadership’s decisions were reported back to party branches in a top-down 
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fashion with little room for debate on a local level.  Covert workplace cells also 
operated to gain influence in institutions including state broadcaster RTÉ.  
 
Whereas SF had a loose form of membership, the WP’s leaders prioritised the quality 
not the quantity of members.  The conditions of membership were formalised and 
members had to carry membership cards.  They were also now compelled to pay 
membership fees, work for the party, canvass and sell the party paper up to five nights 
a week, to build up its support (Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, p. 98).  New members 
attended compulsory education courses by Stalinists at the Research Section and 
needed to be approved by congress or the party executive.  Some applicants including 
Trotskyites were refused membership.  Loyalty was prioritised.  
 
In OSF and the WP, elite advancement processes were tightly controlled.  Only those 
who were ideologically pure were advanced (Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, p. 98).  The 
WP’s leaders did not propose a list of candidates for the Central Executive Committee 
(CEC) of around 40 members.  In contrast to most WECPs, it seemed that there were 
competing candidates.  The party leader – the Party President and most (26) CEC 
members were elected by congress while the other thirteen CEC members were regional 
officials.  However, behind the scenes, OIRA members rigged congress votes (Dunphy 
1997, p. 137).  This ensued that loyal, former republican elites filled leadership positions 
and potential dissidents were rooted out.  
 
The IRA’s representatives had traditionally read out orders at SF’s congresses. This 
continued in SFWP and subsequently the WP.  The leadership engaged in moderate 
levels of briefing at a local level to ensure that their delegates to party congresses 
were loyal.  There was also a convention whereby delegates understood that they 
should wait for and defer to the positions of the WP’s real leaders, the Official IRA, 
and in particular Seán Garland and Cathal Goulding (Dunphy Interview, 25.08.08).  
When congress supported changing the party’s name from SFWP to WP in 1982, 
delegates who were overwhelmingly mandated to vote against the unpopular change 
by local branches followed their orders and suddenly switched positions.  
 
In 1977 the CEC elected Garland as General Secretary.  This role was supposed to be 
limited to organisational responsibilities, but he dominated CEC meetings.  The 
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leadership bodies were reformed in 1983 as Garland prioritised expansion.  A 
powerful Executive Political Committee (EPC) akin to a Politburo was introduced to 
make manifestos and programmes as well as an Executive Management Committee 
(EMC) to run organisational matters.  Filled with loyal elites, they were intended to 
protect the WP’s ideological purity from the dangers of electoralism and de-
radicalisation (Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, p. 104).  
 
5.3 Reforming the WP: Pressure to reform 
The WP’s historical leaders sought to resist abandoning Marxism-Leninism and 
democratic centralism in 1989.  They gave half-hearted support to Gorbachev’s 
reforms to preserve relations with the Soviet Union and some believed events in CEE 
to be a temporary blip.  Prior elite turnover contributed to calls for reform but was 
only moderate.  By 1989, five of thirteen chairs on leading party committees had been 
in place since 1983, as had ten of fourteen regular EPC members (Dunphy and 
Hopkins 1992, p. 104).  The WP’s leadership bodies lacked critical debate about 
Marxism-Leninism.  When elites including Paddy Gallagher returned from trips to the 
Soviet Union and criticised developments there, they were strongly reprimanded.  
However, there was some room for ideological pluralism and competition at elite 
level before the late-1980s as Grzymała-Busse’s framework found in parties whose 
leaders attempt to carry out reform in CEE.   
 
Pressures for reform developed within the elite.  Most significant was the moderating 
experience of working in parliament and local councils.  The WP expanded from two 
to four TDs in 1987 and then seven in 1989.  Working in parliament posed new 
pressures.  Several TDs became reluctant to pay their salaries to the party as was 
planned.  Expansion raised new questions about participation in governing coalitions 
and the TDs favoured moderation to gain political influence.  They grew pragmatic 
through mediating between the party, voters and the Dáil.  Unlike the old guard, they 
became responsive to pressures to change from communicating with the public 
(Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, p. 101).  The TD’s prioritised parliamentary work, 
protecting their seats and vote-seeking rather than revolution.  Even longstanding, 
former republican elites including Proinsias De Rossa and Tony Heffernan changed 
their priorities through the experience of elected politics.  
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The WP developed unevenly as its structure and ideology lagged behind its elected 
representatives.  Most of them knew that the OIRA provided the WP with funding and 
that fellow elites were involved in this but they publicly denied its existence 
(Breathnach Interview).  They were usually kept at arm’s length from its activities and 
turned a blind to those carrying arms out of sympathy with their need for protection 
from other paramilitaries in Northern Ireland.  In the early 1980s police raided the 
WP’s print office in connection with printing counterfeit bank notes.  By the late 
1980s such activities were a liability to the elected officials.   
 
The expansion of the parliamentary group in the late 1980s meant that it became a 
rival power centre to the traditionalist leadership and central office.  The TDs became 
independent and gained control over internal communications and campaigns as the 
WP took advantage of free postage and facilities in the Dáil.  Having qualified as an 
official parliamentary group the TDs received additional funding, allowances for 
research and staff in 1989.  Simultaneously, funding from the Soviet Union dried up 
for traditionalist elites.  Influential functionaries including Tony Heffernan moved to 
the Dáil from central office and were now paid by the state.  The theoretical magazine 
Making Sense also moved to the Dáil and it increasingly became a forum of debate.  
The traditionalist leadership struggled to monitor the parliamentary office.  Policy 
making was increasingly run by parliamentary staff while the TDs’ speeches and 
campaigns pre-empted initiatives by the CEC.  Councillors also worked closely with 
the TDs. Being dependent on their constituency based campaign machines they 
largely supported their calls for reform.  The traditionalist leadership had anticipated 
the risks of parliamentarisation but failed to devise mechanisms to keep the TDs in check 
(Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, p. 108).   
 
The WP’s leaders tried to recruit members from different walks of life, from as many 
constituencies as possible and across the religious divide out of a desire for expansion.  
It had sought to garner influence in civil society in the 1970s and early 1980s by 
promoting radicals from organisations like the National Union of Journalists and 
academics who began writing in party publications (Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, p. 
106).  In accordance with the ideas in Grzymała-Busse’s framework, the WP had 
advanced elites with experience of negotiation with outside groups and institutions. 
They were at the forefront of criticisms of democratic centralism.  Furthermore, trade 
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unionists advanced to elite positions and several leading reformers had became 
pragmatic through working in union politics or found their union policies more moderate 
than party policy.  They offered a more pragmatic outsiders’ perspective and reacted 
quickly to the collapse of Communism by urging people to shift positions to salvage a 
political future.  These advancement processes meant that the WP was an example of 
how not to build a revolutionary party (Yeates, 2009). 
 
Younger elites also had broader conceptions of social change than those offered by 
Marxism-Leninism.  They included student leaders including Pat Rabbitte and Eamon 
Gilmore who became TDs.  They were pragmatic in ideological terms from the 
beginning and were uneasy with democratic centralism.  Their experiences of open 
debate and they lacked the traditionalists’ roots in the republican movement.  To 
traditionalists they were careerists who ‘piggybacked’ on the WP (Mannion 
Interview).  The Research Section had long chastised these ‘student princes’ for being 
out of touch with ordinary workers and lacking revolutionary zeal.  In comparison, those 
with few links to institutions outside the party found it relatively hard to adapt to the 
collapse of Communism.  The party’s historic leaders were also inexperienced in 
elected office, because of the lack of a functioning parliament in Northern Ireland.  
They saw the TDs electoralism as a betrayal of class politics (see WP, 1992; Gillan, 
1992).   
  
In accordance with Grzymała-Busse’s framework, horizontal elite advancement 
processes were a major factor shaping calls for regeneration.  When Joe Sherlock 
became the WP’s first TD in 1981 he had not been included in the CEC.  However, by 
1989 the TDs and councillors were well represented and highly influential in 
leadership bodies where they called for reforms.  All but one of the TDs sat in the 
CEC.  Some TDs were members of the EPC and others including Rabbittee were 
included in its ranks in an effort to stop them leaving the party (Garland 1992, p. 33).  
Elected officials developed a third faction within the elite alongside the Research Section 
and the traditionalist old guard.  Moreover, OSF established Citizens Advice Bureaus in 
the 1970s, to become more like other Irish parties.  These sought to engage with people’s 
concerns as a launching pad for radical mass campaigns.  However, they became 
increasingly focused on everyday problems with state bureaucracy.  Elites advanced 
from these bureaus (and the Research Section) had encountered additional pressures for 
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pragmatism.  Having worked with groups outside the party and in disadvantaged areas, 
some found a need for more realistic policies. 
 
Changes that the WP experienced on the ground made attempts for reform viable.  The 
Research Section and parliamentary group ran more moderate campaigns aimed at 
expansion during the 1980s.  These struck a chord with the urban working class, on 
issues like housing, unemployment and tax reform (Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, p. 
106).  Many new members came from the Labour Party, disillusioned with its 
compromises in coalition government during the 1980s (Breathnach Interview).  
Marxism-Leninism was emphasised less and local branches seeking to expand relaxed 
restrictions on membership and debate.  In 1988 the rigging of elections to the CEC 
ended because it would not wash with the new members, providing additional room 
for reformists to enter the elite.  The focus on electoral campaigning also shifted 
resources from party education and co-ordination at central office making local 
branches more autonomous and in some democratic centralism ceased to function 
(Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, p. 106).  Newcomers were at the forefront of calls for 
reform, lacking attachment to the discipline of democratic centralism, Marxism-
Leninism, republicanism or paramilitarism.  Many genuinely believed military 
activity had been abandoned.  They were less deferential to the traditionalist leadership 
and provided a pool of support for reformist elites.   
 
The contradictions between the old republican leadership and the parliamentary group 
developed throughout the 1980s.  The TDs and newcomers, however, did not make 
serious moves for breaking with Communism before the late-1980s.  The first major 
attempt at this came from the secretive policy making unit the Research Section led by 
Harris and Smullen.  To the reformers’ surprise Harris saw a need for social 
democratisation in 1987 and called for it at a party summer school in Belfast in 1988, 
pre-empting the collapse of the Soviet-bloc and subsequently penned his thoughts in a 
document titled ‘The Necessity of Social Democracy’ (NSD) (1988).  
 
5.4 The process of reform 
Just as Grzymała-Busse found in CEE, these party ideologues had gradually moderated 
through their wider links to society, Harris being a controller at state broadcaster RTE 
and his colleagues in the Research Section having trade union backgrounds.  They 
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became increasingly responsive to pressures to change from these experiences and were 
keen to expand support through keeping in touch with voters’ preferences, even if it 
meant forcing through painful compromises.  Harris worked also this way at RTE (see 
Barry, 1987).  The Research Section’s policy wonks saw Marxism and social class as 
constantly changing were prepared to reassess old commitments.  Its members 
encountered diminishing support for the Soviet model from workers in trade unions 
and horror with the suppression of workers in CEE.  Through analysing the economic 
situation in CEE Harris foresaw the collapse of state socialism.  The Research section 
increasingly sought to make moderate election campaigns to attract middle class, white-
collar voters in the 1980s (McCarthy, 2009).  But now Harris argued that it should 
radically reposition itself because people preferred social democracy (Harris 1990, p. 
26).   
 
These seasoned reformers, tried to social democratise in a centralistic fashion like 
Grzymała-Busse found of similar elites in CEE.  They were experienced in policy 
innovation and broadening appeal having had autonomy to devise policies and 
implement previous reforms.  They tried to force through social democratisation in a top-
down fashion by presenting the NSD in the CEC and distributing it to influential 
members without permission.  To a limited extent, prior experience in carrying out 
reforms had shown them that resistance emerged from holding debates at elite level 
that slowed down decision making.  This encouraged them to publish their document 
first to cajole the leadership into using its influence to promote social democratisation.  
Anticipating that the situation in CEE might destroy the party, they believed an open 
democratic debate at congress would also be too slow. 
 
At first glance the Research Section seems to resemble the centralistic elites Grzymała-
Busse found in CEE.  On closer inspection it is apparent that despite their experiences in 
undertaking earlier reforms they did not develop a comprehensive plan of organisational 
centralisation.  The Research Section worked in a centralistic way primarily because as 
the party’s policy gurus, they had always been highly centralistic and empowered by the 
leadership to work in such a way.  They had published documents that were later 
approved by congress as a fait accompli.  It is not surprising to find centralistic 
attempts at reform in what was a highly centralistic party.  The Research Section’s 
coup was a desperate attempt to retake the initiative as they lost power to the 
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parliamentary group.  While their ideas changed, their methods remained the same.  In 
fact they thought very little in organisational terms, being focused largely on 
programmatic issues.  They believed that once the leadership had used its standing to 
promote social democracy, democratic internal structures would follow.  They 
recognised that in the end there would be little chance of success without democratic 
discussion.  Carrying out previous reforms in a centralistic way had made them aware 
that debate was needed to legitimise reforms and gave them ‘bitter experience that 
with no discussion we had little grip’ (Harris Interview).  
 
De Rossa, a trusted member of the leadership replaced the aging Tomás MacGiolla, as 
Party President in 1988.  However, he had grown pragmatic and began working closely 
with Harris.  De Rossa’s first speech as President at the 1989 congress was written by 
Harris.  This speech, (taking place before the revolutions in CEE), argued for sacrificing 
the sacred cows of subservience to the Soviet Union, criticised North Korea and state 
ownership, called for a ‘march at the head of social democracy’ and advocated office-
seeking (De Rossa, 1989).  De Rossa also tried to broaden appeal by emphasising 
environmental issues and women’s rights in keeping with the less rigid vision the TDs 
had been working on since the mid-1980s (Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, p. 109). 
 
Harris believed that fighting the 1989 election on more social democratic territory was 
central to its success and De Rossa’s successful campaign to become a Member of the 
European Parliament in 1989 – was organised by Harris and echoed these earlier themes 
under the slogan ‘A breath of Fresh air’ (Harris, 2009).  However, elites equipped with 
experience in negotiating with outsiders had not united around social democracy.  The 
electoralism in De Rossa’s 1989 congress speech drew criticism from radical socialist 
reformers including Ellen Hazelkorn.  While these reformers saw a need to moderate, to 
them social democratising was like throwing the baby out with the bathwater.  Other 
radical socialist reformers also criticised their colleagues drift to parliamentary politics 
(Breathnach and Ross 1990, p. 12).  After De Rossa’s speech divisions became 
apparent as traditionalists including Garland briefed colleagues that De Rossa had 
‘gone mad’ (Gallagher Interview).  Most reformists including De Rossa soon rejected 
social democratisation in favour of a broader, less dogmatic form of socialism that broke 
with Marxism-Leninism, leading to confrontation with traditionalist elites.  De 
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Rossa’s contacts with other European left parties at the European Parliament also 
helped him to envisage a broader radical left strategy.   
 
Reformers and traditionalists soon allied to block Harris’s attempt at social 
democratisation from above, suppressing distribution of NSD and expelling Smullen 
from the CEC for breaking decision making procedures (Hanley and Millar, 2009b; 
Cedar Lounge, 2008).  Harris was eventually allowed to publish his views in Making 
Sense, but he and elites from the Research Section resigned at the 1990 congress 
following criticism from the TDs for elitism.  Unprecedented debate tore away the 
façade of unanimity and shattered democratic centralism as controversies including 
the crushing of Solidarity in Poland were re-visited (Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, p. 
110).   
 
The ‘Harris saga’ shows that using Grzymała-Busse’s framework to understand 
WECPs can overstate the ease with which elites can centralise or social democratise.  
Here they overwhelmingly failed to win support from fellow reformers who were 
experienced in negotiation with outside groups and institutions.  Harris’s proposals were 
even rejected by those favouring social democracy including Rabbittee and Gilmore who 
criticised Harris’s authoritarian style.  Personal rivalries also precluded their support for 
the NSD.  TDs favouring moderation had already calculated that there was insufficient 
support for a sudden social democratisation.  Moreover, they saw that jumping ship to 
Labour or Fine Gael would severely weaken their constituency based support 
(Breathnach Interview).  
 
The Research Section had a demonstrable record of undertaking reforms that broadened 
appeal and impressive rhetorical skills.  However, while the framework posits that this 
would strengthen their chances of success, the Research Section’s historic attachment to 
Stalinism meant that reformers saw their sudden adoption of social democracy as 
opportunistic and inauthentic.  Harris’s argument that the party should be the Marxist fist 
inside the social democratic glove was seen as an attempt to hoodwink people into 
believing they had changed (Breathnach Interview).  After leaving the party Harris 
became a ‘freelance ideologue’ (Power 1997, p. 24).  He eventually shifted to rightwing 
politics, becoming a Senator for the centre-right Fianna Fáil which reformers saw as 
being in keeping with his authoritarian style. 
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Harris’s unaccountable attempt at reform ironically fuelled debate on democratisation 
in the pages of Making Sense.  Instead of centralisation, most reformers demanded 
increased debate for ideological renewal and to come to terms with the past.  They 
argued that people would not believe the WP was Stalinist yesterday and social 
democratic today if it was always authoritarian and forcing change upon members 
(Woodworth 1991, p. 11).  To them democratic centralism was now incompatible 
with democratic socialism.  Traditionalists including John Lowry replied that 
democratic centralism guarded against Harris’s opportunism and that binding 
decisions were necessary to ensure accountability (Lowry, 1991, p. 24, 1992, p. 63; 
O’Hagen, 1992 p. 51). 
 
Before De Rossa’s 1989 congress speech few elites had called for abandoning 
Communism or promoted formal reforms that directly questioned Marxism-Leninism.  
Reformers had little power to make such changes.  When Councillor Colm Breathnach 
advocated breaking links with North Korea in the late 1980s he was subsequently 
dropped from the WP’s International Committee and few reformers supported him.  
However, the reformists were moderately equipped with the characteristics that 
Grzymała-Busse argues promote centralisation.  Engagement in prior reform, 
professional backgrounds, and some experience of trying to make changes had not 
turned them into centralisers.  They did not promote democratisation because of a lack 
of know-how or out of naivety.  
 
The WP’s history had been one of on-going reform and innovation.  Most leading 
reformers had extensive experience of designing painful changes in policy and 
organisational committees during SF’s genesis into a Marxist-Leninist party.  Some 
helped design the 1982 constitution which was a watershed for the political side of the 
party taking over from the OIRA.  Others had carried out reforms working in the 
Research Section or had made unsuccessful attempts to criticise the Soviet Union or 
to promote Eurocommunism and feminism.  Reformers had also developed new 
priorities through Citizen Advice Bureaus through which the WP involved itself in 
housing action committees and this led them to call for political campaigns to 
supplant the OIRA.  Many also had professional backgrounds.  
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Although the TDs implemented few formal policy reforms during the 1980s they had 
began to run less theoretical and called for a softening of the party’s image in 
campaigns before the collapse of the Soviet-bloc as they sought a broader appeal.  
The TDs wanted to recognise NATO and accepted the Single European Act – both 
things that were opposed by the traditionalists (Garland 1992, p. 33).  Their autonomy 
in voting at the Dáil caused friction with the traditionalist leadership before 1989.  
The elected officials had also complained that restrictions on members, probationary 
membership periods, education classes and democratic centralism were discouraging 
potential members (Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, p. 106).  The TDs tried to moderate 
the WP’s image through focusing on issues including housing provision, 
unemployment and social welfare rather than ideological and revolutionary 
campaigns.  Having become responsive to the need to broaden the party’s appeal, they 
promoted new policy issues including women’s rights, environmentalism and less 
dogmatic policies on European integration.   
 
5.5 Resistance to reform  
Historically the WP’s executive bodies simply accepted decisions made by the party’s 
top leaders.  The reformers had the initiative with De Rossa being Party President (TD 
and Member of the European Parliament) and sitting on all the important committees.  
His fellow reformist Des Geraghty also replaced the aging Garland, as General 
Secretary in 1991.  However, they had good reason to avoid centralising.  First, 
central office was dominated by the traditionalist functionaries employed by the WP’s 
historical leaders.  Shifting power there would not have benefited reform.  Second, the 
reformers lacked support in most branches in Northern Ireland which retained closer 
links to the Official IRA and where the preservation of democratic centralism 
strengthened the traditionalists’ influence.  Consequently, reformers believed that 
centralisation was not viable and would have precipitated a split which most 
reformers initially sought to avoid at all costs.  
 
Third, while traditionalists had lost the power to expel the reformers, the latter lacked 
sufficient control over the leadership bodies to use democratic centralism to force 
changes through or to centralise.  The reformers could usually rely on a majority in 
the CEC by 1992.  However, traditionalist elites and functionaries from central office 
were entrenched in the WP’s thirteen elite level committees and had majorities in the 
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fourteen member EPC and the eight member EMC.  De Rossa, could not rely on their 
support.  Every meeting of the EPC became a battle between the factions.  Hard-line 
functionaries had more time to dedicate to committee work than the elected officials.  
Moreover, these traditionalists were an obstacle at elite as well as mid-level positions. 
This is a situation Grzymała-Busse’s framework tells us little about, suggesting that 
using it to understand WECPs would overstate the ease with which reformists can 
centralise their parties’ organisations.  
 
Fourth, the reformers also had instrumental reasons for favouring democratisation 
above centralisation.  They saw that their attempts to differentiate themselves as 
democrats in contrast from the traditionalists would have been undermined by trying 
to force changes through.  Fifth, reformers including De Rossa had intrinsic 
attachments to democracy, seeing participative decision-making as an ideal.  They 
genuinely wanted to win open debates and did not find authoritarian behaviour 
appealing – there were subjective barriers to centralising.  This was not something the 
reformers wanted to do, despite their prior experiences.  
 
Traditionalists criticised De Rossa’s 1989 congress speech for breaching protocol 
because it had not been sent to the CEC for approval (WP 1992, p. 78).  However, this 
was an attempt to start a debate rather than to make policy.  The reformers did not 
systematically centralise to sideline resistance from the traditionalists.  When they did 
fight dirty, this was an ad hoc process as they struggled to find solutions in response to, 
rather than pre-empting, resistance.  Their organisational strategy largely consisted of 
twin processes of democratisation and parliamentarisation.  This was insufficient to 
fully dethrone the traditionalist elite but ensured that the reformers won on most of 
their attempts to transform the party.  The TDs continued to empower themselves by 
making more statements calling for ideological change and democratisation.  By the 
time such decisions in the Dáil were considered by the CEC or EPC they had in effect 
already been taken. When traditionalists at central office blocked reform, the 
reformers responded by continuing to shift administrative tasks to the Dáil. 
 
When the reformers’ did try to streamline they were largely defeated by resistance.  
They tried to use funding problems as a ploy to cut the number of traditionalist 
functionaries at central office and attempted to close the party bookshop which they saw 
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as a front for illegal activities.  However, De Rossa’s proposals were rejected by the EPC 
where traditionalists argued he was exaggerating the severity of the financial crisis.  
They responded by making his sister, Marie Brady, redundant, who they claimed was 
employed to allow De Rossa to take over the running of the central office (WP 1992, p. 
8).  De Rossa stopped calling EPC meetings in 1992 and increasingly referred 
decisions to the CEC, without a recommendation from the EPC.  The reformers did 
little to abolish mid-level structures.  However, traditionalists argued that reformist 
Councillors’ refusal to hand over their salaries to the party undermined the 
traditionalist led regional party executive in Dublin in 1992 and that before this the 
reformers had deliberately tried to run its organisation down (WP 1992, p.6).   
 
The reformers’ main strategy was democratisation.  De Rossa began listening to those 
hitherto ignored by the leadership, seeking advice from academics, trade unionists, and 
activists from NGOs.  Congress delegate elections were increasingly open and their 
subservience to the leadership at congresses was evaporating by the late-1980s 
(Heffernan Interview, 25.08.08).  The TDs endorsed open debate, believing that they 
would be empowered by continued democratisation.  Being from large constituencies, 
they could rely on the support of a high number of members and delegates helping 
them to win majorities at congresses.   
 
Democracy remained an unreliable path to reform.  Reformers struggled to extend 
democratisation to all areas of the party.  They complained that covert power centres 
based around the traditionalist leaders and the OIRA made decisions contrary to 
congress decisions (WP 1992, p. 42).  Freeing up debate helped deliver programmatic 
transformation but struggled to remove a secret army group who tried to run things 
(Dunphy Interview, 04.09.08).  Democratisation failed to reign in decision-making 
points including the company Repsol which reformers saw as a front for criminal 
activities, central office, the OIRA and party publications (Dunphy Interview, 
04.09.08).  Although some of the reformers were active in the OIRA they lacked 
influence.  Moreover, streamlining was made difficult because some OIRA members 
were not even card carrying members but loosely associated with party drinking clubs 
in Belfast (Byrne Interview).  
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The reformers in the CEC tried to hasten democratisation and policy change by 
establishing organisational and programmatic committees in 1990, offering an 
alternative route to reform to the EPC and MPC.  A Constitutional Review Committee, 
chaired by TD Eamon Gilmore was established by the CEC and only two of its seven 
members were from the traditionalist-wing.  The traditionalists feared this would be used 
to reinforce the TD’s power, to centralise, or to expel them.  However, the reformers 
intended to use the Committee to democratise the party through a process of open 
debate.  It gave room for all sides to propose new organisational structures including 
radical reformers who wanted greater local activism and supported the traditionalists’ 
calls for the TDs to be more accountable to the CEC (Breathnach et al., 1992).  The 
Committee proposed relaxing membership restrictions and dropping democratic 
centralism.  This was increasingly ceasing to function and was not included in the 
1991 programme.  A special congress was scheduled to decide on new normalised 
organisational structures (Dunphy 1992, p. 33).   
 
Democratisation ensured most of the changes that the reformers wanted.  The 1990 
programme committee presented a draft programme ‘Freedom Democracy and 
Equality’ at the 1991 congress.  This toned down Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, 
positioned the WP as a ‘democratic socialist party’, asserted members’ rights to ‘open 
and free debate’ and emphasised that democracy was central to the WP’s 
organisation.  Moreover, it committed to a range of standpoints including feminism.  
Traditionalist delegates proposed a host of amendments to the programme.  They 
managed to insert ideas about class struggle and revolution into the programme by a 
slim majority but were largely defeated on most of their motions including those 
criticising the market and capitalist property relations (Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, p. 
111).  However, some leading traditionalists were re-elected to the CEC and EPC.  
Their historical role in the party meant they retained appeal to the rank and file and their 
strength in Northern Ireland proved hard to break.  
 
Progress was being made towards reform but internal democracy made this a gradual 
process.  In 1991 De Rossa joined the hard-line Left Unity group in the EP even 
though reformers were ideologically closer to other groups.  They soon overruled the 
traditionalists and left the group (Dunphy 1992, p. 34).  However, frustration with the 
resistance was building.  In the summer of 1991 De Rossa convened secret factional 
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meetings outside official party channels to discuss modernisation and democratisation.  
Fresh media allegations of paramilitary activities and that Garland was receiving 
money from the Soviet Union were subsequently blamed for the WP’s 1991 local 
election loss (Gillan 1997, p. 147).  Reformers feared losing new members who were 
genuinely shocked by the revelations.  This convinced reformers that the ship would 
sink if they did not break with paramilitarism and they tried to bring things to a head.   
 
In January 1992 the CEC endorsed a motion supporting De Rossa’s leadership and 
condemning the OIRA and criminal activities, by 40 votes to nil, with four 
abstentions including Garland and three functionaries (Gillan 1997, p. 144).  Leading 
reformers set the agenda by disingenuously claiming to be shocked by the continued 
existence of the OIRA in media interviews.  Traditionalists could not criticise their 
hypocrisy without admitting to the existence of the OIRA (Breathnach Interview).  
Frustrated by the pace of change, some reformers wanted to expel the traditionalists or 
to form a new party.  However, most, including De Rossa, rejected this fearing a 
disastrous split, being aware of the risks involved in starting a new party and 
recognising that the WP’s organisation was a valuable asset.  Further media allegations 
of OIRA activity forced their hand.  The reformers gave up on seeking gradual change 
through democratisation.  Instead they sought to reconstitute the WP by standing down 
its members and asking them to reapply for membership, like the PCI had done in Italy.   
 
Reconstitution was a belated attempt to sideline the traditionalists.  However, the 
reformers even tried to streamline the party in a democratic way.  The CEC accepted 
De Rossa’s call for a special congress to vote on reconstitution.  This would enable a 
caretaker eleven member CEC to elect a new party President, arrange a congress in 
May 1992 as well as to organise the re-registration of members (De Rossa and Lynch, 
1992a).  It would re-establish the WP according to its 1991 programme as a 
democratic socialist party.  It would also reject violent, criminal or revolutionary 
tactics and democratic centralism (De Rossa and Lynch, 1992b, De Rossa, 1992a).  
This was a winner takes all scenario in which the caretaker CEC would be chosen by 
the winning side.  The reformers hoped it would let them root out traditionalist 
members once and for all.  The CEC appointed a committee of reformists to oversee 
the congress.  
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The Special Congress was more democratic and competitive than previous 
congresses.  The traditionalist faction vigorously campaigned against reconstitution.  
Both sides were allowed to publish articles on reconstitution and to speak openly 
(Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, p. 113).  Garland condemned the ‘liquidators’ for 
seeking social democratisation and giving up on revolutionary struggle or 
nationalising the means of production.  He denied that traditionalists had connections 
to the OIRA or that it operated a kitchen cabinet within the WP (Garland 1992, p. 42).  
The traditionalists criticised the media for conspiring with the TDs and the meddling 
of the American Central Intelligence Agency (Dunphy 1997, p. 134).  
 
Traditionalists had little intention of giving up, having spent a large part of their 
working lives within the WP.  Many of them saw little chance of making alternative 
careers.  Those from Northern Ireland often depended on party drinking clubs for 
protection and their livelihoods.  The traditionalists’ control over central office 
enabled them to distribute their publications, access the membership and to mobilise 
functionaries against reconstitution.  Furthermore, traditionalists in the EPC enjoyed 
strong contacts with local branches that proved useful for lobbying for support.  
Democratic centralism had ceased to function on a national level preventing either 
side from controlling the Special Congress.  However, branches from both sides 
inflated membership figures to gain additional congress delegates.  Reformers were 
horrified as the traditionalists sent a large number of delegates from Northern Ireland, 
where democratic centralism continued to function and links between the party and 
army were stronger.  As many as 80 per cent of delegates from Northern Ireland voted 
against reconstitution while a similar proportion of those from the Republic voted in 
favour (Wilson 1992, p. 6).  The result was that the reformers failed to gain the two-
thirds majority needed to change the party constitution by just nine votes (with 241 to 
133 votes in favour of reconstitution) (Gillan 1997, p. 151; Holmes 1994, p. 148). 
 
Traditionalists including John Lowry argue that the reformers made a strategic error 
by seeking reconstitution (Lowry Interview).  They could have transformed the party 
with a simple majority by waiting for the congress that was scheduled under the 
party’s Constitutional Review.  If anything, the reformers tried to work too 
democratically.  The vote was chaotic as some traditionalists voted for reconstitution 
to preserve unity.  Likewise, reformers voted against, out of personal admiration for 
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Garland and Goulding, or, like Paddy Gallagher, followed decisions made at local 
branches that they subsequently regretted (WP 1992, p. 13).  Democracy was an 
unstable root to reform as Grzymała-Busse’s framework envisages.   
 
Nevertheless, losing the vote on reconstitution was not a forgone conclusion.  That the 
reformers almost won a two thirds majority shows that a democratic vote could have 
reformed the WP.  While democracy is an uncertain path to reform it was not 
incompatible with transformation as Grzymała-Busse seemed to find in the Czech 
KSČM.   The reformers had made considerable advances in breaking with 
Communism and transforming party programmes.  Democratisation helped them to 
do this because of changes in the party’s rank and file.  However, they found that 
democratisation struggled to remove paramilitarism from the party which was specific 
to the Irish scene.   
 
5.6 The WP 1992– 
Following the Special Congress the traditionalists refused to step aside.  In response, 
De Rossa, six of the WP’s seven TDs, 70 per cent of the WP’s members (including 
Communists) and most of its elected officials subsequently left to form a new party 
(De Rossa 1992b, p. 1).  The following sections analyse the WP following the split 
and the reformers’ new party Democratic Left.  This shows that reformist elites 
continued to democratise and further empowered the party in public office to make 
policy changes.  They still did not see a need for centralisation to sideline radical mid-
level elites.  This analysis shows that reformers could opt to leave their parties to form 
new ones following their collapse of Communism.  Doing this could enable them to 
pursue office and programmatic transformation, but involved several dangers.  
 
Table 5.3 Electoral results for WP after 1992 in parliamentary elections (in the Republic 
of Ireland) 
Year 1992 1997* 2002 2007 
Vote (per cent) 0.6 0.44 < 0.7 <0.2 
*Less than 8000 votes in 1997 
(Suiter, 2007; Kennedy, 2002; Murphy, 1997; Holmes, 1994).   
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The traditionalists retained the WP’s name, symbols and national headquarters, and 
few a hundred members (Dunphy and Hopkins 1992, p. 113).  The WP fared poorly in 
elections, being reduced to a handful of local councillors and lost its one 
parliamentary seat in 1992 (see Table 5.3).  It reasserted Marxism-
Leninism/democratic centralism in statutes and programmes in 1993 and solidarity 
with Communist parties in Portugal and Greece and regimes in Cuba and North 
Korea.  Commentators note that it reverted to positions adopted in SFWP with greater 
emphasis on republicanism (Dunphy Interview, 04.09.08) and Euroscepticism (WP, 
2008).  Democratic centralism preserved ideological purity but could not prevent 
further splits during the 1990s as socialists left to form a small Irish Socialist Network 
having been blocked from organising meetings on ideological renewal.  Pragmatic 
elected officials including Councillor John Halligan in Waterford also left (Keys, 
2008).  Halligan refused to vote against local rate increases when the leadership tried 
to impose centrally made decisions on him.  
 
The traditionalist elite consolidated their dominance through democratic centralism.  
The aging Garland and O’Hagen remained in the WP’s executive in 2009, Garland 
being Party Treasurer.  Media reports continued to claim that Garland was a leader of 
the OIRA (The Sunday Times, 09.10.05, BBC, 20.06.04).  He was arrested in 2004 
during the WP’s annual conference and skipped bail (The Times, 05.02.09).  
American authorities have long tried to extradite and prosecute Garland for 
distributing counterfeit $100 ‘super dollars’ from North Korea.  The OIRA 
decommissioned its weapons in February 2010 but the organisations have generally 
struggled to break with their past and Communism. 
 
5.7 Democratic Left: wandering in the wilderness 
Some reformers, including Pat Rabbitte were relieved that the 1992 vote on 
reconstitution was lost, fearing an ongoing battle to weed out traditionalists.  
However, building a party from scratch was equally painstaking.  The reformists 
rejected Garland’s accusations that they wanted social democratisation, were searching 
in vain for a new ideology and would be swallowed up by the Labour Party (WP 
1992, p. 4).  However, his predictions were in many respects vindicated.  The 
reformers struggled from the beginning.  Traditionalist Tomás MacGiolla TD stayed 
with the WP and refused to ‘buy a pig in a poke’ by joining a party with no 
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established policies (MacGiolla, 1992).  The reformers also failed to convince Emmet 
Stagg TD to defect from Labour.  This meant that Democratic Left was too small to 
form an official parliamentary group, which deprived it of vital state funding (Holmes 
1994, p. 150).  The reformers’ new party was also severely weakened in Northern 
Ireland where the majority of members stayed with the WP.  
  
DL claimed to have 2000 members, more than the WP before the split.  However, it 
shows the problems reformers faced in making new parties.  DL had little breathing 
space to build itself up.  Its rank and file were soon exhausted by referendums on the 
Maastricht Treaty and abortion laws before being thrust into an election in November 
1992 at which Labour’s popularity contributed to it losing two of its TDs (Gillan 
1997, p. 152).  DL’s broadly pitched brand of socialism failed to bring electoral or 
organisational expansion (see Tables 5.4 and 5.5).  Many activists lacked the heart to 
struggle to build up DL having been attached to the symbolism of the WP.  New 
members often left, leaving around 1000 members in 1992, most being former members 
of the WP (Dunphy 1998, p. 56).  Had the reformers reconstituted under the WP name, 
it is likely that more activists would have stayed.   
 
DL’s intellectual elites drafted radical documents that were accepted by its founding 
congresses.  These positioned it as a radical red-green party and drew inspiration from 
Scandinavian left parties.  DL was placed to Labour’s left.  Its elites sought to root 
Labour to the left but had become willing to compromise as a junior coalition partner 
(Holmes 1994, p. 151).  DL committed to transforming capitalism but not through 
nationalising the means of production or revolution.  Its socialism emphasised an 
equitable distribution of wealth, extra-parliamentary activism, pluralism and feminism 
(Dunphy 1998, p. 55).  Nonetheless, DL struggled to distinguish itself from Labour 
and its policy committees failed to present a comprehensive programme until 1994, 
following extensive discussion by members and local branches (Holmes 1994, p. 
151).   
 
Democratic decision making fostered a broader radical left identity.  Empowering 
radical mid-level elites did not foster social democracy in keeping with Grzymała-
Busse’s findings in CEE.  However, a deeper radicalisation of policy or a reassertion 
of Marxism-Leninism did not occur as we might expect for her framework.  Elites 
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were also able to use their standing to appeal for programme commitments that were 
not so radical as to obstruct DL’s possible inclusion in government. They also sought 
broad appeal and avoided over identifying with the working class.  Moreover, 
pragmatic TDs did not take radical programmatic commitments too seriously.  
However, after Fine Gael rejected coalescing with DL in 1992, Labour allied with the 
centre-right Fianna Fáil. 
 
Most of DL’s elite came from the WP and there was little doubt De Rossa would be 
the new leader.  He was seen as a catalyst for reform and had a record in carrying out 
reforms. However, that did not mean that the media would be sympathetic to his 
attempt to break with the past.  De Rossa became embroiled in a libel trial over 
newspaper claims that he had accepted funding from the Soviet Union (Dunphy 1998, 
p. 54).  This sapped resources and De Rossa’s attention during the formative years of 
DL.   
 
Table 5.4: Electoral results for DL in parliamentary elections (in the Republic of 
Ireland) 
 
 
 
 
(Dunphy 1998; Holmes, 1994).  
 
Contrary to Grzymała-Busse’s findings about elites with experience in implementing 
prior reforms in CEE, DL’s elite did not try to build highly centralised organisational 
structures.  De Rossa never sought to direct DL, but to establish debate.  Reformers 
did still not favour, or see any possibility of forcing policies through centralised 
policy making structures.  It was extremely unlikely that activists would have allowed 
them to force social democratisation through by centralising in 1992 in any event.  DL 
struggled to build a central organisation as the WP kept most party documents and lists 
of supporters and because of financial constraints.  The elite were largely focused on 
parliamentary work and failed to develop an effective central office or to recruit 
members.  General Secretary John Gallagher believed that instead resources should be 
focused on local branches and that 200 members would be enough to keep DL going 
(Dunphy 1998, p. 53).  Activists saw this as an attempt to run down the party to 
Year 1992 1997 
Vote (per cent) 2.8 2.5 
Seats 4 4 
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precipitate a merger with Labour by Gallagher and some of the TDs.  Grzymała-
Busse’s argument that a lack of centralisation is harmful to transformation gains some 
support from DL, but due to a lack of coordination rather than resistance from 
radicals.  
 
Table 5.5: Membership figures for DL 
Year 1992 1997 
Members 2000 approx 500 
  (Dunphy, 1997; Holmes 1994).  
 
DL was founded on an ideal of participatory internal decision-making (Dunphy 1998, 
p. 52).  Election candidates were chosen by local branches.  Whereas the WP 
demanded disciplined activism, DL demanded little from members and branches were 
not coordinated rigidly by central office (Dunphy 1998, p. 52).  Congress delegates 
were freely elected to annual congresses and voted freely for a nineteen member 
National Executive Committee (NEC) (Holmes 1994, p. 151).  Even activists 
disappointed with DL’s ideological direction argue that there were opportunities to 
campaign for their ideological goals and that these could influence policy formulation 
and decision-making (Breathnach Interview).   
 
In practice, goals of participatory decision making were unfulfilled (Dunphy 1998, p. 
54).  The parliamentarisation present in the WP continued as parliamentary staff ran 
central office while most activists deferred to the TDs who repositioned the party at 
congresses. The leadership was defeated on few issues although radical activists had 
initially defeated it over choosing the party’s name, by selecting ‘Democratic Left’ 
above ‘New Agenda’ at its 1992 founding congress.  The NEC was larger than the 
leadership of the WP in an effort to make it more representative.  However, 
‘horizontal elite advancement’ practices meant that several TDs were included on it.  
NEC members felt that the TDs had become dominant and that it played little of an 
independent role in policy making (Dunphy 1998, p. 63).  The state funding the TDs 
received was financing DL and its campaign machine focused on supporting them 
rather than running radical campaigns.  They carried huge personal influence.   
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When DL was reduced to four TDs in 1992 all of them had to be kept on board to stop 
DL from unravelling, effectively giving them a veto in decision-making.  Activists 
feared that Rabbitte would defect to Labour, placing him in a powerful position to call 
for moderation and closer relations with Labour.  Two bi-election victories in 1994 
and a change of heart by Fine Gael made it possible for DL to enter a ‘Rainbow 
coalition’ government.  There were heated debates on this but only around sixteen of 
100 congress delegates voted against entering government as most deferred to the 
parliamentarians’ wishes.  Consequently, several radical elites and activists including 
Colm Breathnach left DL.   
 
In the early 1990s, most of DL’s elite still did not embrace social democracy despite 
being experienced in dealing with outside groups and institutions.  In this respect they 
were different from the elites in CEE that Grzymała-Busse studied.  Leading figures 
including De Rossa believed that the WP’s rise showed that a strong radical left party 
was feasible in Ireland.  Problematically, new programmes and flexible organisational 
structures lacked resonance with many of DL’s working class activists who were used 
to the discipline of the WP (see Dunphy, 1998).  De Rossa’s calls for informal 
democratic ‘Coffee shop meetings’ to debate policy were unpopular with seasoned 
activists for being like middle class dinner parties.  After two years, most of its 
members and a large proportion of radical activists had dropped out. 
   
Governing placed immense burdens on DL.  Four of its six TDs had ministerial roles 
and resources were dedicated to support them.  This left little time building up the 
party or differentiating it from its coalition partners.  Policy committees and the NECs 
‘Strategy 2000’ established to define DL’s radical left identity were put on hold 
(Dunphy 1998, p. 58).  The NEC failed to develop a party building role and activism 
was downgraded (Dunphy 1998, p. 56).  DL’s ministers delivered some changes in 
government policy including increases in child benefit, a referendum on divorce and 
the introduction of an anti-poverty strategy.  However, members felt that too many 
unsatisfactory compromises were made and activists left frustrated by moderation and 
social democratisation (Dunphy 1998, p. 60).  Being the junior coalition partner, DL’s 
ministers picked their fights carefully and ended up accepting their allies’ less radical 
and more social democratic policies.   
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In the end, it took years not weeks as Garland predicted (1992, p. 33) for the 
reformists to ‘sell out’ to social democracy.  The TDs continued to moderate in office, 
became social democratic and grew reluctant to chase Green-Left protest votes (see 
Dunphy, 1998).  The TDs developed trust in their Labour colleagues.  As Tony 
Heffernan argues, those working in parliament realised ‘that they were not that 
different from Labour, who were not the shits that we thought they were’ (Heffernan 
Interview, 26.08.08).  When DL left government in 1997, having lost two of its six 
seats, surviving in parliament had become the TDs’ priority.  There was little that the 
NEC could do to stop the TDs defecting to Labour.  Rabbitte responded warmly to 
Labour’s secret proposal for a merger and seized the initiative. The TDs were 
overwhelmingly in favour of a merger, viewing it as the only way to salvage 
something from DL.  With the rank and file in tatters there was little standing in their 
way or to counter the moderating effects of office.   
 
Activists including Breathnach argued that DL suffered from a lack of time in 
opposition to consolidate a radical identity and that this left voters unable to notice 
differences between it and Labour.  Indeed, there was little reason to vote for it as an 
alternative.  It failed to either provide criticism of social democracy by offering a protest 
vote, or to stake a claim for a more radical brand of social democratic polices than those 
pursued by Labour which in office with the conservative Fianna Fáil had accepted 
controversial tax amnesties.  It was not Eurosceptic like many other left parties and it 
lacked radical appeal or class consciousness needed to bind its members together 
(Dunphy 1998, p. 66).  Moderation, social democracy and office-seeking could become 
a poisoned chalice for WECPs’ successor parties.  DL did not rapidly social democratise, 
but growing too close to Labour and office-seeking became an electoral disaster.  It 
enjoyed short-term gain but failed to develop a sustainable long-term strategy. 
 
Secret unaccountable talks between some TDs and their Labour counterparts initiated 
the merger.  However, DL’s leaders did little to centralise following the election 
defeat.  The leadership believed that any decision on merging required consent from 
DL’s members.  Dunphy had found in 1997 that 54 per cent of mid-level elites 
opposed merging with Labour (Dunphy 1998, p. 69).  Yet, election defeat and the 
leadership’s appeals convinced them to do this within a democratic debate.  Congress 
delegates voted by 89 per cent to supported the merger (O’Neill 1998, p. 5). 
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DL’s leaders portrayed the merger as being between two equal partners and as an 
opportunity to form a new party or to root Labour to the left.  Such claims were a 
gross distortion.  DL’s members were assimilated into Labour, which eliminated the 
threat to its left while keeping is programme and most of its organisational structures 
intact. That DL’s elected officials did not become a left-wing faction within Labour 
showed just how much they had moderated it elected office. While Rabbitte and 
Gilmore went on to lead Labour and Liz McManus, became deputy leader, leading to 
claims it was a ‘reverse takeover’ this did little to shift Labour to the left.   
 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that organisational strategies pursued by elites long played a 
highly influential role in the WP’s evolution.  The first section demonstrated that 
centralistic structures and democratic centralism enabled party leaders to make 
sweeping changes in ideology and party culture.  Paramilitarism meant that the WP 
found reasons for rigid elite advancement processes and a centralistic internal basis of 
power.  The second showed that the esoteric nature of policy formulation was 
contested as a reformist faction formed around the WP’s parliamentary group.   Their 
attempts at reform were often successful but as Grzymała-Busse’s framework posits, 
democratisation was not always a reliable path to reform.  This meant that the 
reformers eventually gave up on reforming the WP and left to start anew.  The WP 
also supports the idea in Grzymała-Busse’s framework that elites experienced in 
negotiating with outside groups and organisations or advanced horizontally are 
predisposed to seeking reform.  Despite the WP’s paramilitary features, these factors 
still affected its adaptation. In contrast, elites without such influences often resisted 
the break with Marxism-Leninism.  Loyalty was emphasised in elite advancement and 
discipline was cherished but could not ameliorate the effects of expansion.   
 
The WP and DL, nevertheless highlight that several qualifications are needed if we 
are to use Grzymała-Busse’s framework to explain the development of WECP’s and 
their post-Communist successors’ following the collapse of Communism.  This 
chapter supports her argument that democratisation may empower traditionalists to 
resist reform.  However, it shows this does not mean that reformists were unable to 
take considerable steps to breaking with Communism or to implement electorally 
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driven policy reforms.  Centralisation might seem an obvious way to overcome this.  
However, the case of the WP questions whether reforms aimed at centralising, office-
seeking or social democratising were actually viable in 1989.  While reformist elites 
were powerful and had drawn on experiences in negotiating with outsiders most had 
not accepted the need for such measures.  Analysis also showed that radical mid-level 
elites could present obstacles to transformation just as Grzymała-Busse found in CEE.  
Mid-level activists were a bulwark against social democratisation (and centralisation) 
in 1989.  However, a majority of them did support breaking with Communism and 
broadening appeals unlike Grzymała-Busse’s findings in CEE.  
 
However, the role of traditionalists at elite level was more troubling for reformers.  
Viewing the WP’s development through the lens of Grzymała-Busse’s framework 
fails to account for how resistance from the WP’s historic leaders also blocked 
reforms and social democratisation.   Reformists argue that the WP could have been 
transformed if it were a typical orthodox Marxist-Leninist party, rather than one with 
a paramilitary organisation.  However the historic leaders’ confidence, refusal to 
abandon Marxism-Leninism or to step aside, and prestige in Northern Ireland also 
posed significant barriers to reform or centralisation.  In this was the challenge facing 
reformist elites is comparable with those in other WECPs.  This also shows how 
under democratic structures, a small group of elites who refuse to change can cause 
major problems for reformers in terms of undermining their programmatic reforms 
and damaging their public image. 
 
This chapter also questions an understanding of WECPs based on Grzymała-Busse’s 
ideas about centralisation.  Analysis of the WP also demonstrates that this risks 
viewing experience in reform as a prerequisite to centralisation. Some ad hoc 
processes of centralisation took place, which elites do not associate with experiences 
gained from carrying out previous reforms but instead simply associate with trying to 
find solutions to resistance when it arose.  They did not have a comprehensive plan to 
centralise.  The reformists in the WP and the leadership of DL were not as convinced 
of the need to centralise as they should have done if the ideas in Grzymała-Busse’s 
framework were capable of explaining their behaviour.  They had professional 
backgrounds, experience in implementing reforms and in trying to broaden appeal but 
remained committed to internal democracy.  
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Paramilitarism and ideological change were burning issues.  Paramilitarism certainly 
made it harder to transform the WP (and there were additional obstacles to 
transformation than in other WECPs), but democratisation almost achieved this feat.  
The slow pace of change convinced reformers that they were better off leaving the 
WP.  It took time and the de-radicalising experience of government to break down 
opposition from elites and mid-level elites to social democratisation and before a 
decision on merging with Labour was possible through DL’s internal democratic 
structures.  The WP’s reaction to the collapse of Communism and DL’s initial 
positioning seem to add some relevance to Grzymała-Busse’s finding in CEE that 
democracy was incompatible with social democratisation.  However, DL got there 
eventually by accepting social democratic policies in coalition with Labour.   
 
Parliamentarisation gave alternative sources of power by which reformers could bring 
about transformation.  DL shows that Grzymała-Busse’s finding in CEE that parties 
needed to centralise, social democratise and seek to office to regenerate is too simplistic 
for understanding WECPs’ paths of transformation.  This was not always feasible and 
they had other alternatives.  However, DL failed to play a guessing game over coalition 
formation or to find ways to define itself in opposition to Labour.  Having grown too 
close to Labour it was assimilated.  DL’s radical activists were also exhausted and 
disillusioned to the extent that they would no longer block a merger.  A lack of 
centralisation and effort to build DL rather than streamlining or centralisation meant 
that activists did not stand in the way.  Democratic Left was over within a decade.   
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Chapter 6: 
The Communist Party of the Netherlands – the Democratisers  
 
   
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter analyses the development of the Communist Party of the Netherlands 
(CPN).  It demonstrates that drawing on Grzymała-Busse’s ideas about elite 
advancement and organisational reform can help to explain how WECPs like the CPN 
gradually broke with key parts of their Communist identity before 1989.  The chapter 
shows that the CPN’s elite advancement processes promoted a leadership with an 
extremely high degree of experience in negotiating with outside groups/institutions 
and at carrying out reforms.  Moreover, analysis here shows that such processes 
helped them to envisage and implement programmatic and organisational 
transformation.  These elites pursued organisational reforms aimed at (and effective 
in) generating ideological renewal.  Nonetheless, using the ideas in the framework to 
understand the development of the CPN is found to be problematic in several respects.  
Most significantly, this analysis shows that these elites avoided social democratisation 
and centralisation in response to exogenous shocks.  It also shows that their 
experiences led them to gradually democratise the CPN.  This was a successful route 
to breaking with Communism and programmatic reform. 
 
The CPN’s support swelled following World War Two in no small part because of its 
role in resisting Nazi occupation (van der Linden and Wormer 1989, p. 81, Voerman, 
1989, p. 2).  In 1946, it won over ten percent of the vote and its membership peaked at 
over 50,000 (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2).  However, the CPN struggled to maintain its 
appeal as Cold War hostilities prompted mainstream parties to constrain its influence. 
6
  The CPN’s supporters also became disillusioned by the actions of the Soviet Union 
while a decline in the number of industrial manual workers reduced its core support 
(Lucardie et al. 1995, p. 92, Voerman 1991, p. 460).  The CPN’s vote share fell to 
below four percent by 1967 and its membership to 11,000 (van der Linden and 
                                                           
6
 In the post-war period CPN members were barred from posts in the civil service, access to public 
broadcasting and parliamentary committees on foreign affairs (see Lucardie 1991, p. 122). 
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Wormer 1989, p. 81).  Its radicalism led to exclusion from progressive governments 
in the 1970s and it gained little experience in local government.  
 
In the 1970s, the CPN’s decline threatened its existence altogether and presented 
significant pressures for reform.  It became a case of ‘premature Perestroika’ as it 
began transforming its programmes and electoral strategy before events unfolded in 
the Soviet-bloc (Voerman 1993, p. 157).  However, greater ideological pluralism in 
the 1980s did not avert further decline and the CPN lost its three remaining seats in 
parliament in 1986 (see Table 6.1).  This prompted an electoral alliance under the 
banner ‘GroenLinks’ with other small left parties the Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP) 
and Political Party of the Radicals (PPR) in May 1989.  The CPN subsequently 
dissolved itself in 1991 and fully amalgamated into GroenLinks.      
 
Table 6.1: Electoral results of the CPN in parliamentary elections 
Year 1946 1948 1952 1956 1959 1963 1967 
Vote (per cent) 10.6 7.7 6.2 4.8 2.4 2.8 3.6 
        
Year  1971 1972 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989* 
Vote (per cent) 3.9 4.5 1.7 2.1 1.8 0.6 4.1 
  *Under the GroenLinks electoral alliance 
(Staar 1990, 1985, 1981; Fenemma, 1988).  
 
This chapter applies Grzymała-Busse’s framework to four stages in the CPN’s 
development.  The first shows how the Stalinist Paul de Groot (one of the CPN’s 
wartime leaders) manipulated elite advancement processes and used hierarchical 
institutional structures under democratic centralism to dominate the party from 1945–
1977.  This analysis traces how from the late 1960s the CPN’s leaders sought to 
reverse its decline by relaxing recruitment processes and enrolling student activists 
(see Table 6.2).  The second section analyses how a younger generation of orthodox 
leaders broke with de Groot and initiated democratisation to abandon Stalinism from 
1977–1982.  These leaders seemed an unlikely source of change.  However, they had 
prior experiences that helped them to envisage reforms following electoral defeat in 
1977.   These elites drew on backgrounds that involved negotiation with outside 
groups and institutions, dialogue with the CPN’s new student members and 
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experience in working with outsiders available to them because they had been 
‘horizontally advanced’ from across a range of party institutions.  
 
The third section begins by analysing how the CPN’s ‘old guard’ elite was replaced 
by a reformist leadership of (former-) student activists.  It demonstrates that these new 
leaders were highly experienced in negotiating with outside groups and in undertaking 
prior reforms to broaden appeal. However, contrary to what Grzymała-Busse found in 
parties in CEE, they continued to democratise and did not seek social democratisation.  
This chapter then shows how democratisation was an effective instrument for reform 
which helped the leadership to replace Leninist ideology with feminism and other 
radical goals from 1982–1986.  A final section analyses how the leadership continued 
to democratise the CPN with the aim of further programmatic reform from 1986–
1989.  They did this even after gaining additional experience in carrying out prior 
reforms.  Democratisation helped to facilitate the formation of GroenLinks and to 
breaking with Communism.  The leadership did not seek to overhaul institutional 
structures with the aim of centralising.  However, with the PSP and PPR struggling to 
form an alliance it pursued a limited informal process of ‘centralisation’ or more 
specifically ‘elitist behaviour’ in holding secret elite level meetings that helped to 
move the CPN into GroenLinks.   
 
Table 6.2: Membership figures of the CPN 
Year  1948 1950 1957 1962 1972 1977 
Members 53,000 27,392 12,858 11,000 10,000 15,300 
       
Year  1980 1981 1982 1986 1989 1991 
Members 15,510 14,400 13,900 8,500 5,700 3,400 
(Lucardie and Voerman, 2003; Voerman and Wormer, 1997; Voerman, 1995; Voerman,  
1989a; Staar, 1990, 1988, 1985, 1981; van der Linden and Wormer, 1989).  
 
6.2 Dutch Stalinism  
Under De Groot the CPN promoted the Stalinist model for the Netherlands.  It 
advocated a dictatorship of the proletariat and proclaimed Stalin to be ‘the greatest 
social reformer, scholar and statesman of mankind’ (CPN 1952, p. 10).  De Groot 
established a personality cult and statutes upheld democratic centralism (CPN 1952, 
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1958).  Discipline was ensured through control committees appointed by the party 
executive and latter by regional level organisations to expel dissidents and to regulate 
local organisations (Voerman 1989b, p. 21).  Consequently, a large number of 
delegates at party congresses were either party functionaries or ideologues picked by 
highly disciplined local party leaders.  Little room existed for internal debate at local 
meetings that were policed by party officials.  Furthermore, minimal debate was 
allowed at congresses which simply supported the leadership’s proposals, and factions 
were banned.  Membership was restricted to the ideologically pure and members were 
required to spend much of the week canvassing or selling the party paper.  The Party 
Board (executive) included obedient functionaries and nominated a small Daily Board 
to run the party which De Groot dominated.   
 
Democratic centralism allowed the leadership to weed out internal opposition and 
ideological pluralism inherited from the fragmented Communist wartime resistance 
movement.  De Groot broke with the Soviet Union and Khrushchev over de-
Stalinisation making the CPN a Stalinist party in isolation (Devlin, 1972a, 1972b).  
Thereafter, the leadership stamped out criticism from younger elites and the 
parliamentary group who demanded freedom of discussion and de-Stalinisation 
(Voerman 1989b, p. 6).  These critics had been recruited at a young age and were 
once loyal to De Groot but became increasingly independent as they grew older and 
worked in parliament.  Opposition in the Communist Unity Trade Union Federation 
was also purged before it was liquidated in 1959 (Kool, 1960, p. 22).  Likewise, 
Maoists were expelled.   
 
The critics in the Party Board and parliamentary group were replaced by even younger 
apparatchiks (many having been teenagers in the wartime resistance) who were loyal 
to De Groot and dependent on him for their positions (Stratton, 2000).  Most of them 
had little professional or political experience of working outside the party.  New rules 
also blocked them from gaining influence in several party functions, which limited 
their influence.  This also helped to remove dissidents who had combined 
parliamentary and trade union work with other activities in the Board (Voerman 
1989b, p. 6).  By the late 1960s, health problems forced De Groot to relinquish some 
control to this younger generation.  He left Parliament in 1967, being replaced by his 
loyal foot soldiers. These included Marcus Bakker who became parliamentary leader 
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and Henk Hoekstra who became Party Chair.  Turnover in the elite remained limited, 
insular and based on ideological conformity.  Those apparatchiks who were promoted 
to top positions worked in De Groot’s shadow since he remained an honorary lifelong 
member of the leadership.    
 
Remarkably, however, the CPN became one of the leading WECPs in terms of 
programmatic reform.  A major factor shaping this development was the decision to 
relax recruitment regulations in response to changes in Dutch society.  Increased 
levels of student activism and the emergence of new peace, environmentalist and 
feminist social movements led young left-wing radicals to show increased interest in 
the CPN’s revolutionary politics.  It also appealed to them because it offered a critical 
realist critique of positivism in the social sciences and social democracy that 
dominated Dutch universities (Fennema 1988, p. 166).  
 
The CPN’s leaders (including De Groot) opportunistically tailored appeals to students 
and forged links with their protests in a bid to bolster support.  They tried to exert 
influence on the student movement by infiltrating student union debates in the late 
1960s.  In 1968, the CPN’s journal Politics and Culture claimed that students were 
not simply young members of the bourgeoisie but allies of workers who faced similar 
forms of oppression (Fenemma 1988, p. 160).  In 1969, Communist workers 
supported students occupying Amsterdam University by constructing bridges between 
buildings that enabled students to get supplies and break police blockades.   
 
The CPN’s leaders had reservations that students were too anarchic and liberal.  Some 
student leaders were refused membership while others had to write self-criticisms 
denouncing their bourgeois pasts.  However, this was soon relaxed and from 1972–
1977 approximately 5,000 students joined, boosting the CPN’s membership, which 
reached 15,000 by 1980 (Linden and Wormer 1989, p. 81, Fennema 1988, p. 164).  
The composition of the CPN’s membership and congress delegates changed 
dramatically as the students displaced the CPN’s traditional recruiting ground, the 
orthodox Communist Youth Organisation.7  Before 1977 the effects were small.  The 
                                                           
7
 The increase in the number of students is reflected in survey data on the characteristics of CPN 
congress delegates that reports only 4.2% (18 of 432) delegates were students at the 1972 congress, 
rising to 12.7% (69 of 545 delegates) in 1975 and this continued thereafter; the number of teachers and 
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students generally upheld the CPN’s rigid party culture and refrained from public 
criticisms of its Stalinist programmes.  The students were excluded from the party 
leadership and few were engaged for their intellectual abilities in theoretical work at 
the research bureau.  Instead they were encouraged to stay active at universities and to 
sell the party paper De Waarheid (Fennema 1988, p. 164).   
 
6.3 Breaking with Stalinism 
Losses at the 1977 national parliamentary election reduced the CPN’s share of the 
vote from four and a half per cent to below two per cent and it lost five of its seven 
parliamentary seats (Voerman 1992, p. 23).  The CPN had expected to grow and the 
defeat turned the students’ latent criticisms of Stalinism into open dissent (Fennema 
1988, pp. 169–72).  The leadership had wrongly believed that the students could be 
controlled.  However, the old guard in the leadership carried out the first major 
reforms.  De Groot blamed their lack of revolutionary spirit, accommodation of 
Eurocommunism, and the influence of students and civil servants for the party’s 
weakening appeal to manual workers (Fenemma 1988, p. 169).  The old guard broke 
ranks and blocked his attempt to introduce new rules for expelling members who were 
not subservient to him in the wartime resistance.  The Party Board stripped De Groot 
of lifelong membership of the leadership and restored relations with the Soviet Union 
(Fennema 1988, p. 170).  
 
The CPN’s formal leaders now came to the fore (Devlin, 1977a).  The leadership was 
dominated by a clique in the party’s small daily leadership the Executive Board 
including Bakker, Hoekstra, Joop Wolff (editor of De Waarheid and MP) and his 
brother Jaap Wolff – head of the research bureau.  This old guard had done De 
Groot’s bidding.  Joop Wolff designed his theoretical propaganda and Bakker wrote 
the ‘Red Book’ (1958) which persecuted former resistance leaders and dissidents in 
the Communist Unity Trade Union Federation as traitors and British spies leading to 
their expulsion (Kool 1961, p. 22).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
academic professionals also increased while the number with manual industrial jobs declined 
significantly (Voerman 1991, p. 469, 1989a, p. 8; Fennema 1988, pp. 160-1).   
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To those outside the party it was surprising that seemingly highly orthodox elites, 
with little experience in carrying out (or desire for) reform, broke with De Groot (De 
Roo Interview).  It was a desperate situation and they realised that the party could 
implode or vanish altogether if it did not respond to the election defeat.  However, 
Grzymała-Busse’s arguments about the factors that can equip elites with experiences 
beneficial to reform help us to explain (and re-examine) their actions.  These leaders 
joined the CPN through the wartime resistance movement rather than because of 
revolutionary zeal.  Had it not been for the wartime situation they might well have 
joined the social democrats instead, and to activists they had always seemed more like 
social democrats with Stalinist techniques (Izeboud Interview, 14.05.09, van der Pilj 
Interview).  The Wolff brothers had links to groups outside the party including artists, 
and intellectuals that helped them develop a critical approach to Stalinism and to 
engage in theoretical debate.  This group largely followed the orthodox line out of 
loyalty to (and dependence on) De Groot rather than ideological conviction.  When 
this loyalty declined there was little holding them back from seeking reform.  
 
The break with De Groot was also more gradual than met the eye.  The old guard had 
long encountered pressures to moderate.  This included negotiation with outsiders in 
parliament that made them more pragmatic.  Some members of the party’s daily 
Executive Board worked as parliamentarians allowing this pressure to feed back into 
the leadership.  Cold War paranoia and the CPN’s distinctive sub-culture made it easy 
for some of the old guard to socialise almost exclusively with fellow orthodox 
Communists.  However, during the 1970s they also held internal talks with student 
members on issues including the Soviet Union, and student politics.  The students had 
plenty of experience in negotiating with outside groups and called (within the 
confines of party meetings) for them to adapt.  They questioned the leadership’s 
demand that criticisms of the party line remain inside party meetings and opposed the 
expulsion of those who ‘went public’.  Contact with the students affected the old 
guard (and Hoekstra in particular) and they become responsive to accommodating 
their demands for greater discussion and ideological renewal.  These demands grew in 
intensity following the 1977 election defeat (Voerman 1993, p. 161).   
 
The old guard had wanted to break with De Groot before the 1977 election but feared 
triggering a split.  However, electoral defeat weakened his support enough to get rid 
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of him.  The old guard’s longstanding public defence of Stalinism also overshadowed 
their limited but not insignificant record in proposing and carrying out prior reforms 
to broaden appeal.  De Groot had constrained them but they found some opportunities 
to modify the party line.  They had made some gradual inroads to reproaching the 
Soviet Union in the early 1970s and Hoekstra signed, against De Groot’s wishes, 
international Communist resolutions with the aim of breaking the party’s isolation, 
(Devlin, 1977a, 1977b).  Moreover, they had tried to broaden appeal by embracing the 
peace movement, emphasising issues appealing to feminists including abortion policy 
and had been at the forefront of tailoring policy to students.  De Groot spent little time 
with the students.  Indeed, without the efforts of other members of the old guard, their 
recruitment would have been blocked.   
 
Bakker had taken great strides in accepting parliamentary democracy.  He had some 
room for manoeuvre in this as De Groot advocated something similar in the 1950s 
before slipping back into revolutionary appeals. Even so, De Groot constrained the 
leadership and regularly re-drafted Bakker’s speeches in parliament.  At the 1975 
congress he also blocked their programmatic reforms that aimed to moderate social 
policies to appeal to new groups including public sector workers in health and 
education.  De Groot also blocked their attempts to open up elite advancement to the 
CPN’s students and prevented this by using his influence to reduce the size of the 
Board.  
 
But reforming the CPN did not come easy to the old guard.  Initially, they continued 
the rapprochement with the Soviet Union.  In 1978, Joop Wolff visited 
Czechoslovakian hardliner Vasil Bilak on holiday and the CPN supported the Soviet 
treatment of dissidents Orlov and Sakharov, triggering internal dissent (Fennema 
1988, p. 170).  The old guard’s experience in negotiating with outsiders exposed them 
to pressures to reform but they still lacked ideas in terms of how to reform the party in 
1977.  Their thinking remained rooted to the past and they still struggled to question 
the fundamentals of Communism.8  However, the leadership initiated a phase of 
ideological renewal at the 1978 congress and began drafting a new programme 
                                                           
8
  In 1986 Bakker still argued that and Communism would once again become an ideal (Voerman 1993, 
p. 168).  In 1991 Joop Wolff declared that the collapse of the Soviet Union was catastrophic 
(Abrahams, 1991).  
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(Voerman 1991, p. 465).  They also used their power at the congress to advance 
trusted prominent student activists into the board and jeopardised rapprochement with 
the Soviet Union by condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.   
 
Party Chair Henk Hoekstra led the committee to draft a new programme and he 
himself wrote most of it.  Hoekstra searched far and wide for ideas, analysing party 
history and purges.  Having accepted that he did not understand how to democratise 
the party, he even asked counterparts in the PSP how the CPN could democratise and 
studied their internal rules.  The leadership had some experience in carrying out 
reforms and encountered resistance to previous attempts to broaden appeal but this 
had not convinced them of a need to replace democratic centralism with new 
centralised structures.  However, they did lack professional backgrounds which 
Grzymała-Busse found had predisposed elites to centralise in CPs in CEE.   
 
Hoekstra’s proposed draft programme, the ‘Dutch Road to Socialism’ (1981), 
advocated democratisation, broader appeals and breaking with Stalinism.  This 
criticised the CPN’s ‘dogmatic rigidity’ and ideological ‘codifying and disciplining’ 
and renounced Stalinism (Voerman 1991, p. 465, CPN 1981, p. 18).  The leadership 
did not force the programme through but distributed it for discussion throughout the 
party and allowed local level debate with the aim of freeing-up criticism of Stalinism.  
The leadership’s tolerance of dissidence ensured that the days of prefabricated 
congress decisions with almost unanimous votes in support of the leadership ended.  
The 1982 congress endorsed the proposals for ideological renewal and a break with 
Stalin amid an outpouring of criticism of Stalinism (Devlin, 1982b).  The congress 
also expressed support for Charter 77 and Solidarność movements in CEE rather than 
the regimes there.  In line with the leadership’s proposals it asserted that the party 
should not write history, its opposition to a one-party state and recognised the need for 
differences of opinion within the party.  
 
The old guard failed to anticipate that democratisation was a double-edged sword.  
The leadership lost control as groups (such as feminists) were empowered in a spirit 
of openness to question the CPN’s Leninist and Communist identity and demanded 
further reform (Fennema 1988, p. 191).  The result was a congress decision to draft 
another new more detailed and reformist programme.  Discussions also saw feminists 
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criticise the abuse of women by Russian soldiers during the World War Two, which 
evoked fierce debate.  The leadership’s moves to increase elite turnover in the Board 
and publications (and to open up elite advancement processes) from 1978–1982 
enabled a cohort of (former-) students, feminists, public sector professionals and 
newcomers to rapidly advance to elite positions.9  The new elites also demanded 
further changes and persuaded the old guard to agree to withdraw Bakker’s ‘Red 
Book’, renounce the CPN’s Stalinist purges of the 1950s and call for those who were 
expelled to re-join at the 1982 congress.  These made a symbolic break with the past 
and dealt a blow to the old guard.   
 
6.4.1 A student leadership 
The old guard realised that a younger generation with more authentic and spontaneous 
ideas for reform was waiting in the wings.  With these students, public sector workers 
and members of new social movements calling for reforms, they decided to gradually 
handed power over to them. Following the 1982 congress elites with student and 
feminist backgrounds were firmly in control of the parliamentary leadership and the 
Board.  A new dominant group in the small Daily Board emerged to informally run 
the party including Ina Brouwer (parliamentary leader), Ton van Hoek, Boe Thio and 
Elli Izeboud (Party Chair).  Since 1978 this group had gained experience of working 
in the Board and were promoted because they were mildly reformist.  The old guard 
trusted them not to go too far in implementing reforms.  The new leaders responded to 
the CPN’s decline by continuing to democratise in pursuit of more flexible 
programmes and electoral strategy.  They took this further than the old guard foresaw.   
 
The new leaders’ experiences in academia, student politics and new social movements 
were more conducive to reform than those available to the old guard and the generally 
more orthodox elites advanced from the CPN’s youth organisation.  There discussions 
and the scope for autonomous action were tightly constrained.  The new leaders’ 
greater experience in negotiating with outside groups and institutions meant they were 
more exposed to pressures to respond to electoral decline and to broaden appeal.  
                                                           
9
 Prominent elites including Ton van Hoek, Marius Ernsting, Elsbeth Etty, Elli Izeboud and Harry van 
der Berg came from the student movement.  
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Working with other groups and brokering compromises in the student movement had 
also made the new leaders to be more pragmatic than their predecessors, making it 
easier for them to sacrifice elements of orthodox Communism.  Moreover, their 
backgrounds gave them a plethora of new ideas and ideological inspiration with 
which to envisage broadening the CPN’s programmes.  Many were social scientists 
who had encountered Eurocommunist theories and debates surrounding social change 
in the Netherlands including the decline of the industrial working class which gave 
them ideas for reform.  All of these influences were unavailable to the old guard.   
 
Nobody could have foreseen such newcomers rapidly rising to top positions in a party 
hitherto dominated by long-established elites.  The new party leader (in 1981) Ina 
Brouwer only joined the CPN in 1973, and had been in the Board for just a year.  She 
has also come from a middle class a centre-right background.  Brouwer joined the 
CPN through encountering it in working for organisations providing legal services for 
low income workers rather than because of theoretical or philosophical motivations.  
However, it became easier for members like Brouwer to gain elite positions as the old 
guard sought to promote both younger and female candidates with links to other social 
organisations to broaden appeal.  Furthermore, the new leaders called for further elite 
turnover and Izeboud only accepted being Party Chair in 1982 on the basis that at 
least a third of Board members were women.  During the 1970s it was normal for 
candidate committees to propose lists of candidates for the Board which let 
congresses choose from a range of candidates.  However, few students were put 
forward as lists were dominated by orthodox candidates.  After 1978 the leadership 
made candidate committees more open and pluralistic and congress delegates were 
increasingly free to choose critically minded Board members.  
 
The cohort of new leaders found that portable skills and experiences gained from prior 
activism helped them to reform the CPN.  These included practice in debating, 
practical organisational skills, designing successful policy appeals and reforms, an 
awareness of the institutional structures, developing campaigns, formulating strategies 
to overcome entrenched opposition within institutions; working and compromising 
with other movements, political parties and trade unions; organising activists and 
protests, and public speaking.  Several of the CPN’s new leaders had held senior 
positions in university and national student union organisations as well as new social 
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movements.  These positions gave them prior opportunities to work together and 
arenas in which to discuss reforming the party.  They also developed a group identity 
and supported one another’s rise up the party hierarchy. 
 
The new leaders had a high degree of experience in negotiating with outsiders and 
responding to their demands. They had seen a need to broaden appeal to feminists, 
public sector and white-collar workers rather than just the industrial working classes.  
They had also developed more pragmatism than their predecessors and encountered 
the need for compromising excessive demands to win broader appeal.  However, 
while they sought to broaden appeal in response to electoral decline they did not show 
relentless pragmatism or a desire to enter mainstream politics.  Instead they used their 
radical New Left ideas to renew the CPN’s Communist ideology.  These leaders 
believed in a range of New Left perspectives alongside Marxism and accepted the 
need for ideological pluralism which gave them more options than simply accepting 
social democracy. 
 
These politicians had moved closer to social democracy in ideological terms but did 
not wish to join the social democratic PvdA and sought more radical alternatives.  
Negotiation with outside groups benefited reform without requiring social 
democratisation.  The leadership were by no means ideological wheeler-dealers who 
would opportunistically seek to meet the preferences of the mainstream voters.  They 
were very different from elites with similar experiences of negotiating with outsiders 
and state administration that Grzymała-Busse found in CEE.  They show that 
pragmatism was just one type of skill that could be beneficial to party change 
alongside expertise in other ideas and philosophies.  These different skills need to be 
separated if Grzymała-Busse’s framework is to be useful in explaining the 
development of WECPs like the CPN.    
 
In the early 1980s the CPN’s leaders rapidly broke with key aspects of Communism.  
However, they cautiously encouraged fellow reformers to keep criticisms under wraps 
until after the 1981 election to avoid damaging the party.  Subsequently, they still 
sought to avoid breaking with Communism altogether.  They preferred a gradual 
approach to reforming and renewing Communism contrary to what Grzymała-Busse 
tells us about how elites equipped in societal negotiation are likely to behave.  The 
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leadership still valued the CPN’s radical heritage and only eventually abandoned 
Communism only when they saw that their programmatic reforms had failed to 
regenerate support.  This process demonstrates that even party leaders equipped with 
prior experiences and skills beneficial to change might still see reasons to avoid 
making full use of them. 
    
The CPN’s new leaders had a high degree of experience in carrying out reforms and 
broadening appeal.  They had done this in the student movement.  There they worked 
to change student organisations by building appeals beyond the confines of particular 
student groups and to ally both extreme and moderate student organisations.  They 
also worked to adjust appeals to talk to a wider audience and they reformed the 
internal workings of university administration.  Further, they had advocated reforms at 
internal party meetings during the 1970s and some worked with the old guard to 
propose earlier reforms at the 1975 congress and to break with Stalinism after the 
1977 election defeat.  The leaders had encountered resistance to prior reforms and 
many had professional backgrounds.  However, they did not envisage centralisation as 
a way to transform the CPN as Grzymała-Busse found elites did in CEE. 
  
The leadership pursued democratisation as a means by which to carry out reform for 
several reasons.  First they believed democratisation could secure a broader radical 
left appeal.  Second, they believed centralisation would have encountered 
overwhelming opposition from new members who were increasingly anarchistic and 
were demanding democratic accountability and for power to be decentralised to local 
branches.  Third, undertaking earlier reforms had not shown them that significant 
advantages were to be gained from centralising.  Instead, they developed a consensual 
and inclusive style of leadership in the student movement in which they mediated 
between rival groups to connect them and broker alliances and compromises.  In 
doing this they encouraged competing groups to talk to one another and ‘led from the 
back rather than the front’ (Izeboud Interview, 14.05.09).  Their success in this 
convinced them of the advantages in such a style of leadership.  This was reinforced 
by their experiences in pursing prior reforms within the party.  These showed them the 
benefits of working intensively with mid-level elites to build support for reform rather 
than sidestepping them.  
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Fourth, these leaders were averse to centralising because they held deep seated belief 
in participatory democracy which was of intrinsic value for them and they 
passionately believed that the CPN should thoroughly democratise.  They had 
developed this commitment to democracy within the student movement.  Dutch 
student protests initially addressed materialist issues like improving student income 
but soon evolved into post-materialist struggles over values and defending the rights 
of others.  The students’ campaigns addressed a lack of democratic decision-making.  
They focused on enhancing accountability in university research policies, 
representative decision-making, rights for university employees, the content of course 
syllabuses, epistemological pluralism in the social sciences, expanding higher 
education to lower social classes; criticism of the Vietnam War, cruise missiles, 
apartheid, and the neutron bomb.  Some elites with student backgrounds including 
Geert Lameris in Groningen remained committed to democratic centralism (Lucardie 
Interview, 10.04.08).  However, centralism and centralisation were an anathema to 
most of the new elites who were generally hesitant to streamlining or expelling 
hardliners. 
 
Fifth, the students also saw democratisation as a force for change.  Their protests were 
moderately effective as Dutch universities established representative bodies that 
increased their influence in decision-making.  This gave them a demonstrable record 
of success in showing that democratisation could be instrumental in generating 
reform.  The students had reformed universities to ensure that marginalised voices 
were taken seriously and saw reforming the CPN as a similar process.  The leadership 
saw that their own calls for change had been ignored under democratic centralism and 
the CPN’s centralistic culture.  They were sceptical that building new centralistic 
organisational structures or forcing through changes would avoid similar mistakes.  
Moreover, they believed that such unresponsive structures needed to be replaced to 
increase the party’s appeal to both activists, other groups in society and voters.  The 
leadership sought to tap into views within the party and wider society which had been 
suppressed for too long, to break with old dogma, and to renew programmes by 
democratising.  
 
Grzymała-Busse’s framework portrays leaders who do not centralise their 
organisations as exhibiting a lack of skills in organisational reform or being naïve out 
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of a lack of experience in carrying out reform.  This was not the case in the CPN.  Its 
leaders were effective organisers who understood the risks and opportunities 
democratisation involved.  However, they pursued a conscious strategy of continuing 
to democratise because they realised that their party’s configuration of members and 
mid-level elites meant that democratisation could help to provide support for 
abandoning vulnerable ideas including Leninism and orthodox Communism.   
 
The CPN’s leaders also believed that democratic debate offered a way to help them 
bridge the gap between orthodox Communists and a minority of ultra-reformists who 
would expel Communists, break with Communism, abolish the party or establish 
looser social movements.  The leadership aimed to keep everyone on board and to 
reconcile differences while renewing the party and breaking with Leninism.  In doing 
this they used their inclusive style of leadership developed in the student movement.  
They believed that a patient and democratic process of change had advantages in 
averting a damaging split between the party’s rival wings. The leadership also 
believed that reforming Communism would be easier with the support of the old 
guard who had useful experience in activism and parliamentary politics.  Several of 
them remained on the Board until the mid-1980s including Marcus Bakker and Jaap 
Wolff and were consulted on reforms and helped to build support for them.   
 
6.4.2 Breaking with Leninism 
In parliamentary elections in 1981 and 1982 the CPN only marginally increased its 
share of the vote compared with that which it polled in 1977.  The new leadership 
continued to feel the pressure to change and in response deepened democratisation in 
several respects.  First, the leadership spoke out for a less rigid and more decentralised 
party culture and encouraged debate at all levels.  They organised more meetings than 
their predecessors had on marginalised issues including feminism and the 
environment and they increasingly sponsored open debate.  This sped up the informal 
erosion of democratic centralism in the first half of the 1980s – although there was 
little change in the CPN’s statues.  Democratising the party was relatively easy as 
their efforts linked in well with the demands for reform and greater discussion that the 
rank and file were making.  A more permissive approach was enough to enable this to 
begin changing programmes.   
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Second, the new leaders relaxed membership criteria in 1982 by reducing restrictions 
on Christians joining the party to make it more pluralistic.  Third, the leadership 
decentralised the powers of the national Board by establishing working groups to 
devise policy on major issues.  Their work influenced the Board’s draft programmes 
for congresses.  While the Board chose the committee’s chairs, reformist mid-level 
elites were encouraged to sit on them.  The committees became a venue of open 
debate and a driving force for reform. 
 
Fourth, the leadership’s permissive approach enabled party publications including the 
daily paper De Waarheid to become editorially autonomous.  This soon caused 
tensions as ‘ultra-reformists’ at De Waarheid criticised the leadership’s gradual 
strategy of compromise with the orthodox-wing, ongoing relations with the Soviet 
Union and lobbied for co-operation with other small left parties (Fennema 1988, pp. 
172–3).  Some of them also advocated social democratisation.  Internal 
democratisation did not only empower the orthodox-wing, the ultra-reformists 
campaigned for radical reforms in the Board and at congresses.  This group included 
students and activists struggling to come to terms with their families’ Communist 
backgrounds or to justify Cold War controversies to their peers.  However, their 
proposals to break with Communism were rejected at the 1982 congress (Devlin, 
1972a).  De Waarheid’s criticisms strengthened the case for reform but were 
damaging and unwanted by the leadership.  Frustrated by the slow pace of change 
several leading ultra-reformists left the party.  
 
The leadership took a major step towards democratising the party by introducing a 
new intellectual journal called Komma in 1982.  It published a wide range of 
perspectives on issues such as women’s rights, political power, pornography, racism, 
rights for foreign workers, Eurocommunism and feminism.  Even ultra-reformists at 
De Waarheid criticised Komma’s pluralism for going too far.  Its content was in stark 
contrast to Politics and Culture, another publication run by the national board and 
Marcus Bakker.  In 1984, Komma also began publishing articles in collaboration with 
politicians from the PPR and PSP, which broke party discipline (Komma 1984, 1985).  
Almost every issue of Komma became problematic for the leadership.  Its editors 
were summoned to central office to explain themselves but the party’s leaders soon 
resigned themselves to Komma’s autonomy.  The leadership had not streamlined 
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decision-making points but created a new one and had lost control of it.  However, 
this did not serve the interests of orthodox activists as Grzymała-Busse’s arguments 
anticipate, but rather those seeking reform. 
 
Fifth, the leadership gave greater freedom to local party organisations.  Reformist 
local branches like those in Nijmegen had questioned the authority of central office 
and the national leadership to impose candidates on them since 1977.  The old guard 
had increasingly struggled to control such branches.  Several branches had sought to 
democratise themselves and to appoint students, feminists and environmentalists as 
congress delegates, and local party chairs in competitive elections instead of the party 
hacks being nominated from above.  Young local councillors with student 
backgrounds had also become increasingly pragmatic through working in local 
councils and demanded increased inter-party co-operation in the search for greater 
influence.  The new leadership was concerned about losing the CPN’s distinctive 
identity through a national level electoral alliance with its small left rivals.  However, 
it endorsed co-operation on a local level and gave greater room for local branches to 
make their own local coalitions and to run their own affairs.  
 
Local councillors were also granted an increased role in the national Board’s working 
groups where they pointed to the increased influence they had gained from local 
electoral alliances.  They also formed a network to lobby the leadership for a national 
level alliance with the PSP and PPR.  The CPN’s decline meant that its only realistic 
chance of gaining a seat in the European Parliamentary election in 1984 was in 
coalition with the PPR and PSP.  The leadership agreed to an alliance termed the 
Green Progressive Accord.  This also decentralised power as the CPN’s Member of 
the European Parliament, Nel van Dijk, worked closely with the other parties in 
Brussels which became an arena for continued programmatic convergence between 
the parties.  There they wrote joint documents and trust emerged between elites in a 
joint decision-making board giving rise to further pressure for closer relations.  
 
Sixth, the new leadership took a massive step toward democratising the CPN by 
introducing ‘Horizontal groups’ or factions in 1982.  The CPN had traditionally 
deflected calls for increasing women’s representation by referring feminists to its 
women’s organisation which dismissed their concerns as bourgeois and elitist 
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(Fennema 1988, p. 191).  Feminists increasingly demanded rights to organise 
autonomously from the leadership in order to debate issues without fear of being 
punished and to campaign within the party for equal representation at congresses and 
in the leadership (Fennema 1988, p. 191).  Feminists within the leadership including 
Party Chair Elli Izeboud had become convinced of the need for factions through 
debates in feminist organisations.  They promoted their demands and convinced the 
leadership to sanction the formation of factions.  
 
The formation of horizontal groups broke the CPN’s vertical hierarchical lines of 
authority and adherence to a single party line.  Minority groups of activists in local 
branches were able to mobilise and organise meetings on a national level with several 
hundred members that channelled their demands for reform.  The leadership endorsed 
these meetings and offered assistance in organising them.  Members of the leadership 
also participated actively in horizontal groups to campaign for reform and the 
horizontal groups were allowed to present motions at party congresses.   
 
The feminists’ success encouraged other groups to organise factions including black 
communists and homosexuals.  Increased demand for reform meant that even foreign 
workers were guaranteed representation on the CPN’s national Board.  This broke 
with the party’s traditional fears that they threatened the livelihoods of Dutch workers 
and were foreign spies (Fennema 1988, p. 191).  However, orthodox communists also 
formed a horizontal group ‘Horizontal Overlag van Communisten’ (HOC) which was 
largely focused around Amsterdam and Groningen.  This began publishing its own 
journal Manifest to criticise the leadership’s reforms and the erosion of democratic 
centralism.  Empowered by democratisation and decentralisation they opposed the 
leadership’s reforms and campaigned to retain an orthodox Communist identity at 
congresses and party meetings while the leadership had little power to rein them in.  
Orthodox figures made symbolic appeals that portrayed the young reformers’ 
proposals as a betrayal of the party’s role in the wartime resistance and post-war 
labour movement.   
 
HOC wreaked chaos in Groningen.  There, the orthodox figurehead Geert Lameris 
maintained democratic centralism to dominate local party affairs during the 1980s 
(Voerman Interview, 10.04.08).  HOC refused to sell De Waarheid in Groningen, 
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which brought it to the brink of financial collapse (Fennema 1988, p. 173).  It also 
blocked calls for co-operation with the PSP and PPR in local politics which would 
weaken ideological purity and during the 1986 election its members cut party leader 
Ina Brouwer’s name off campaign posters in rejection of her reforms.  However, even 
in the orthodox wing’s bastion of Groningen it could not use democratic centralism to 
fully stifle debate as student reformists began organising their own cross-branch 
discussions.  
 
Although HOC were a minority group, they punched above their weight in debates.  
They were formidable opponents and highly effective organisers.  The reformers 
initially struggled to counter them at party meetings and conferences.  While reformist 
branches regularly nominated congress delegates reflecting the diversity among their 
members, HOC fought dirty and tried to pack congresses with orthodox delegates.  It 
campaigned behind the scenes in an attempt to block reformist candidates and to 
promote orthodox ones.  HOC’s older activists had detailed knowledge of internal 
party regulations and institutions and gained a disproportionate amount of speaking 
time at party meetings.  They were also prolific in holding meetings to draft policy 
proposals making them strong in the ‘paper fight’ at congresses.  The reformers had 
plenty of skills and experiences beneficial to reform but still found that the orthodox-
wing were powerful opponents who in many respects out-skilled them.  Even when 
reformists occupied most elite positions it took them time to fully learn how the 
party’s institutions worked and to outmanoeuvre the orthodox groups. 
 
However, the changing composition of the CPN’s membership meant that students 
and public sector workers increasingly entered the mid-level elite – a group that was 
detached from the traditions of orthodox Communism (Voerman 1995, p. 122).  
Therefore, HOC became outnumbered and was comprehensively defeated in 
democratic votes.  Because membership change made its struggle to sabotage reform 
futile, streamlining by the leadership was not necessary.  The democratisation of 
congresses meant that HOC’s representatives in the mid-level elite were unable to 
block reform. The CPN shows that WECPs’ local leaders and mid-level elites were 
not necessarily hard-liners.  Unlike Grzymała-Busse’s findings in CEE, most of the 
mid-level elite were not predisposed to stalling reforms that broadened appeal.  
Democratisation empowered orthodox mid-level elites to oppose reform but they 
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could not prevent it.  HOC gradually lost influence and suffered a series of defeats as 
it lost at the 1982 congress on breaking with Stalinism, programmatic reforms at the 
1984 congress and failed to block co-operation with the PSP and PPR in the election 
for the European parliament in 1984.   
 
Several hardliners also accepted the need for reform following the suppression of 
Polish workers (Fennema 1988, p. 173).  Democratisation also presented the 
orthodox-wing with a strategic dilemma which Grzymała-Busse’s framework fails to 
recognise.  While the orthodox mid-level of the party had incentives to engage in 
factionalism and criticism of the leadership, many of them had deep ideological 
reservations about organising as an internal opposition.  This meant that some 
refrained from joining HOC or eventually fell in line out of misplaced loyalty.   
 
The leadership used the 1984 party congress as a launch pad for reform and developed 
unprecedented debate.  It introduced new procedures that allowed each member to 
propose amendments.  It also organised a series of regional and national conferences 
at which it encouraged activists to propose amendments on highly pluralistic draft 
party programmes (drafted by the leadership) without fear of being punished.  This 
process brought more activists into the policy making process and involved an open 
climate of debate.   
 
The result was chaos.  As the leadership had intended there was an outburst of tension 
and new ideas for reform.  So many amendments were proposed (around 3,500) that 
the congress was spread out over a month rather than lasting for one weekend as 
planned (Koeneman et al. 1984, p. 27).  The leadership had correctly anticipated that 
it would struggle to control policy making at the congress and time constraints meant 
that not all of its proposals were discussed.  Congress proceedings were also opened 
to journalists for the first time and media coverage of the intense debates helped to 
illustrate that the party was reforming.  The CPN’s newfound confidence with internal 
debate did not go unnoticed by the leaders of its potential allies the PSP and PPR.   
 
At the congress the leadership suffered defeats on some issues like immigration and 
wage policies and was surprised that the congress moderated party policy on the 
monarchy by accepting that it could remain in place.  However, the congress largely 
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moved the party in the direction that the reformist leadership wanted.  Reform minded 
horizontal groups played a strong influence on the new programme (Fennema 1988, p. 
191).  The orthodox wing was defeated as the programme replaced the notion of class 
struggle as the engine of history with multiple ideas about social conflict – between 
man and nature, man and woman, North and South, hetero- and homosexuality 
(Lucardie et al. 1993, p. 43, Voerman 1992, p. 24).  The party broke with Marxism-
Leninism replacing it with Marxism-Feminism (Voerman 1995, p. 115).  It sought to 
ally different radical forces rather than act as the vanguard of the working class 
(Lucardie 1984, p. 30). 
 
HOC divided over how to respond to defeat at the 1984 congress and its Amsterdam 
contingent left to form the Association of Dutch Communists (Lucardie et al. 1995, p. 
96).  The leadership’s faith that democracy could keep everyone on board whilst 
renewing the party with aims of electoral expansion failed.  However, the 
streamlining that did occur is better seen as a process of voluntary rather than 
institutional streamlining.  The orthodox-wing was weakened by the split but rather 
than break with Communism altogether the leadership continued its attempts to 
accommodate it. 
 
Informal organisational democratisation preceded the changes in the CPN’s policies 
and pushed democratic centralism aside in the early 1980s.  This meant that the 
leadership’s authority was continually contested.  Even when the CPN’s leaders 
encountered attempts to sabotage their gradual reforms they refrained from 
centralisation.  Nevertheless, democratisation drove reform and gave the party a 
makeover.  It can seemingly be just as effective as centralisation in stimulating reform 
or sweeping aside orthodox Communist ideology.  However, the CPN echoes 
Grzymała-Busse’s finding in CEE that democratisation rooted parties to protest 
politics.  The CPN moved closer to social democracy in this period but remained a 
niche radical left party committed to revolutionary and systemic change (CPN, 1984).  
Congress decisions and debates indicated that mid-level elites wanted to remain a 
radical alternative.  If the leadership had desired to transform the CPN into a 
mainstream social democratic office-seeker then democratic debate was unlikely to 
support this and in all likelihood centralisation would have been required.  However, 
the leadership did not think it had the power to centralise in any event.    
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The leadership continued to democratise after the congress.  In 1985 it recommended 
statutes that emphasised optimum room for the formation of opinions and 
contributions of members, democratic decision-making, more autonomous districts 
and branches, a larger role for internal groups, rights protecting members from 
punishment and publishing rights for minority opinions (Voerman 1991, p. 466).  The 
leadership also had other resources by which it could promote programmatic reforms 
rather than simply doing so through organisational changes.  Brouwer used her role as 
the public face of the party to make stands against HOC.  She made symbolic protests 
with Christian democrat and liberal politicians at the Polish Embassy in support of 
dissidents from the Soviet Union and used speeches in parliament to promote a 
reformist agenda.   
 
6.5 Breaking with Communism and forming GroenLinks  
The electoral rewards of breaking with Stalinism and Leninism were nil.  The CPN 
lost its remaining three seats at the 1986 parliamentary election which was a hard 
lesson for the CPN’s leaders who hoped that their reforms would bring electoral 
expansion success.  The CPN’s leaders who were equipped with experiences in 
negotiating with outside groups and institutions were unable to develop appeals that 
resonated with voters.  This failure could be blamed on the democratic process that 
underpinned the development of their policies and subsequently helped to produce 
multifaceted, inconsistent and complex appeals.  However, this ‘highly skilled’ 
leadership had also strongly supported the programmatic reforms.  Loosening the 
bonds of democratic centralism had also posed new problems. This made it harder to 
co-ordinate campaigns and mass rallies, and intensive canvassing was replaced with 
internal debate.  Even parliamentarians had stopped donating their salaries to the party 
in the early 1980s. 
 
The CPN, PSP and PPR lost six of their nine seats in 1986 which seemed to confirm 
arguments that a national electoral alliance was necessary and that they could not 
survive alone.  Attempts to build such an alliance had stalled in 1985 as the PSP’s 
party congress voted against co-operation but reformers had also criticised the CPN’s 
leaders’ hesitancy to endorsing such initiatives.  Following the election defeat the 
leadership became convinced that an alliance with the PSP and PPR was necessary 
(van Hoek Interview, 08.04.08).  This could provide a basis for further programmatic 
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reforms and electoral expansion.  Their pragmatism, pluralism, acceptance of deeper 
ties at local level/European co-operation and internal reforms made an alliance more 
viable and more favourable to the PSP and PPR.   
 
However, it was not until this electoral alliance had been formed and Communism 
had collapsed in CEE that the leadership fully accepted the need for a merger as a 
route to breaking with Communist symbolism.  The CPN’s leaders did not rapidly 
break with Communism following the 1986 election as Grzymała-Busse’s framework 
would lead us to expect of an elite so experienced in negotiation with outside social 
groups.  Instead they continued to tread cautiously, being well aware that any merger 
(and end of Dutch Communism) would depend on events in the other parties 
(Lucardie et al. 1995, p. 96).  They could also bide their time with the next election 
not scheduled until 1990.  The CPN’s leaders proposed conferences with the other 
parties to discuss closer co-operation in 1987 but Browuer did not publicly endorse an 
electoral alliance until 1988 (Voerman 1990, p. 2).    
 
By 1986 the CPN’s leaders had an exceptionally high degree of experience in 
implementing programmatic and institutional reforms.  They had continued to reform 
policies after the election defeat and took steps to replace blanket opposition to 
European integration with more progressive alternative visions for it.  They also met 
Gorbachev’s reforms in the Soviet Union with approval having made similar changes 
themselves already (Voerman 1990, p. 1).  However, they still did not attempt to 
centralise or streamline the CPN’s organisational structures to force through 
programmatic change or a new electoral strategy in response to the CPN’s electoral 
oblivion.  The democratic internal organisation that they had developed during the 
early 1980s made this an even more unrealistic option.  The aim of closer co-
operation with the PSP and PPR posed additional barriers to centralising because their 
New Left partners would have strongly opposed such measures.  Continued 
democratisation also empowered mid-level elites to campaign in favour of co-
operation and to outnumber the orthodox wing (who opposed making compromises 
with other parties) in debates.  
 
New statutes at the CPN’s 1989 congress formally replaced democratic centralism 
with more open procedures and brought formal rules up to date with changes that had 
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already occurred in practice.  The statutes no longer protected the party against a 
volatile membership but the rights of the membership against the leadership 
(Voerman 1991, p. 466).  Changes included the abolition of regional level control 
committees, elaborate procedures of appeal for members who felt that they had been 
treated unfairly by the leadership and removal of the leadership’s power to initiate 
expulsions.  Other changes included formal rights for marginalised groups to organise 
within the party, rules compelling the leadership to report on minority opinions and an 
opening up of leadership meetings to members to avoid elitist behaviour (Lucardie 
and Voerman 1989, p. 24, Voerman 1989b, p. 22, Koeneman et al. 1988, p. 30).  
 
As criticism of the leadership’s cautious approach to inter-party co-operation 
mounted, the CPN’s Member of the European Parliament, Nel van Dijk, and her 
colleague in Brussels Alexander de Roo from the PSP took the initiative.  In spring 
1988 Van Dijk invited influential people known to favour co-operation from within 
Groenlinks’s founder parties including Brouwer and van Hoek for informal talks at 
her home in Sittard (Lucardie et al. 1999, p. 76).  These secret social meetings took 
place outside of the parties’ formal channels of democratic decision-making.  They 
provided an opportunity to discuss the possibilities for an electoral alliance or merger 
and excluded the PPR’s parliamentary leaders who were known to oppose deeper co-
operation.   
 
The participants in the Sittard meetings developed strategies to direct their parties 
towards formal talks and to overcome opposition.  The participants devised ‘the trick’ 
which kick-started co-operation.  This was a referendum which gained support from 
PSP members for closer co-operation and bypassed the PSP’s congress delegates who 
were seen as more radical and autonomist.  Following the referendum the PSP invited 
the CPN and PPR for formal talks in spring 1989.  The CPN’s 1989 congress 
mandated representatives to explore negotiations (Voerman 1990, p. 2).  Secret 
informal talks continued and functioned as a ‘shadow board’ that allowed the 
participants to overcome difficulties that emerged (see Lees et al., 2010).   
 
The CPN’s leaders held a long-standing commitment to internal democracy.  
However, they engaged in this limited but not insignificant informal process of 
‘centralising power’ – or, put more specifically, ‘elitist behaviour’ – to set the agenda 
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and direct the CPN into the GroenLinks alliance.  Such undemocratic behaviour was 
useful in changing party strategy even though it involved no formal change to the 
CPN’s institutional structures or procedures for making party programmes which 
were simultaneously being democratised.  The CPN’s daily Executive Board had deep 
reservations about such a secretive approach but believed it was justified considering 
their parties’ desperate position.  This process seems to resemble Grzymała-Busse’s 
findings regarding experience of carrying out prior reforms promoting centralisation.  
The CPN’s leaders had accepted a limited process of centralisation to co-ordinate a 
merger between the parties because they had seen prior attempts at forging inter-party 
co-operation flounder.  The CPN’s leaders tried to organise conferences with the other 
parties from 1987–1988 but at these their proposals for co-operation had been 
unsuccessful.  They had also witnessed the rejection of co-operation by the PSP’s 
congress in 1986.  As a result, the leadership accepted a need for informal 
centralisation rather than relying on unpredictable internal democracy and party 
congress decisions.  
 
Nevertheless, with CPN congresses having expressed speculative support for 
increasing co-operation in the 1980s, the leadership was confident that it could win a 
democratic congress vote in support of an electoral alliance or merger.  It was not 
resistance from the CPN’s orthodox-wing that convinced them of the need for a 
limited degree of informal centralisation.  Instead, they accepted this because they had 
seen the PPR and PSP’s reformist elites struggle with resistance from both elites and 
mid-level elites.  What is more, their belief in centralisation as a mechanism to aid 
reform did not extend to implementing internal organisational or programmatic 
reforms or forcing policy changes through.  However, the CPN’s leaders believed that 
making a new party was a much bigger task than reforming the CPN, in which more 
things could go wrong.  Previous failed attempts at national level co-operation had 
shown them a need for the parties’ elites to take a lead setting the agenda for a 
merger, the need for them to build trust in one another and to work closely to insure 
against unwanted surprises and resistance.  The leadership also saw a need for a risk 
free environment out of the media spotlight, in which they could find common ground 
with their counterparts and work with them to envisage ways that an alliance could 
continue the parties’ key goals.  
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Formal talks between the parties were far from straightforward and initially broke 
down. However, the collapse of a governing coalition in April 1989 triggered a 
surprise election and the talks hastily resumed.  Their negotiators were placed in 
pressure cooker conditions and the CPN’s negotiators made concessions over their 
demands for candidates on the GroenLinks electoral list.  Leading CPN politicians 
including Brouwer were involved in the negotiations. They were monitored 
informally by the daily Executive Board, mandated by a conference to conclude the 
talks and reported to the party’s larger national Board throughout the process. 
However, the agreement they made to participate in the GroenLinks electoral alliance 
gave little room for involvement from the CPN’s rank and file.  It was publicly 
announced at a press conference, precluding detailed debate and making ratification 
by a party congress a fait accompli.  
 
The alliance was made before the revolutions in CEE.  It was not portrayed as a break 
with Communism but as a way to get a Communist (Brouwer) back into parliament.  
The reality was quite different.  Leading negotiators realised that once the parties had 
a joint parliamentary group then GroenLinks’s organisational development was likely 
to continue.  Before the election a provisional GroenLinks executive Board was also 
established to support the parliamentary candidates. This became a driving force for 
organisational co-operation and an outright merger.  The CPN’s national Board 
monitored its representatives in the GroenLinks provisional executive Board regularly 
but this gained power as trust emerged soon between GroenLinks’s elected officials.   
 
The CPN’s leaders’ took a gradual approach to the merger as they sought to bring as 
much of the CPN into GroenLinks as possible and proceeded with caution in case 
GroenLinks failed.  This frustrated their counterparts in the PSP and PPR.  However, 
the CPN’s leadership advised members to join GroenLinks in June 1990 (Lucardie et 
al. 1990, p. 15).  The CPN’s 1990 congress also delegated more power to the 
GroenLinks board and brought forward a vote on dissolving the CPN from 1992 to 
1991.  The leadership’s calls to merge into GroenLinks were strengthened by the 
collapse of Communism in CEE and the fall of the Berlin Wall.  They convinced 
congress delegates to dissolve the CPN in a democratic debate at its 1991 Congress – 
thereby abandoning Communism.  By this time most of HOC had left in protest at 
mounting co-operation and subsequently formed the New CPN (Voerman 2008, p. 
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21).  Transparent congresses made it hard for HOC to stop the merger.  Only two of 
167 congress delegates opposed merging into GroenLinks (Voerman 1991, p. 472).   
GroenLinks soon became a radical left-libertarian party and a member of the 
European Green Party rather than a member of the international European left. During 
the 1990s GroenLinks became increasingly moderate.  
 
The CPN’s leaders who broke with Communism in 1991 were highly equipped with 
experiences of negotiation with social groups adding support to Grzymała-Busse’s 
arguments that this helps elites to transform their parties.  By this time most of the old 
guard had retired.  The leadership increasingly prioritised regaining representation in 
parliament above ideological purity and accepted compromises to form GroenLinks.  
Moreover, the members of the CPN’s daily Executive Board were aware of mounting 
demand for a merger from party officials and elites already working closely with the 
PSP and PPR at the European Parliament and in local councils. These politicians had 
become increasingly pragmatic in office called for policy moderation to increase the 
party’s influence.   
 
6.6 Conclusion 
The first section of this chapter analysed how the authoritarian Paul De Groot 
dominated the CPN and made it a Stalinist party following the Second World War.  In 
the late 1960s the CPN began opportunistically recruiting students.  This process had 
unforeseen consequences and subsequently led to a break with Stalinism, Leninism 
and Communism.  The second section showed how the CPN’s old guard leaders 
responded to electoral decline by breaking with De Groot and Stalinism.  These 
leaders were highly obedient apparatchiks with limited professional or political 
experience outside of the party.  Grzymała-Busse’s framework helps to explain how 
even they had experiences of negotiating with outsiders that were beneficial to reform 
by pointing us to their recruitment and roles working for the party.  
 
The CPN also demonstrates the risks that WECPs faced in recruiting outsiders.  They 
boosted membership but soon demanded places in the elite as well as reform.  
Analysis showed that the old guard responded to election defeat in 1977 by relaxing 
elite advancement practises and increasing generational turnover to promote the 
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students.  The third section examined how these younger reformist elites were well 
equipped with ideas and skills conducive to envisaging reform and how they 
proceeded to democratise the party to break with Leninism.  The final section showed 
that they pursued the formation of GroenLinks after the CPN lost its remaining 
parliamentary seats in 1986.   
 
The CPN’s student elites drew on their experiences from student activism and new 
social movements to renew party programmes.  This was the major factor driving the 
reform of the CPN.  Their ideological pluralism and pragmatism were beneficial in 
working with the PSP and PPR and breaking with Communism in 1991.  Moreover, a 
moderate level of ‘horizontal advancement’ of MEPs, parliamentarians, local 
councillors and employees in party publications to the national Board and elite 
positions also exposed the CPN’s leaders to outside pressures to reform.   
 
The CPN’s leaders deliberately changed the party’s internal organisational structures 
to shape reform.  Democratisation helped them to break with Stalinism, Leninism and 
Communism.  Informal changes in the way the CPN worked preceded programmatic 
changes and were also more important than formal changes to statutes.  The old guard 
had limited – but not insignificant – prior experience of carrying out reform and their 
successors had significantly higher experience in this and professional backgrounds.  
There was little to suggest that these factors gave rise to organisational centralisation 
or streamlining.   
 
The CPN’s student leaders highlight a need to separate the concept of ‘centralisation’ 
from that of a ‘skilled leadership’ in using Grzymała-Busse’s framework to 
understand WECPs.  The CPN’s student leaders did not fail to centralise because of a 
lack of skill but because they had other skills to draw on.  When the leadership did 
seek to bypass formal decision-making structures this was limited and because of the 
complex nature of trying to broker inter-party co-operation not from its experience of 
carrying out reforms per se.  In the end both democratisation and ‘informal 
centralisation’ – in other words elitist behaviour – were used to move the CPN into 
GroenLinks.  The CPN’s leaders democratised with the aim of generating reform and 
found that it laid a basis for the merger into GroenLinks.   All the critical decisions 
involved support from democratic congress votes while secret meetings played more 
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of a role in co-ordinating the process.  GroenLinks would not have been viable for the 
PSP and PPR’s leaders without the CPN’s democratisation.  However, 
democratisation also saw the old guard lose control and in 1984 the younger leaders 
could only stand back and watch as their proposals for pluralistic programmes were 
intensely debated and modified with some unwanted and surprising results. 
 
Analysis also shows that elites experienced in negotiating with other social 
organisations and institutions are not necessarily predisposed to social democratising 
their parties.  The CPN’s leaders still wanted to distinguish themselves from the social 
democrats and a merger with their small left competitors gave them another 
alternative.  Nonetheless, analysis supports the idea that such elites will be 
predisposed to reform, having both useful ideas and encountering stronger pressures 
to change.  Moreover, the CPN shows that WECPs’ mid-level elites could be a source 
for reform if they were recruited with experience of societal negotiation or gained it 
through working for the party.  Ironically, this process was strongest on a local level 
where the CPN had less support giving rise to pressures for its councillors and 
activists to build bridges with other parties. 
 
The collapse of Communism in the Soviet bloc made it easier for the CPN’s leaders to 
dissolve the party in 1991 but electoral defeat, open elite advancement processes, 
democratisation and to a lesser extent informal centralisation had already set it on this 
path.  Comprehensive centralisation of the CPN’s internal institutions was not 
required to break with Communism by the time it collapsed in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  Instead, it merged into GroenLinks’s participative organisational structures 
and the CPN’s elite did not seek a highly centralistic organisational model for 
GroenLinks.    
 
The CPN’s leaders believed Communism was no longer electorally viable in the 
Netherlands in face of international events and social changes.  They attempted to 
salvage something from the CPN by continuing some of its goals and socialism 
through GroenLinks.  Their gradual process of reform was successful at moving most 
of the party into GroenLinks.  Nevertheless, the CPN’s leaders were soon 
disappointed by GroenLinks’s left-libertarian direction (see Voerman, 2008, Keith, 
2010).  GroenLinks failed to unify the Dutch radical left.  The CPN’s leaders’ gradual 
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approach to interparty co-operation meant that by the time GroenLinks formed, the 
CPN entered negotiations from a position of weakness having lost its parliamentary 
seats.  Brouwer briefly led GroenLinks but within a few years only a small number of 
Communists remained in its ranks (Lucardie and Voerman 2003, pp. 162–3).  The 
CPN’s leaders lacked the influence to root GroenLinks to socialist politics.   
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Chapter 7 
Testing the hypotheses 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Western European Communist parties faced a considerable challenge following the 
collapse of Communism in 1989.  It had seemed that they had been discredited, like 
Communist parties in CEE.  However, in a similar way to their counterparts in CEE 
several WECPs successfully regenerated themselves.  Seemingly against the odds, 
some managed to position themselves as social democrats or to transform themselves 
into other non-communist radical left parties.  These parties were also capable of 
pursuing what were often successful vote- and office- seeking strategies just like 
parties in CEE.  In contrast, some WECPs stubbornly resisted reform.  Where 
attempts at transformation failed or were unable to deliver success leading reformers 
often split to form their own parties or merged with non-Communist rivals to 
accomplish these goals.  In all the cases analysed in this research, Communists 
showed they were often highly capable of reinventing themselves. 
  
This research used a theoretical framework developed in Anna Grzymała-Busse’s 
study of Communist parties in CEE, ‘Redeeming the Communist Past’, to examine 
WECPs’ diverse adaptation.  To do this it analysed five cases to explain how 
organisational factors affected WECPs’ ability to transform themselves.  Although the 
framework was not originally intended to analyse Western European parties, it has 
helped to fill some of the considerable gaps in our knowledge of WECPs’ 
organisations and how these shaped their programmatic development.  This research 
rejects an understanding of WECPs based on Grzymała-Busse’s finding in CEE that 
elites learned to centralise through carrying out prior reforms and that centralisation 
was necessary for them to transform decisively.  However, elite interviews found that 
the framework has several strengths in helping to explain why some WECPs reformed 
and broke with Communism and others failed.  In particular it helps to bring our 
attention to the two broader independent variables of elite advancement processes and 
changes in the internal distribution of power which could include both 
democratisation and/or centralisation. 
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This research supports Grzymała-Busse’s argument that the seeds for transformation 
were planted before 1989.  Almost relentless exposure to previous exogenous shocks 
including electoral defeats and events in the Cold War meant that most WECPs had 
made earlier efforts to reform or break with Communism.  WECPs had been forced to 
make greater changes than parties in CEE by 1989.  The decisions taken following 
these exogenous shocks shaped their ability to respond to the collapse of 
Communism.  Sometimes earlier shocks seemed to be the defining moments in their 
histories.  Consequently, the framework was applied to explain WECPs’ reactions to 
earlier exogenous shocks as well as events following 1989 to provide additional tests 
for the ideas in the framework. 
 
This chapter begins by restating the hypotheses tested in this research.  It then 
summarises the five case studies before providing an in-depth test of the hypotheses in 
comparative terms.  This establishes a basis for Chapter eight which assesses the main 
findings of the research and ends by pointing to a revised model to explain WECPs’ 
divergent adaptation as well as examining how this can be used in future research.  
 
7.2 Restating the hypotheses 
The research used Grzymała-Busse’s explanation of party adaptation in CEE to 
investigate two main research questions.  The first focused on the affects of elite 
advancement.  It sought to determine if party leaders’ portable skills and ‘useable 
pasts’ affected their ability to transform their parties following the collapse of 
Communism and/or other exogenous shocks which included: numerous election 
defeats, Cold War controversies including the crushing of the Hungarian Revolution 
in 1956, the Prague Spring in 1968, the Sino-Soviet split, de-Stalinisation in the 
Soviet Union, the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the crushing of worker movements 
in Poland in the early 1980s, the arms race, and Perestroika to name but a few.  Some 
of these external shocks presented WECPs with bigger problems than others.  
However, each led to debates that questioned fundamental parts of party strategy and 
ideology.  
 
Hypotheses focused on the independent variables of elites’ prior experience in 
negotiation with groups and institutions outside the party, ‘horizontal’ elite 
advancement practices, the degree of prior pluralism in leadership bodies and levels of 
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elite turnover.  The hypotheses below proposed a relationship between these factors 
and elites’ ability to envisage change and their parties’ ability to enact the following: 
vote-seeking reforms aimed at broadening appeal, office-seeking, social 
democratisation, breaking with Communism/democratic centralism, and 
organisational centralisation.   
 
H1a.  Those parties that advanced leaderships with greater prior 
experience in working with groups and institutions outside of the party 
and with greater levels of horizontal elite advancement were more 
engaged in carrying out electorally-driven reforms after the revolutions 
of 1989 (or exogenous shocks).  
H1b.  Those parties with leadership bodies that gave more room for 
ideological pluralism and debate before 1989 (or exogenous shocks), 
were more engaged in carrying out electorally-driven reforms after the 
revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous shocks). 
H1c.   Elites equipped with greater experience in negotiating with 
outside groups and institutions will have been more engaged in carrying 
out electorally-driven reforms after the revolutions of 1989 (or 
exogenous shocks). 
H1d.  Those parties exhibiting greater levels of elite turnover will be 
more engaged in carrying out electorally-driven reforms or breaking with 
Communism after the revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous shocks). 
 
H2a.  Those parties that advanced leaderships with more prior 
experience in working with groups and institutions outside the party and 
with greater levels of elite horizontal advancement were more engaged in 
implementing office-driven reforms after the revolutions of 1989 (or 
exogenous shocks). 
H2b.  Those parties that had leadership bodies that gave more room for 
ideological pluralism and debate before 1989 (or exogenous shocks), 
were more engaged in implementing office-driven reforms after the 
revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous shocks). 
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H2c.  Elites equipped with greater experience in negotiating with outside 
groups and institutions will have be more engaged in implementing 
office-driven reforms after the revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous 
shocks). 
 
H3a.  Those parties that advanced leaderships with more prior 
experience in working with groups and institutions outside the party and 
with greater levels of horizontal elite advancement were more engaged in 
social democratising after the revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous shocks).  
H3b.  Those parties with leadership bodies that gave more room for 
ideological pluralism and debate before 1989 (or exogenous shocks), 
were more engaged in social democratising after the revolutions of 1989 
(or exogenous shocks). 
H3c.  Elites equipped with greater experience in negotiating with outside 
groups and institutions will have been more engaged in social 
democratising after the revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous shocks). 
 
H4a.  Those parties that advanced leaderships with more prior 
experience in working with groups and institutions outside the party and 
with greater levels of horizontal elite advancement, were more engaged 
in breaking with Communism (and democratic centralism) after the 
revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous shocks). 
H4b.   Those parties with leadership bodies that gave more room for 
ideological pluralism and debate before 1989 (or exogenous shocks), 
were more engaged in breaking with Communism (and democratic 
centralism) after the revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous shocks). 
H4c.   Elites equipped with greater experience in negotiating with 
outside groups and institutions will have been more engaged in breaking 
with Communism  (and democratic centralism) after the revolutions of 
1989 (or exogenous shocks). 
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H5a.  Those parties that advanced leaderships with more prior 
experience in working with groups and institutions outside the party and 
with greater levels of horizontal elite advancement were more engaged in 
organisational centralisation after the revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous 
shocks). 
H5b.  Elites equipped with greater experience in negotiating with groups 
and institutions outside the party or with professional backgrounds will 
have been more engaged in organisational centralisation after the 
revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous shocks). 
 
The second major research question examines the relationship between the internal 
distribution of power (independent variable) and policy change (dependent variable) 
following exogenous shocks or the collapse of Communism in 1989.  It questions 
whether there is evidence to suggest that parties could replace democratic centralism 
with new highly centralised structures that enabled their leaders to force through 
policy reforms and social democratisation.  In doing so it also applied Grzymała-
Busse’s idea that democratisation was counterproductive to transformation because it 
resulted in reformist elites losing control of strategic matters.  It also asked if retaining 
democratic centralism allowed orthodox leaders to resist pressure to reform.  Last, it 
sought to determine if elites equipped with experience in carrying out prior reforms 
aimed at broadening appeal are more likely to recognise a need for organisational 
centralisation.   
 
Specifically, the second research question generated these hypotheses: 
 
H6a.  Following events in 1989 (or exogenous shocks) parties that 
replaced democratic centralism with new highly centralised party 
organisations were more able to adopt radical reforming policies 
(electorally-driven reforms, social democratisation, breaking with 
Communism and office-seeking) than less centralised parties. 
H6b.  Following events in 1989 (or exogenous shocks), parties that 
abolished democratic centralism by democratising themselves were more 
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likely to fail to adopt radical reforming policies (electorally-driven 
reforms, social democratisation, breaking with Communism and office-
seeking) than less democratic parties.                                                             
H6c.  Parties that kept democratic centralism will not have significantly 
sought to transform themselves (with electorally-driven reforms, social 
democratisation, breaking with Communism and office-seeking). 
   
H7.  Elites equipped with greater prior experience in carrying out 
reforms aimed at broadening appeal, will have been more engaged in 
pursuing organisational centralisation in aim of reform following the 
collapse of Communism (or exogenous shocks).  
 
7.3 Summary of the case studies 
Chapter two analysed the Portuguese Communist Party.  It showed that the PCP’s 
narrow elite advancement processes systematically promoted poorly educated, loyal 
and orthodox functionaries.  These apparatchiks had little political experience other 
than working at central office or coordinating local party organisations.  Critics were 
systematically excluded from elite positions and those with experiences in working 
with outside institutions or organisations including elected officials were intentionally 
underrepresented in leadership bodies.  The advancement of intellectuals was also 
constrained in case they started thinking for themselves or stirred up trouble.  Aging 
elites purposely kept elite turnover low and gradual to avoid calls for change.  Those 
newcomers who did gain elite positions in the 1980s and 1990s were usually 
handpicked by orthodox leader Álvaro Cunhal or his sidekicks leaving little room for 
reformers.  The PCP’s top leaders could have used their power to carry out reforms 
but chose a strategy of resistance.  They refused to moderate Stalinist programmes or 
a hostile approach to their social democratic rivals.  Cold War controversies, the 
collapse of Communism and disastrous election results, were all taken on the chin.  
Rigid adherence to democratic centralism gave them almost complete control over 
policy making and elite advancement.   
 
The leadership made easy work of dissident reformers following election defeats, 
Perestroika and the collapse of Communism.  Continued decline in the 1990s did not 
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persuade the leadership to initiate reform.  Recently, it introduced a new generation of 
elites from the PCP’s highly orthodox youth organisation.  Analysing the PCP shows 
the merits in using Grzymała-Busse’s framework to studying parties which 
maintained democratic centralism.  It helps to shed light on precisely how the PCP’s 
leaders used restrictive elite advancement processes and established rigid internal 
organisational procedures to preserve ideological purity.  Because the PCP’s top 
leaders opposed programmatic reform democratic centralism was consistently used to 
block proposals for moderation by elites and mid-level elites.  In the PCP significant 
numbers of mid-level elite supported reform (unlike Grzymała-Busse found in the 
Czech KSČM).  Whereas the Czech KSČM failed to adapt because hard-line mid-
level elites succeeded in blocking reforms, reform minded mid-level elites in PCP 
were continually crushed by the leadership and prevented from organising themselves. 
Just as Grzymała-Busse found in the Czech KSČM, the PCP’s failure to adapt meant 
that it faced parliamentary isolation. 
 
Chapter three showed how the Dutch Socialist Party (SP) developed as a small Maoist 
party that emphasised direct action to help workers.  Its leaders dropped association 
with Mao finding it to be out of touch with their in local activism.  Democratic 
centralism made this change possible with minimal debate and the leadership 
continued to work in the style of the ‘mass line’ justifying its actions through its 
relationship with ‘the people’.  Elite advancement was tightly controlled with little 
place for debate.  The SP’s dogmatic founding leader Daan Monjé dominated 
decision-making.  However, local councillors and functionaries experienced in 
running direct action projects were ‘horizontally’ advanced to the leadership.  These 
politicians grew increasingly pragmatic and overthrew Monjé for failing to take 
electoral campaigning seriously.  They set out to achieve representation in parliament 
by developing the SP’s central infrastructure after 1986 and to break with Marxism-
Leninism in 1991.  Democratic centralism helped them to make these major changes 
and to promote new elites loyal to them. 
 
The leadership dropped democratic centralism but introduced a new highly centralised 
organisation that allowed it to replace ideologically driven campaigns with ones that 
focused on opposition to the ‘neo-liberalisation’ of their social democratic rivals.  The 
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strategy of opposition along moderate lines and the move onto traditional social 
democratic terrain was highly successful.  The SP’s leaders used their power to 
continually reposition their party by sacrificing radical policy commitments and 
eventually replaced their oppositional message with office-seeking.  
 
Chapter four analysed the Swedish Left Party.  It showed that attempts to reform 
Swedish Communism began during the 1960s.  Despite rigid elite advancement 
processes C.H. Hermansson – who was ‘horizontally advanced’ and had extensive 
experience at working with outside groups and institutions slipped through the net.  
After becoming party leader he (rather than a cohort of reformist elites) initiated 
reform in 1964.  Hermansson promoted democratisation in aim of ideological renewal 
and opened up elite advancement processes.  Subsequently, this allowed more elites 
experienced in negotiation with outside groups and institutions to advance and they 
made further reforms.  Hermansson used democratisation to foster broader appeals, to 
gain distance from Soviet Communism and sought greater influence on the social 
democrats.  However, democratisation allowed mid-level elites to re-radicalise 
programmes leaving his strategy incomplete.  Later, internal democratic structures 
combined with a lack of direction from leader Lars Werner to heavily constrain 
attempts at reform in response to Perestroika, international events and the collapse of 
Communism.   
 
When Werner ceded power and elite turnover occurred at the top of the party, reform 
gained momentum.  Reformers led by Gudrun Schyman sought to break its captive 
support role to minority social democratic governments. They had the prior 
experiences that the framework tells us will promote reform.  The leadership 
moderated campaigns to provide opposition to the neo-liberal direction of the social 
democrats.  Power was also shifted to the parliamentary group giving it increased 
room to promote traditional social democratic policies.  This strategy delivered 
electoral expansion and the leadership forged closer cooperation with the social 
democrats and greater influence on them during the 1990s through signing contracts 
for V’s support.  Most reformist elites had not favoured social democratisation in 
1989, contrary to the framework’s ideas about elites equipped in social negotiation.  
However, the leadership’s pragmatism meant that vote- and office-seeking strategies 
were increasingly prioritised.  Parliamentary negotiations with the social democrats 
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allowed further power to be shifted to the parliamentary group, enabling it to move 
ever closer to social democracy.    
 
Radical mid-level elites and a failure to streamline the increasingly orthodox 
Communist Youth League caught up with V’s leadership and infighting intensified 
following electoral loss in 2002.  The party’s traditionalist-wing began organising at 
congresses, secured important positions and re-radicalised programmes.  After 
Schyman resigned in 2003 traditionalists gained control of leadership bodies and 
installed Lars Ohly as leader.  Programmatic radicalisation continued and Ohly’s 
Communist beliefs proved a public relations disaster.  The party suffered another 
electoral defeat in 2006.  Recently, parliamentarisation has continued as 
parliamentarians increasingly became members of the national leadership.  Although 
V’s leaders are highly experienced in implementing reforms to broaden appeal they 
have not sought organisational centralisation in response to electoral defeat.  Ohly has 
thus far successfully combined pragmatism in negotiations with the social democrats 
with radical internal appeals to reinvigorate V’s office-seeking.  Decisions made 
through V’s internal democratic structures combined with the greater influence of 
parliamentarians in its national Board have helped V to make the policy sacrifices 
needed to provide it with its first realistic chance of gaining office in the 2010 
parliamentary elections.  The trust the leadership enjoys among radical mid-level 
elites made this possible.   
 
The Irish Workers’ Party (WP), its main successor Democratic Left (DL) and the 
remnants of the WP after 1992– were analysed in Chapter five.  This showed how 
highly centralistic organisational structures and subsequently democratic centralism 
helped the leadership of Official Sinn Féin to break with republicanism and to build a 
Communist party in the 1960s.  Centralism enabled the leadership to make painful 
policy changes with minimal debate.  Tight control over elite advancement meant that 
loyalty and ideological conformity were prioritised.  However, this did not prevent 
members of the parliamentary group, intellectuals and social activists from advancing 
to elite positions as the WP sought to acquire greater influence in society.  These 
elites led calls for reform following Perestroika and the collapse of Communism 
lending support to the idea in the framework that prior experiences and negotiation 
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with outsiders were beneficial to reform.  However, few of them sought social 
democratisation in 1989.   
 
The WP’s reformist elites had moderate experience in carrying out earlier reforms but 
did not centralise. Instead, they democratised and also continued to increase the power 
of the parliamentary group.  This enabled them to make significant programmatic 
reforms but they remained constrained by orthodox historic leaders.  These elites 
retained enough support from mid-level elites, mostly from Northern Ireland, to block 
the leadership’s attempt to reconstitute the WP as a non-Communist party and to 
sideline or streamline those it believed were involved in paramilitarism.  The 
leadership won support from over a majority of mid-level elites but not the two thirds 
support required for reconstitution.  While many mid-level elites had grown sceptical 
about the growing power of the parliamentary group, most of them broadly supported 
the leadership’s reforms and subsequently left with it to establish Democratic Left.  
 
Contrary to the framework, the reformists did still not purse a centralised 
organisational model in DL, even after subsequent election defeats.  DL initially 
committed to a broadly pitched radical left platform rather than social democracy.  
Calls for DL to enter government were resisted by radical mid-level elites.  However, 
this was insufficient to stop it from entering office in 1994. Thereafter, DL’s 
parliamentarians increasingly accepted social democratic policies.  By the time DL 
left office its resources were exhausted.  The lack of centralisation was apparent.  It 
had failed to build a central apparatus and many mid-level elites had left in frustration 
with its social democratisation making it easy for DL’s parliamentarians to lead a 
merger with the social democratic Labour Party.  In contrast, the traditionalist leaders 
in the WP used democratic centralism to control elite advancement, re-establish 
orthodox programmes and to block attempts at policy moderation.  It was consigned 
to the margins of Irish politics.  
 
Chapter six analysed the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN).  Its post-war 
leader Paul de Groot ruthlessly used democratic centralism to control elite 
advancement and to stalinise the CPN.  It declined heavily during the post-war period 
and the opportunistic recruitment of students fuelled calls for reform.  Following 
election defeat in 1977 De Groot was overthrown by his hitherto loyal lieutenants.  
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They took tentative steps toward democratising in aim of breaking with Stalinism and 
they advanced some of the newcomers to elite positions.  The old guard lost control of 
democratisation as younger elites broke with Leninism and democratic centralism.  
The party’s new leadership under did not centralise from 1982–1986, despite having a 
high degree of experience in carrying out prior reform.  Nor did they social 
democratise as the framework would expect from their backgrounds and the moderate 
processes of horizontal elite advancement that took place.    
 
Democratisation brought about most the changes that the leadership desired because 
the CPN’s mid-level elite had changed so dramatically.  Most mid-level elites had 
little attachment to Marxism-Leninism and plenty of ideas for programmatic reforms.  
Democratisation also made the CPN more attractive as a partner for other left parties 
and decentralisation made it easier to form local alliances.  This process paved the 
way for the formation of GroenLinks in 1989.  A low but significant level of informal 
centralisation through secret elite-level talks helped to coordinate the formation of 
GroenLinks.  However, the leadership did not seek to significantly centralise the 
CPN’s organisation and internal democratic procedures supported the CPN’s 
dissolution and its merger into GroenLinks.  Furthermore, only a handful of reformist 
elites were involved in the secret meetings that took place.  
 
7.4 Comparative Analysis: Research question one 
The first research question addressed how elite advancement practices affected 
WECPs’ ability to make electorally-driven policy reforms, social democratise, pursue 
office-seeking strategies, to break with Communism or to centralise following the 
collapse of Communism and exogenous shocks.  The results are presented in Table 
7.21.  
 
Negotiation with outside groups and institutions, horizontal advancement and 
electorally-driven policy reforms 
 
The idea in H1a that WECPs with elite advancement processes that fostered elites 
with greater prior experience in working with outside groups and institutions or had 
greater levels of horizontal advancement were more engaged in making electorally-
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driven policy reforms is generally supported by this research, with some 
qualifications.  In general terms, the ideas about experience in negotiation with 
outside groups and institutions are supported by the reforms made by the SP, VPK, V, 
WP, DL, and the CPN.  Where parties lacked such elite advancement processes they 
made few policy reforms following exogenous shocks like the PCP and SKP (see 
Table 7.1).  
 
Table 7.1: Elite negotiation with outside groups and institutions and electorally-driven policy 
reform 
                                                 
Electorally-
driven Policy 
Reform 
 
Prior elite 
negotiation with 
outside groups 
and institutions 
Low Moderate High 
Low PCP 1974–1992 
PCP 1992–2002 
PCP 2002– 
SKP 1950–1964 
VPK 1964–1975  
Moderate SP 1971–1986         
V 2003–2006         
CPN 1950–1977 
VPK 1975–1993 CPN 1977–
1982            
V2006– 
High   SP 1986–1998           
SP 1998–              
V 1993–2003             
WP 1977–1992                
DL 1992–1998              
CPN 1982–
1986           
CPN 1986–
1991                  
 
An increase in the number of elites equipped with these experiences in the late 1980s 
in the PCP 1992–1998 also led to a limited process of reform in response to the 
collapse of Communism and subsequent electoral defeats (see Table 7.21). On the 
other hand when the presence of such elites declined (V 2003–2006, PCP 2002–2006) 
we find a decline in electorally-driven policy making.  In general terms in parties 
where elites had greater experience in negotiating with outside groups and institutions 
or higher levels of horizontal advancement before exogenous shocks, we find a higher 
degree of electorally-driven policy reform (See Tables 7.1 and 7.2).  Focusing on the 
parties’ responses to the collapse of Communism shows that the PCP failed to reform 
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while parties with elites with such characteristics made electorally-driven policy 
changes: SP, V, WP and CPN.  
 
However, two qualifications are necessary.  First, this research suggests that 
exogenous shocks could trigger changes in elite advancement that subsequently 
benefited reform. Consequently, while electorally-driven policy reforms were more 
likely in parties where elites already had prior experiences beneficial to reform, 
sometimes this was not necessary.  It was possible for exogenous shocks to result in a 
rapid opening up of elite advancement and elites with prior experiences that were 
beneficial to reform emerging.   For example in the SKP in 1964 new party leader 
Hermansson entered the elite after the exogenous shock of election defeat and 
initiated reforms.  Before this the party had operated highly restrictive elite 
advancement processes providing less room for horizontal advancement or for elites 
with experience in working with outside groups and institutions.  Hermansson’s 
advancement took place post-shock rather than prior to it contrary to H1a.  Following 
his initial calls for greater ideological flexibility elite advancement processes were 
relaxed, allowing elites equipped in negotiation with outsiders and who had been 
horizontally advanced to play a stronger role in carrying out further reforms in 
response to the election defeat.   
   
Similarly, the CPN’s elite advancement processes were relaxed following the 1977 
election loss by established leaders who had only moderate experience of negotiating 
with outsiders and levels of horizontal elite advancement (CPN 1977–1982).  This 
group brought younger reformers who were better equipped to implement reforms 
into the elite.  The younger leaders then made more comprehensive changes in 
response to the 1977 election defeat after 1982.  When elites who were moderately 
equipped with experiences of negotiating with outside groups and institutions were 
joined or replaced by new elites who were equally or more equipped in this respect, 
following exogenous shocks, there was evidence to suggest that more far reaching 
reforms resulted: CPN (1982–1986, compared to 1977–1992) V (1993–2000 
compared to 1975–1993), and the SP (1986–1998 compared to 1971–1986, SP 1998–
compared to 1986–1998). 
 
  
216 
A second qualification is that advancing elites with prior experiences that were 
beneficial to reform did not guarantee electorally-driven policy change following 
exogenous shocks.  The CPN’s elites before 1977 had such experiences and desired 
reforms following exogenous shocks but had long been constrained by their loyalty to 
leader Paul De Groot and his authoritarian behaviour.  Similarly, the SP’s leader Daan 
Monjé (1971–1986) gave little room for reformers to make attempts to broaden 
appeal.  
 
Table 7.2: Horizontal elite advancement practices and electorally-driven policy reforms 
 Electorally- 
driven Policy 
Reform 
  
Horizontal 
Elite 
Advancement 
Low Moderate  High 
Low PCP 1974–1992   
PCP 1992–2002   
PCP 2002– 
  
Moderate SP 1971–1986              
SKP 1950–1964        
CPN 1950–1977 
V 2003-2006        
VPK 1964–1975          
VPK 1975–1993          
SP 1986–1998            
WP 1977–1992           
CPN 1977–1982         
CPN 1982–1986 
CPN 1986–1991               
High   SP 1998–                   
V 1993–2003              
V 2006–                       
DL 1992–1998            
 
Prior ideological pluralism and electorally-driven policy reform  
 
The idea (in H1b) that prior pluralism and debate in leadership bodies was conducive 
to electorally-driven policy reform in response to exogenous shocks, gains some 
support from the case studies (see Table 7.3).  Most of the parties that made such 
reforms had these characteristics.  In comparison, the lack of prior pluralism in the 
PCP, SP (1971–1986) and SKP constrained such changes.  In these cases reformers 
had been unable to air their grievances or to build earlier support for reform.  With 
little precedent for debate in leadership bodies they struggled; it was harder for them 
to their message across following exogenous shocks.   
 
The effects of prior pluralistic debate could, however, be contained.  In the Swedish 
SKP prior pluralism was not allowed to shape reform in response to electoral losses 
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and Cold War tensions in the 1950s as the party Stalinised and tried to remove its 
culture of dissent (1950–1964).  This meant that when Hermansson became leader the 
party had been Stalinised and had become devoid of pluralism.  Likewise, the CPN’s 
experiences of pluralism from the wartime resistance movement were erased during 
the 1950s (CPN 1950–1977).  The lack of pluralism in these last two examples 
constrained reform but did not rule it out.  Further, in V (2003–2006) prior experience 
in pluralistic debate did not prevent a radicalising response to the 2002 electoral 
defeat.   
  
Table 7.3: Prior pluralism in leadership bodies and electorally-driven policy reforms 
 Electorally-
driven Policy 
Reforms 
  
Prior Pluralism 
in leadership 
bodies  
Low  Moderate High 
Low PCP 1974–1992         
PCP 1992–2002         
PCP 2002–                
SP 1971–1986               
SKP 1950–1964          
VPK 1964–1975             SP 1986–1998               
SP 1998–                
CPN 1977–1982           
Moderate V 2003–2006                
CPN 1950–1977            
V1975–1993                      WP 1977–1992           
CPN 1982–1986        
High   V 1993–2003             
V 2006–                  
DL 1992–1998             
CPN 1986–1991          
 
Following the collapse of Communism, the PCP which lacked prior pluralistic 
leadership bodies failed to change, while reforms in V, WP and the CPN were aided 
by prior pluralism.  The chances of electorally minded reform were lower in cases 
with low prior pluralism in leadership bodies.  There reformers usually struggled to be 
heard.  However, contrary to H1b, a lack of prior pluralism in the SP proved 
(paradoxically) beneficial to such reforms. There was little precedent for debate on 
alternative views to those of the party’s top leaders.  When they decided in favour of 
electorally-driven policy reforms that was the end of the matter.  The research found 
that greater pluralism in leadership bodies before an exogenous shock made reform 
more likely, in support of H1b, but this was far from a pre-requisite for reform.  This 
is shown by the SP (1986–1998 and 1998–) and CPN 1977–1982 where such 
conditions did not necessarily preclude electorally-driven policy reforms. 
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Experience in negotiating with outside groups and institutions and electorally-
driven reforms 
 
H1c gains very strong support from this research.  In each case study it was found that 
elites (and mid-level elites) equipped with greater experience in working with outside 
political or social groups and institutions were more likely to seek electorally-driven 
policy reforms after the revolutions of 1989 (or exogenous shocks).  Those with little 
or no experience in this struggled to envisage reforms aimed at broadening appeal.  In 
what may be unwanted news for orthodox Communists, those parties that advanced 
elites who worked in professional employment, students, activists from new social 
movements, trade unionists or other social organisations were at the forefront of 
calling for electorally-driven reforms following exogenous shocks and the collapse of 
Communism.  In the CPN, V the WP and the SP elites with these broader experiences 
played a massive role in the process of reform.  In the PCP they led calls for reform 
but rigid discipline and party culture meant that most of them still refrained from 
criticism.   
 
Electoral politics posed considerable challenges to WECPs and had internal 
ramifications that shaped their programmatic adaptation following exogenous shocks.  
Parliamentarians, Members of the European Parliament local office holders and those 
whose party responsibilities involved working with outsiders were generally more 
likely to become pragmatic and seek electorally-driven policy changes.  This echoes 
Grzymała-Busse’s finding that parliamentarians in the Czech KSČM tended to seek 
reform.  Not even the PCP’s Stalinistic internal discipline could filter out such 
influences.   
 
Elite turnover, electorally-driven reforms and breaking with Communism 
The idea in H1d that parties with greater elite turnover before the collapse of 
Communism (or exogenous shocks) were more likely to break with Communism or to 
pursue electorally-driven policy reforms gains qualified support from the case studies.  
When prior turnover was low, policy reform following exogenous shocks was also 
generally low (see table 7.4).  However, prior levels of turnover did not always seem 
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to matter.  This had been low in the CPN 1977–1982 and VPK 1964–1975 where 
electorally-driven reforms occurred.  Here, established leaders or a handful of 
newcomers carried out important reforms and tried to break with Communism after 
exogenous shocks.  Post-shock increases in turnover also resulted in additional 
programmatic reforms and inroads to breaking with Communism.  For example, a 
high degree of turnover in the CPN after the 1977 election defeat had a profound 
affect on reform. 
 
Table 7.4: Prior elite turnover and electorally-driven reforms 
 Electorally-
driven policy 
reforms  
  
Prior elite 
turnover 
Low  Moderate  High 
Low PCP 1974–1992                  
PCP 1992–2002                    
PCP 2002–                                
SP 1971–1986                  
SKP 1950–1964                       
CPN 1950–1977                    
VPK 1964–1975 CPN 1977–1982 
Moderate  V 2003–2006 VPK 1975–1993 V 1975–1993         
SP 1986–1998          
SP 1998–             
V2006–                   
WP 1977–1992                        
DL 1992–1998         
High   CPN 1982–1986      
CPN 1980–1991          
 
 
A high degree of prior elite turnover promoted reform in the CPN.  Most of the time, 
however, moderate turnover was enough to provide a high or moderate degree of 
reform.  Generally, elite turnover before 1989 (or other exogenous shocks) in the 
CPN, WP, SP and V was conducive to policy reform and breaking with Communism 
(see Tables 7.4 and 7.5).  New leaders led these changes.  Even though turnover was 
low in the PCP, a slight increase in this before the collapse of Communism gave rise 
to some reform following 1989.  Turnover prior to exogenous shocks usually gave 
opportunities for reformers to advance.  However, sometimes an increase in turnover 
was detrimental to reform – for example in the PCP after 2000, V 2003–2006 which 
radicalised in response to electoral losses.  Increased turnover also constrained reform 
in VPK in the 1970s (VPK 1975–1993). 
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7.5: Prior elite turnover and breaking with Communism 
 
 
Breaking with 
Communism  
  
Prior elite 
turnover 
Low Moderate High 
Low  CPN 1950–1977             
PCP 1974–1992    
PCP 1992–2002                    
PCP 2002–                           
SKP 1950–1964                  
SP 1971–1986                                                                    
VPK 1964–1975 CPN 1977–1982 
Moderate V 2003–2006 VPK 1975–1993   DL 1992–1998                     
SP 1986–1998              
SP 1998–                  
V 1993–2003              
V 2006–                         
WP 1977–1992             
High   CPN 1982–1986               
CPN 1986–1991             
 
 
Negotiation with outside groups and institutions, horizontal advancement and office-
seeking 
 
Only the SP 1998–, DL 1992–1998 and V 1993–2003, 2006– pursued office-seeking 
strategies following the collapse of Communism (or other exogenous shocks).  These 
cases support the idea in H2a that parties whose leaderships had significant levels of 
horizontal elite advancement and negotiation with outside social groups and 
institutions were more likely to respond to exogenous shocks and the collapse of 
Communism by seeking office.  Where elites had a low level of such experiences they 
failed to pursue an office-seeking strategy (see Tables 7.6 and 7.7).  Moreover, when 
elites with more experience in negotiating with outsiders advanced in the PCP in the 
late 1980s they went on to take marginal steps toward an office-seeking strategy.   
 
It is noticeable that in those parties where office-seeking did occur it took several 
years to take shape.  These parties had pragmatic elites by 1989, but most of them had 
not become office-seekers immediately in reaction to the collapse of the Soviet bloc.  
At this time office-seeking was still very much a strategy that was unavailable to them 
because of their small size and because they were treated as pariahs by mainstream 
parties.  In V it required more elites to emerge with useful experiences of negotiating 
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with outsiders and horizontal advancement and for them to reach the very top 
leadership positions before office-seeking took off.  Office-seeking did not have to be 
rapid following the collapse of Communism as Grzymała-Busse found in CEE.  High 
levels of elite experience in negotiating with outside groups and institutions featured 
strongly in each of the cases that became office-seekers.  However, the relationship 
does not appear to be that strong.  In the CPN, where elites also had high levels of 
experience in negotiating with outsiders, they did not seek office.  Nor, most of the 
time, did parties whose leaderships had significant records of negotiation with 
outsiders or had been horizontally advanced (see Tables 7.6 and 7.7).  Few stages in 
WECPs’ development analysed here show that such elites responded to exogenous 
shocks or the collapse of Communism by immediately pursuing office.  Thus, the 
research provides only limited support to the idea that parties whose elites have a 
greater degree of negotiation with outsiders or horizontal advancement will be more 
inclined to accepting an office-seeking strategy.   
 
Table 7.6: Elite negotiation with outside groups and institutions and office-seeking 
 Office-seeking   
Prior elite 
negotiation with 
outside groups 
and institutions 
Low  Moderate High 
Low PCP 1974–1992         
PCP 1992–2002         
PCP 2002–                
SKP 1950–1964          
VPK 1964–1975            
  
Moderate SP 1971–1986           
VPK 1975–1993            
V 2003–2006              
CPN 1950–1977               
CPN 1982–1986           
 V 2006– 
High SP 1986–1998            
WP 1977–1992                
CPN 1982–1986                 
CPN 1986–1991         
SP 1998–                 
DL 1992–1998               
V 1993–2003              
 
Office-seeking took hold as elected officials in V, DL and the SP became increasingly 
pragmatic and powerful after 1989.10  This process also depended on the parties’ 
social democratic rivals.  Their leaders saw opportunities for office-seeking because 
                                                           
10
 Please note – although the SP is analysed here from 1998 onwards, its office seeking strategy begins 
in 2002 – see Chapter Three.  
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of more flexible approaches from the social democrats, as did reformers in the PCP.  
Both V and the SP also found that electoral expansion in the 1990s gained from more 
moderate forms of opposition to the social democrats provided electoral growth that 
was necessary before office-seeking could be realistic.  The SP’s leaders also saw 
from market research that they would win more votes if they could convince voters 
that there was a realistic chance of the SP participating in government.  Here vote-
seeking was complemented by office-seeking and they responded by making further 
policy sacrifices to portray the SP as a credible alternative.  
 
In DL, and V the increased horizontal advancement of parliamentarians into 
leadership bodies resulted in an office-seeking strategy following the collapse of 
Communism and election defeats.  Similarly in the SP, as the party’s leaders became 
parliamentarians or local councillors in the 1990s, they became increasingly in favour 
of governing.  In the CPN horizontal elite advancement was lower.  There some 
parliamentarians were included in the national leadership but their role was limited in 
comparison to the other parties.  The CPN’s national Board remained powerful vis-à-
vis its elected officials and office-seeking did not take hold (even when it still had 
members of parliament) following exogenous shocks in the early 1980s.  Such 
developments were also prevented in the PCP.  Its low levels of horizontal elite 
advancement, the under-representation of parliamentarians in its leadership bodies 
seem to have shaped a failure to seek office and add support to H2a.   
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Table 7.7: Horizontal elite advancement practices and office-seeking 
 Office-seeking   
Horizontal elite 
advancement  
Low  Moderate High 
Low PCP 1974–1992        
PCP 1992–2002            
PCP 2002–              
  
Moderate SP 1971–1986             
SP 1986–1998                  
SKP 1950–1964          
VPK 1964–1975            
VPK 1975–1993                 
V 2003–2006                     
WP 1977–1992                
CPN 1950–1977                    
CPN 1977–1982                    
CPN 1982–1986              
CPN 1986–1991                                
  
High   SP 1998–                   
V 1993–2003                  
V 2006–                   
DL 1992–1998            
 
 
Prior ideological pluralism and office-seeking  
 
The idea that parties with pluralistic leadership bodies before an exogenous shock or 
the collapse of Communism were better placed to pursue an office-seeking strategy 
gains only limited support from the case studies.   A lack of pluralism constrained 
attempts to build an office-seeking strategy in several cases (see Table 7.8).  
Moreover, DL: 1992–98, and V: 1993–2003, 2006– found previous pluralism 
beneficial to office-seeking.  It provided plenty of room for pragmatic politicians to 
advocate such strategies before the collapse of Communism.  However, the SP 1998– 
shows that parties that adopted office-seeking did not always require histories of 
pluralistic leadership bodies.  Those parties that did not pursue office-seeking 
strategies also often had prior pluralistic leadership bodies.  This research found that 
prior pluralism in leading party institutions helped shape office-seeking strategies in 
some cases but the relationship appears to be fairly weak.  
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Table 7.8: Prior pluralism in leadership bodies and office-seeking 
 Office-Seeking   
Prior pluralism 
in leadership 
bodies  
Low Moderate High 
Low  PCP 1974–1992          
PCP 1992–2002          
PCP 2002–                 
SKP 1950–1964          
VPK 1964–1975         
CPN 1977–1982                  
SP 1971–1986          
SP 1986–1998              
SP 1998– 
Moderate CPN 1950–1977           
CPN 1982–1986      
VPK 1975–1993           
V 2003–2006             
WP 1977–1992 
  
High CPN 1986–1991   DL 1992–1998                
V 1993–2003         
V 2006–  
 
Negotiation with outside groups and institutions and office-seeking  
 
The case studies lend limited support to the idea in H2c that elites with greater 
experience in negotiation with outside groups and institutions were more likely to 
pursue office-seeking strategies (see Table 7.6).  In each of the case studies those 
elites who prompted office-seeking usually had a high degree of these experiences.  
This was most noticeable in the SP, V and DL.  These factors even shaped some calls 
for office-seeking in the PCP.  The CPN’s local councillors who had a high degree of 
experience of social negotiation also became office-seekers.  However, the CPN’s 
leaders show that such experiences in social negotiation did not always bring 
commitment to office-seeking.  This points to the need to look to the type of outside 
social negotiation that elites had experienced.  The CPN’s leaders in the mid-1980s 
were more pragmatic than their predecessors, but their radical backgrounds in student 
and new social movements still led them to oppose office-seeking.  These factors also 
led many elites in V, DL and to a lesser extent the SP to oppose office seeking.  
 
Office-seeking also proved to be a riskier strategy for WECPs than their counterparts 
in CEE following 1989.  Unlike the parties that Grzymała-Busse studied, the WECPs 
analysed here lost votes or suffered huge organisational problems because of their 
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office-seeking strategies.  This is shown by the problems that DL faced in government 
and the loss of votes that V encountered in 2002.  This helped radical mid-level elites 
to radicalise policy.  The SP’s elites believe that its failure to enter government in 
2006 after participating in coalition talks and campaigning on the idea that it could 
govern contributed to its loss of support.   
 
Negotiation with outside groups and institutions, horizontal elite advancement and 
social democratisation 
 
Where social democratisation occurred it was more gradual than in parties in CEE and 
not a reflex reaction to events in 1989.  The relationship in H3a between social 
negotiation, horizontal elite advancement and social democratisation was found to 
gain only limited support.  Most of the time parties whose elites had these 
characteristics did not respond to exogenous shocks by social democratising.  
Moreover, most reformist elites in the PCP with these characteristics also rejected the 
idea of social democratising; although those with experience of elected office were 
more likely to promote it.  None of the parties significantly social democratised 
following exogenous shocks before 1989, even when they had a high degree of prior 
experience in social negotiation and horizontal elite advancement. 
 
The relationship in H3a was only found in a minority of cases.  However, when social 
democratisation did occur in the SP 1998–, V 1993–2003, V2006–, DL 1992–1998 
(see Tables 7.9 and 7.10), this was led by elites that were highly equipped with the 
above experiences.  What is more in the PCP, where negotiation with outside groups 
and horizontal advancement were limited, social democratisation did not occur 
following the collapse of Communism and exogenous shocks.   
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Table 7.9: Elite negotiation with outside groups and institutions and social democratisation  
 Social 
Democratisation 
  
Prior elite 
negotiation with 
outside groups and 
institutions 
Low  Moderate High 
Low  PCP 1974–1992         
PCP 1992–2002            
PCP 2002–                   
SKP 1950–1964         
VPK 1964–
1975  
 
Moderate SP 1971–1986           
VPK 1975–1993              
V 2003–2006               
CPN 1950–1977           
CPN 1977–1982           
V 2006–       
High SP 1986–1998             
WP 1977–1992             
CPN 1982–1986          
CPN 1986–1991             
SP 1998–           
V 1993–2003        
DL 1992–1998  
 
 
In the CPN, high levels of negotiation with outsiders did not prompt elites to seek 
social democratisation. They still preferred a radical left identity.  This suggests that 
any relationship only works on a probabilistic level and might not be that strong.  
Negotiation with outside groups fostered reform more than social democratisation.  
The CPN’s leaders had developed pragmatism but just having such skills did not 
ensure that they would necessarily want to use them to their full extent.  It is 
noticeable that the CPN’s lower levels of horizontal elite advancement left less room 
for social democratisation.  For the most part it had fewer MPs in its leadership bodies 
than V, the SP and DL.  This factor appeared to play a more significant role than 
negotiation with outside groups and institutions.  Furthermore, in V: 1975–1993, SP: 
1971–1986, 1986–1998, WP: 1989–1992 calls for social democratisation were much 
weaker following exogenous shocks than when more elected officials and 
parliamentarians were in their leadership bodies.  They led the push for social 
democratic policies.  
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Table 7.10: Horizontal elite advancement practices and social democratisation  
 Social 
Democratisation  
  
Horizontal 
Elite 
Advancement  
Low Moderate High 
Low PCP 1974–1992                        
PCP 1992–2002                         
PCP 2002–                              
  
Moderate CPN 1950–1977                         
CPN 1977–1982             
CPN 1982–1986                         
CPN 1986–1991                          
SP 1971–1986                                     
SP 1986–1998                              
SKP 1950–1964                          
VPK 1964–1975                      
V 2003–2006                                      
WP 1977–1992                               
VPK 1964–1975  
High   DL 1992–1998              
SP 1998–                     
V 1993–2003                  
V 2006–                          
 
Prior pluralism and social democratisation 
 
The idea in H3b that prior pluralism in leadership bodies made social democratisation 
more likely gains limited support from the case studies.  This helped to shape social 
democratisation in V and DL.  It gave plenty of opportunities for politicians to 
advocate policies that were closer to social democracy following the collapse of 
Communism.  However, when this happened in the WP and V in 1989, these calls 
were quickly rejected and those advocating it lost influence among fellow reformers.  
It soon became apparent social democratisation lacked support immediately following 
the collapse of Communism despite evidence of prior pluralism.  Reformers who were 
social democratic in all but name were however, generally tolerated at elite level in 
the WP and V.  This pluralism gave room for calls for ideological moderation and laid 
a basis for subsequent social democratisation but it did not come rapidly as in parties 
in CEE.  In comparison, a lack of prior pluralism left little room in several cases (see 
Table 7.11).  Even so, prior pluralism did not ensure social democratisation in several 
cases including VPK: 1975–1993, WP: 1977–1992 and CPN: 1986–1991.  Nor was a 
high degree of prior pluralism required for social democratisation in the SP (1998 
onwards).   
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Table 7.11: Prior pluralism in leadership bodies and social democratisation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Negotiating with outside groups and institutions and social democratising  
 
Elites that favoured social democratisation generally had a higher degree of 
experience in negotiation with outsiders and had often been advanced ‘horizontally’ to 
elite positions, which adds limited support to the ideas in H3c.  In contrast, few elites 
who had low levels of these experiences accepted social democracy.  However, this 
did not mean that most of those with these experiences favoured social 
democratisation.  In the CPN most of the leadership still opposed social 
democratisation despite moderate levels of horizontal advancement and experience in 
negotiating with outsiders.  Only a majority of the dissidents in the PCP accepted 
social democracy.  Even so, elite interviews suggest that generally, elites who did 
accept social democracy (even when their parties did not) had been gradually 
influenced by experiences from social negotiation and in particular horizontal 
advancement.  A classic example of this was the WP’s Research Section (1977–1989) 
where elites negotiating with outsiders and horizontally advanced from the party’s 
policy making unit saw a need for social democracy.  This group had drawn on their 
experiences negotiating with outsiders in trade unions and media institutions.  They 
tried respond to what they saw as workers’ and voters’ preference for social 
democracy as they struggled to devise new policies in reaction to Perestroika.  
 
 Social 
democratisation 
  
Prior pluralism in 
leadership bodies  
Low Moderate High 
Low  CPN 1977–1982                     
PCP 1974–1992                     
PCP 1992–2002                                    
PCP 2002–                                      
SKP 1950–1964                                      
SP 1971–1986                                     
SP 1986–1998                                        
VPK 1964–1975 SP 1998– 
Moderate CPN 1950–1977                             
CPN 1982–1986                                  
VPK 1975–1993                                      
V 2003–2006                                        
WP 1977–1992                                         
  
High CPN 1986–1991  DL 1992–1998                   
V 1993–2003                       
V 2006–                                   
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Grzymała-Busse found that the legacy of having a powerful social democratic party 
presented additional obstacles to the social democratisation of the Czech KSČM.  
Existing social democratic competitors presented an even larger barrier to social 
democratisation in WECPs.  None of the cases enjoyed the opportunity available to 
the PCI in Italy in the early 1990s, where party system change and the break-up of 
their social democratic rivals left a gaping hole.   Social democratisation was in many 
respects shaped by party systemic factors.  The strength of existing social democratic 
parties, their presence in office, their internal divisions and ideological direction all 
affected the case studies’ strategic choices.   
 
However, these factors did not rule out social democratisation in any of the parties 
studied here.  All were presented with realistic chances to social democratise 
themselves or to make inroads in encroaching on traditional social democratic 
territory to win votes.  The case studies suggest that WECPs usually had more gradual 
possibilities for social democratisation than the PCI.  Nonetheless, only some of them 
took this route.  This research found that this depended to a large extent on the 
experiences available to elites.  Opportunity structures mattered; but these were 
mediated through elites’ perceptions of the party system and the need for change, 
which had been shaped by elite advancement processes.  
 
The CPN’s leaders could have sought moderation and a shift to traditional social 
democratic politics following the 1977 election defeat since space was opened up by 
the social democratic PvdA’s decision to ally itself with the centre-right in 
government – something that also happened in 1989.  However, the CPN’s reformist 
leadership remained radical and there was little room for parliamentarians to dictate 
affairs.  Instead, they pursued opportunities to ally with other radical left parties with 
whom they forged closer relations throughout the 1980s.  This allowed it to retain a 
radical left identity in the immediate aftermath of 1989. 
 
The actions of social democratic rivals also provided pressure for social 
democratisation for WECPs’ successor parties in Sweden and Ireland.  V and DL 
found possibilities for social democratisation through forging coalition relationships 
or parliamentary contracts following the collapse of Communism.  Having lost all its 
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parliamentary seats before 1989, the CPN had fewer options.  V: 1993–2000 and the 
SP: 1986–98, 1998– were also offered possibilities for social democratisation by the 
neo-liberal direction of governing social democratic rivals.  In the 1990s the SP’s 
pragmatic leaders saw opportunities for social democratisation as a vote seeking 
strategy in response to Wim Kok’s ‘Purple Governments’.  Their experiences in 
negotiating with outsiders and horizontal elite advancement helped them to make the 
sacrifices needed to moderate and contest traditional social democratic politics in 
opposition to their rivals’ privatisations and spending cuts.   Such vote-seeking policy 
reforms helped V and the SP to grow rapidly.  
 
In comparison, the PCP’s leaders spurned opportunities for social democratisation.  In 
the 1980s they relentlessly criticised the social democrats’ rightward direction but did 
little to stake a claim for social democracy.  They failed to moderate to win over 
disaffected social democratic voters in the early 1980s when the social democrats 
allied with the centre-right.  When opportunities emerged for closer relations with the 
social democratic Socialist Party under António Guterres’s minority governments in 
the mid-1990s the PCP’s leaders ignored them.  Its leaders generally had little 
experience of negotiating with outsiders and horizontal advancement was kept to a 
minimum.  Those elites with these experiences were more in favour of moderation to 
stake a claim for social democratic voters and to root the social democrats to left-wing 
policies.  Sometimes they even accepted social democracy wholeheartedly.  The 
PCP’s leaders also failed to respond as their counterparts had in V and the SP had 
when the social democrats did pursue neo-liberal privatisation campaigns in the late 
1990s.  
 
Events in V also illustrate the importance of leaders’ prior experiences in mediating 
changes in the party system.  Opportunities for vote-seeking policy reforms and social 
democratisation presented themselves in 1989 as Ingvar Carlsson’s social democratic 
government pursued proposed wage freezes, strike bans and cutting the Swedish 
model (Madeley 1993, p. 118).  V opposed such changes (VPK 1975–1993) but failed 
to moderate to take advantage and win over disillusioned social democrats.   
Reformers calling for this were ignored.  It was not until a leadership with greater 
experience in social negotiation and horizontal advancement emerged that V provided 
more moderate and social democratic forms of opposition to the social democrats’ 
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record in office and tried to win more influence on them (1993–2003).  In V and the 
SP it also took time for reformist elites to recognise just how much potential they had 
to win over disaffected social democratic voters.   
 
Negotiation with outside groups and institutions, horizontal elite advancement 
and breaking with Communism  
 
H4a gains some support from this research.  Where parties made significant inroads to 
breaking with Communism and democratic centralism this was fuelled by experience 
of social negotiation and horizontal elite advancement (see Tables 7.12 and 7.13).11  
This helped the CPN: 1986–1991, SP: 1986–1998, and DL: 1992–1998 to break with 
Communism following events in 1989 (and even the SP: 1971–1986 to break with 
Mao).  All the parties that fully broke with Communism had elites with these 
experiences.  However, V’s leaders (1993–2002 and thereafter) had a high degree of 
horizontal advancement and prior negotiation with society but despite their efforts 
Communist symbolism still remains important even though it was removed from 
party programmes. V has not entirely broken with Communism because of internal 
resistance.  
 
Elites moderately equipped with such experiences were also prevented from breaking 
with Stalinism in parties including the CPN: 1950–1977.  There was more support for 
H4c than H4a.  In all the cases, even the PCP, elites with greater levels of these 
experiences were more engaged in breaking with Communism in response to 
exogenous shocks and the collapse of Communism.  The PCP’s lack of such elites 
helps to explain its failure to even break with Stalin, much like the lack of change in 
SKP 1950–64.   
 
 
 
 
                                                           
11
 The VPK’s break with the Soviet Union and orthodox Communism 1964–1975 can also be included 
here (such reformist elites advanced after 1964 so their experiences are not well illustrated by Tables 
7.21 and 7.22).    
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Table 7.12: Elite experience in negotiating with outside groups and institutions and breaking 
with Communism 
 Breaking with 
Communism 
  
Prior elite 
negotiation 
with outside 
groups and 
institutions 
Low Moderate  High 
Low PCP 1974–1992      
PCP 1992–2002        
PCP 2002–            
SKP 1950–1964       
VPK 1964–1975 
  
Moderate  CPN 1950–1977    
SP 1971–1986         
V 2003–2006          
V 2006–                  
CPN 1975–1993                
V 1975–1993           
High   CPN 1982–1986    
V 1993–2003           
WP 1977–1992      
CPN 1986–1991            
DL 1992–1998         
SP 1986–1998         
SP 1998–                
 
 
Table 7.13: Horizontal elite advancement practices and breaking with Communism 
 Breaking with 
Communism  
  
Horizontal elite 
advancement 
Low  Moderate High 
Low PCP 1974–1992                     
PCP 1992–2002                            
PCP 2002–                           
 
Moderate CPN 1950–1977                    
SKP 1950–1964                        
SP 1971–1992                          
VPK 1964–1975                    
V 2003–2006                                                               
CPN 1977–1982              
CPN 1982–1986                  
V 1975–1993                                   
WP 1977–1992                  
CPN 1986–1991             
SP 1986–1998  
High V 2006–                                    V 1993–2003      DL 1992–1998                    
SP 1998– 
 
Prior pluralism in leadership bodies and breaking with Communism 
 
The research supports the idea in H4b that pluralism in leading bodies before 
exogenous shocks and the collapse of Communism made it more likely that parties 
would break with Communism and democratic centralism.  This helps to explain why 
the CPN, V and WP/DL largely broke with Communism following the collapse of 
Communism while the PCP did not (see Table 7.14).  Attempts to root out pluralism 
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in VPK: 1950–64, CPN: 1950–1977 also made it harder to question Communism.  
Low levels of prior pluralism in the PCP had prevented elites from formulating 
alternative policies or challenging key concepts like Marxism-Leninism.  Where 
parties had pluralistic leadership bodies they were generally better prepared to 
respond to exogenous shocks or the collapse of the Soviet bloc by breaking with 
Communism.  However, this was not a prerequisite for breaking with Communism 
and democratic centralism as shown by the efforts of the CPN’s leaders to break with 
Stalinism 1977–1982 and the SP’s transformation 1986–1998.  
 
7.14: Prior pluralism in leadership bodies and breaking with Communism 
 Breaking with 
Communism 
  
Prior 
pluralism in 
leadership 
bodies 
Low  Moderate  High 
Low PCP 1974–1992              
PCP 1992–2002                 
PCP 2002–                    
SKP 1950–1964                
SP 1971–1986              
VPK 1964–1975 
CPN 1977–1982 SP 1986–1998           
SP 1998– 
Moderate CPN 1950–1977              
V 2003–2006 
CPN 1982–1986   
VPK 1975–1993          
WP 1977–1992         
 
High V 2006– V 1993–2003             CPN 1986–1991        
DL 1992–1998  
 
 
Negotiation with outside groups and institutions; horizontal advancement, 
professional backgrounds and organisational centralisation 
 
The case studies gave little support to a link between elite advancement processes and 
organisational centralisation contrary to H5a and H5b.  It does not appear that parties 
would be predisposed to replace democratic centralism with new centralised 
structures if they had horizontal processes of elite advancement or elites experienced 
in negotiation with outside groups and institutions.  The SP was the main ‘centraliser’ 
out of the five cases.  It was the only one to replace democratic centralism with new 
highly centralised structures following the collapse of Communism.  Its elite 
advancement processes seem to fit the bill.  However, elite interviews found that these 
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were not the reason for its centralisation.  It was not experience in negotiation with 
outsiders or prior professional backgrounds that promoted centralisation but lessons 
learnt from prior election failures which showed a need for greater coordination and 
also a failure to break with the SP’s highly centralistic internal party culture.  The 
hangover from Maoism was more important than the factors that Grzymała-Busse 
found to promote centralisation in CEE.  While the horizontal advancement of local 
councillors who had seen a need for greater internal coordination and vote-seeking 
strategies promoted centralisation, the elites’ did not draw on their professional 
backgrounds outside the party in centralising.   
 
Table 7.15: Horizontal elite advancement practices and electorally-driven organisational 
centralisation12  
 Electorally-driven 
organisational 
centralisation 
  
Horizontal elite 
advancement  
Low Moderate High 
Low PCP 1974–1992                              
PCP 1992–2002                                         
PCP 2002–                                        
  
Moderate CPN 1950–1977                                        
CPN 1977–1982                                 
CPN 1982–1986                                    
CPN 1986–1991                                   
SKP 1950–1964                               
SP 1971–1986                                  
VPK 1964–1975                                            
VPK 1975–1993                                      
V 2003–2006                                     
WP 1977–1992                                                                                    
SP 1986–1998  
High DL 1992–1998                                        
V 1993–2003                                     
V 2006–                                      
SP 1998–  
 
No elites surveyed in the course of this research associated attempts to centralise with 
having professional backgrounds or from public sector backgrounds in administration.  
Ideologues at the WP’s Research Section had professional backgrounds and tried to 
social democratise in a centralistic fashion (1977–1989).  However, they did this 
primarily because they had always operated this way, having been tasked with such 
                                                           
12
 Please note that processes of electorally driven organisational centralisation are defined here as 
organisational changes that seek to centralise or streamline the party apparatus in aim of forcing 
through programmatic reforms. While the PCP is classified as low on these criteria in Table 7.15 it is 
also classified as being highly centralised in Table 7.22 because it operated under democratic 
centralism.  The crucial point here is that while it was highly centralistic its leaders were not building a 
new top down hierarchy like in the SP.  
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responsibilities by the leadership.  They did not seek to install new centralised 
organisational structures as we might expect from the hypotheses but simply to cajole 
the party leadership into action.  Their attempt to social democratise in a centralistic 
fashion was also blocked – to a large extent by fellow reformers with a high level of 
experience in social negotiation, professional backgrounds and who had been 
advanced ‘horizontally’ to elite positions. 
 
The CPN’s leaders (1986–1991) had the prior experiences and backgrounds in H5a 
and H5b and initiated a limited process of centralisation in response to election defeat.  
Again, however, elite interviews show that they did not draw on these experiences to 
centralise.  They worked this way due to experience in the problems coordinating a 
merger with other parties.  In fact we find that most cases that had advanced such 
elites democratised in response to exogenous shocks or the collapse of Communism 
rather than centralising (see Tables 7.15, 7.16 and 7.17).  In contrast to H5b, few elites 
interviewed in this project explained a need to centralise from having professional 
backgrounds or observed this thinking among colleagues.  Furthermore, flexible 
advancement processes allowed the promotion of professionals, public sector 
administration and activists from student and new social movements who were highly 
opposed to centralisation in V, CPN and the WP.  
 
Table 7.16: Elite professional backgrounds and electorally-driven organisational centralisation 
 Electorally-
driven 
organisational 
centralisation 
  
Elite professional 
backgrounds 
Low Moderate High 
Low CPN 1950–1977                                                 
CPN 1977–1982                                            
PCP 1974–1992                                                      
PCP 1992–2002                          
PCP 2002–                                                                      
SKP 1950–1964                                                                    
VPK 1964–1975                                                     
Moderate DL 1992–1998                                                         
SP 1971–1986                                                      
VPK 1975–1993                                                         
V 2003–2006                            
WP 1977–1992                                                           
SP 1986–1998                            
SP 1998–                                
High CPN 1982–1986                                                  
CPN 1986–1991                                                           
V 1993–2003                                                            
V 2006–                                                                
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Table 7.17: Elite experience in negotiation with outside groups and institutions and electorally-
driven organisational centralisation  
 Electorally-
driven 
organisational 
centralisation  
  
Prior elite 
negotiation with 
outside groups 
and institutions 
Low Moderate High 
Low PCP 1974–1992         
PCP 1992–2002               
PCP 2002–                          
SKP 1950–1964              
VPK 1964–1975            
  
Moderate CPN 1950–1977            
CPN 1977–1982           
SP 1971–1986               
VPK 1975–1993                   
V 2003–2006                     
V 2006–                        
 
High CPN 1986–1991                      
CPN 1982–1986             
DL 1992–1998               
V 1993–2003                        
WP 1977–1992                
SP 1986–1998                 
SP 1998– 
 
 
7.5 Comparative Analysis: Research Question Two 
The second research question investigated the relationship between organisational 
change and party transformation.  The results are presented in Table 7.22.  
 
‘The Centralisers’ 
This study found some evidence to support the idea in H6a that replacing democratic 
centralism with new, highly centralised organisational structures could be beneficial 
to transformation following the collapse of Communism or exogenous shocks.  This 
was most evident in the SP: 1986–1998, 1998– (see Table 7.18).  There, new top 
down organisational structures after 1991 allowed the leadership to implement 
electorally-driven policy changes, exchange socialism for social democratic policies 
and pursue office-seeking.  They did this in response to successive electoral defeats, 
the collapse of Communism, the Labour Party’s neo-liberal direction and rapid 
expansion.  Centralisation allowed the leadership to sacrifice radical policies at a 
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whim and to overcome resistance from radical mid-level elites.  It was easy for them 
to social democratise.  
 
Analysis of the WP 1977–1989 also showed that the creation of a highly centralised 
organisation following the split in the republican movement and election defeats 
allowed the leadership to change policy and to stalinise the party.  There centralisation 
helped the leadership to try to broaden the party’s appeal to workers beyond the 
republican/Catholic community.  To a much more limited extent, the CPN’s leaders 
also pursued a process of centralisation in response to electoral defeat in 1986 and the 
collapse of Communism.  Informal elitist meetings set the agenda for the formation of 
GroenLinks electoral alliance and the CPN’s eventual merger into it and break with 
Communism.  This allowed the leadership to coordinate the merger while 
sidestepping resistance within the parties.  However, it was not used in order to social 
democratise or to pursue office.  This process also shows a need for a more nuanced 
understanding of the ways that elites could use centralisation.  It occurred 
simultaneously with processes of democratisation to empower reformists in the elites 
and mid-level elite.  Both processes contributed to the formation of GroenLinks and 
democratisation played the leading role.   
 
Highly centralised organisations helped leaders to control strategic affairs, to carry out 
reforms and painful policy sacrifices.  However, this must be qualified in two 
respects.  First the evidence in the following section shows that this did not make it 
that more likely that parties would undertake reforms, seek office, break with 
Communism or social democratise.  There were alternative paths to this which the 
case studies pursued more regularly.  
 
Second, centralisation (and streamlining) was rarely a viable strategy for reformist 
elites.  They usually thought it was unlikely to succeed because of entrenched 
opposition from orthodox elites and mid-level elites in the party apparatus including 
at central office.  In the WP and V centralisation would have been counterproductive 
to programmatic reform.  Further, in V and the CPN prior democratisation made 
centralisation a huge task by 1989.  Power was more dispersed in these parties and 
reformist elites did not believe that they could easily re-centralise power in 1989.  
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Even when initial reforms were made in these parties V: 1964–1975, CPN: 1977–
1982, 1982–86 in response to exogenous shocks (and in the WP: 1989–92 following 
the collapse of Communism) – elites believed that opposition to centralistic decision 
making from reformist elites and mid-level precluded centralisation.  Internal 
discipline had already been sufficiently eroded before their leaders pursued 
democratisation for these elites to see that centralisation would have had been 
disastrous.  When reformers made small or ad hoc attempts to carve out greater 
central power for themselves in V and the WP this centralisation this was blocked by 
traditionalists or even rival reformers.   
 
Table 7.18: Centralised organisational structures and electorally-driven policy reforms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The SP does not present a model that these other WECPs could have easily replicated 
in 1989.  Its transition to a new centralised organisation was made easier because it 
maintained a disciplined party culture during the late-1980s.  Unlike in the other 
parties, unity, trust in the leadership, preserving effectiveness, and a focus on direct 
action rather than debate were still at a premium.  This suggests that establishing a 
new centralised organisational model to replace democratic centralism was easier in 
parties with low levels of internal debate among the rank and file during the 1980s.  
 
The SP’s leadership could wield its power under democratic centralism to take the 
first steps towards transforming the party (see below).  Moreover, it succeeded in 
 Electorally-
driven policy 
reforms 
  
Centralised 
organisational 
structures  
Low Moderate High 
Low V 2003–2006  CPN 1982–1986             
CPN 1986–1991                   
DL 1992–1998                        
V 1993–2003                       
V 2006–                              
WP 1989–1992                      
Moderate SP 1971–1986                                              
WP 1992–                     
VPK 1964–1975     
VPK 1975–1993          
CPN 1977–1982                
WP 1977–1989             
High CPN 1950–1977                                
SKP 1950–1964                                 
PCP 1974–1992                                
PCP 1992–2002                                  
PCP 2002–                                         
SP 1986–1998                      
SP 1998–                            
  
 
239 
expanding the party’s central apparatus following the 1986 election defeat helping to 
increase its power before 1989 (this was in stark contrast to developments in many 
other WECPs).  After events in CEE and the abolition of democratic centralism, 
internal party life changed little despite the introduction of new formal structures.   
The SP’s small size also meant that it had relatively few local branches, making it 
easier for the leadership to retain its grip.  There were fewer decision-making points 
over which the leadership could lose control.  Additionally, being a small sect, the 
SP’s elites worked more closely with one another than in the other parties.  It was 
better positioned for centralisation than other WECPs.  Centralisation did not provide 
a one size fits all solution to WECPs’ problems.  
 
‘The Democratisers’ 
This research studied three cases that democratised (V, the WP and the CPN) and 
provide only very limited or weak support for H6b.  They suggest that WECPs that 
democratised were only marginally more likely to fail to adopt radical reforming 
policies (electorally-driven reforms, social democratisation, breaking with 
Communism, and office-seeking) than less democratic parties that centralised.  The 
cases Grzymała-Busse analysed in CEE showed that where parties centralised they 
managed to transform themselves; where they democratised attempts at reform and 
breaking with Communism failed as orthodox mid-level elites seized control.  In the 
case studies analysed here, democratisation usually helped reformers to make such 
changes.  Although they democratised, reformist leaders’ attempts to carry out radical 
reforms often still got there in the end – they rarely failed.  Further, sometimes 
unleashing democratisation brought about rapid reform.             
 
Democratisation was generally a more unstable path to transformation.  In comparison 
with the leaders SP’s leaders, those that democratised were more likely to lose control 
over strategic matters.  In each party that democratised (or had existing democratic 
structures for example V: 1975–1993, 1993–2003) reformist party leaders had to 
make more significant compromises or faced more defeats as they tried to respond to 
exogenous shocks.   
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Democratising did empower radical and orthodox mid-level elites.  For example in V 
1964–75, 1975–1993 neo-Leninists and orthodox Communists managed to undo or 
block some of C.H. Hermansson’s reforms aimed at broadening appeal.  Similarly, an 
internal backlash from radical mid-level elites sabotaged Gudrun Schyman’s office-
seeking strategy and social democratisation 1993–2003.  Democratic structures 
allowed traditionalists to prevent V from fully breaking with Communism.  In the 
CPN, the old guard lost control of the reform process as younger elites and mid-level 
elites (1977–1982) demanded more substantial reforms.  Their successors also found 
that internal democratic processes meant that they did not always get their way in 
policy making (1982–86).  In the WP: 1989–1992 orthodox elites and mid-level elites 
also constrained some programmatic reforms and blocked attempts to reconstitute the 
party.  
 
However, democratisation or existing democratic structures rarely gave rise to the 
comprehensive reversal of reforms or a failure to adopt radical reforming policies.  
Only in the WP 1992– were traditionalists able to re-assert orthodox Communism and 
rigid democratic centralism.  This was only possible after the reformers chose to 
leave.  They had been in the majority and did not lose control but left out of 
frustration.  After the majority split to form DL, democracy continued to constrain the 
reformist leadership and they were even defeated in choosing the party’s name.   In V, 
Hermansson’s reforms aimed at broader appeal and Schyman’s vote-/office-seeking 
reforms were not completely undone.  From 2003–2006 V radicalised and seemed to 
rule out participation in coalition government.  However, it maintained its contractual 
parliamentary relationship with the social democrats and the bulk of previous reforms.  
Nor could orthodox Communists reverse the CPN’s break with Stalinism and 
Leninism.  The cases suggest that generally democracy did not promote a re-
radicalisation or re-assertion of orthodox communism.   
 
Grzymała-Busse’s framework asserts that mid-level elites were more radical or more 
attached to an orthodox Communist identity than reformist leaders in parties in CEE.  
These arguments seem to promote a perspective similar to May’s (1973) ‘Law of 
curvilinear disparity’.  This was not always the case in the case studies analysed here. 
Their leaders were still often able to win enough support for reforms.  The 
configuration of elites and mid-level elites affected their chances of carrying out 
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successful reforms.  Changes in recruitment structures meant that democratisation had 
often been beneficial to programmatic transformation.   
 
Where the rank and file or mid-level elites had a high level of experience in 
negotiating with outside groups and institutions – for example in student 
organisations, new social movements, public sector employment or professional 
backgrounds outside the party – they were generally more in favour of reform and 
closer in experience and goals to the reformist elites.  What Waller (1989, p. 44) 
termed as ‘the new member factor’ – where WECPs expanded on the back of other 
social movements, provided support for reformist elites.  For example Hermansson’s 
efforts to democratise the VPK freed up support for reform from local level activists 
and meant that newcomers from new social movements could help to reform the 
party.  New mid-level elites and activists also supported many of Schyman’s reforms.  
V’s leadership also currently draws on its support from radical mid-level elites as a 
basis from which to bring V into compromises with the social democrats and for 
office-seeking.  In the CPN mid-level elites and local party officials with backgrounds 
in student and new social movements gave considerable pressure for reform and 
played a key role in the merger with GroenLinks.  Such groups were also more 
inclined to supporting reform in the PCP and the WP.   
 
Consequently, at times democratisation fuelled reform or reformers managed to 
implement reforms through existing democratic structures (see Tables 7.19 and 7.22).  
In the CPN (1977–1982) democratisation helped the leadership to break with 
Stalinism, Leninism, merge into GroenLinks and to finally abandon Communism.  It 
enabled the VPK’s reformist leaders to broaden appeal and break with the Soviet 
Union (1964–1975).  Democratic internal structures did not completely constrain V’s 
reformist elites’ attempts to change the party name or reform programmes in response 
to Perestroika and the collapse of Communism (1975–1993). During the 1990s 
reformers initiated electorally-driven programmatic reforms, social democratisation, 
policies aimed at broader appeal and pursued closer relations with the social 
democrats.  Since 2006– the leadership has made new policy sacrifices and pursued 
office.  These policies were facilitated by democratic processes.  The Schyman 
leadership in particular found that congresses were favourable to its reform proposals 
  
242 
when the party was riding high in the polls.  When this declined and the party 
encountered election defeat in 2002 it was no coincidence that there was more internal 
opposition.  In the WP (1989–1992) mid-level elites supported most of the reformist 
leadership’s proposals for more moderate appeals.  In DL they endorsed an office-
seeking strategy and more electoralist policies and even later a merger with Labour.  
In these parties many mid-level elites were close supporters of the parliamentarians.  
  
Reformists had alternative methods to centralisation to re-orientate their parties.  They 
used speeches and media appearances to great effect to denounce Communism.  They 
used their party roles to great affect: CPN chair Henk Hoekstra proposed policy 
reforms and started a debate while in the WP parliamentary leader Proinsias de Rossa 
did this with his 1988 congress speech.  However, more important was the shifting of 
power and resources to the party in public office and the increasing role of 
parliamentarians joining national party leadership bodies.  This helped reformists to 
pursue electorally-driven reforms, social democratisation and office-seeking.  A 
double whammy of processes of internal democratisation and parliamentarisation 
helped the leadership to make most of the reforms it wanted in V 1993–2003, 2006–, 
WP 1989–1992 and DL 1992–98.   This brought reform.  However, in the long-term 
they struggled from a lack of centralisation.  Parliamentarisation, office-seeking and 
social democratisation were contested by V’s Youth League while in DL 
parliamentarisation crowded out internal room for debate, activism and a healthy 
central party apparatus. Nonetheless, after 2006– palriamentarisation again came to 
shape V’s office-seeking strategy and social democratisation and in DL it resulted in a 
merger with Labour. 
 
The distinction between the party in public office and the party in central office 
mattered, but this division was not as clear cut as political scientists have made out 
(Katz and Mair 2009, p. 756).  These cases generally, then, lend support to Katz and 
Mair’s idea that parties in public office have been gaining ascendency over the central 
administration.  In the WP, DL and V the parliamentary group took a life of its own, 
developed a common perspective which differed from that of the national leadership 
and started to run things.  Moreover, parliamentarians who were often not regular 
members of the national leadership increasingly sat in its bodies and gained increased 
influence there.  This was very different from the process in the SP.  There the 
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dominance of the party in public office took a different route as a small group of local 
councillors came to dominate the central leadership bodies.  This group subsequently 
became the party’s first parliamentarians in the 1990s.  They continued to dominate 
the national leadership and parliamentary group.   
 
Table 7.19: Democratic organisational structures and breaking with Communism 
 Breaking with 
Communism  
  
Democratic 
organisational 
structures  
Low Moderate High 
Low CPN 1950–1977            
PCP 1974–1992                  
PCP 1992–2002                     
PCP 2002–                     
SKP 1950–1964                                
SP 1971–1986                     
VPK 1964–1975                    
WP 1977–1989                  
WP 1992–                                                   
 SP 1986–1998       
SP 1998– 
Moderate CPN 1977–1982               
V 2006–                 
VPK 1975–1993                 
V 1993–2002           
WP 1989–1992          
DL 1992–1998 
High V 2003–2006 CPN 1982–1986  CPN 1986–
1991 
 
 
While the party’s leaders became increasingly pragmatic through working in 
parliament, and accepted social democratisation and office-seeking, the parliamentary 
group or party in public office per se did not come to control the party.  Instead a 
small inner-circle or dominant coalition came to control both the party in public and 
central office.  The parliamentary group was not able to develop separate goals like in 
the WP and V.  New parliamentarians remained subservient to the inner-circle.  The 
high degree of monitoring and central control prevented significant tensions emerging 
like in the other parties between the party in public and central office, allowing the 
inner-circle to control the SP’s parliamentary expansion.  Its parliamentarians and 
elected officials were prevented from becoming too independent, failing to pay their 
salaries to the party or shirking responsibilities in direct action like in the other 
parties.  In contrast, in the PCP parliamentarians were always deliberately limited in 
influence in national leadership bodies.   
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Democratisation or adherence to internal democratic structures was not necessarily 
self-defeating for reformers.  The CPN, WP and V, had made prior inroads to 
democratisation before 1989.  They achieved significant programmatic reforms when 
they first began to democratise and internal democracy did not prevent them from 
carrying out further reforms in response to the collapse of Communism.  Continued 
democratisation reinforced this process of programmatic transformation.  The WP had 
further to go to democratise itself in the late-1980s but this did not unleash 
overwhelming opposition that would crush reformers.  
 
The ‘resisters’ and ‘dictators’  
Grzymała-Busse said relatively little about what to expect if parties keep democratic 
centralism following the collapse of Communism.  However, her framework implies 
that a reassertion of democratic centralism following an internal backlash against 
reform was likely to constrain the latter.  This research looked to see what happened 
in parties that kept democratic centralism and whether it was inherently inimical to 
carrying out electorally-driven reforms, office-seeking, social democratisation and 
breaking with Communism.  It asked whether democratic centralism was an effective 
means of resisting reform or, on the other hand, whether reformist elites found 
opportunities to use its power to dictate and force through reforms following the 
collapse of Communism or exogenous shocks.  
 
The research rejects H6c in its deterministic form.  However, it supports the idea that 
keeping democratic centralism, while it might sometimes prove useful to reformers, 
ultimately made reform less likely following exogenous shocks and the collapse of 
Communism.  True, the power democratic centralism gave to party leaders did 
sometimes help them to sacrifice sacred cows.  This helped the leaders of the Irish 
WP 1977–1989 to continue to break with Republicanism, build cross community 
support, enabled its Research Section to mould campaigns to appeal to urban workers 
in less ideological terms and to emphasise social democratic policies with little 
accountability.  In the PCP it enabled the leadership to run campaigns emphasising 
broad themes of national and democratic revolution rather than simply a Communist 
state, with little internal debate.  It also found room to pursue a local level alliance 
with the social democrats in 1989 to hide the party’s election losses.  The CPN’s 
leaders used democratic centralism to break with the Soviet Union and to temporarily 
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promote parliamentary democracy (1950–77).  They also used it to help to promote 
younger reformist elites (1977–1982).   
 
The SP’s leaders used democratic centralism to break with Mao without debate in the 
1970s.  Following election defeat in 1986 they used it to build a highly centralised 
campaign machine and to break with Marxism-Leninism in 1991.  But even though 
democratic centralism helped to initiate the SP’s transformation, its leaders realised 
that it was electorally damaging and replaced it with new top down, centralistic 
structures.  This suggests that reformers could use democratic centralism but found 
little purpose for it in the long term.  Democratic centralism was only likely to be 
beneficial to reform if those at the very top desired it and were willing to continue 
undemocratic organisational practices.  This also appears to have been the case in 
Communist successor parties in Cyprus and Moldova where the party leadership used 
democratic centralism to promote programmatic reform in order to gain electoral 
success.  However, the cases analysed here indicate that we can expect such 
developments in WECPs to be rare.  Unlike the leaders of the SP, reformist elites in 
V, the CPN and the WP and for the most part the PCP, were generally hesitant to use 
democratic centralism to push through change (see Table 7.20). They wanted rid of 
democratic centralism and believed using it or imposing new centralistic structures 
would de-legitimise their calls for reform.  Most of the time when democratic 
centralism was upheld it prevented reform.  It had been used at various points in time 
to crush calls for reform in all the case studies following exogenous shocks.   
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Table 7.20: Democratic centralism and electorally-driven policy reforms 
 Electorally- 
driven policy 
reforms 
  
Democratic 
centralism  
Low Moderate High 
Low V 2003–2006 VPK 1964–1975       
VPK 1975–1993     
CPN 1982–1986         
CPN 1986–1991                
DL 1992–1998          
SP 1998–                   
V 1993–2003           
V 2006–               
WP 1989–1992    
Moderate   CPN 1977–1982  
High CPN 1950–1977          
PCP 1974–1992           
PCP 1992–2002          
PCP 2002–             
SKP 1950–1964              
SP 1971–1986              
WP 1992–           
SP 1986–1998               
WP 1977–1989 
 
 
Prior experience in reform and organisational centralisation  
 
This research found little evidence to suggest that elites with prior experience in 
implementing reform were more likely to pursue organisational centralisation in 
response to exogenous shocks and the collapse of Communism.  H7 is firmly rejected.  
There were three main examples when elites did something similar to this.  In the WP 
1977–1989 the Research Section, who were highly equipped with experience in 
carrying out prior reforms and sought to force through social democratisation in a top 
down fashion in reaction to Perestroika and anticipation of problems in CEE.  They 
believed they needed to seize the initiative and drive changes through in fear of 
electoral catastrophe if the WP was not rapidly transformed.  From carrying out prior 
reforms they saw that resistance at elite level had meant that some reforms took 
several years to implement.  However, the main reason for their centralistic approach 
was that this was simply a continuation of the centralistic way in which they had 
always operated.   
 
The CPN’s leaders drew on previous failures in forging an electoral alliance with 
other left parties to see a need for a limited informal process of centralisation 
involving secret elite-level meetings. These set the agenda for a merger.  However, it 
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was not prior experience at carrying out programmatic reforms per se but fear that 
forging an electoral alliance involved too many actors and stumbling blocks that 
convinced them of the need for centralisation.  Furthermore, they only saw a limited 
role for this and believed internal democratic procedures would being the CPN into 
GroenLinks and could be used to break with Communism.  Neither they, nor the 
Research section in the WP, had seen a need for thorough organisational 
centralisation.  
 
Any relationship between prior reform and centralisation was also affected by the 
parties’ leaders’ other prior experiences.  The leaders of the CPN had backgrounds 
which made them highly committed to internal democratic procedures – like most 
reformers in V and the WP (and even the PCP).  Backgrounds in student movements, 
new social movements were largely alien to democratic centralism, centralistic 
structures or streamlining.  The experience of carrying out programmatic reforms and 
trying to broaden appeal had not convinced them of a need to centralise to overcome 
internal resistance.  Further, the CPN’s leaders had seen centralistic structures block 
their previous calls for reform and believed they were largely incompatible.  
 
The SP’s pragmatic local councillors saw the need for organisational centralisation 
because the party ran disastrous, uncoordinated electoral campaigns in the 1980s. 
They had also seen that local activists were producing excessively ideological 
material and thought a stronger central apparatus would provide greater control over 
this and improve the quality of campaign material.  However, they did not come to 
centralisation from the experience of carrying out prior reform but more out of a 
continuation of top-down party culture.  They had moderate experience in reform.  
This was lower than reformers elsewhere who were less or not engaged in 
centralisation.  Elite interviews suggest that like in the other case studies, having made 
prior attempts to broaden appeal had actually shown the SP’s leaders a need for 
increased debate, even though this was subsequently ignored.  However, the SP’s 
leaders still often reject the idea that their party is highly centralised.  Until they 
accept this the full process behind this will remain hard to fully discern.  
 
  
248 
The case studies question the idea that experience in carrying out prior reforms will 
condition party leaders into being centralisers.  In V, the CPN, the WP and DL most 
reformist elites that had experience in implementing or designing prior reforms aimed 
at broadening appeal were firmly committed to democratisation and averse to 
centralising.  They understood the risks of democratising and that reforms were likely 
to encounter resistance but did not see centralisation as an easy way out or a magic 
bullet.  Most of the time reformist elites did not seek to replace democratic centralism 
with new centralised regulations or to significantly centralise following exogenous 
shocks: when they had experience in carrying out prior reforms, including for the 
most part the CPN 1986–1991.   
 
Elites from V’s Youth League who also had experience in carrying out reforms to 
radicalise policy proposals and who encountered previous resistance did not seek 
centralisation to reform party programmes either.  The WECPs analysed here had 
greater possibilities to undertake reforms before 1989 than their counterparts in CEE.  
Even the PCP’s parliamentarians found some opportunities for this in the early 1980s.  
If H7 were correct then we could expect centralisation to have been much more 
prevalent in the case studies.  In recent years politicians in V have searched to find the 
secrets to the SP’s stunning expansion.  However, when they see the source of its 
chameleon-like powers, they are unlikely to want to copy it. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Prior 
horizontal elite 
advancement 
Prior elite 
negotiation 
with outside 
groups and 
institutions 
Prior 
pluralistic 
leadership 
bodies 
Prior elite 
turnover 
Prior elite 
professional 
backgrounds 
Strategy of 
electorally-
driven 
centralisation 
Breaking with 
democratic 
centralism 
Electorally-
driven policy 
reforms 
Social 
democratisation 
Office-
seeking 
Breaking with 
Communism 
PCP 1974–
1992 low low low low low low low low low low Low 
PCP 1992–
2002 low (+) low (+) low (+) low (+) low (+) low low (+) low (+) low low (+) low (+) 
PCP 2002– low (-) low (-) low (-) low (+) low low low low (-) low (-) low (-) low (-) 
SP 1971–1986 moderate moderate low low (+) moderate low  low low (+) low low low (+) 
SP 1986–1998 moderate (+) High low  moderate moderate high high high low low High 
 SP 1998– high High low moderate moderate (+) high low high high high High 
(Swedish) 
SKP 1950–
1964 moderate Low low low low low low low low  low Low 
(Swedish) 
VPK 1964–
1975 moderate low* low (+) low ** low low high moderate moderate low low (+) 
VPK 1975–
1993 moderate moderate moderate moderate moderate low moderate moderate low low Moderate 
V 1993–2003 high High high moderate high low moderate high high high Moderate 
V 2003–2006 moderate moderate moderate moderate moderate low low low low low low (+) 
V 2006– high moderate (+) high moderate high low low high high high low (+) 
WP 1977–
1992 moderate High moderate moderate moderate low high high low low Moderate 
DL 1992–1998 high High high moderate moderate low high high high high High 
CPN 1950–
1977 moderate moderate moderate low low low low low (+) low low Low 
CPN 1977–
1982 moderate moderate low low*** low (+) low high high low low moderate 
 Table 7.21: Research question one         
  
 
* this increased rapidly after 1964 
 ** this increased rapidly after 1964   
*** this increased rapidly after 1977 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CPN 1982–
1986 moderate high moderate high high low high high low low moderate 
CPN 1986–
1991 moderate high high high high low (+) high high low low high 
  
 
Table 7.22: Research Question Two 
Party Centralised 
organisation 
Democratised 
organisation 
Use of 
democratic 
centralism 
Parliamentar- 
isation of the 
leadership 
Electorally-
driven policy 
change 
Office- 
seeking 
Social 
democratisation 
Breaking 
 with 
Communism 
Elite 
organisational 
strategies 
Experience 
of reform to 
broaden 
appeal 
Main features of 
organisational 
strategy 
PCP 
1974–
1992 high low  high low low low low low high low 
Democratic 
centralism  
PCP 
1992–
2002 high low (+) high low low (+) low (+) low low (+) high low 
Democratic 
centralism 
PCP 
2002– high low high low low low low low high low 
Democratic 
centralism 
SP 
1971–
1986 moderate low high low low (+) low low low (+) high low 
Democratic 
centralism 
SP 
1986–
1998 high low high* moderate*** high low moderate high high moderate Centralisation  
SP 
1998– high low low (+) high high high high high high high Centralisation  
SKP 
1950–
1964 high low high low low low low low high low 
Democratic 
centralism 
VPK 
1964–
1975 moderate moderate low (+) low moderate  low moderate low (+) high moderate Democratisation 
VPK 
1975–
1993 moderate moderate low (+) low moderate  low low moderate moderate moderate Democratisation 
V 
1993–
2003 low moderate (+) low high high high high moderate (+) moderate moderate 
Democratisation 
and parliament- 
arisation 
  
 
*high until 1991, ** high until the mid-1980s, ***after 1994 
 
 
 
V 
2003–
2006 low high low moderate  low low low low high moderate Democratisation 
V 
2006– low moderate low high high high high low (+) low high 
Parliamentarisa-
tion and internal 
democracy 
WP 
1977–
1989 moderate low high** moderate  high low low (+) low (+) high high 
Centralisation and 
democratic 
centralism 
WP 
1989–
1992 low moderate low moderate (+) high low low moderate high moderate 
Democratisation 
and 
parliamentarisa- 
Tion 
DL 
1992–
1998 low moderate low high high high high high high high 
Democratisation 
and 
parliamentarisa- 
tion 
WP 
1992– moderate low high low low low low low high high 
Democratic 
centralism 
CPN 
1950–
1977 high low  high low (+) low (+) low low low high low  
Democratic 
centralism 
CPN 
1977–
1982 moderate low (+) moderate low (+) high low low moderate  high low (+) Democratisation 
CPN 
1982–
1986 low high low low (+) high low low moderate high high Democratisation 
CPN 
1986–
1991 low (+) high low low (+) high low low high high high (+) 
Democratisation 
and informal 
centralisation 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
 
8.1 Main Empirical Findings 
 There are two main empirical findings from this research.  First, just as in the 
successor parties in CEE, it was party leaders who had experience in working with 
groups and institutions outside of their immediate party hierarchy that led efforts to 
reform WECPs.  It was this group of elites who ‘cracked first’ following exogenous 
shocks and who were better equipped with ideas about how to achieve reforms.  
Second, organisational centralisation was not needed for WECPs to achieve 
programmatic transformation.  With reform minded mid-level elites and leaders 
committed to advocating reform, this was often possible through democratic 
processes.  Moreover, shifting power to the party in public office provided reformers 
with other elitist organisational strategies to organisational centralisation.  
 
8.2 Key Findings: Research Question One 
To scholars watching events unfold in the early 1990s, WECPs’ divergent trajectories 
did not seem that surprising (Bull 1994, p. 211).  However, viewed in a longer term 
perspective these parties can be seen to have taken unexpected directions.  The SP 
became a major force in Dutch politics, much of the WP was assimilated by Labour, 
V accommodated social democracy and the PCP managed to avoid even small 
reforms.  Using Anna Grzymała-Busse’s framework to analyse WECPs helps to 
advance our understanding of such developments.  It shows in comparative terms how 
organisational decisions that the parties made before the collapse of Communism and 
in response to it, played a highly significant role in shaping their directions.  This 
chapter summarises the main findings from this study.  It shows how elite 
advancement practices and changes in the internal distribution of power impacted 
upon WECPs’ programmatic development.  This research has also demonstrated that 
the framework has considerable merits in helping us to explain the development of 
WECPs’ post-Communist successor parties.  
 
Most significantly, the research suggests that WECPs’ leaders regularly pursued 
organisational changes to resist or promote reform following exogenous shocks and 
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the collapse of Communism in CEE in 1989.  They often went to great lengths to use 
these to influence decision-making or to assert control over strategic matters.  In the 
case studies, party leaders were highly adept to using such measures to promote their 
programmatic goals.  This highlights the need to analyse such strategies in other 
WECPs.  Only one period was analysed when there was little attempt to use 
organisational changes to influence other aspects of party strategy (V 2006–).  Even 
then, the representation of parliamentarians in national leadership bodies increased in 
a relatively ad hoc way, which had had profound effects on decision-making.  
Organisational changes usually preceded other changes.  When they shifted power 
across party institutions this usually fuelled policy change.   
 
This study has ten key findings for research question one that investigated the 
relationship between elite advancement practices and party transformation.  First, elite 
advancement practices meant that some WECPs were better placed to transform 
themselves following the collapse of Communism in CEE in 1989.  Several parties 
had advanced leaders with prior experiences and portable skills that were beneficial to 
carrying out electorally-driven policy changes and breaking with Communism.  They 
had negotiated with outside groups and institutions, making them more responsive to 
pressures to break with Communism.  These elites could draw on ideas and analytical 
skills, pragmatism, media skills, prior experience of reforming institutions and of 
mobilising coalitions of support that helped them to change their parties by 
undertaking both organisational and programmatic reforms.  This research anticipates 
that we can expect to find such elites in other WECPs that transformed themselves.   
 
Some WECPs were more active in advancing elites ‘horizontally’ from ancillary 
organisations or including their elected officials in leadership bodies.  This made it 
more likely that they would be transformed following the collapse of Communism.  
Negotiation with outsiders in parliaments, trade unions, media roles and new social 
movements (or even new groups of new party members) equipped elites with 
experiences that were beneficial to implementing electorally-driven reforms and 
organisational changes.  Dissent in party publications was often one of the first signs 
that calls for reform were brewing.  The different prior experiences that WECPs 
elites’ drew on in working with other political and professional organisations or from 
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being ‘horizontally advanced’ help to explain the diverse programmatic directions that 
their parties took. 
 
Advancing these more analytically minded functionaries to elite positions often 
proved particularly beneficial to reform as did the inclusion of local councillors in 
leadership bodies.  These politicians had often tried to broaden appeals and accepted 
office-seeking in local politics.  Such elites were often relieved by the collapse of 
Communism in 1989 and saw it as an opportunity to start anew.  Reformist politicians 
also drew on inspiration for reform from contacts with rival parties and colleagues at 
the European Parliament.  This helped them to envisage not just programmatic 
reforms but organisational changes as well.  Some WECPs advanced officials with 
such experiences to leadership positions making them better positioned to learn from 
policy and organisational reforms in other parties.  WECPs often craved the prestige 
and influence that having elected officials brought, but found that once they had them 
they wanted increased influence within leadership bodies. 
   
In contrast, some WECPs pursued elite advancement policies that fostered leaderships 
that lacked these experiences.  They generally struggled to transform their parties.  
Most of the time having elites who were experienced in negotiating with outsiders 
increased WECPs’ chances of adapting themselves.  Nonetheless, it was not always 
necessary to have a large number or cohort of such elites.  Sometimes an individual 
was enough to spark reform.  However, only rarely did having elites with experience 
of negotiating with outsiders become detrimental to reform.  As orthodox WECPs 
tried to influence society they found it very difficult to avoid feedback.  They have 
long struggled to work within parliamentary democracy.   The research warns them 
that it is risky for them to recruit students and members of other social movements.  
Moreover, they advance them to elite positions at their peril.  Orthodox WECPs 
seeking to retain ideological purity are well advised to pack their leadership bodies 
with tested and obedient full-time functionaries, with little experience of working 
outside the party.  Tactics such as filling leadership bodies with functionaries on the 
party payroll could also be used in post-Communist successor parties to provide tight 
discipline and support for transformation.  However, many WECPs and post-
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Communist successor parties lacked the resources this requires.  Several WECPs 
sought to solve this problem by controlling the wages of their elected officials.  
 
WECPs’ leaders’ portable skills and prior experiences rather than simply their 
ideology affected their chances of transforming their parties.  Just as Grzymała-Busse 
found in their counterparts in CEE, these factors helped some elites to envisage and 
enact programmatic and organisational reforms.  Elites who negotiated with outsiders 
often had ideas that were less rigid to begin with or were the ones whose orthodoxy 
cracked first.  Having established records in broadening appeal helped to provide 
legitimacy to reformers as it had done in CEE.  However, sometimes, records of prior 
reform were overshadowed by reformers’ former orthodoxy.  This could be sufficient 
for those seeking transformation to be shunned by fellow reformers or for the media 
to question their credibility.   
 
Second, WECPs that advanced elites with the above prior experiences were more 
likely to break with Communism and to pursue electorally-driven reforms rather than 
to go the whole hog by social democratising or seeking office.  Horizontal elite 
advancement practices promoted social democratisation and office-seeking more than 
experiences of negotiation with outsiders per se.  Elected officials were often 
constrained by other reformist elites from taking such initiatives.  Advancing elected 
officials into leadership bodies did not ensure that parties would seek social 
democracy or office; however, those parties that did pursue these strategies had 
advanced elites this way.  
 
Third, WECPs’ pursuit of electorally-driven policy reforms, social democratisation 
and office-seeking did not always work out as planned for example in V, DL and the 
SP.  Depending on the context and the way in which they were implemented, reforms 
including broader appeals or social democratisation could be lost on voters.  
Furthermore, office-seeking did not necessarily mean that parties would manage to 
win inclusion in government.  Failing to enter government after having made it appear 
possible could prove devastating.  Being in government also presented additional 
burdens.  It could become a poisoned chalice. Party leaders could often manage 
backlashes against the programmatic compromises that office-seeking required but 
found it hard to prevent activists and members tiring or from leaving.  Searching for 
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votes by encroaching on traditional social democratic polices also alienated radical 
activists.  Attempting to preoccupy them with direct activism or to coerce them into 
hard work through centralistic structures might help to keep them on board.  However, 
this research suggests that even such measures fail in the long-term.  Recruiting social 
democratic supporters offered rapid short-term expansion but they usually returned 
back to established social democratic parties, were less inclined to meet the 
commitments demanded of them or found their parties’ centralism problematic.   
 
Fourth, all the parties analysed here that transformed themselves took rapid steps to 
distance themselves from Communism following 1989 for example V and DL made 
programmatic changes.  However, none of them had rapidly accepted social 
democracy or office-seeking.  When this occurred, it generally took place gradually.  
Sometimes this meant that parties tried to make appeals that reconciled or combined 
radical socialism with social democracy.  Post-Communist successor parties could 
enjoy periods of electoral expansion through strategies based on ideological 
moderation, intense opposition to social democratic rivals and Euroscepticism.  
Parties who had advanced elites with experiences of negotiating with outside groups 
and institutions or who had advanced them horizontally across the party organisation 
were more likely to make moderating changes.  Sometimes these elites had accepted 
the need for social democratisation and office-seeking through their experiences in 
negotiating with outsiders but this usually took place through experiences in 
parliament or elected office.  
 
Parties with high numbers of such elites were more likely to seize on opportunities 
that emerged in their respective party systems.  This was often when rival social 
democratic parties were in office, were struggling to please their own supporters or 
when it was possible to argue that they were pursuing neo-liberal or right-wing 
policies.  Parties whose elites had such experiences were also more likely to advocate 
social democratisation and office seeking when social democratic rivals made eyes at 
bringing their parties into government or closer parliamentary relationships.  This 
poses the question of whether possibilities for gradual change emerged for parties in 
CEE that did not social democratise in 1989 in the long term.   
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Fifth, elites with experiences of outside negotiation or who had been advanced 
‘horizontally’ were generally far more likely to demand reforms in response to 
external shocks and the collapse of Communism.  This is evident even in parties that 
did not transform.  These leaders were generally more likely to seek electorally-driven 
policy reforms or breaking with Communism than office or social democracy.  
Negotiation with outside groups and institutions could promote such a move to 
mainstream politics.  These elites were more ready to accept compromises those with 
little experience at negotiating with outsiders.  However, their experiences usually 
gave them radical ideas that were not beneficial to seeking office or social 
democratisation.  These experiences did not mean that most reformist elites would 
seek such changes.  Nonetheless, those elites who did embrace mainstream politics 
had been strongly influenced by such factors and especially experiences available 
made to them because of horizontal elite advancement practices.  Elites with 
backgrounds in student organisations were often more pragmatic than WECPs’ 
historic leaders, however they usually favoured broader radical left appeals.  In 
contrast, elites with experience in elected office were more exposed to pressures of 
appealing to voters and more likely to seek social democratisation. 
 
Sixth, these processes meant that those WECPs seeking to remain orthodox required 
extremely rigid elite advancement policies.  Excluding those with moderate ideas 
from elite positions was not enough, they also needed to those with prior experiences 
that could be beneficial to transformation.  Some orthodox party leaders knew this all 
along. However, many unwittingly pursued elite advancement practices that had huge 
ramifications in promoting reform. Others took the risk in aim of gaining increased 
influence in other social institutions. 
 
Seventh, this study casts doubt on the idea that attempts to reform WECPs following 
the collapse of Communism are best understood as being made by elites who simply 
had a greater degree of an innate ‘adaptive capacity’13 – some randomly being more 
predisposed to adapting and recognising the need to change in response to an external 
shock.  While such factors may well still matter, this research points to there being 
                                                           
13
 This idea and possibility was proposed by Professor Aleks Szczerbiak at the initial research outline 
presentation for this study.  
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more systematic influences on attempts to reform WECPs.  If the attempts at reform 
analysed here could be understood in terms of some elites simply being more capable 
of changing because of innate attributes, then we would expect reformists to have 
been more spread out in terms of background characteristics and party roles.  Elite 
interviews showed that most reformers had gradually become more pragmatic through 
their contact with outsiders rather than simply suddenly seeking reform in reaction to 
the collapse of Communism.  Leading reformist elites saw their own paths to seeking 
reform this way and those of their colleagues.   
 
Eighth, tolerance of ideological pluralism in elite bodies before exogenous shocks and 
the collapse of Communism helped some WECPs and post-Communist successor 
parties to adapt.  Prior pluralism was by no means essential for this to occur but 
shaped electorally-driven policy reforms and attempts to break with Communism in 
several parties.  The research found only limited evidence to suggest that prior 
pluralism would engender office-seeking or social democratisation.  Most of the time 
this did not occur, but it is noteworthy that most parties that pursued these directions 
did exhibit prior pluralism.  Those parties without significant levels of prior pluralism 
generally struggled to reform themselves.  However, occasionally transformation was 
possible in centralistic parties, without prior pluralism and debate, when the parties’ 
top leaders had accepted the need to change.  It was a paradox that with little 
precedent for debate and discussion, it was easy for leaders to force through reforms.  
 
Ninth, prior turnover in the elite generally made it more likely that reform would take 
place in WECPs following the collapse of Communism and exogenous shocks.  
Parties with this were more likely to pursue electorally-driven reforms or to break 
with Communism.  However, this research found that sudden turnover following a 
shock was also highly likely to contribute to reform – sometimes shocks could spur 
sudden changes in elite advancement policies which then had subsequent 
ramifications in terms of policy change.  Increased turnover usually gave significant 
opportunities for reformers to emerge by removing members of WECPs’ old guard 
leaderships who had tended to dominate the parties for decades.  
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Tenth, the research found little evidence to support the idea that WECPs which 
advanced elites with experience in negotiating with outsiders, professional 
backgrounds or ‘horizontally’ across their organisations, were more likely to pursue 
organisational centralisation.   More pragmatic elites with backgrounds in new social 
movements or student politics were not more likely to centralise.  When parties 
centralised this appeared to be better explained as a form of continuity with former 
centralistic organisational practices rather than being due to elite advancement 
processes.  Sometimes reformist elites that centralised in response to difficult 
situations and resistance, did so in an ad hoc fashion rather than because they were 
drawing on their prior experiences.  They seemed just as likely to do this as elites with 
lower or greater levels of such experiences.  Only a small number of such elites 
explained centralisation as something they had done through drawing on their prior 
experiences in these backgrounds.  In contrast to what was found in CEE, most elites 
did not believe that such experiences promoted centralisation and thought they were 
more beneficial to promoting calls to abolish democratic centralism through 
democratisation.  Horizontal advancement practices seemed to promote centralisation 
in a slightly stronger way than the other factors.  In particular elected officials and 
employees from think-tanks seemed more inclined to centralise but this relationship 
again appeared to be relatively weak and did not apply in most cases.   
 
8.3 Key Findings: Research Question Two  
Grzymała-Busse identified a very strong relationship between centralisation and 
programmatic transformation and found that democratisation was unlikely to result in 
reform.  The cases she studied supported this so overwhelmingly that it is easy to 
assume her claims operated on a deterministic rather than a probabilistic level.  This 
study has found that the internal distribution of power within WECPs played a 
significant role in shaping their programmatic transformation.  It shows that 
centralisation and streamlining could be used in WECPs to promote reform by riding 
roughshod over resistance from orthodox mid-level elites.  Nevertheless, reformers 
rarely used such tactics.  
 
What is more, many WECPs still managed to transform themselves.  This points to 
the finding that centralisation was not that significantly more likely to bring 
transformation than other organisational strategies.  It was by no means the only route 
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for breaking with Communism and programmatic transformation.  Party leaders’ 
organisational strategies could also be multifaceted and could combine several 
different processes.  This research found that WECPs could pursue organisational 
strategies corresponding to five ideal types.  These could broadly be classified as 
‘resisters’, ‘dictators’, ‘centralisers’, ‘democratisers’, or being based on 
‘parliamentarisation’. 
 
Specifically, the research has eight key findings for research question two which 
investigated the relationship between parties’ internal distribution of power and party 
transformation.  First some WECPs managed to use democratic centralism to resist 
change.  In each case study analysed here elites had at some time reacted to their 
parties’ troubles by searching for new ways to control or to punish reformers.  Some 
elites had grown highly adept at doing this and were able to see out pressures to 
reform from exogenous shocks and the collapse of Communism.  They rigidly 
controlled elite advancement practices to prevent reformists gaining influence.  
Moreover, they established organisational structures that gave them huge control over 
the internal distribution of power.  Factors including experience in clandestine action 
or a history that involved a thorough Stalinisation of the party apparatus could help to 
shape these processes. 
  
Second, this study shows that WECPs had a range of possible organisational strategies 
at their disposal compared with the parties that Grzymała-Busse studied in CEE.  
Most of the time when democratic centralism functioned this constrained attempts to 
carry out reforms.  However, sometimes it was an effective way to take the first steps 
to transformation. WECPs’ leaders could use democratic centralism to ‘dictate’ 
reform, making a rapid centralisation less necessary than in CEE.  WECPs’ adaptation 
did not simply depend on a rapid centralisation following 1989.  
 
However, only a few of the cases analysed here that maintained democratic centralism 
following exogenous shocks and the collapse of Communism used it to dictate 
reforms. When democratic centralism was harnessed this way it was only a short 
period of time.  It was soon left behind when it became too much of an electoral 
liability.  Most reformers were uneasy about such measures.  Following exogenous 
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shocks or the collapse of Communism democratic centralism had also usually broken 
down anyway.  This precluded its use in dictating reforms.  Nevertheless, in those 
parties that maintained rigid structures throughout the late 1980s this was possible.  
  
Third, some WECPs replaced democratic centralism with new highly centralistic 
structures.  In these ‘centralisers’ elites were able to force through programmatic 
changes, break with Communism or to seek office and social democratise.  
Sometimes even weak processes of centralisation could help to achieve such goals.  
They could also operate simultaneously alongside other organisational strategies 
including democratisation to empower party institutions in which reformists were 
influential.  However, the research found that by 1989 (or the moments when WECPs 
first broke with democratic centralism) WECPs’ organisations had often changed to 
such an extent that centralisation was not viable.  Calls for internal democratisation 
were often so fierce that centralisation was not feasible and elites had alternative 
organisational strategies that they could use to promote programmatic change.  Only 
in those parties that retained highly centralistic organisations was it possible for 
leaders to centralise in a way similar to parties in CEE.  In most WECPs we can 
expect centralisation to have been more modest.   
 
Fourth, this research shows that ‘democratisers’ could be highly adept at 
programmatic transformation.  Grzymała-Busse found that democratisation enabled 
hardliners to take over, to reassert orthodox Communism and to force reformers out in 
CEE.  However, this did not happen in the WECPs analysed here.  Most of the time, 
democratisation complemented transformation.  It helped reformers to make painful 
breaks with Communism or to move towards electorally-driven programmatic 
reforms.  Prior membership recruitment policies had meant that there were often many 
reformists within the mid-level elite and rank and file.  This meant that 
democratisation could spur major reforms and in many cases worked to dethrone 
orthodox activists and elites.  
 
Democratisation did not guarantee that reformist leaders could always manage to get 
their reforms accepted.  This was less certain than in centralised parties.  Nonetheless, 
democratisation could be an effective route to transformation. In WECPs that 
democratised we can expect there to have been backlashes against reforms.  These 
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were usually mild in comparison to those Grzymała-Busse found in parties like the 
Czech KSČM.  Reformers who had democratised generally did not lose control to 
orthodox Communists bent on reasserting Communism and were rarely forced out of 
their parties or ostracised.   
 
Orthodox Communists only had mild success at using democratic structures in such 
ways.  Major reforms were possible under democratic structures and only one of the 
parties analysed here ended up reasserting a rigid form of democratic centralism. This 
was after the reformist majority decided to leave rather than because they were forced 
out.  Following democratisation orthodox Communists were usually unable to reassert 
democratic centralism to punish reformers.  Having realised that they could not 
control their parties, they often broke away on their own accord.  Sometimes orthodox 
Communists managed to reassert Communist symbols or concepts into party 
programmes but on the whole attempts to do this were unsuccessful.  Some WECPs 
were able to survive for years under democratic structures without a retreat to 
orthodoxy or democratic centralism.  They could usually maintain the bulk of 
programmatic reforms, even if they endured ongoing conflicts over ideological 
matters.   
 
Grzymała-Busse’s finding in CEE that letting the rank and file participate in policy 
making would preclude social democratisation or office seeking following the 
collapse of Communism, has some relevance to WECPs.  For several this meant that 
such options were off the table in 1989.  However, democratisation did not mean that 
party leaders were unable to convince mid-level elites of the need for such strategies 
after 1989. Assertive leaders achieved such transformations within democratic 
structures. Democracy did not root WECPs’ successor parties to protest politics.  
While backlashes did occur against reforms they were rarely undone entirely.  Those 
parties that centralised did transform themselves; however, those that democratised 
often managed to make similar changes during the 1990s.  Democratisation was only 
marginally less beneficial to reform.  Using Grzymała-Busse’s framework to 
understand WECPs would overstate the need for them to centralise to adapt. 
Fifth, Grzymała-Busse’s findings about mid-level elites in CEE need to be adjusted to 
understand many WECPs.  Basing our understanding of them on a perspective similar 
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to May’s ‘Law of Curvilinear Disparity’ (1973) is problematic.  They were often little 
more radical or attached to orthodox Communism than most reformist elites.  Mid-
level elites were unlikely to be overwhelmingly in favour of social democratisation or 
office seeking in 1989 but were often enthusiastic to electorally-driven reforms and 
sought broader appeal or breaking with Communist dogma.  Mid-level elites 
including regional leaders and congress delegates had often encountered pressures for 
these at a local level.   
 
Importing theoretical frameworks from CEE to the West helps to provide useful ideas 
that can expand our knowledge of WECPs.  There are, however, dangers in importing 
back assumptions they have drawn on from the West that have belong troubled 
political scientists (Norris, 1995; Kitschelt, 1989).  Sometimes mid-level elites were 
more radical than the leadership and this posed additional obstacles to reform but this 
was not a hard and fast rule.  Mid-level elites could have the same experiences in 
negotiating with outsiders that had led elites to seek reform.  Further, the strength of 
radical mid-level elites and their impact on reformist elites’ chances of enacting 
reforms could also be contingent on other factors. These included the radicalisation of 
parties’ youth organisations, recruitment practices, as well as the leadership’s efforts 
to consult them, its skill in justifying need for reform or the party’s electoral 
performance and poll-ratings.   
 
Sixth, WECPs and their successor parties were also often subject to the general trend 
that scholars have observed of the increasing role of party in public office that 
scholars have observed in more mainstream parties.  WECPs’ central offices were 
often dominated by traditionalists, making centralisation less appealing to reformers.  
However, parliamentarisation or professionalisation presented reformers with 
opportunities for alternative organisational strategies than centralisation.  In particular, 
shifting power to the party in public office enabled significant reforms.  Members of 
leadership bodies with roles or backgrounds in elected positions were unsurprisingly 
at the forefront of implementing such strategies.  Envisaging such a strategy did not 
even require a great deal of experience in elected politics.    
Parliamentarisation brought about a decline in participative decision-making and gave 
reformers increased power to transform their parties.  This research shows that when 
it took place alongside otherwise democratic or decentralised internal structures this 
  
 
 
265 
could lead to internal conflicts.  Reformist leaders who shifted power to parliament 
but paid little attention to building centralised structures were more likely to face 
backlashes or to find that their parties imploded.  Despite this, radical mid-level elites 
seemed unable to block the continued shift of power to parliamentary groups.  This 
was an effective route to transformation and one that reformist elites in WECPs 
appear to have been more at ease with than organisational centralisation.  However, it 
did correspond with a decline in internal democratic decision-making and role for the 
rank and file.  
 
Seventh, small centralistic WECPs with few or no MPs in 1989 were also well placed 
to adapt.  Those with a small group of pragmatic leaders or local councillors were able 
to initiate electorally-driven policy reforms.  If these policies worked, then they stood 
to gain full control over their parties’ nascent parliamentary groups.  This gave them a 
high degree of power to steer their parties’ adaptation, control its messages and 
establish parliamentary unity which was useful in helping them to establish credibility 
as a potential coalition partner.   
 
Eighth, the research found that the idea that carrying out prior reforms provided elites 
with experiences that were beneficial to organisational centralisation fails to capture 
the main reasons behind centralisation in WECPs and their successor parties (see 
above).  Elites with extensive experience in implementing reforms rarely made 
comprehensive efforts or plans to centralise their parties in the way that that 
Grzymała-Busse found elites had done in CEE.  Prior experience in reform was 
actually likely to lead reformist elites to see a need for democratisation and 
consultation as a way to undertake reforms.  They had found that forcing through 
reforms was likely to lead to internal dissent that could be defused through democratic 
and inclusive debate.  In this respect experiences from carrying out prior reforms did 
shape elites’ ability to develop strategies to reorganise their parties.  This research 
also suggests when WECPs’ leaders democratised they did not necessarily do so out 
of a lack of ‘skill’ or experience in implementing prior reforms.  Instead they did so 
precisely because they had prior experience and expertise in such deeds.  Many 
WECPs made significant reforms before 1989.  Centralisation should have been more 
prevalent if a significant relationship existed between it and policy innovation in 
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WECPs.  This poses the question of why elites’ prior experience in carrying out 
reforms led them to behave so differently in CEE and Western Europe.   
 
8.4 Revisiting the literature on CEE successor parties  
Importing Grzymała-Busse’s framework is a useful starting point from which to 
develop an explanation of WECPs’ divergent adaptation.  However, the empirical 
findings of this research suggest that it needs several modifications to provide a more 
comprehensive account of WECPs’ development.  This study has found two 
important differences between their diverse adaptation and that of the successor 
parties in CEE and that there are some significant weaknesses in using Grzymała-
Busse’s framework to study WECPs.  First, it has highlighted that the mid-level elite 
and party membership in several WECPs were not necessarily hardliners bent on 
stubbornly resisting reform.  This questions a key part of Grzymała-Busse’s 
framework and of several studies of successor parties in CEE (see Kitschelt 2002, 
Ishiyama 2002).  
 
Second, analysis shows that experienced reformers in WECPs were not predisposed to 
centralising and had not learnt this ‘skill’ as Grzymała-Busse found that reformers in 
CEE had done – in stark contrast to this, they had become democratisers.  This 
research shows that there is room for future studies to re-examine the strength of this 
relationship in successor parties in CEE and to question whether this process took 
place in those successor parties in CEE that Grzymała-Busse did not study.  
Furthermore, further research is needed to explain why such differences existed in 
reformers’ ‘organisational skills’ in WECPs compared with the successor parties in 
CEE.  Third, this research shows that while leaders’ portable skills helped them to 
envisage and carry out reforms their ‘usable pasts’ were less significant.  While there 
was evidence to suggest that leaders who pursued reforms before 1989/external 
shocks could point to their records of reform sometimes they found it difficult to 
break with their previous actions and their longstanding commitment to Communism.  
Moreover, records of reform were not necessary to gain legitimacy as a reformer – 
sometimes new faces that were less associated with the past were better placed to 
advocate reforms.  This suggests that out of the two skill sets that Grzymała-Busse 
identified leaders’ portable skills had greater impact on their parties’ development 
than their ‘useable pasts’.  
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The empirical findings of this research also show that there are at least five ways in 
which the explanative and descriptive power of Grzymała-Busse’s framework can be 
improved for analysing WECPs by drawing on ideas found in other frameworks for 
studying successor parties in CEE.  First, as Kitschelt observed in successor parties in 
CEE agency factors and the decisions of individual elites could be important in 
shaping party adaptation in WECPs and Grzymała-Busse pays little attention to this 
factor (Kitschelt 2002, p. 39).  Second, his argument that office-seeking strategies 
could yield disappointing results also resonates with the experience of several 
WECPs.  This is in stark contrast to Grzymała-Busse’s tendency to view office 
seeking as being a successful transformation (Kitschelt 2002, p.14).  Further, as Bauer 
found in successor parties in CEE, strategies of retaining Communism and protest 
politics could yield electoral success for successor parties in CEE despite Grzymała-
Busse’s conclusion that this would necessary bring electoral failure (Bauer 2002, p. 
366).  Indeed, several WECPs also managed to profit from such strategies.  
 
Third, this research has shown that Grzymała-Busse’s framework can be improved for 
analysing WECPs by studying their development after their initial reactions to the 
revolutions of 1989.  In a similar way to one Kitschelt identified in CEE, WECPs’ 
politicians continued to encounter exogenous shocks that they could learn from.  For 
example, electoral failures during the 1990s could convince politicians to change their 
strategies.  Thus, while 1989 was of huge significance for many WECPs, their 
reactions to it were not necessarily set in stone and the legacies of the past did not 
entirely prevent politicians from learning in new political circumstances (see 
Kitschelt, 2002 and Bunce 2002, p. 424).   
 
Fourth, the literature on the adaptation of successor parties in CEE has shown that 
organisational variables were of primary importance in shaping party adaptation and 
that, while external or environmental factors could influence party adaptation, they 
played a secondary role.  This research points to the primary significance of 
organisational variables in shaping the adaptation of WECPs.  Nevertheless, a more 
comprehensive understanding of their adaptation is gained from taking environmental 
factors into account in a broader theoretical framework than the one provided by 
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Grzymała-Busse.  Therefore, the refined model for explaining WECPs’ divergent 
adaptation provided in this chapter is in some respects similar to the theoretical 
framework provided by Bozóki and Ishiyama (2002) which also accounts for the 
impact of environmental factors on party adaptation.  
 
Last, our understanding of WECPs can be improved by paying more attention to how 
we classify the outcomes of their adaptation strategies.  Mapping WECPs 
development can be improved by drawing on arguments by Ziblatt and Biziouras 
(2002) that successor parties in CEE could be classified on more than one ideological 
dimension.  There was not a linear relationship between reform and non-reform – 
instead it was possible for parties to adopt a range of identities.  Studies of WECPs 
could better describe the outcomes of WECPs adaptation by classifying them not 
simply on the basis of whether they pursued a strategy of ‘leftist-retreat’ (based on 
orthodox Communism, Marxism Leninism and oppositional politics) or social 
democracy or more pragmatic forms of socialism.  Instead they could also classify 
WECPs in terms of whether they embraced internationalism or became rooted to 
nationalism/patriotism like several parties did in CEE (Bozóki and Ishiyama, 2002).  
This might help to establish a basis on which to explain why some WECPs remained 
more rooted to nationalism.  
 
8.5 Remodelling the framework 
Importing Grzymała-Busse’s framework improves our understanding of WECPs by 
bringing our attention to the importance of elite advancement processes and changes 
to their internal distribution of power.  The research found that these institutional 
variables were important in all five case studies.  The cases were generally similar in 
that they had upheld Marxism-Leninism, revolutionary goals and democratic 
centralism.  However, it was found that their historical backgrounds (for example: 
membership of the Comintern, paramilitarism and clandestine activities) and previous 
decisions by party leaders had affected elite advancement practices and organisational 
procedures.  This had shaped the viability of programmatic transformation and meant 
that the parties adapted in very different ways following the collapse of Communism 
in 1989.   
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However, the research found that Grzymała-Busse’s framework has several ideas that 
need to be addressed to make it capable of understanding WECPs’ development.  
First, its assumptions about mid-level elites and the reasons elites centralise are 
problematic.  Second, the framework’s parsimony is useful for telling us where to 
start analysing WECPs.  However, as with previous attempts to understand WECPs’ 
divergent adaptation (Arter, 2002, Tannahill, 1978) there is a need for a wider, but not 
exhaustive framework to account for other variables.   
  
An explanation of WECPs’ divergent adaptation must appreciate changes in their 
mid-level elite and what Waller (1994, p.44) termed the ‘new member factor’.  This 
idea that recruiting from a range of social groups and new social movements could 
undermine WECPs’ orthodoxy gains support from the case studies.  However, they 
have also shown that this mattered in two respects.  First, it led to calls for reform at 
grass roots level in response to exogenous shocks.  Second, it impacted upon elite 
advancement processes.  As the newcomers worked their way into leading party 
bodies, they brought prior experiences that were beneficial to transformation with 
them (see Figure 8.1).  Changes in WECPs’ mid-level elite before exogenous shocks 
often helped to promote reform.  In addition, other factors including trips to CEE and 
the Soviet Union also helped to convince elites of the need for reform.  This raises the 
question of whether elites in CEE who visited the west had similar experiences. 
 
Agency factors also need to be built into the framework to explain WECPs’ 
development.  WECPs’ top leaders could be highly influential in shaping or blocking 
reform.  In the PCP Cunhal’s (and lately his henchmen’s) refusal to change and 
manipulative use of democratic centralism to control elite advancement and remove 
rivals presented significant barriers to transformation.  Resistance or hesitance to 
reform from long-serving historical leaders presented barriers to transformation in all 
the case studies.   Turnover within the elite did not necessarily mean these influential 
figures would be pushed aside.  But reform gained momentum after Werner, Garland, 
De Groot, and Monjé had been left behind.  The ability to remove such figures 
affected WECPs’ chances of making a new beginning.  In the PCP, where this did not 
occur, reform became harder.  Developments within West European party systems 
were also shown to have posed opportunities and constraints on WECPs’ adaptation, 
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particularly in terms of office-seeking and social democratisation.  This research also 
shows that the chances of reform often depended on elite advancement practises to 
WECPs’ small daily executive committees rather than simply their large but 
peripheral central committees. 
 
8.6 Further research 
This research shows that we can learn more about parties in Western Europe and 
WECPs by drawing on frameworks developed in CEE.  It also poses a challenge to 
scholars to analyse WECPs in comparative perspective.  Through testing and refining 
a theoretical framework developed to study the adaptation of CPs in CEE against five 
case studies it proposed a new framework that can be used in studying other WECPs.  
It can be used to see if factors including elite advancement processes and changes to 
the internal distribution of power shaped WECPs’ programmatic development or 
transformation.  The parties studied here adapted differently because their leaders 
made different decisions on questions regarding elite advancement processes and 
organisational structures.  These were issues that all WECPs had to address.  Their 
adaptation was not just determined by variables that were case specific.   
 
This research points out that scholars should take a second look at the body of 
literature that exists on parties in CEE.  It has shown that organisational factors were 
extremely significant in shaping WECPs’ diverse adaptation – just as they were in 
CEE.  It demonstrates that such factors were frequently more important than 
environmental factors because they shaped elites’ ability to respond to changes in the 
political environment.  However, this opens up the way for studies like those 
conducted by Ishiyama on CEE successor parties to see if quantitative analysis of a 
larger number of WECPs supports such findings.  This study opens up a debate as to 
whether external or internal factors were of primary significance in shaping WECPs’ 
divergent programmatic adaptation.  Moreover, it establishes a basis on which to ask 
which external factors were the most significant or whether some can even be ruled 
out entirely as having causal significance.  This research also raises the question of 
whether there were similarities in terms of which external factors were significant in 
shaping the development of WECPs and their counterparts in CEE.   
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Further research is also needed to develop our classifications of WECPs’ adaptation 
strategies.  These could be strengthened by drawing on studies from CEE that offer a 
four part classification to show whether they pursued nationalist socialist/populist, 
reformist/social democrats, orthodox Communist/internationalist or national 
Communist strategies (Bozóki and Ishiyama, 2002).  More research is also needed to 
investigate the relationship between state funding for political parties and WECPs’ 
diverse adaptation.  Studies in CEE found that greater funding enabled leaders greater 
independence from their memberships and more room to pursue programmatic 
reforms (Ziblatt and Biziouras 2002, p. 422).  This research has shown that the 
relationship between party funding and programmatic change in WECPs warrants 
further analysis with changes in the distribution of state funding having been highly 
significant in shaping the adaptation of several of the cases analysed here.  
 
This study used interview material to analyse how changes in elite advancement 
practices and party organisation affected WECPs’ transformation. It shows that 
qualitative research can be used to study frameworks like this through systematic 
analysis.  It also demonstrates the benefits from talking to elites about the process of 
party transformation and the motives behind their organisational strategies.  Its 
findings can be strengthened by future quantitative research regarding the changing 
composition of party leadership bodies and party organisations.  However, it was also 
found that the documents needed for this are often hard to obtain with orthodox 
WECPs remaining hesitant to share this or because the data is inaccessible.    
 
Testing the framework against additional cases can help to examine the main 
propositions from this research.  These include the idea that elite advancement 
processes and elites’ experiences in negotiating with outside groups and institutions 
help to explain attempts to reform WECPs.  Scholars can draw on this to analyse the 
larger WECPs in Italy and France as well.  Further research is also necessary to see if 
the relationship between experience in carrying out reforms and organisational 
centralisation that Grzymała-Busse’s identified in CEE has relevance elsewhere.  On 
the other hand it can see if such experiences promoted democratisation as this study 
found.  This theoretical debate has wider relevance to debates on party change and can 
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be tested in non-communist parties of the radical left, mainstream parties and in other 
party families.  
 
The research also shows that political scientists should be more active in developing 
explanations of those parties (and those WECPs) that fail to adapt to external shocks 
like the PCP.  Too often they are crowded out by analysis of more successful 
counterparts.  This is problematic when studying the reasons behind their failure lack 
of responsiveness can tell us a great deal about party change.  This study also shows 
that party leaders are often pivotal in shaping party adaptation.  They can do much to 
stop or promote reform and need to be placed at the forefront of our understanding of 
party change in WECPs and left parties.  This research shows that the attributed and 
decisions made by party leaders mattered in a similar way to that which scholars have 
found in radical right-wing parties (Mudde, 2007).   All this points to a need to for 
political scientists to pay greater attention to the ‘supply side’ in left parties by 
undertaking more research on their leaders.  
 
Thinking more specifically, additional research is also warranted to see if the SP is 
unique among WECPs in using a highly centralised organisational model to social 
democratise itself and whether leaders in other WECPs managed to initiate 
transformation through using democratic centralism after 1989.  Analysis of the SP 
found that its high levels of direct action created great pressures for moderation.  
Maoists in other parties analysed here were also at the forefront of calls for 
programmatic moderation.  Greater comparative work, on Maoist parties in Western 
Europe is therefore warranted to see whether they shared this feature and if they were 
better placed than other WECPs to break with their Communist past.  
 
Analysis of the PCP also offers scholars a basis from which to comparatively analyse 
WECPs that retained democratic centralism. This study has provided new information 
on the PCP’s secretive internal workings and established a basis for comparison with 
other parties that failed to break with orthodox Communism.  One such party is the 
Greek KKE on which there are only a few studies (Kalyvas and Marantzidis, 2005, 
2003; Bosco, 2001; Smith, 1993; Verney, 1989).   Research is needed to examine 
whether its leaders pursued similar strategies to resisting reform and if reformers there 
had similar characteristics or faced similar dilemmas to those in the PCP.  
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Furthermore, it can tell us whether reformers’ attempts to democratise were to blame 
for the KKE’s failure to adapt.  This can help to further update our understanding of 
WECPs that kept democratic centralism and to see if party leaderships other than the 
PCP’s can still maintain rigid control over elite advancement and policy making.  
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Figure 8.1  WECPs’ divergent transformation following exogenous shocks and the collapse of Communism 
                                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Elite level Factors 
 Prior elite advancement 
 Prior elite turnover 
 Prior pluralistic leadership bodies 
 Prior portable or transferable skills 
and experiences 
 Prior elite experience working with 
outsiders 
 Prior horizontal advancement 
 Elite agency factors 
 Records and experience of reform 
 Visits to CEE 
 Removal of Historic Leaders 
 Rapid turnover following 
exogenous shocks 
Elite Organisational 
Strategies 
 Democratisation 
 Preserving established 
democratic structures 
 Maintaining 
Democratic Centralism 
 New Centralised 
structures 
Transformation 
Electorally-driven policy change 
Office-seeking 
Breaking with Communism  
Social democratisation 
 
Party Systemic factors 
(e.g. a rightwards shift by social 
democratic rivals). 
Changes in the mid-level 
elite and rank and file 
Prior organisational 
change 
Maintenance of centralistic 
culture and institutional 
structures 
  
 
 
275 
Bibliography 
 
Abedi, A. and Schneider, S. (2004). ‘Adapt or die! Organisational Change in Office 
Seeking anti-Political Establishment Parties’, paper presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association in Winnipeg, Manitoba, 
3–5 June.  
Abrahams, F. (1991). ‘Ik ben ook voor sommige mensen een verschrikking geweest’ 
(Interview with Joop Wolff), NRC, 18.05.91, (Amsterdam: NRC). 
Ágh, A. (1995). ‘Partial Consolidation of the East Central European Parties: The Case 
of the Hungarian Socialist Party’, Party Politics, Vol. 1, pp. 491-514.  
Albertazzi, D., McDonnell, D. and Newell, J. (2007). Di lotta e di governo: The Lega 
Nord and Rifondazione Comunista in Coalition, paper presented at 57th 
Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association, University of Bath 
11–13 April 2007.  
Arter, D. (2003). “‘Communists we are no longer, Social Democrats we can never 
be’’: the Evolution of the Leftist Parties in Finland and Sweden’ in J. Botella 
and L. Ramiro (eds.), The Crisis of Communism and Party Change: The 
Evolution of West European Communist and Post Communist Parties 
(Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Politiques i Socials). 
Arter, D. (2002). “‘Communists we are no longer, Social Democrats we can never 
be”: the Evolution of the Leftist Parties in Finland and Sweden’, Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 1–28. 
Arter, D. (1993). ‘Post-communist Parties in Finland and Scandinavia: A Red-Green 
Road to the Twenty-first Century’ in D. S. Bell (ed.), Western European 
Communists and the Collapse of Communism (London: Berg).   
Arter, D. (1991). ‘The Swedish Leftist Party: Eco-Communism or Communist 
Echo?’, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 60–78. 
Arter, D. (1988). ‘A Tale of Two Carlssons: The Swedish General Election of 1988’, 
Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 84–101.  
Avante, 16.10.08, 26.07.07, 27.10.05, (PCP: Lisbon).  
  
276 
Bäck, H. (2008). ‘Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Formation: Evidence from 
Swedish Local Government’, Party Politics, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 71–89. 
Bale, T. and Bergman, T. (2006). ‘A Taste of Honey is Worse than None at All: 
Coping with the Generic Challenges of Support Party Status in Sweden and 
New Zealand?’, Party Politics, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 189–209.  
Bale, T. and Bergman T. (2006b). ‘Captives No Longer, but Servants Still? Contract 
Parliamentarism and the New Minority Governance in Sweden and New 
Zealand’, Government and Opposition, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 422–449.  
Bale, T. and Blomgren, M. (2008). ‘Close but no cigar? Newly governing and nearly 
governing parties in Sweden and New Zealand’, in K. Deschouwer (ed.), 
Newly Governing Parties: In Power for the First Time (London: Routledge). 
Bale, T. and Dunphy, R. (2007). ‘Red Flag Still Flying? Explaining AKEL – Cyprus’s 
Communist Anomaly’, Party Politics, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 287–304.  
Bale, T. and Dunphy, R. (2006). ‘In from the cold: Left Parties, Policy, Office and 
Votes in Advanced Liberal Democracies Since 1989’. Paper presented to the 
Political Studies Association Specialist Group on Communist and Post-
Communist Politics: Workshop on ‘The Non-Social Democratic Left and 
Government Participation’, University of Sussex. 
Barnea, S. and Rohat, G. (2007). ‘Reforming Candidate Selection Methods: A three 
level approach’, Party Politics, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 375–394. 
Bauer, M. (2002). ‘Changing Cleavage Structure and the Communist Successor 
Parties of the Visegrád Countries’ in A. Bozóki and J. Ishiyama, (eds.), The 
Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe (London: 
Sharpe). 
Bell, D. S. (2006). ‘Governed to Death?’ Paper presented to the PSA Specialist Group 
on Communist and Post-Communist Politics: Workshop on ‘The Non-Social 
Democratic Left and Government Participation’, University of Sussex. 
Bell, D. S. (2004). ‘The French Communist Party within the Left and Alternative 
Movements’, Modern and Contemporary France, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 23–34. 
Bell, D. S. (2003). ‘The French Communist Party: from revolution to reform’ in J. A. 
Evans (ed.), The French Party System (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press). 
  
 
 
277 
Bell, D. S. (2001). ‘Challenges and Responses in the French Party System: The 
Unified Left?’, Political Studies Association Conference (Manchester: PSA). 
Bell, D. S. (1998). ‘The Confederal Group of the United European Left-Nordic Left’ 
in D.S. Bell, (ed.), Transnational Parties in the European Union (Ashgate: 
Ashgate).  
Bell, D. S. (1996). ‘Western Communist Parties and the European Union’ in J. 
Gaffney (ed.), Political Parties and the European Union (London: Routledge). 
Bell, D. S. (1993). Western European Communists and the Collapse of Communism 
(Oxford: Berg). 
Bell, D. S. and Criddle, B. (1989). ‘The Decline of the French Communist Party’, 
British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 515–536. 
Benedetto, G. and Quaglia, L. (2007). ‘The Comparative Politics of Communist 
Euroscepticism in France, Italy and Spain’, Party Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 
478–499.  
Bosco, A. (2001). ‘Four Actors in Search of a Role: The Southern European 
Communist Parties’, in N. Diamandouros and R. Gunther (eds.), Parties, 
Politics and Democracy in the New Southern Europe (London: John Hopkins 
University Press). 
Bosco, A. (2000). Comunisti: Transforazioni di partito in Italia, Spagna e Portogallo 
(Bologna: Il Mulino). 
Bosco, A. (1998). “‘Eppur si muove”: La Lenta Transmazione Del Partito Comunista 
Portoghese’, Studi Politici, Vol. 2, pp. 43–85. 
Bosco, A. and Morlino, L. (2007). ‘What Changes in Southern European Parties? A 
Comparative introduction’, South European Society and Politics, Vol. 11, No. 
3–4, pp. 331–358.  
Bottwyk, K. (1998). ‘Ingen arbetarbakgrund hos vänstern’, Contra, No. 4.  
Botella, J. and Ramiro, L. (2003). ‘The Crisis of West European Communist Parties 
and their Changing Trajectories: Communists, Post-Communists, Ex-
Communists?’ in J. Botella and L. Ramiro (eds.), The Crisis of Communism 
and Party Change: The Evolution of West European Communist and Post-
Communist Parties (Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques Socials: ICPS). 
  
278 
Bozóki, A. (2002). ‘Technocratic Modernisation or New Social Democracy?’ in A. 
Bozóki and J. Ishiyama, (eds.), The Communist Successor Parties of Central 
and Eastern Europe (London: Sharpe). 
Bozóki, A. and Ishiyama, J. (eds.) (2002). The Communist Successor Parties of 
Central and Eastern Europe (Sharpe: London).  
Breathnach, C. and Ross, F. (1990). ‘Socialism: a third way’, Making Sense, (Dublin: 
WP), No. 15, pp. 12–18. 
Breathnach, C. et al. (1992). For a mass campaigning socialist party (Dublin: WP).  
Budge, I., Klingemann, H.D., Volkens, A., Bara, J. and Tanenbaum, E. (2006). 
Mapping Policy Preferences II: estimates for Parties, Electors, and 
Governments in Eastern Europe, European Union and OCED 1990–2003 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).  
Budge, I., Klingemann, H.D., Volkens, A., Bara, J. and Tanenbaum, E. (2001). 
Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and 
Governments 1945–1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).  
Bull, M. J. (1995). ‘The West European Communist Movement in the Late Twentieth 
Century’, West European Politics, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 78–97. 
Bull, M. J. (1994). ‘The West European Communist Movement: Past, Present and 
Future’ in M. J. Bull and P. Heywood (eds.), West European Communist 
Parties after the Revolutions of 1989 (London: St. Martin’s Press). 
Bull, M. J. and Heywood, P. (eds.), (1994). West European Communist Parties after 
the Revolutions of 1989 (London: St. Martin’s Press). 
Bunce, V. (2002). ‘The Return of the Left and Democratic Consolidation in Poland 
and Hungary’ in A. Bozóki and J. Ishiyama, (eds.), The Communist Successor 
Parties of Central and Eastern Europe (London: Sharpe). 
Burchell, J. (2001). ‘Evolving or Conforming? Assessing Organisational Reform 
within European Green Parties’, West European Politics, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 
113–134.  
Cabral, M. (1983). ‘The Portuguese Communist Party: the weight of fifty years of 
history’ in H. Machin (ed.), National Communism in Western Europe: a third 
way to socialism? (London: Methuen). 
  
 
 
279 
Calder, C. (1992). ‘An orange sweep: The Portuguese general election of 1991’, West 
European Politics, Vol. 15 No. 2 pp. 167–170. 
Cancio, F. and Almeida, O. (2007). ‘Entrevista a Zita Seabra: Fui uma mulher-a-dias 
do PCP’ in Diário de Notícias, 08.07.07, (Lisbon: Diário de Notícias).  
Carvalhas, C. (2004). Speech by Carlos Carvalhas, General Secretary of the PCP, 
Opening the Seventeenth Party Congress (PCP: Lisbon). Available at: 
http://www.international.pcp.pt/index.php?option=com_content&task=categor
y&sectionid=6&id=14&Itemid=30. Accessed 01.12.09. 
Carvalhas, C. (2000).  Speech by Carlos Carvalhas, General Secretary of the PCP – 
Sixteenth Party Congress, December 2000 (PCP: Lisbon). Available at: 
http://www.international.pcp.pt/index.php?option=com_content&task=categor
y&sectionid=6&id=13&Itemid=31. (Accessed 01.12.09). 
Cedar Lounge: The Left Archive (2008). ‘The Necessity of Social Democracy’ by 
Eoghan Harris, Workers’ Party 1992 (Cedar Lounge: Dublin).  Available at:  
http://cedarlounge.wordpress.com/2008/06/02/the-left-archive-the-necessity-
for-social-democracy/ posted 02.06.08 (Accessed 20.12.09).  
Childs, D. (1980). (ed.), The Changing Face of Western Communism, (London: 
Croom Helm).  
Chotiner, B. A. (2002). ‘Organisational Strength Divorced from Power’ in A. Bozóki 
and J. Ishiyama, (eds.), The Communist Successor Parties of Central and 
Eastern Europe (London: Sharpe). 
Christiansen, F. and Damgaard, E. (2008). ‘Parliamentary Opposition under Minority 
Parliamentarism: Scandinavia’, Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 14, No. 
1/2, pp. 46–76.  
CPN (1984). Partij Program van de CPN: Machts Vorming voor een socialistisch 
Nederland (Amsterdam: CPN).  
CPN (1981). Ontwerp-program van de CPN: Doelstelling en toekomstvisies van de 
Nederlandse communisten (Amsterdam: CPN). 
CPN (1958). Statuten van de CPN (Amsterdam: CPN).  
CPN (1952). Beginselverklaring en statuten der CPN, (Amsterdam: De Waarheid). 
  
280 
Cunha, C. (2008). ‘Few, But Pure and Good Members, are Preferred to a Mass Party: 
the Portuguese Communist Party’s Continued Orthodoxy’ in U. Backes and P. 
Moreau (eds.), Communist and Post-Communist Parties in Europe (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht).  
Cunha, C. (2003). ‘‘‘Mais Portugal! Mais CDU!...Mais PCP?’’ The Portuguese 
Communist Party at the turn of the 21st Century’ in J. Botella and L. Ramiro 
(eds.), The Crisis of Communism and Party Change (Barcelona: ICPS). 
Cunha, C. (1992). The Portuguese Communist Party’s Strategy For Power 1921–
1986 (New York: Garland Publishing). 
Cunha, C (1991). ‘The Portuguese Communist Party and Perestroika: Resistance and 
Reforms’, Current Politics and Economics of Europe, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 157–
171.  
Cunhal, A. (1995). Alvaro Cunhal’s interview to the ‘Quaderni Comunisti (PCP: 
Lisbon). Available at: http://www.pcp.pt/english/. (Accessed 20.12.09). 
Cunhal A. (1988). ‘As the Class Confrontation Mounts’, World Marxist Review, pp. 
19–31. 
Daniels, P. (1989). ‘Communist Parties and the Greens in the European Elections of 
1989’, Journal of Communist Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 189–199.   
De Boer, B., Lucardie, P., Noomen, I., and Voerman, G. (1998). Kroniek 1998 
Overzicht van de partijpolitieke gebeurtenissen van het jarr 1998 (Groningen: 
DNPP).  
De Rossa, P. (1992). Speech Proposing the Reconstitution of the Workers’ Party 
(Dublin: WP). 
De Rossa, P. (1992b). Statement by Proinsias De Rossa TD to meeting of Workers’ 
Party and Comhairle meeting, 22 February, 1992 (Dublin: WP). 
De Rossa, P. (1989). Ard Fheis Annual Delegate Conference 1989: Presidential 
address (Dublin: WP).  
De Rossa, P. and Lynch, S. (1992). Letter to all branch secretaries (Dublin: WP).  
De Rossa, P. and Lynch, S. (1992b). Why there is no alternative to reconstitution 
(Dublin: WP).  
  
 
 
281 
De Sousa, J. (2008). Opening Speech of the General Secretary to the Eighteenth-
Congress of the PCP (Lisbon: PCP). Available at: 
http://www.international.pcp.pt/index.php?option=com_content&task=categor
y&sectionid=6&id=23&Itemid=44. (Accessed 01.12.09). 
De Sousa, J.  (2004). Closing speech by General Secretary Jerónimo de Sousa to the 
Seventeenth Congress of the PCP, (Lisbon: PCP).  Available at: 
http://www.international.pcp.pt/index.php?option=com_content&task=categor
y&sectionid=6&id=14&Itemid=30. (Accessed 01.12.09). 
De Sousa, L. (2001). ‘Political Parties and corruption in Portugal’, West European 
Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1 pp. 157–180. 
Devlin, K. (1982a). Swedish Communists back victorious socialists (Munich: Radio 
Free Europe).  
Devlin, K. (1982b). Dutch CP Congress Strengthens Independent Stand (Munich: 
Radio Free Europe), 28.12.82. 
Devlin, K. (1979). ‘Eurocommunism: Between East and West’, International 
Security, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 81–107. 
Devlin, K. (1977a). The Return of a Maverick (Munich: Radio Free Europe), 
10.05.77. 
Devlin, K. (1977b). ‘The Challenge of Eurocommunism’, Problems of Communism, 
Vol. 26, pp. 1–21. 
Devlin, K. (1972a). New Polemic Embitters Soviet-Dutch Communist Rift (Munich: 
Radio Free Europe), 16.05.72. 
Devlin, K. (1972b). The Independent Dutch Communist (Munich: Radio Free Europe) 
26.05.72. 
Devlin, K. (1969). Swedish Communists’ Congress of Disunity, (Munich: Radio Free 
Europe).  
Devlin, K. (1968). ‘The New Crisis in European Communism’. Problems of 
Communism, Vol. 17, No. 6, pp. 57–68. 
De Witt, R. (1998). ‘Agnes Kant wordt nieuwe fractievoorzitter SP’, Elsevier 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier) 19.06.08. 
Diário de Notícias, (2004). (Lisbon: Diário de Notícias), 24.11.04.  
  
282 
Di-Palma, G. (1977). ‘Eurocommunism?’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 
357–375. 
DNPP (2010). SP Ledentallen (Groningen: DNPP).  Available at: 
 http://www.rug.nl/dnpp/politiekePartijen/sp/documentaireInformatie/lt. 
(Accessed 10.01.10). 
Dooney, T. (1991). ‘The WP’s Democratic Credentials’, Making Sense, (Dublin: 
WP), No. 22, p. 5. 
Dunphy, R. (2006). ‘In Search of an Identity: Finland's Left Alliance and the 
experience of coalition government’. Paper presented to the PSA Specialist 
Group on Communist and Post-Communist Politics: Workshop on ‘The Non-
Social Democratic Left and Government Participation’, University of Sussex. 
Dunphy, R. (2004). Contesting Capitalism: Left parties and European integration 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press). 
Dunphy, R. (1998). ‘A group of individuals trying to do their best: the dilemmas of 
Democratic Left’, Irish Political Studies, No. 13, pp. 50–75. 
Dunphy, R. (1997). ‘The Contradictory Politics of the Official Republican Movement 
1969–1992’ in R. Deutsch (ed.), Les Republicanismes Irlandais (Rennes: 
Presses Universitaires de Rennes).  
Dunphy, R. (1992). ‘The Workers’ Party and Europe: Trajectory of an Idea’, Irish 
Political Studies, No. 7, pp. 21–39. 
Dunphy, R and Hopkins, S. (1992). ‘The organisational and political evolution of the 
Workers’ Party of Ireland’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition 
Politics, No. 8, Vol. 3, pp. 91–118.   
Duverger, M. (1954). Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the 
Modern State (London: Methuen). 
Ed.nl (2007). 03.07.07, Van Bommel: SP kan democratischer (Amsterdam: ED.nl).  
Available at: 
http://www.ed.nl/algemeen/edbinnenland/1829583/Van-Bommel-SP-kan-
democratische, (Accessed 01.12.09). 
Ehmer, J. (1998). ‚Die Kommunistische Partei Österreichs’ in P. Moreau and H. 
Gerhard (eds.), Der Kommunismmus in Westeuropa: Niedergang oder 
  
 
 
283 
Mutation? (Augsburg: Olzog). 
Einaudi, M., Domenach, J. and Garosi, A. (1971). Communism in Western Europe 
(Hamden: Archon). 
Eriksson, G. (2004). ‘Förnyarna starkare än någonsin’, Dagens Nyheter, (Stockholm: 
Dagens Nyheter) 22.02.04. 
Ersson, S. (2004). ‘Post-Communism and Leftist Parties in two Scandinavian 
countries after 1989: the cases of Denmark and Sweden’ in U. Backes (ed.), 
Kommunismus nach dem Zusammenbruch des real existierenden Sozialismus 
(Dresden: Hanah Arendt Institute).   
Ersson, S. (1998). ‘Kommunismus und linke Stömungen in Skandinavien nach 1989: 
Niedergang, Wiederbelebung oder Schwankungen ohne zugrunde liegender 
Tendenz?’ in U. Backes (ed.), Kommunismus nach dem Zusammenbruch des 
real existierenden Sozialismus (Dresden: Hanah Arendt Institute).   
Farrell, D. and Webb, P. (2000). ‘Political Parties as Campaign Organisations’ in R. 
Dalton and M. Wattenberg (eds.), Parties Without Partisans (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
Faucher-King, F. and Treille, E. (2003). ‘Managing Intra-party Democracy: 
Comparing the French Socialist and British Labour Party Conferences’, 
French Politics, Vol. 1, pp. 61–82. 
Fattore, C. and Bohrer, R. (2003). ‘Coincidence or Connection? The Demise of 
Communist Parties and the Rise of the Far Right in Western Europe’.  Paper 
presented at Annual Meeting of the Mid-West Political Science Association, 
Chicago.  
FCO, (1975). Meeting Socialist Leaders, FCO 9/2287 (London: FCO).  
Fennema, M. (1988). ‘The End of Dutch Bolshevism? The Communist Party of the 
Netherlands’ in M. Waller and M. Fennema (eds.), Communist Parties in 
Western Europe: Decline or Adaptation?, (London: Blackwell).  
Flamman, 04.11.04.  ‘Jag var tvungen att säga det ingen annan sa’ (Stockholm: 
Flamman). 
Flamman, 03.06.04. ‘Vänsterpartiet brännmärker Plan B och delar av Vägval vänster’ 
(Stockholm: Flamman). 
  
284 
Flamman, 03.04.04. ‘Uppropet VägVal Vänsters hemliga strategidokument’ 
(Stockholm: Flamman).  
Flamman, 11.03.04. ‘Den som ligger bakom detta måste träda fram!’ (Stockholm: 
Flamman). 
Fraurud, T. (2004). Yes I am a Communist (Stockholm: Ung Vänster).   
Freire, A. and Costa Lobo, M. (2008). ‘The Portuguese 2005 Legislative Election’, 
West European Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3 pp. 581–588.   
Fryatt, D. (1999). ‘Radical captains and militant workers – the Portuguese revolution’, 
Socialism Today, April, No.37.  
Gallagher, M., Mair, P., and Laver, M. (2006). Representative Government in Modern 
Europe (London: McGraw-Hill).  
Gallagher, T. (1988). ‘Twilight Draws Closer for Portugal’s Communists: The 
General Election of 19 July 1987’, Journal of Communist Studies Vol. 4, No. 
1 pp. 90–96. 
Gallagher, T. (1986). ‘Cracks in the Monolith? The Portuguese Communist Party and 
the Portuguese Elections of 1985–86’, Journal of Communist Studies, Vol. 2. 
No. 3 pp. 292–295. 
Gapper, S. (2002). ‘From Eastern European Communist Successor to Western 
European Socialist Party? Germany’s Party of Democratic Socialism in a 
Comparative Context 1990–2002’. DPhil Thesis Institute for German Studies 
(Birmingham: University of Birmingham). 
Garland, S. (1992). ‘Why There is an Alternative, Defend the Party – Defeat the 
Liquidators’, reproduced in The Workers’ Party, Patterns of Betrayal: the 
flight from Socialism, the struggle for the Workers’ Party (Dublin: Repsol). 
Gaspar, C. (1991). ‘Can Communists Survive Communism?’ Camoes Centre 
Quarterly, Vol.  3, No. 5. 
Gaspar, C. (1990). ‘Portuguese Communism since 1976 limited decline’, Problems of 
Communism, Vol. 39, pp. 45–63. 
Gilberg, T. (1980). ‘Communism in the Nordic Countries: Denmark, Norway, Sweden 
and Iceland’, in D. Childs (ed.), The Changing Face of Western Communism 
(London: Croom-Helm).  
  
 
 
285 
Gillan, P. (1997). ‘From the Workers’ Party to Democratic Left: political change and 
the limits of Republicanism’ in R. Deutsch (ed.), Les Republicanismes 
Irlandais (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes).  
Gillan, P. (1992). ‘Utopian illusion which ignores lessons of the past’, The Irish 
Times, (Dublin: The Irish Times), 15.02.92.  
Guardiola, N. (1984). ‘Zita Seabra: Medical and Communist deputy, has been the real 
hero of the battle for the legalisation of abortion in Portugal’, El Pais (Lisbon: 
El Pais), 30.01.84. 
Greene, T. H. (1973). ‘Non-Ruling Communist Parties and Political Adaptation’, 
Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 331–454. 
Greene, T. H. (1968). ‘The Communist Parties of Italy and France: A study in 
Comparative Communism’, World Politics, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 1–38. 
Grix, J. (2004). The Foundations of Research (Basingstoke: Palgrave).  
Groppo, B. (1990). ‘The Italian Communist Party and the CGIL: A Survey’, The 
Journal of Communist Studies, Vol. 6, pp. 52–57. 
Grzymała-Busse, A. (2002). Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of 
Communist Parties in East Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
Hanley, B. (2009 – unpublished paper). ‘Peace, Work and Class Politics’: The 
Workers Party, 1982–1992 (Belfast: Queens University).  
Hanley, B. and Millar, S. (2009). The Lost Revolution: The Story of the Official IRA 
and the Workers’ Party (Dublin: Penguin Ireland).  
Hanley, B. and Millar, S. (2009b). ‘The story of the revolutionaries working inside 
RTE’, The Sunday Times, (London: The Sunday Times), 30.08.09.  
Harmel, R., Heo, U., Tan, A. and Janda, K. (1995). ‘Performance, Leadership, 
Factions and Party Change: An Empirical Analysis’, West European Politics, 
Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 1–33.  
Harmel, R. and Janda, K. (1994). ‘An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party 
Change’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 6 No. 3, pp. 259–287. 
  
286 
Harmel, R. and Tan, A. (2003). ‘Party actors and party change: Does factional 
dominance matter?’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 42, pp. 
409–424.  
Harmsen, G. (1998). ‘Oorspronkelijk Gepubliceerd’, Biographical Dictionary of 
Socialism and the Labor Movement in the Netherlands, No.7, pp. 69–76. 
Harmsen, R. (2005). ‘The Dutch Referendum on the Ratification of the European 
Constitutional Treaty’, European Parties and Elections and Referendums 
Network Referendum Briefing Paper No.13, (Sussex: EPERN).  
Harris, E. (2009). ‘Old Guard Failed to Hear Sound of the Wall Crashing Down’, 
Sunday Independent (Dublin: Sunday Independent), 15.11.09. 
Harris, E. (1990). ‘The Necessity of Social Democracy’, Making Sense, No.15, (Dublin: 
WP) pp. 19–28.   
Hermansson, J. (1988). ‘A New Face for Swedish Communism: The Left Party 
Communists’ in M. Waller and M. Fennema (eds.), Communist Parties in 
Western Europe: Decline or Adaptation? (Oxford: Blackwell).  
Hillebrand, R. and Irwin, G. (1999). ‘Changing strategies: the dilemma of the Dutch 
Labour Party’ in W. Müller, and K. Strøm (eds.), Policy Office or Votes? How 
Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Hippe, J., Lucardie, P. and Voerman, G. (2003). Kroniek 2003 Overzicht van de 
partijpolitieke gebeurtenissen van het jaar 2003 (Groningen: DNPP).  
Holmes, M. (1994). ‘The Establishment of Democratic Left’, Irish Political Studies, 
Vol. 1, No. 9, pp. 148–156. 
Hottinger, A. (1975). ‘The Rise of Portugal’s Communists’, Problems of Communism, 
Vol. 26, pp. 1–17.  
Hough, D. and Handl, V. (2004). ‘The post-Communist left and the European Union: 
The Czech Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) and the 
German Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)’, Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, Vol. 39, pp. 319–339.  
Hough, D., Koβ, M. and Olsen, J. (2007). The Road to Normality? The Left Party in 
Contemporary Germany (London: Palgrave). 
  
 
 
287 
Haughton, T. (2004). ‘Explaining the Limited Success of the Communist Successor 
Left in Slovakia: The Case of the Party of the Democratic Left SDĽ, Party 
Politics, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 177–191. 
Hudson, K. (2000). European Communism since 1989 (London: Macmillan). 
Ishiyama, J. (2005). ‘Political Parties in post-Communist Politics’, Comparative 
European Politics, Vol. 3, pp. 118–127.  
Ishiyama, J. (2001). ‘Party Organisation and the Political Success of the Communist 
Successor Parties’, Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 82, pp. 844–864. 
Ishiyama, J. (2000). ‘Communists after Communism: Adaptation, Electoral 
Performance and the Successor Parties in Comparative Perspective’, Illinois 
Political Science Review, Vol. 6, pp. 50-65.  
Ishiyama, J. (1999). ‘The Communist Successor Parties and Party Organisational 
Development in post-Communist Politics’, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 
52, No. 1, pp. 87–112. 
Ishiyama, J. (1997). ‘The Sickle or the Rose? Previous Regime Types and the 
Evolution of the Ex-Communist Parties in Post-Communist Politics’, 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 299–330. 
Ishiyama, J. (1995). ‘Communist Parties in Transition: Structures, Leaders and 
Processes of Democratisation in Eastern Europe’, Comparative Political 
Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 147–166. 
Ishiyama, J. and Bozóki, A. (2001). ‘Adaptation and Change: Characterising the 
Survival Strategies of the Communist Successor Parties’, Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 33–51. 
Janda, K. (1980). Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey (New York: The Free 
Press). 
Jonsson, G. (2005). ‘Vänsterpartiets främste budgetförhandlare, blev inte ens 
tillfrågad när partistyrelsen lät ta fram ett nytt förslag till ekonomisk politik’, 
Dagens Nyheter (Stockholm: Dagens Nyheter) 27.05.05. 
Jorgenson, T. (2002). ‘Split or Reform? The Danish and Swedish CP’s facing the 
post-Stalin era’ in M. Bracke and T. Jorgensen (eds.), West European 
Communism After Stalinism, EUI Working Paper 2002/4 (Florence: EUI).  
  
288 
Josefsson, J. (2004a). ‘Vänsterns kontakter med östdiktaturerna’, SVT, May 2004 
(Stockholm: SVT). 
Josefsson, J. (2004b). ‘Lars Ohlys syn på demokrati’, SVT, May 2004 (Stockholm: 
SVT).  
Kagie, R. (2004). De socialisten: achter de schermen van de SP (Amsterdam: Mets an 
Schilt). 
Kalyvas, S. and Marantzidis, N. (2005). ‘Communist Dualism: The Greek Communist 
Parties after the Collapse of Communism’ in L. Kopeček, (ed.), Trajectories of 
the Left: Social Democratic and (ex-) Communist Parties in Contemporary 
Europe: Between Past and Future (Brno: ISPO).  
Kalyvas, S. and Marantzidis, N. (2003). ‘The Two Paths of the Greek Communist 
Movement (1985–2001)’, in J. Botella and L. Ramiro (eds.), The Crisis of 
Communism and Party Change: The Evolution of West European Communist 
and Post-Communist Parties (Barcelona: ICPS). 
Katz, R. and Mair, P. (2009). ‘The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement’, Perspectives 
on Politics, No. 7 pp. 753–766.   
Katz, R. and Mair, P. (1995). ‘Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party 
Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party’, Party Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
pp. 5–28. 
Katz, R. and Mair, P. (1992). ‘The Cross-National Study of Party Organisations’ in R. 
Katz and P. Mair (eds.), A Data Handbook on Party Organisations in Western 
Democracies (London: Sage). 
Keith, D. (2010). ‘Ready to get their hands dirty: The Dutch Socialist Party and 
GroenLinks’, in J. Olsen, M. Koβ and D. Hough (eds.), Left Parties in 
National Governments (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).  
Keith, D. (2009). ‘Review of Trajectories of the Left: Social Democratic and (ex-) 
Communist Parties in Contemporary Europe: Between Past and Future’, Party 
Politics, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 397–399. 
Kennedy, F. (2002). ‘The 2002 General Election in Ireland’, Irish Political Studies, 
Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 95–106. 
  
 
 
289 
Keys, D. (2008). ‘Workers’ Party asks Halligan for his seat’, Muster Express 
(Munster: Munster Express), 22.02.08.  
Kitschelt, H. (2002). ‘Constraints and Opportunities in the Strategic Conduct of Post-
Communist Successor Parties’ in A. Bozóki and J. Ishiyama, (eds.), The 
Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe (London: 
Sharpe). 
Kitschelt, H. (1995). ‘Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-communist Democracies: 
Theoretical Propositions’, Party Politics, Vol.1, pp. 447–72. 
Kitschelt, H. (1990). ‘The Medium is the Message: Democracy and Oligarchy in 
Belgian Ecology Parties’ in W. Rüdig (ed.), Green Politics One (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press).  
Kitschelt, H. (1989). ‘The Internal Politics of Parties: The Law of Curvilinear 
Disparity Revisited’, Political Studies, Vol. 37, pp. 400–421. 
Kitschelt, H., Mansfeldova, Z., Markowski, R. and Toka, G. (eds.), (1999). Post-
Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party 
Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Koeneman, L., Lucardie, P. and Noomen, I. (1984). Het partijgebeuren: kroniek van 
de partijpolitieke gebeurtenissen van het jaar 1984 (Groningen: DNPP).  
Koeneman, L., Noomen, I. and Voerman, G. (1988). Kroniek 1988: Overzicht van de 
partijpolitieke gebeurtenissen van het jaar 1988 (Groningen: DNPP).  
Komma Tijdschrift voor politiek en social onderzoek (1985). (Amsterdam: Bevrijding) 
No. 2, Issue 2. 
Komma Tijdschrift voor politiek en social onderzoek (1984). (Amsterdam: Bevrijding) 
No. 4, Issue 3. 
Kool, F. (1961). ‘Communism in Holland’, Problems of Communism, Vol. 9, No. 5, 
pp. 17–24. 
Kopeček, L. (ed.) (2005). Trajectories of the Left: Social Democratic and (ex-) 
Communist Parties in Contemporary Europe: Between Past and Future (Brno: 
ISPO). 
  
290 
Koβ, M. (2010 – forthcoming). ‘Close to, but still out of, government: The Swedish 
Vänsterpartiet’, in J. Olsen, M. Koβ and D. Hough (eds.), Left Parties in 
National Governments (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 
Kox, T. (2007). ‘Twintig jaar SP-partijcongressen Hoofdrol voor de werkelijkheid’, 
Spanning, Vol. 9, No. 9 (Rotterdam: SP). 
Lange, P. and Vannicelli, M. (1981). The Communist Parties of Italy, France and 
Spain: Post-war Change and Continuity (London: Allen & Unwin). 
Lawson, K. (1990). ‘Political Parties Inside and Out’, Comparative Politics, pp. 105–
119. 
Lazar, M. (2002). ‘The Communist and Extreme Left Galaxy’ in P. Perrineau, G. 
Grunberg, and C. Ysmal (eds.), Europe at the Polls: The European Elections 
of 1999 (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 
Lazar, M. (1988). ‘Communism in Western Europe in the 1980s’, Journal of 
Communist Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 242–258. 
Leclerque, C. and Platone, F. (2003). ‘A Painful Moulting: the ‘‘Mutation’’ of the 
French Communist Party’ in J. Botella and L. Ramiro (eds.), The Crisis of 
Communism and Party Change: The Evolution of West European Communist 
and Post-Communist Parties (Barcelona: ICPS). 
Lees, C., Hough, D. and Keith, D. (2010 – forthcoming). ‘Towards an analytical 
framework for party mergers – operationalising the cases of the German Left 
Party and the Dutch GroenLinks’, West European Politics, No. 33.  
Lewis, P. and Webb, P. (2003). Pan-European Perspectives on Party Politics 
(Leiden: Brill).  
Lisi, M. (2009). ‘From movement to party: the rise and success of the Left Bloc’, Pole 
Sud, Vol. 30, pp. 130–160.  
Lisi, M. (2007). ‘The Importance of Winning Office: The PS and the Struggle for 
Power’ in A. Bosco and L. Morlino (eds.), Party Change in Southern Europe 
(London: Routledge). 
The Local:  
– The Local, 07.12.08. ‘Opposition Parties to Build Coalition’, (Stockholm: The 
Local). 
  
 
 
291 
– The Local, 08.10.08. ‘Left Party snubbed by Sahlin and Greens’, (Stockholm: The 
Local).  
– The Local, 11.06.07. ‘Left Party loses out in new poll’, (Stockholm: The Local). 
– The Local, 08.12.04. ‘Media Glee as Schyman Quits Left Party’, (Stockholm: The 
Local). 
Lowry, J. (1992). ‘Appeals for fair play will not help the working class’, The Irish 
Times, 15.02.92 reproduced in The Workers’ Party (pub.), (1992) Patterns of 
Betrayal: the flight from Socialism, the struggle for the Workers’ Party, pp. 
61–63 (Dublin:  Repsol). 
Lowry, J. (1991). ‘A stereotyped picture’, Making Sense, (Dublin: WP), No. 21, pp. 
24–25. 
Lucardie, P. (2007). ‘The Netherlands’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 
46, No. 1, pp. 1041–1048.  
Lucardie, P. (1991). ‘Fragments from the Pillars: Small Parties in the Netherlands’ in 
F. Müller-Rommel and G. Pridham (eds.), Small Parties in Western Europe 
(London: Sage). 
Lucardie, P. (1984). Van Bolsjemisme naar ‘pluriformisme’: de recente 
propgrammatische vernieuwing van de CPN (Groningen: DNPP).   
Lucardie, P. and Voerman, G. (2007). Kroniek 2007 Overzicht van de partijpolitieke 
gebeurtenissen van het jaar 2007 (Groningen: DNPP).  
Lucardie, P. and Voerman, G. (2003). ‘The Organisational Development of Green 
Left’ in J. Botella and L. Ramiro (eds.), The Crisis of Communism and Party 
Change: The Evolution of West European Communist and Post-Communist 
Parties (Barcelona: ICPS). 
Lucardie, P. and Voerman, G. (1989). Kroniek 1989: Overzicht van de partijpolitieke 
gebeurtenissen van het jaar 1989 (Groningen: DNPP).  
Lucardie, P., Bredewold, M., Voerman, G. and van de Walle, N. (2006). Kroniek 
2006: Overzicht van de partijpolitieke gebeurtenissen van het jaar 2006 
(Groningen: DNPP). 
Lucardie, P., van der Knoop, J., van Schuur, W. and Voerman, G. (1995). ‘Greening 
the Reds or Reddening the Greens?: The Case of the Green Left in the 
  
292 
Netherlands’ in W. Rüdig (ed.), Green Politics Three (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press).  
Lucardie, P., Nieboer M. and Noomen, I. (1990). Kroniek 1990: Overzicht van de 
partijpolitieke gebeurtenissen van het jaar 1990 (Groningen: DNPP).  
Lucardie, P., van Schuur, W. and Voerman, G. (1999). Verloren Illusie, Geslaagde 
Fusie? GroenLinks in Historisch en Politicologisch Perspectief  (Groningen: 
DSWO Press). 
Lucardie, P., Voerman, G. and van Schuur, W. (1993). ‘Different Shades of Green: A 
Comparison between Members of Groen Links and De Groenen’, 
Environmental Politics, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 40–62. 
Lundell, K. (2004). ‘Determinants of Candidate Selection: The Degree of 
Centralisation in Comparative Perspective’, Party Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 
25–47. 
MacGiolla, T. (1992). ‘I will not buy a pig in a poke’, reproduced in The Workers’ 
Party (pub.), Patterns of Betrayal: the flight from Socialism, the struggle for 
the Workers’ Party (Dublin: Repsol). 
Machin, H. (ed.), (1983). National Communism in Western Europe (London: 
Methuen).  
Mackie, T. and Rose, R. (1974). ‘General Elections in Western Nations During 1973’, 
European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 2, pp. 293–298. 
Madeley, J. (1993). ‘Death and Taxes: The Waning of Swedish Social Democracy’, 
Government and Opposition, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 118–125.    
Magone, J. (2006). ‘Portugal’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 45, pp. 
1247–1253.   
Magone, J. (2005). ‘Portugal’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 44, pp. 
1158–1166. 
Magone, J. (2004). ‘Portugal’ European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 43, pp. 
1116–1120.   
Mahoney, J. (2000). ‘Path Dependence in Historical Sociology’, Theory and Society, 
Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 507–548.   
Mair, P. and Mudde, C. (1998). ‘The Party Family and its Study’, Annual Review of 
  
 
 
293 
Political Science, Vol. 1, pp. 211–29. 
Mair, P. and van Biezen, I. (2001). ‘Party Membership in Twenty European 
Democracies 1980–2000’, Party Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 5–21.    
Maor, M. (1998). Parties, Conflicts and Coalitions in Western Europe: 
Organisational Determinants of Coalition Bargaining (London, Routledge). 
Marão, (2008). ‘Jerónimo de Sousa fecha portaa ‘‘entendimentos artificiais’’ com PS 
e Bloco’ (Lisbon: Marão), 01.12.08.  
March, L. and Mudde, C. (2005). ‘What’s Left of the Radical Left? The European 
Radical Left After 1989: Decline and Mutation’, Comparative European 
Politics, Vol. 3, pp. 23–49. 
Mareš, M. (2005). ‘Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and its Attitude 
towards its own History’ in L. Kopeček (ed.), Trajectories of the European 
Left (Brno: IPSO). 
March, L. (2008). Contemporary Far Left Parties in Europe: From Marxism to the 
Mainstream? (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung). 
Marsh, D. and Furlong, P. (2002). ‘A Skin not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology 
in Political Science’, in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds.), Theory and Methods in 
Political Science (second edition) (London: Palgrave Macmillan).  
May, J. D. (1973). ‘Opinion Structure of Political Parties: the special law of 
curvilinear disparity’, Political Studies, Vol. 21, pp. 135–51. 
McCarthy, J. P. (2009). ‘Lost chance to write the Workers’ Party history’, Irish 
Sunday Independent, (Dublin: Sunday Independent), 08.11.09. 
McGiffen, S. (2007). ‘Human beings and hard work the secret of Europe’s most 
successful left party’, Spectrezine, 03.01.07.  
McInnes, N. (1975). The Communist Parties of Western Europe (London: Oxford 
University Press). 
Middlemass, K. (1980). Power and the Party (London: Trinity).  
Möller, T. (2007). ‘Sweden: Still a Stable Party System?’ in K. Lawson and P. Merkl 
(eds.), When Parties Prosper: the uses of electoral success (London: Reinner).  
  
294 
Möller, T. (1998). ‘The Swedish Election 1998: A protest Vote and the Birth of a 
New Political Landscape’, Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 
261–276.  
Moreau, P. (ed.), (1998). Der Kommunismmus in Westeuropa: Niedergang oder 
Mutation? (Augsburg: Olzog).  
Mortimer, E., Filo della Torre, P. and Story, J. (1979). ‘Whatever Happened to 
‘‘Eurocommunism’?’’, International Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 574–585. 
Mudde, C. (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press).  
Mujal-Leon, E. (1977). ‘The PCP and the Portuguese Revolution’, Problems of 
Communism, Vol. 26, Jan-Feb, pp. 31–34.  
Mullan, M. (2002). ‘João Amaral’. Available at: 
   http://www.grijalvo.com/Mullan/b_Amaral_eng.html. (Accessed 01.12.09). 
Müller, W. and Strøm, K. (eds.), (1999). Policy Office or Votes? How Political 
Parties in Western Europe make Hard Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
Murphy, G. (1997). ‘The 1997 general election in the Republic of Ireland’, Irish 
Political Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 127–134.  
Narkiewicz, O. (1990). The End of the Bolshevik Dream: Western European 
Communist parties in the late twentieth century (London: Routledge). 
Narciso, R. (2007). Álvaro Cunhal e a Dissidência da Terceira Via (Coimbra: 
Coimbra). 
Newell, J. (2000). Parties and Democracy in Italy (Aldershot: Ashgate). 
Norris, P. (1995). ‘May's Law of Curvilinear Disparity Revisited: Leaders, Officers, 
Members and Voters in British Political Parties’, Party Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
pp. 29–47. 
Norris, P. and Lovenduski, J. (2004). ‘Why Parties Fail to Learn: Electoral Defeat, 
Selective Participation and British Party Politics,’ Party Politics, Vol. 10, No. 
1, pp. 85–104.  
  
 
 
295 
O’Hagen, D. (1992). For Party Unity, Class Politics and Socialism: speech to party 
members and supporters in Dundalk, Co Louth, 11 February 1992 (Dublin: 
WP).  
Olsen, J., Koβ, M. and Hough, D. (eds.), (2010 – forthcoming). Left Parties in 
National Governments (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 
Olsen, J. and Hough, D. (2006). ‘Is There a ‘Rot-Rosa’ Model of Government?’, 
Paper Presented at Annual Meeting of the German Studies Association, 
Pitttsburg, 28 September–1 October. 
Olsen, S. (1986). ‘Swedish Communism poised between old reds and new Greens’, 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 359–
379.  
O’Neil, L. (1998). ‘All for one and one for all’, The Examiner, 14.12.98, p.5.   
Orenstein, M. (1998). ‘A Genealogy of Communist Successor Parties in East-Central 
Europe and the determinants of their success’, East European Politics and 
Societies, Vol. 12, pp. 472–499.  
Panebianco, A. (1988). Political Parties: Organisation and Power (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Patricio, M. T. (1990). ‘Industrialisation and Communism: the Portuguese Communist 
Party Confronts the Sines Growth Pole’, Journal of Communist Studies, Vol. 
6, No. 3, pp. 44–61. 
Patricio, M. T. and Stoleroff A. D. (1994). ‘The Portuguese Communist Party: 
Perestroika and its Aftermath’ in M. Bull and P. Heywood (eds.), West 
European Communist Parties after the revolutions of 1989 (London: 
Palgrave). 
Patricio, M.T. and Stoleroff, A.D. (1993). ‘The Portuguese Communist Party: Loyalty 
to the ‘‘Communist Ideal’’’ in D. S. Bell (ed.) Western European Communists 
and the collapse of Communism (Oxford: Berg). 
Patterson, H. (1989). The Politics of Illusion: Republicanism and Socialism in Modern 
Ireland (London: Radius). 
PCP (2009). History of Party Congresses (Lisbon: PCP). Available at: 
  
296 
http://www.international.pcp.pt/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&i
d=22&Itemid=29. (Accessed 15.11.09). 
PCP (2008a). Eighteenth-Congress Congress Theses (Lisbon: PCP), available at: 
http://www.international.pcp.pt/index.php?option=com_content&task=categor
y&sectionid=6&id=23&Itemid=44. (Accessed 15.11.09). 
PCP (2008b). Eighteenth-Congress list for the Central Committee (Lisbon: PCP). 
Available at: 
http://www.pcp.pt/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=32942&Ite
mid=769. (Accessed 15.11.09). 
PCP (2006). Programme and Constitution (Lisbon: PCP). Available at: 
http://www.international.pcp.pt. (Accessed 15.11.09).  
PCP (2005). Statement of the Secretariat: The Government’s turn to the Right 
Deepens (Lisbon: PCP). 
PCP (2004a). Seventeenth-Congress Theses (Lisbon: PCP). Available at:  
http://www.international.pcp.pt/index.php?option=com_content&task=categor
y&sectionid=6&id=14&Itemid=30. (Accessed 20.11.09). 
PCP (2004b). Seventeenth-Congress CC (Lisbon: PCP). Available at: 
http://www.pcp.pt/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=20&Itemi
d=563. (Accessed 12.11.09). 
PCP (2002). Statement of the Secretariat 01.7.02. and 20.6.02 (Lisbon: PCP). 
Available at: 
http://www.pcp.pt/english/sc20020720.htm. (Accessed 17.11.09). 
PCP (2000a). Sixteenth-Congress Theses (Lisbon: PCP). Available at: 
 http://www.international.pcp.pt/index.php?option=com_content&task=categor
y&sectionid=6&id=13&Itemid=31. (Accessed 10.10.09). 
PCP (2000b). Sixteenth-Congress CC (Lisbon: PCP). Available at: 
 http://www.pcp.pt/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=88&Itemi
d=562. (Accessed 10.10.09). 
PCP (1996). Fifteenth Congress CC (Lisbon: PCP). Available at: 
  
 
 
297 
http://www.pcp.pt/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=122&Item
id=195. (Accessed 12.11.09). 
PCP (1974). Programa E Estastutos do PCP 1974 (Lisbon: Avante). 
Peil (2009). ‘Nieuw Haags Peil van 5 September 2009’. Available at: 
https://n6.noties.nl/peil.nl/ (Accessed 01.09.09).  
Pereira, J. (1988). ‘A case of Orthodoxy: The Communist Party of Portugal’ in M. 
Waller, and M. Fenemma, (eds.), Communist Parties in Western Europe: 
Decline or Adaptation? (London: Blackwell). 
Pettitt, R. T. (2004). ‘The Members and the Message: membership influence on party 
policy in Western Europe’.  Paper presented to The Political Studies 
Association of the United Kingdom Annual Conference. 
Politieke Barometer (2010). Politieke Barometer Week 04–28 januari 2010. Available 
at: http://www.politiekebarometer.nl/rss_feed.cfm?uid=378 (Accessed 
16.02.10). 
Power, B (1997). Eoghan Harris out of the shadows (Dublin: Magill). Available at:  
 http://www.indymedia.ie/article/81368?search_text=Eoghan+Harris (Accessed 
20.12.09). 
Publico, (Lisbon Publico): 
– ‘Edgar Correia diz que saída de Carvalhas foi imposta pela direcção do PCP’, 
20.08.05. 
– ‘PCP: renovador Lopes Guerreiro divide delegados entre vaias e aplausos’, 
27.11.04. 
– ‘Quem é quem no PCP?’, 26.11.04a.  
– ‘Entre o líder omnipotente eo relações públicas’, 26.11.04b. 
– ‘Carvalho da Silva descontente com escolha de Jerónimo de Sousa’, 19.11.04. 
– ‘PCP: Edgar Correira questiona “legitimidade democrática” da escolha de 
Jerónimo de Sousa’, 17.11.04. 
– ‘Direcção do PCP propõe voto secreto para eleger Comité Central’, 20.10.04. 
– ‘Carlos Carvalhas abandona liderança do PCP’, 05.10.04. 
  
298 
Raby, D. (1989). ‘The Twelfth Congress of the Portuguese Communist Party’, 
Journal of Communist Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 220–222. 
Radio Noticias, (2002). 14.04.02 (Lisbon, Radio Noticias).  
Ramiro, L. (2005). ‘Programmatic Adaptation and Organisational Centralisation in 
the AP-PP’, South European Society and Politics, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 207–
223. 
Ramiro, L. (2003). ‘The Crisis of Western Communist Parties: Reconsidering Socio-
Structural Explanations’. Comparative Politics Workshop, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago). 
Ramiro, L. (2002). Electoral Incentives and Organisational Limits: The Evolution of 
the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) and the United Left (IU), (Barcelona: 
Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials – ICPS), Working Paper No. 209. 
Renovação Comunista (2007). Estatutos da Renovação Comunista (Lisbon: 
Renovação Comunista). Available at: http://www.comunistas.info/?no=2020. 
(Accessed 10.12.09). 
Renovação Comunista (2003). Manifesto da Renovação Comunista (Lisbon: 
Renovação Comunista), Available at:  
 http://www.comunistas.info/?no=8600;ano=2003;mes=5;i=70. (Accessed 
10.12.09). 
Rosenburg, E. and Valk, G. (2007). ‘The SP is democratic says SP’, NRC 
(Amsterdam: NRC), 21.07.07.  
Santamaria, Y. (1990). ‘The French Communist Party and the CGT: Problems of 
Adaptation’, The Journal of Communist Studies, Vol. 6, pp. 58–79. 
Scarrow, S. (1994). ‘The ‘‘paradox of enrolment’’: assessing the costs and benefits of 
party memberships’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 25, pp. 41–
60.  
Smith, O. (1993). ‘The Greek Communist Party in the Post-Gorbachev Era’, in D. S. 
Bell (ed.), Western European Communists and the Collapse of Communism 
(Oxford: Berg).  
Socialism Today, (1998). ‘Sweden Votes Left as Left Party Moves Right’, Socialism 
Today, No. 33, 01.11.98.  
  
 
 
299 
Socialistiese Partij, (1991a). Handvest 2000 (Rotterdam: SP). 
Socialistiese Partij, (1991b). Statuten en Huishoudelijk Reglement (Rotterdam: SP).  
Socialistiese Partij, (1987). Beginselen van de Socialistiese Partij: Algenmeen 
Geschienis en Klassenstrijd (Rotterdam: SP). 
Socialistiese Partij, (1976). Statuten van de Socialistiese Partij (Rotterdam: SP).  
Socialistiese Partij, (1974). Beginselen van de Socialistiese Partij: Vastgesteld door 
het Tweede Partijkongres 2 en 3 Februari 1974 in Nijmegen (Rotterdam: SP). 
Socialistische Partij, (2009a). ‘Brief history of the SP’ (Rotterdam: SP). Available at: 
  http://www.sp.nl/nieuws/spanning/200710/de_congressen.shtml.  
(Accessed 01.12.09). 
Socialistische Partij, (2009b). De partijraad van de SP (Rotterdam: SP). Available at: 
  http://www.sp.nl/partij/partijraad/. (Accessed 01.12.09).  
Socialistische Partij, (2006). Een beter Nederland, voor hetzelfde geld: 
Verkiezingsprogramma van de SP, 2006–2010 (Rotterdam: SP). 
Socialistische Partij, (2003). Statuten van de SP (Rotterdam: SP).  
Socialistische Partij, (2002). Socialistische Partij: Eerste Wed Links (Rotterdam: SP). 
Socialistische Partij, (1999). Heel de mens (Rotterdam: SP).  
Socialistische Partij, (1998). TEGENGAS! Verkiezingsprogramma van de 
Socialistische Partij 1998–2002 (Rotterdam: SP). 
Sparring, A. (1973). ‘The Communist Party of Sweden’ in A. Upton (ed.), The 
Communist Parties of Scandinavia and Finland (London: Redwood).  
Sparring, A. (1964). ‘Sweden’, in W. Griffith (ed.), Communism in Europe, Vol. 2, 
(Cambridge: Mass). 
Staar, R. (1990). ‘Checklist of Communist Parties in 1990’, Problems of Communism, 
Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 75–84.  
Staar, R. (1989). ‘Checklist of Communist Parties in 1989’, Problems of Communism, 
Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 47–68. 
Staar, R. (1988). ‘Checklist of Communist Parties in 1987’, Problems of Communism, 
Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 70–76.   
  
300 
Staar, R. (1987). ‘Checklist of Communist Parties in 1986’, Problems of Communism, 
Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 40–56. 
Staar, R. (1985). ‘Checklist of Communist Parties in 1984’, Problems of Communism, 
Vol. 34, No. 2 pp. 80–101.  
Staar, R. (1981). ‘Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts in 1980’, Problems of 
Communism, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 88–92. 
Stratton, B. (2000). ‘Summary’ translation of J.W. Stutje, De man die de weg wees. 
Leven en werk van Paul de Groot 1899–1986 (Amsterdam: De Bezige). 
Suiter, J. (2007). ‘The Irish Dáil Election 2007’, Irish Political Studies, Vol. 23, No. 
1, pp. 99–110.  
SVT, (2004). ‘Dokument från reportaget om(v)’ (Stockholm: SVT). Available at: 
  http://svt.se/svt/jsp/Crosslink.jsp?d=15777&a=264856. (Accessed 06.06.09). 
Swan, S. (2008). Official Irish Republicanism 1962 to 1972 (London:  Lulu).  
Szczerbiak, A. and Taggart, P. (eds.), (2008). Case Studies and Country Studies, 
Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Vol.1 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).  
Takayasu, K. (2004). ‘Prime-Ministerial Studies and the Comparative Method’, The 
Hokkaido Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 1377–1382. 
Tannahill, R. (1978). The Communist Parties of Western Europe: A Comparative 
Study (Connecticut: Greenwood Press).  
Tannahill, R. (1976). ‘Leadership as a Determinant of Diversity in Western European 
Communism’, Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 346–
368. 
Tansey, O. (2006). ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-
Probability Sampling’, Nuffield College Working Paper Series in Politics 
(Oxford: Nuffield). 
Tarschys, D. (1974). ‘The Unique Role of the Swedish CP’, Problems of Communism, 
May-June, pp. 36–44. 
Timmermann, H. (1979). ‘The Eurocommunists and the West’, Problems of 
Communism, Vol. 28, pp. 31–54. 
Urban, G. R. (1978). Eurocommunism: its roots and future in Italy and elsewhere 
  
 
 
301 
(London: Temple Smith). 
Van Biezen, I. (2000a). ‘On the Internal Balance of Party Power: Party Organisations 
in New Democracies’, Party Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 395–417.  
Van Biezen, I. (2000b). ‘Party Financing in New Democracies’, Party Politics, Vol. 6, 
No. 3, pp. 329–342.  
Van der Linden, M. and Wormer, J. (1989). ‘The end of a Tradition: Structural 
Developments and Trends in Dutch Communism’, Journal of Communist 
Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 79–87. 
Van der Steen, P. (1994). ‘De doorbraak van de “gewone mensen”-partij: De SP en de 
Tweede-Kamerverkiezingen’, in J. Hippe, P. Hippe, P. Lucardie and G. 
Voerman (eds.), Kroniek 1994: Overzicht van de partijpolitieke 
gebeurtenissen van het jaar 1994 (Groningen: DNPP).  
Vänsterpartiet, (2008). Party Programme 2008: A Socialist and Feminist Party 
(Stockholm: Vänsterpartiet).  
Vänsterpartiet, (2004). Party Programme 2004: A Socialist and Feminist Party 
(Stockholm: Vänsterpartiet). 
Vänsterpartiet, (2001). Stadgefrågor diskuterade pa Vänsterpartiet partikongresser 
1990–2000, (Stockholm: Vänsterpartiet). 
Vänsterpartiet, (1997). Feminism and Socialism: The Left Party Programme on 
Women’s Policies (Stockholm: Vänsterpartiet).  
Vänsterpartiet, (1996). Partiprogram and stadgar 1996 (Stockholm: Vänsterpartiet). 
Vänsterpartiet, (1993). For en solidarisk värld: partiprogram (Stockholm: 
Vänsterpartiet).  
Vänsterpartiet, (1990). Socialism Ivär tid (Stockholm: Vänsterpartiet).  
Van Holsteyn, J. (2007). ‘The Dutch Parliamentary Elections of 2006’, West 
European Politics, Vol. 30, No. 5, pp. 1139–1147.  
Van Kessel, S. and Crum, B. (2009). ‘The European Parliament Elections in the 
Netherlands’, 4 June 2009, European Parties, Elections and Referendums 
Network, European Parliament Election Briefing Paper No. 28, (Sussex: 
EPERN).  
  
302 
Varela, R. (2008). ‘The Portuguese Communist Party in the Carnation Revolution’. 
Paper presented to the European Social Science History Conference, Lisbon 
26 February–1 March. 
Verge, T. (2007). ‘From Outsider Confrontation to Partnership Appeals: the Case of 
the United Left and the End of the Spanish Exception’. Paper presented at the 
57th Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association, University of 
Bath. 
Verney, S. (1989). ‘Compromesso Storico’: Reunion and Renewal on the Greek Left, 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 200–
206. 
Voerman, G. (2008). ‘The Disappearance of Communism in the Netherlands’ in U. 
Backes and P. Moreau (eds.), Communist and Post-Communist Parties in 
Europe (Gottingen: Vandenoek and Ruprecht).  
Voerman, G. (2007a). ‘Hoe Mao moeiteloos werd ingeruild voor Jezus’, Trouw, 
28.04.07. 
Voerman, G. (2007b). ‘Ten strijde tegen de eigen geest’, Socialisme & Democratie, 
Vol. 64, No.7–8, pp. 43–51. 
Voerman, G. (2007c) ‘SP moet partiorgansisatie aanpassen’, NRC, 16.7.2007. 
Voerman, G. (2007d). ‘De congressen van de Nederlandse politieke partijen’, 
Spanning, Vol. 9, No. 9. 
Voerman, G. (2006). Partijcultuur in Nederland: Naar nieuwe invalshoeken in de 
studie van de politieke partij (Groningen: DNPP). 
Voerman, G. (2004). ‘Een politieke kameleon: over het aanpassingsvermogen van de 
Socialistische Partij in Nederland’, Vlaams marxistisch tijdschrift, Vol. 38, 
No. 1, pp. 48–58. 
Voerman, G.  (2002). ‘De ideologische overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen PvdA 
en SP’, Roodkoper Tijdschrift voor cultuur, religie en politiek, No. 7, Vol. 2, 
pp. 8–12. 
Voerman, G. (1998). ‘Snelle groei SP heeft risicos’, de Volkskrant, 16.02.98.  
  
 
 
303 
Voerman, G. (1995). ‘The Netherlands: Losing Colours, Turning Green’, in D. 
Richardson and C. Rootes (eds.), The Green Challenge: The Development of 
Green Parties in Europe (London: Routledge).  
Voerman, G. (1994a). ‘Een partij voor ‘‘gewone mensen’’ Bij het parlementaire 
debuut van de SP’, Politiek and Cultuur, No. 54, Vol. 2, pp. 3–9. 
Voerman, G. (1994b). ‘PvdA hoeft SP-succes niet gelaten te accepteren’, Lokaal 
Bestuur, No. 18, Vol. 6, pp. 4–7.  
Voerman, G. (1993). “‘Premature Perestroika”: The Dutch Communist Party and 
Gorbachev’ in D. S. Bell (ed.), Western European Communists and the 
Collapse of Communism (Oxford: Berg). 
Voerman, G. (1992). ‘‘‘The Netherlands’’ Green Paradoxes’, Capitalism, Nature, 
Socialism: A Journal of Socialist Ecology, Vol. 3, No. 11, pp. 19–26. 
Voerman, G. (1991). ‘‘‘Away with all your Superstitions!’’: The End of Communism 
in the Netherlands’, Journal of Communist Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 460–
476.   
Voerman, G. (1990). ‘Le Retour du Communisme au sein du Parlement Néerlandais’, 
Communisme Revue d'Etudes Pluridisciplinaires, No. 26–27, pp. 109–113. 
Voerman, G. (1989a). ‘‘‘Now, away with all your superstitions’’: The De-
Leninisation of the CPN and its causes’. Paper presented at the European 
Consortium for Political Research, Paris 10–15 April.  
Voerman, G. (1989b). ‘The CPN between Adaptation and Separation: Dutch 
Communism and the International Communist Movement 1945–1970’. Paper 
presented at the Research group on Western European Communism Paris, 28–
30 September.  
Voerman, G. (1986). ‘De Rode Jehova’s Een geschiedenis van de Socialistiese Partij’ 
in L. Koeneman, P. Lucardie and I. Noomen (eds.), Kroniek Overzicht van de 
partijpolitieke gebeurtenissen van het jaar 1986 (Groningen:  DNPP).  
Voerman, G. and Lucardie, P. (2007). Sociaal-democratie nu definitief verdeeld: Met 
volwassen SP is het abonnement van de PvdA op de linkse stem verlopen 
(Groningen: DNPP).  
  
304 
Voerman, G. and van Schuur, W. (1995). ‘‘‘David en Goliath?’’ Over de SP en de 
PvdA’, Socialisme and Democratie, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 86–92. 
Voerman, G. and Wormer, J. (1997). ‘De ledentallen zijn ontleend aan de CPN in 
cijfers, 1909–1991’, in M. Schrevel and G. Voerman, (eds.), De 
communistische erfenis: Bibliografie en bronnen betreffende de CPN 
(Amsterdam: IISH).  
Vollaard, H. and Boer, B. (2006). ‘Euroscepticism in the Netherlands’. Paper 
presented at EpsNet conference, Central European University, Budapest, 16–
17 June.  
Von Beyme, K. (1985). Political Parties in Western Democracies (London: Gower).  
Von Beyme, K. (1975). ‘A Comparative View of Democratic Centralism’, 
Government and Opposition, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 260–277. 
VPK, (1987). Parti-program Antaget av Vänsterpartiet Kommunisternas 28 Kongress 
(Stockholm: VPK).  
VPK, (1977). Parti-Program for Vänsterpartiet kommunisterna, (Gothenburg: VPK).  
Waller, M. (1995). ‘Adaptation of the Former Communist Parties of Former East 
Central Europe: A Case of Social Democratisation?’, Party Politics, Vol. 1, 
No. 4, pp. 473–490.  
Waller, M. (1989). ‘The Radical Sources of the Crisis in West European Communist 
Parties’, Political Studies, Vol. 37, pp. 39–61. 
Waller, M. (1988). ‘Democratic Centralism: The Costs of the Discipline’ in M. Waller 
and M. Fennema (eds.), Communist Parties in Western Europe: Decline or 
Adaptation? (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 
Waller, M. (1981). Democratic Centralism: An Historical Commentary (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press). 
Waller, M. and Fennema, M. (eds.), (1988). Communist Parties in Western Europe: 
Decline or Adaptation? (Oxford, Basil Blackwell). 
Webb, P. and Fisher, J. (2001). ‘Professionalising the Millbank Tendency: The 
Political Sociology of New Labour’s Employees’. Sussex European Institute 
Working Paper in Contemporary European Studies, No. 47, (Sussex: SEI).  
  
 
 
305 
Welsh, H. (1994). ‘Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe’, 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 26, pp. 379-391.  
Widfeldt, A. (2006). ‘Sweden’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 45, pp. 
1270–1274.  
Widfeldt, A. (2005). ‘Sweden’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 44, pp. 
1195–1202.  
Widfeldt, A. (2004). ‘Sweden’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 43, pp. 
1144–50.  
Wilson, F. (1992). ‘Communism at the Crossroads: Changing Roles in Western 
Democracies’, Problems of Communism, pp. 95–106. 
Wilson, R. (1992). ‘Official Divorce’, Fortnight, pp. 6–7.  
Wilson, F. (1980). ‘Sources of Party Transformation: The Case of France’ in P. Merkl 
(ed.), Western European Party Systems: Trends and Prospects (New York: 
Free Press). 
Westlake, M. (2000). Leaders of Transition (New York: St Martin’s Press). 
Woodworth, P. (1991). ‘On the Outside Looking in’, Making Sense, No. 20, pp. 10–
12.  
The Workers’ Party, (2008). We want a Europe fit for Workers (Dublin: WP).  
The Workers’ Party, (1992). Patterns of Betrayal: the flight from Socialism, the 
struggle for the Workers’ Party (Dublin: Repsol). 
The Workers’ Party, (1991). Freedom Democracy and Equality: Draft Programme 
(Dublin: WP).  
The Workers’ Party, (1976). The Irish Industrial Revolution (Dublin: WP). 
Yeates, P. (2009). ‘A Revolutionary Janus’. Available at:  
http://www.drb.ie/more_details/09-11-
15/A_Revolutionary_Janus.aspxPadraigYeates. 
(Accessed 20.12.09).  
Ziblatt, D. and Biziouras, N. (2002). ‘Doomed to be radicals?’, in A. Bozóki and J. 
Ishiyama, (eds.), The Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern 
Europe (London: Sharpe). 
  
306 
List of Interviewees 
 
Chapter Two: The PCP 
 Arsénio Nunes, J., member of the Lisbon intellectual sector: 22.08.08, 
25.08.08. 
 Brito, C., former member of the Secretariat: 15.10.08, 25.10.08.  
 Cunha, C., political scientist: 09.04.08, 15.07.08.  
 Dias, V., former member of Political Commission: 18.09.08.  
 Diniz, F., member of the PCP’s Lisbon intellectual sector: 18.09.08.  
 Fidalgo, P., Director Renovaçao Communista: 10.09.08, 08.04.09.    
 Figueiredo, I., MEP: 09.04.08.  
 Guerreiro, P. MEP: 09.04.08.  
 Hespanha, A., former member of the intellectual sector: 04.05.09.  
 Moreira, V., MEP, former PCP parliamentarian, member of Constitutional 
Court:  13.09.09, 10.10.09. 
 Oliveria, D., former member of JCP: 10.10.09, 15.10.09.  
 Portas, M., former member of UEC, MEP for BE: 10.07.08.  
 Semedo, J., former CC member, parliamentarian for BE: 08.10.09, 15.10.09.  
 Varela R., historian: 22.08.08.  
 
Chapter Three: The SP 
 Beekers, H., member of Party Board: 17.06.09. 
 Bommel, H., van, parliamentarian: 28.04.08, 25.06.09.  
 Denkers, R., former regional leader, Drenthe: 06.07.09. 
 Dunphy, R., political scientist: 29.08.08. 
  
 
 
307 
 Futselaar, F., local Chair Zwolle: 28.04.09.  
 Harmes, G., provincial representative: 17.04.09.  
 Kagie, R., Editor of Vrij Nederland: 29.06.09. 
 Kox, T., Senator: 05.05.08, 12.02.09. 
 Kwisthout, J., former Board member: 20.06.09.  
 Lucas, M., former GroenLinks Councillor: 03.09.08. 
 Lucardie, P., political scientist: 10.04.08. 
 Luijendijk, J., former local Councillor:  30.06.09. 
 Meijer, E., MEP: 10.09.08. 
 Platvoet, L., GroenLinks Senator: 09.04.08. 
 Roovers, K., party functionary: 10.09.08. 
 Roovers, R., former Board member: 01.10.08. 
 Twisterling, M., former local Councillor: 20.05.09. 
 Verhey, E., former Editor of Tribune: 30.06.09. 
 Voerman, G., political scientist: 09.07.09.  
 Vroomen, W. de, former Board member: 20.04.09. 
 
Chapter Four: V 
 Bäckström, L., former parliamentarian: 09.09.08.  
 Britt-Svensson, E., MEP: 10.09.08 
 Einarsson, M., former parliamentarian, 29.09.07, 09.6.08.  
 Esbati, A., former Chair of the Programme Commission: 07.08.07, 15.08.07, 
10.10.07, 08.09.08. 
 Etzler, A., Editor of Flamman 25.07.07, 13.06.08. 
  
308 
 Hermansson, S., former MEP, 20.07.08.  
 Hoffman, U., former Party Chair: 21.06.08. 
 Holm, J., MEP: 16.06.07, 02.07.07. 
 Larsson, K., parliamentarian: 28.09.07, 03.10.07 12.06.08, 20.06.08, 13.12.08. 
 Lindahl, J., Information Office Director: 16.04.08.  
 Livh A.M., Board member: 16.10.07. 
 Lönnroth, J., former Vice-Chair: 04.08.06, 27.09.07, 15.10.07, 16.04.08, 
08.06.08. 
 Ohly, L., Party Chair: 17.6.08. 
 Palmer, B., political scientist: 16.08.07.  
 Schmidt, H., former MEP: 25.6.08. 
 Schyman, G., Former Chair: 16.08.07. 
 Sjöstedt, J., Former MEP: 02.07.07, 11.09.07, 11.06.08, 18.06.08, 25.06.08, 
06.22.09.  
 Tännsjö, T., former member of the Programme Commission: 15.08.07, 
14.06.08.  
 
Chapter Five: The WP and DL  
 Breathnach, C., former Councillor: 16.12.09.  
 Byrne, E., former parliamentarian: 02.09.08. 
 De Rossa, P., former WP/DL Party President, MEP: 04.06.07, 10.9.08. 
 Dunphy, R., political scientist: 25.08.08, 04.09.08. 
 Gallagher, P., former parliamentarian: 17.06.08.  
 Gillan, P., former Editor of Making Sense: 26.06.08. 
 Hanley, B., political scientist: 22.12.09.  
  
 
 
309 
 Harris, E., former Research Section functionary: 25.01.09. 
 Heffernan, T., former WP General Secretary: 25.08.08, 26.08.08. 
 Lowry, J., WP General Secretary: 06.07.09. 
 Mc Mahon, M., former WP Executive Political Committee member, 
Councillor: 25.09.09.  
 Mannion, P., Research Officer WP: 30.10.08. 
 Rabbitte, P., parliamentarian: 20.08.08. 
 
Chapter Six: The CPN 
 Brouwer, I., former parliamentary leader: 08.04.08.  
 De Boer, A., former Board member: 08.04.08, 12.03.09.  
 De Roo, A., former GroenLinks MEP: 21.02.09. 
 Ernsting, M., former parliamentarian: 20.03.08, 15.11.08.  
 Izeboud, E., former Party Chair: 26.02.09, 14.05.09.   
 Lagendijk, J., GroenLinks MEP: 05.07.07.  
 Lucardie, P., political scientist: 22.02.08, 10.04.08.  
 Lucas, M., former local Councillor: 03.09.08.  
 Luccassen, T., former local Councillor: 18.09.08.  
 Marloes Weesjes, E., historian: 20.02.08.  
 Meijer, H., former Board member: 10.08.05, 06.03.09.  
 Nijhof, H., GroenLinks Party Chair: 03.04.08.  
 Platvoet, L., former PSP Executive Committee member: 04.03.08, 09.04.08, 
13.10.08. 
 Thio, B., former daily Executive Board member: 20.02.09.  
 Van Dijk, N., former MEP: 27.02.08, 09.04.08, 20.10.08.  
  
310 
 Van Hoek, T., former daily Executive Board member: 10.03.08, 08.04.08, 
22.01.09, 08.02.09.  
 Van Ojik, B., former PPR Chair: 08.08.08, 13.10.08, 15.10.08, 18.10.08.  
 Van der Pijl, K., former CPN functionary: 20.02.08.  
 Voerman, G., political scientist: 10.04.08, 09.07.09.  
 
 
